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ABSTRACT 
Communalism has been a central feature of Malaysian politics. Communal 
identity and competing communal interests formed the basis of Malaysia's 
"constitutional contract" agreed upon by leaders of major communal groups -
Malays, Chinese and Indians - on the eve of independence in 1957. Contrary to 
the liberal notion of social contract, the communally-based constitutional 
contract had been tilted toward serving competing communal interests rather 
than promoting individual liberties. Continuing articulation of competing 
communal interests in post-independent .!v1alaya, coupled with a communist 
threat, prompted the government to enact and enforce illiberal laws, aiming at 
maintaining national security and racial harmony in a communally-divided 
society. The courts too, recognizing the importance of state policies on ethnic 
relations, economic development and national security, legitimated illiberal 
statist legal meanings, which prioritized state power over individual freedoms. 
However, by the 1990s, the easing of ethnic tension and the end of the 
communist threat led to the questioning of the use of illiberal laws against 
political opponents and government critics. The trend in subjecting them to 
criminal and civil proceedings also raised concerns that the courts had been 
turned into one-sided political arenas to disgrace and humiliate political 
opponents and make oppositional political activities illegitimate. The criminal 
trials of former Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim vividly 
illustrated the conduct of political trials in Malaysia. However, the politics of 
Reformasi, which began soon after Anwar' s ouster from the government in 
September 1998, had promoted a non-communal vision of Malaysian politics and 
proliferated liberal legal meanings based on the liberal conception of rule of law, 
contesting the illiberal statist legal meanings. The government responded to this 
development by making "superficial" legal changes in politically less sensitive 
areas like women's rights and normal crime, while continued to maintain an 
illiberal legal structure in the politically highly sensitive areas like national 
security and ethnic relations. Progress toward greater government 
responsiveness in these areas however had been slow and halting. By the mid 
2000s, tussles between the Islamic mainstream, which promoted the more 
conservative view of Islam and religious freedom, and the liberals, who 
promoted the more liberal understanding of the same, reinforced communalism 
and raised a specter of divisive communal politics. This in turn provided the 
government with justifications to maintain the illiberal legal structure on the 
grounds of maintaining religious and racial harmony. Despite the recent push for 
democracy and non-communalism, the politics of race, religion and repression 
continued to be a dominant feature of Malaysian politics. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Communalism has been at the core of Malaysia's constitutional and legal history. 
Competing interests among major communal groups, which at the time of 
independence encompassed special position of the indigenous Malays and 
citizenship and other legitimate rights of the non-indigenous communities, had 
led to the signification of communal rather than individual rights in Malaysia's 
political discourse. Continued articulation of these communal rights, which 
formed the basis of Malaysia's constitutional contract agreed upon by leaders of 
major communal groups - Malays, Chinese and Indians - on the eve of 
independence in 1957, has caused Malaysian politics to be at times unstable. 
Responding to the challenge to political stability, the Malaysian government 
introduced laws that enhance its powers and limit the interpretive jurisdiction of 
the courts, especially in the politically highly sensitive areas of ethnic relations, 
national security and economic development. It is in this context that the 
government has been promoting an illiberal statist understanding of the law, 
which tends to enhance state powers rather than limiting them, often on the basis 
that it is "necessary for the maintenance of order in a multicommunal society 
where racial tensions could flare up and turn into violence at any time" .1 Some of 
the laws however have been put to quite different uses, the most apparent of 
which was as a means of political control, aimed at limiting the scope for political 
competition. These included the use of the Internal Security Act 1960 to detain 
without trial opposition politicians and govenunent critics, the Police Act 1967 
(to make peaceful assemblies without police permit illegal), the University and 
University Colleges Act 1971 (to control student activities), the Printing Presses 
and Publication Act 1984 (to curb press freedom), the Official Secrets Act 1972 (to 
1 Crouch (1996: 95). 
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deny public access to classified documents) and the Sedition Act 1972 (to restrict 
freedom of speech). 
The government, however, employs these laws in an unprivileged 
fashion. Faced with competitive though not necessarily fair elections, as well as 
the proliferation of liberal legal meanings in the society, i.e. views that law 
should promote individual liberties and human rights rather than limiting them, 
the government responded to societal demands for legal change along more 
liberal lines by taking steps to introduce rights-enhancing laws in politically less 
sensitive areas such as consumer rights, women's rights and the normal criminal 
justice system, while maintaining rights-limiting ones in the politically-highly 
sensitive areas like anti-subversion and security-related legislation. Though 
societal demand for legal change has been more pronounced since the outbreak 
of the Refonnasi movement in 1998, the communally divided nature of Malaysian 
politics and society - especially along ethnic and religious lines - limits the 
possibility of widening the articulation of liberal legal meanings, often 
understood in its \Vestem secular-liberal fashion, among multiracial and multi-
religious Malaysians. As the articulation of communal interests among different 
communal groups remained significant, the government continues to justify the 
existence and use of repressive laws on the ground that they were necessary to 
maintain racial harmony, and since the September 11 attack on the United States, 
to curb Islamic militancy. "Within the judiciary, the general judicial attitude has 
been to recognize the government's concern in regard to the need to maintain 
national security and racial harmony, and more recently, with the surge of court 
cases on the right to renounce Islam and challenge the jurisdiction of the syariah 
courts, to continue to uphold its long-held commitment to the special 
constitutional position of Islam under which the legal system affords protection 
and privileges to the religion of the Malay majority. 
2 
Theorizing Communalism, Law and State Power 
A brief survey on the debate between the liberals and the communitarians in the 
Western socio-legal tradition, especially following the publication of John Rawls' 
A Theory of ]u5tice,2 is useful to understand the recent discourse about communal 
constitutional contract in :tvfalaysia. In an attempt to revive the idea of social 
contract, Rawls "imagines a society composed of rational, educated, and morally 
disinterested men, who are ignorant of or at least not influenced by, their own 
social position in the community, their own abilities, and their personal 
prospects and aims in society".3 The hypothetical "antecedently individuated" 
men in their original position "denied knowledge of their talents and 
endowments, motivated not by a particular conception of the good but by their 
interest in their capacity to frame, revise and rationally to pursue such 
conceptions", would agree that their society should be regulated by the 
principles of justice that promote equal rights and freedom to constantly make 
choices of what is best for them, and to change their choices later.4 The two 
principles of justice agreed upon by these hypothetical men are: first, each person 
is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all; and second, social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to 
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity" .s The first principle is to take 
precedence over the second, and in the second, (b) is to take precedence over (a). 
The basic liberties envisaged by the first principle are" political liberty ... 
together with the freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and 
freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the right to hold 
2 Rawls (1971). 
'Stein & Shand (1972: 71). 
4 Mulhall & Swift (1996:7) 
s Rawls (1971: 302). 
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(personal) property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure".6 The second 
principle "applies, in the first approximation, to the distribution of income and 
wealth and to the design of organizations that make use of differences in 
authority and responsibility, or chains of command''.7 The antecedently 
individuated man would not therefore pursue his strictly utilitarian interests, but 
seeks to protect his and other's right and freedom to make choices, for he himself 
would not know what position he will occupy in the society, and what 
conceptions of good, purpose and end are best for him then. In the worst case 
scenario, the right to equality and freedom of choice promotes everybody's 
interests. 
The comm unitarians on the other hand see Rawls' theory of men as 
problematic.s Commenting on Sandel,9 ·Mulhall and Swift for instance observe: 
If the self is antecedently individuated, then no matter how closely it 
identifies with a given end, that end can never become integral to the self's 
identity. The characterization of such values or interests must describe the 
object that I seek, not the subject that I am; my identity is fixed in advance 
of my choice of ends, so that a certain distance between who I am and what 
I value must always remain. Such a conception of the self rules out the 
possibility of being torn between several competing values in a way which 
I experience as the pull of competing identities within my self; in other 
words, it permits no intra-subjective understanding of the self. And by the 
same token, it limits Rawls' understanding of the relation between a self 
and any other-directed (in particular, any community-directed) end to 
which that self is committed ... Rawls thus excludes the possibility of 
purposes and ends held in common with others that inspire more expansive inter-
6 Rawls (1971: 61) quoted in Stein & Shand (1972: 72). 
7 Rawls (1971: 61} quoted in Stein & Shand (1972: 72). 
s See for example Walzer (1981); Sandel (1982); Taylor (1985); Mcintyre (1988). 
'Sandel (1982). 
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subjective self-understandings, one in which I identify myself with that 
community and regard my membership of it as essential to who I am.10 
Mulhall and Swift's criticism of Rawls' exclusion of the individual's sense 
of purpose and ends held in common with others in his conununity seems to find 
resonance with Robert Cover's explication of the importance of the "normative 
world" in defining the province and meanings of law. The normative universe, 
Cover argues, "is held together by the force of interpretive commitments ... that 
do determine what law means and what law shall be". Jn Cover's view, law can 
be understood only in relation to a normative universe in which people live in -
or nomos, which entails the application of human will to an extant state of affairs 
(reality), as well as toward their alternative future (vision). The codes that relate 
the normative system to the construction of reality and to the vision of 
alternative future are narratives, such as divine texts, history, tragedy or even 
fiction, which provide the sources of the multiple narratives existing in a society. 
As there are multiple narratives, there are bound to be different "redemptive 
communities", with which people identify themselves, engaging in incessant 
contestations to redeem each community's vision of the alternative future. Law is 
one of the sites of those contestations, and the meaning-giving process to a just 
law is a communal rather than individual affair. 
Building on Cover, Migdal argues that the ability of different categories of 
law and legal meanings - including those opposed to the state, others not 
controlled by the state but not necessarily in opposition to it, and still others 
complementary to state law - to subvert, strengthen, or transform state law has a 
deep impact on the ability of the state to stay intact. On the one hand, when the 
state is successful in offering a broad-based shared meaning of law, which 
necessitates the inclusion in state law of other sets of laws accepted by various 
communities as just and a guide to their behavior, it reinforces state cohesion. On 
10 Mulhall & Swift (1996: 51 ). 
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the other, competing legal meanings, as well as emerging new legal meanings 
brought forth by social change, might turn into texts of resistance, and hence 
threaten state cohesion.11 
W'hile Rawls' imagined society of antecedently individuated men, and his 
conception of liberal legalism, is premised on a social condition that is 
recognizably Western, liberal and democratic, different dynamics are seemingly 
at work in some non-Western illiberal societies. In this regard, Jayasuriya 
observes that in East Asia's authoritarian and statist-legal systems, "the legal 
subject is constituted in terms of the enterprise or institution rather than the legal 
person (natural or juristic), and second, law is used as a technique of rule to 
implement the policy objectives or goals of the state".12 These features of 
authoritarian statist legalism were the result of legal institutions being the 
product of an exceptional form of Asian capitalism, which is characterized by 
strong state intervention in the economy. W'hile competitive liberal capitalism in 
the West led to the emergence of "liberal legalism", strong and interventionist 
states in East Asia bred "authoritarian legalism". Jayasuria notes, under this kind 
of legal system, legal institutions are designed to play a 11 policy implementing" 
role in that they serve to enforce government objectives and policies, rather than 
limiting governmental powers. In this regard, "legal formalism", which places 
strong emphasis on adherence to formal rules, processes and procedures, 
regardless of the fairness of substantive outcomes, provides an ideological basis 
for the legal system. Jayasuriya argues that the deployment of authoritarian 
legalism as a technique of rule or governance enables the East Asian states to use 
legalism to expand and consolidate - rather than restrain - the exercise of its 
powers. His analysis of the statist-legalist model in Singapore reveals that "the 
ideology of legalism" not only facilitates the accurate achievement of 
government policy objectives, but also "provides an instrument for making 
n Migdal (1998: 25-28). 
12 Jayasuriya (1996: 367). 
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certain types of oppositional political activities illegitimate" .13 Authoritarian and 
statist legalism, in this respect, is characterized by the "rule through law" rather 
than the "rule oflaw." 
This thesis finds Rawl' s theory of antecedently individuated men 
problematic. Not only are individuals more inclined to identify themselves with 
the community they live in, but also articulate a particular conception of law that 
derives its meanings from communal narratives and/ or promotes the purpose 
and ends of that community. As in Malaysia, where major communal groups are 
divided along ethnic and religious lines, ethno-religious narratives play 
significant role in shaping the discourse about, borrowing from Cover, "what 
law means and what law shall be" .14 The state, as Migdal argues, is in the 
position to strengthen its cohesion as long as it could provide broad-based 
shared legal meanings, presumably by incorporating into the state law certain 
values and principles of the different visions of law in the society. But in a society 
where the "interest" of one community is the "deficit" of the other, the state's 
ability to forge broad-based shared legal meanings is very much limited. This is 
all the more so when the discourse about law tends to be colored by 
contestations between two or more visions of law, as the Malaysian case 
demonstrates, between the "Islamist" and the "secular-liberal" visions, the 
proponents of which are increasingly adopting a more hard-line view of such 
visions. 
This thesis will evaluate the ability of the competing visions of law 
and legal meanings, as Migdal put it, to "subvert, strengthen, or transform 
state law", 1s within the context of a political and legal system that is 
designed to serve competing communal interests - along ethnic and 
religious lines - as well as to keep the destabilizing forces caused by such 
competition in check. An important question to ask is whether such 
13 Jayasuriya (1996: 368). 
14 Cover (1992: 99) 
1s Migdal (1998: 25-28) 
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contestation of legal meanings helped promote legal change toward 
stronger liberalism, or facilitates the maintenance of an essentially statist-
authoritarian legal system, which according to Jayasuriya, "provides an 
instrument for making certain types of oppositional political activities 
illegitimate" .16 
In answering this question, this thesis will consider the impact of 
Malaysia's communally-based constitutional-contract politics on the 
conception of law and state power. In this regard, this thesis will examine 
the notion of communal constitutional contract, which recognizes a set of 
communal rather than strictly individual rights that the constitution and 
the state need to protect. These include the special position of the Malays 
and, after the formation of Malaysia in 1963, the natives of Sabah and 
Sarawak, and the legitimate interests of other ethnic communities. 
Although the communal constitutional contract had arguably laid down 
the constitutional foundation of independent Malaysia, the recognition of 
special position of one community over the others has caused protracted 
problems in understanding common citizenship and nationhood in 
modern multiracial Malaysia. There had been protracting debates about 
the terms of the constitutional contract between the different communities 
far beyond the period of constitution-making. What is even more, the 
need to protect these communal rights and ensure racial harmony had 
been made justification by the government to limit democratic practices 
mainly by putting the state's repressive apparatuses ready to circumscribe 
civil and political rights whenever the need arises. 
Recently, however, the constitutional hegemony of the special 
position of the Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak, and the 
notion of limited democratic practices to ensure racial harmony, have 
been increasingly challenged by the articulation of more substantive 
J6 Jayasuriya (1996: 368). 
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democratic values in the society that catapult to prominence the more 
liberal conception of civil and political rights including equality among 
citizens. The main ideas related to the constitutional hegemony that are 
being challenged are: (i) the notion of state as a political institution the 
main purpose of which is to serve competing communal interests rather 
than protecting individual liberties; (ii) the need for expansive state power 
to maintain racial harmony and public order rather than limited state 
power to guarantee the exercise of individual liberties; and (iii) illiberal 
legalism based on an illiberal statist notion of" rule by law" rather than 
liberal legalism based on a liberal conception of "rule of law" as an over-
arching legal ideology. 
As the articulation of competing communal interests causes 
potential threat to political stability, and therefore gives a semblance of 
legitimacy to the expansion of state power and the limit to democratic 
practices, determining the question of whether communalism still 
dominates Malaysian politics is central to this thesis. This will be done by 
analyzing the intensity of communal politics and the use of state power in 
different political periods beginning with the pre-independence 
constitution-making period until the eruption of Refonnasi (Reformation) 
movement in 1998 following the expulsion of former Deputy Prime 
Minister Anwar Ibrahim from the government and the ruling United 
Malays National Organization (UMNO). The Reformasi period is 
significant in the sense that the constitutional hegemony of communal 
bargain that was constructed during the constitution-making period has 
been increasingly challenged by a set of political ideas stressing on the 
importance of non-communalism as the basis of political mobilization. 
Malaysian political discourse since the Reformasi era has revolved mainly 
around the unresolved contestation between the two ideological postures 
that have significant bearing on the efficacy of communal arguments as 
9 
the basis of limiting democratic practices for the purpose of maintaining 
racial harmony. 
Has Communalism Withered Away? 
Informed largely by Furnivall, 17 contributors to The Politics of Multiculturalism: 
Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, suggest that in some 
plural societies, "civil society" organizations - whose autonomy and self-
organization do normally encourage civility and inclusiveness - may not 
necessarily lead to the rise of civil society and democracy.1a These civic 
organizations too have to grapple with social rivalries which emanate from 
ethnic, religious and cultural divisions that may diminish rather than enhance 
the social capital needed for democracy and civility to flourish. As often is the 
case in such societies, there is bound to be oscillation between civic virtues and 
sectarian interests within the realm of civil society. 
Four contributors on Malaysia argue that sustained economic 
development, particularly during the New Economic Policy (NuP) years,19 has 
paved the way for the emergence of sizable multi-ethnic business and middle 
classes, which in turn eased ethnic tension and turned political discourse away 
from the old politics of" ethnicism" to the new politics of" inclusive 
multiculturalism'. This new politics is characterized by the emergence of new 
middle classes with" new forms of civility and participation among various 
ethnic groups";zo the creation by the arts community- the so-called cultural 
producer - of an inclusive trans-ethnic and trans-regional "national perspective" 
17 Pumivall (1944, 1948). 
is Hefner (2001). 
19 The New Economic Policy (1971-1990) is an affirmative action which aimed at restructuring the 
society so as to eliminate the identification of race with economic function and to eradicate 
pover'cy. The policy in essence helped the Buntiputeras (son of the soil), which refers to the Malays 
and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak, to achieve upward social mobilicy through government 
assistance. 
w Abdul Rahman (2001: 63). 
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of pluralism?' a new non-communal and non-class interest-based politics 
associated with "mass politics of dissent, more interested in creating spaces for 
political expression than in winning votes" ;n and not the least, the valorization of 
developmentalism, rather than ethnicity, as a new pillar of political discourse.2:l 
An important marker of Malaysia's new politics of multiculturalism was 
the mushrooming of cross-communal and cross-sectional coalitions of civic 
associations pressing for political reform, especially at the height of Reformasi 
following the sacking of former Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar 
Ibrahim in September 1998. These included social and political movements like 
the People's Movement for Justice (Gerakan Keadilan Rakyat, GERAK), a coalition 
of Islamic organizations, human rights NGOs and opposition political parties 
headed by the opposition Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, 
PAS); the People's Coalition for Democracy (Gagasan Demokrasi Rakyat, Gagasan), 
a coalition of NGOs and opposition political parties led by the human rights 
NGO, Voice of Malaysian People (Suara Rakyat Malaysia, SlJARAM)?' the 
Movement for Social Justice (Pergerakan Keadilan Sosial, ADIL), a loose-knit social 
movement led by Anwar' s wife, Datin Seri Dr. Wan Azizah Wan Ismail; Artis 
Pro Activ (APA), an arts community initiative aimed at" developing a more open 
society" in Malaysia;25 the \.Vomen' s Candidacy Initiative (\NCI), a campaign to 
boost women's involvement in electoral politics; and the Abolish ISA Movement 
(Gerakan Mansuhkan ISA, GMI), a group of about 80 NGOs, Islamic movements, 
trade unions and political parties, pressing for the repeal of ISA. Among 
students, there were similar cross-communal coalitions for political reform. One 
of the most significant coalitions was the Students' Abolish ISA .Movement 
(Gabungan Mahasiswa Mansuhkan ISA, GMMI), the key member organizations of 
21 Manda! (2001: 162). 
n Shamsul AB. (2001: 222). 
2:l Loh Kok Wah (2001: 184). 
24 Weiss (1999: 430). 
25 Mandal (2001: 162). 
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which included Malay-Muslim student organizations like the National Union of 
Muslim Students' Associations of Malaysia (Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar-Pelajar 
Islam Malaysia, PKPIM), the Malaysian Isiah Undergraduates' Peer Club (Kelab 
Rakan Siswa Isiah Malaysia, KARISMA) and the Peninsular Muslim Students' 
Coalition (Gabungan Mahasiswa Islam Semenanjung, GAMIS); the predorninantly-
Chinese Malaysian Youth and Students' Democratic Movement (Gerakan 
Demokratik Belia dan Pelajar Malaysia, DEMA); and the socialist-leaning Universiti 
Bangsar Utama (UBU) group. These are "inclusive" organizations whose 
members cut across ethnic, religious and class divisions. Apart from being a 
symbol of spontaneous revolt against state repression, the battle cry of Reformasi 
also symbolized a new political consciousness among the reformist sections of 
Malaysian society about the virtues of non-communal politics, characterized by 
commitment to common values of humanity rather than ethno-religious and 
class identity. 
At this juncture, it is important to note that the call for political reform, 
which was manifested in the new reform movement, was not altogether new. 
Back in the 1960s until 1980s, there had been similar struggles against state 
repression. Plantation workers' strikes, students' demonstration against the 
government, protests against ill treatment of political detainees and lawyers' 
boycotts of court cases tried under repressive laws were examples of societal 
movements against state repression. What makes the struggle new is perhaps the 
political context within which it occurred. First, it occurred at a time when the 
middle-class was expanding and ethnic relations improving - both as a result of 
sustained economic growth over the previous three decades; and the growing 
involvement of Malays, unlike in the 1960s until 1980s, in mounting an open 
"cultural revolt" against the Malay-led government, especially in response to the 
sacking, trial and imprisonment of Anwar.26 
26 Hari Singh (2000); Maznah (2003). 
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Though the call for political reform has been multi-racial, with the Malay 
segments of the society now playing a more important role, the contributors to 
The Politics of Multiculturalism hold different views about the movement's 
contribution to the widening of democratic space in Malaysia. Abdul Rahman 
offers a cautious but positive outlook.27 Though religious and cultural divisions 
may continue to characterize "contestation and struggles among different groups 
in society", he argues, "the language of inclusion is making a positive 
contribution to the evolution of a new political culture that champions universal 
values such as human rights, democracy and interfaith cooperation among all 
Malaysians." He even suggests that should the Islamic elements - represented by 
the mainstream Islamic organizations and political parties such as the Muslim 
Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) and PAS - "continue to develop the 
language and practice of inclusive participation", a trend toward pluralist 
participation and cooperation could be reinforced. 
Loh Kok Wah, however, doubts that the easing of ethnic tension and the 
vibrant discourse on participatory democracy, especially among the NGOs, will 
eventually lead to sweeping political change.28 This, he argues, is due to the 
predominance of" developmentalism", i.e. a new legitimating ideology, which 
not only "valorizes rapid economic growth, rising living standards and the 
resultant consumerist habits", but also "privileges political stability, which 
growth and consumerism necessitated, associated in the minds of most 
Malaysians with the (ruling coalition) Barisan Nasional, even when authoritarian 
means are resorted to and cronyism is evident".2• Another contributor to the 
volume, Zainah Anwar, is even less hopeful. She points out that" democratizing 
structures and progressive voices are up against very powerful forces who in the 
21 Abdul Rahman (2001: 65 & 81). 
2B Loh Kok Wah (2001: 184). 
29 Loh Kok Wah (2003: 278). 
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name of religion deny the plurality and diversity of the Malaysian heritage and 
the democratic principles and liberties in which most Malaysians believe" .JO 
Not long after the authors of the essays in The Politics of lv1ulticulturalism 
put pen to paper, dissension occurred among the so-called "civic associations" 
over some contentious religious issues. First was the proposal by the Human 
Rights Committee of the Malaysian Bar Council to form an independent 
Interfaith Commission of Malaysia, a statutory body whose primary objective 
would be to "promote and protect every individual's freedom to (sic) thought, 
conscience and religion with a view to (maintain) harmonious co-existence in 
(Malaysian) society" .31 A conference was held in February 2005 to discuss the 
draft bill of the proposed commission and to "receive, address and make 
recommendations in respect of complaints or grievances brought by persons, 
bodies or organizations in connection with the individual rights to profess and 
practice his or her religion or faith of choice".32 Leading NGOs such Sisters in 
Islam, SUARAM and ALIRAN supported the proposal. Others included the 
Malaysian Consultative Council for Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and 
Sikhism (MCCBCHS), a non-governmental body representing major religions in 
Malaysia, except Islam; interfaith organizations like the Inter-Faith Spiritual 
Fellowship (INSAF) and the Malaysian Interfaith Network; human rights NGOs 
like the National Human Rights Society (HAKAM), the Voice of Malaysian 
People (SUARAM) and Aliran Kesedaran Negara (ALIRAN); and leaders from the 
opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR, 
People's Justice Party)33. Mainstream Islamic organizations such as the Muslim 
'° Zainah (2001: 249). 
31 See the proposed draft bill of the Interfaith Commission of Malaysia presented and discussed at 
the National Conference toward the Formation of the Interfaith Commission of Malaysia, held in 
Bangi, fklangor on 24-25 February 2005. 
32 Malaysian Bar Council (2003: 1). 
33 There were disagreements in PKR regarding this issue. Human-rights based party leaders like 
Vice-Presidents Sivarasa Rasiah and Tian Chua supported the initiative, while ABIM-linked 
leaders like Youth Vice-Chief Shamsul Iskandar Mohd Akin was critical of it. Parti Keadilan 
Nasional (Keadilan, National Justice Party) was renamed Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR, People's 
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Youth 1vfovement of 1vfalaysia (ABIM), Jamaah Isiah Malaysia (JIM) and Persatuan 
Ulama' Malaysia (PUM, MUBlim Scholars' Association of Malaysia), however, 
protested against the proposal, which they described as anti-Islam and an effort 
by the non-l'v1uslims to intervene in matters internal to Islam.34 
Further dissension arose when Sisters in Islam led a campaign in early 
2005 to review syariah (Islamic law) and municipal laws that stood in stark 
contradiction to the Western conception of individual freedoms. These included 
the laws that make certain acts, which the critics viewed as strictly "personal" 
and "victimless", like indecent behavior, close proximity between unmarried 
men and women, drinking liquor and smoking, as punishable offences. The 
campaign, dubbed as the" Anti-Moral Policing Campaign", sought to have such 
laws repealed on the ground that morality is a matter of personal choice and 
policing morality has no basis in Islam.35 This move was again protested by the 
mainstream Islamic organizations like ABIM, JIM and the Allied Coordinating 
Council of Islamic NGOs (ACCIN) on the basis that those punishable offences 
are sinful acts, and hence the state and the Muslim society owe a collective duty 
to prevent them. The Islamic concept of al-amr bil ma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar 
(enjoining good and prohibiting evil) was invoked to justify their stance. 36 A PAS 
Member of Parliament and the party's Youth Chief, Salahuddin Ayub, vdthdrew 
from the Parliamentary Human Rights Caucus after the caucus decided to 
endorse the campaign.37 Faced with mounting protests from the Islamic groups, 
the government shot down both initiatives, though some ministers, including the 
Justice Party) after its merger with Patti Rak-;1at Malaysia (PRM, People's Party of Malaysia) in 
October 2002. 
"'See ACCIN's press Statement on the Proposed Inter-Religious Council dated 25 June 2004. 
35 See Sisters in Islam's press statement, "Moral Policing Violates Qur'anic Spirit and 
Fundamental Rights". http: I I www.sistersinislam,org, my/Letterstoeditors/ 010205.htm 
(Accessed on 1 May 2005). 
36 See ABIM' s press statement Pencegahan Maksiat dan Salah Laku Moral Han;s Dipettahankan 
(Prevention of Vices and Immoral Conduct Should Be Defended) dated 31 Mac 2005 at 
http:/ /www.abim.org.my/portal/modules/news/article.php?storyid=5l5 (Accessed on 15 June 
2005) 
17 The bipartisan parliamentary caucus, comprising opposition and BN MPs, was established i11 
early 2005 to look into the country's human rights affairs, 
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Minister in the Prime l\1inister's Department, Datuk Seri Mohd. Nazri Aziz, and 
the Minister of Arts, Culture and Heritage, Datuk Seri Dr. Rais Yatim, expressed 
open support for the initiatives. 
Up to this point, the campaigns brought to the fore hitherto silent protests 
against" religious authoritarianism", which mainly refers to the undemocratic 
ideas, practices and rules that the Islamic law antagonists claimed were prevalent 
in the Islamic judiciary and bureaucracy .38 The more secular-liberal sections 
among the l\1uslims and non-Muslim groups resented conservative 
interpretations of Islamic laws, which they claimed were against basic human 
rights principles and democratic values. These included, among others, 
allegations that the syariah laws, especially in relation to matrimonial matters, 
are biased against Muslim women; the overzealousness of religious enforcement 
officers in enforcing Islamic "morality" laws; the difficulties faced by non-
Muslim religious groups to build places of worship; the hardships faced by non-
Muslim parents to determine the religion of their minor children when their 
spouses convert to Islam; and the most sensitive of all, the unsettled legal debates 
on the right of Muslims to convert out of Islam. 
As contestations between the Islamist and the secular-liberal visions of 
law and fundamental liberties ensued, communalism, this time round based 
more on religion than ethnic identity, re-emerged as the focal point of interest 
articulation and political mobilization, calling into serious question the tenacity 
of multiculturalism as the foundation for new social capital to facilitate the 
blossoming of civil society and democracy in Malaysia's ethnically and 
religiously divided society. Ironically, the articulation of liberal legal meanings 
aggravated the still unresolved conflict between the "secular-liberals" and the 
"Islamic mainstream" over the perennial question of the place of divine law and 
its narrative in a modern state, and stirred up the potential destabilizing forces 
that such conflict might unleash. As a result, it facilitated the state's perpetuation 
'"Farish (2005). 
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of rule through law which was justified on the ground of maintaining racial and 
religious harmony, rather than "liberalizing" the legal system based on the more 
liberal conception of the rule of Jaw. 
The Main Arguments 
The Westminster-style of parliamentary democracy and English legal system 
found its way into Ma.laysia's political and legal system. However, the Merdeka 
Constitution, the document that sets out the pillars of the supposedly democratic 
political system, is not a product of an individually agreed social contract -
however fictional that concept is - on which Western liberal democracies are 
based. The major terms of the constitutional contract - Islam as the religion of the 
Federation, :\falay as the National Language, the special position of the Malays 
and the Malay Rulers, and the legitimate political and economic rights of other 
ethnic communities - is a result of a" communal compact" between the leaders of 
major communal groups, negotiated and reached prior to independence in 1957. 
The constitution in this respect is not only a legal document that sets out the 
contractual rights and duties of the people and the state, but also a political 
document that is carefully crafted to serve competing interests of major 
communal groups in the country. Contestations between these two purposes 
characterize Malaysia's communally-based constitutional contract politics, the 
central features of which are: first, the focus of interest articulation and political 
mobilization has been communal rather than individual; second, the need to 
maintain racial harmony and national security overrides individual liberties; 
third, the continuing existence of potentially destabilizing forces caused by the 
competing communal interests serves as a justification for the state to expand its 
powers through law, rather than to limit them; and fourth, individual's 
identification with a particular community - religious and/ or ethnic - influences 
his or her vision of politics and law. 
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This thesis argues that the process of constitution-making, which involved 
hard bargaining between competing communal groups, each seeking to 
maximize group interests in an independent state, had the tendency to aggravate 
rather than resolve communal tensions. After independence, the ensuing politics 
of constitutional contract - which encompasses the whole debate on the special 
position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of other ethnic communities -
had been the main source of discontent among major communal groups and 
fuelled racial tensions. The existence of a communist threat was yet another 
source of destabilizing forces in the new state. This, in turn, provided the 
government with a legitimate basis to employ repressive laws to maintain racial 
harmony and national security. At the same time, the government expanded its 
powers through law and made certain oppositional political activities 
illegitimate. The judiciary, recognizing state-defined policy objectives in the 
politically highly sensitive areas of ethnic relations and national security, helped 
promote illiberal statist legal meanings, which prioritised state legal powers over 
individual freedoms, and hence facilitated suppression of dissent 
However, the excessive use of law and legal institutions as a means to 
suppress dissent and a tool to disgrace political opponents (as illustrated by the 
corruption and sodomy trials of Anwar) has led the entire political and legal 
system to a serious legitimacy crisis. It was in this regard that the Reformasi 
movement, which exploded onto the political scene following Anwar's dismissal 
in September 1998, served as an ideological conduit as well as an instrument for 
political change. Ideologically, it attempted to catapult to prominence a shift in 
the focus of political interest, from one which is essentially communal to 
individual, in conceptualising politics in plural society. As an instrument for 
political change, the movement began as a conglomeration of non-governmental 
organizations, opposition parties, trade unions and individuals across races 
pushing for political and legal reform. The articulation of a non-communal vision 
of Malaysian politics, which sought to contest the communal underpinnings of 
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the race-based constitutional-contract politics as pursued and perpetuated by the 
ruling Barisan Nasional, has facilitated the proliferation of a liberal vision of state 
law, which is associated with the more liberal conception of the rule of law rather 
than illiberal notion of rule through law. In this regard, the articulation of 
Refonnasi's non-communal ideology helped de-communalise the legal discourse 
by shifting the discourse of rights and interests from one which was essentially 
communal to individual, and pulled together anti-repressive law activists across 
racial and religious divisions, calling for comprehensive liberal reforms. 
But this thesis also argues that there were limitations to the articulation 
and internalisation of liberal legal meanings among the wider spectrum of 
Malaysian society. The proliferation of competing legal meanings involving both 
a modern liberal interpretation of universal human rights principles and values 
and the Islamist-ethno-religious vision of Islamic law and legal meanings (as 
seen in the recent debate on the right to freedom of religion and personal 
morality), has led to the pre-eminence of communally-based constitutional-
contract politics based more on religion than ethnicity. Several court cases 
involving religious conversion39 were followed by fierce contestation between 
"secular-liberals" - who champion the right to freedom of religion, including the 
Muslim's right to convert out of Islam (apostasy); and the "Islamic mainstream" 
- which seeks to re-emphasize the special constitutional position of Islam and 
defend the laws and legal system that afford protection to the sanctity of the 
religion. As ethno-religious interest articulation within Malaysia's multiracial 
and multi-religious society remained significant, the government found 
justification to maintain its illiberal statist legal system as a means to keep 
potential destabilizing forces at bay. In the face of these contending forces, the 
39 See for example Shamala Sathiyasee/an v Dr Jeyaganesh C Mogarajah & A nor [2004] 2 MLJ 648; 
Kamariah bte Ali & Ors v Gavernment of Kelantan & Anor [2005] 1MLJ197; Lina Joy v Majlis Agama 
Islam Wilayah Persekuhian & Ors [2005] 6 ML] 193; Kaliammal a/p Sinnasamy lwn Pengarah /abatan 
Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan (JAWI) & Ors [2006) 1 MLJ 685 (the Moorthy case). 
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government has been less responsive to the calls for legal change in politically 
highly sensitive areas, such as the anti-subversion and security-related laws. 
However, it had shown positive signs of change in the politically less sensitive 
areas, such as those related to the "normal" criminal justice system, though the 
actual process remained slow and halting. 
Finally, this thesis argues that communalism - this time round based more 
on religion than etlmicity - continued to characterize Malaysian politics and 
society. As the focus of political interest remained largely communal, the 
articulation of a non-communal political vision and liberal legal meanings 
among wider sections of the society faced a serious challenge. \'\'hat is more, the 
articulation of secular liberal legal meanings, especially in respect of religious 
freedom and personal morality, which stands in stark contradiction to the ethno-
religious vision of Islamic law and legal meanings, had the tendency to aggravate 
communal tensions rather than forge communal harmony. On both sides of the 
political divide - the secular-liberals and the Islamic mainstream - individual 
identification with community's purpose and ends remained very significant 
This in turn, promotes communalism as the focus of political mobilization, the 
potential destabilizing force of which legitimises the existence of an illiberal 
statist legal system. 
Chapters Overview 
In this introductory chapter, I outline the main arguments of the thesis, the 
theoretical framework that informs this study and a brief overview of the thesis 
chapters. The following Chapter 2 will deal with the background of Malaysia's 
communal politics, in particular the making of the communally-based 
constitutional contract in pre-independent Malaya. Chapter 3 surveys the 
development of constitutional-contract politics in the post independence years 
and the expansion of state power. Special focus will be on how the state employs 
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law as a means to keep the destabilizing forces caused by articulation of 
competing communal interests in check, expands its legal powers and, at the 
same time, suppresses dissent. This chapter will also take a quick glance at the 
use of courts as arenas of" political trials" to punish opposition politicians and 
government critics, especially in the early and mid 1990s, which coincided with 
the beginning of the public questioning of judicial independence as a result of the 
watershed 1988 Executive-Judiciary crisis. 
Chapter 4 looks at how the Malaysian courts recognize the importance of 
state-defined policy objectives, especially in politically highly sensitive areas of 
ethnic relations, national security and economic development, and hence help 
promote illiberal statist legalism as an over-arching legal ideology, which tends 
to prioritise state powers over individual freedoms. Special attention will also be 
given to a particular legislative style which limits the court's power to review 
executive actions and decisions, which in turn, facilitates the primacy of the 
Executive over the Judiciary. 
Chapter 5 analyses the prospect of political change resulting from the rise 
of the 1998 Refonnasi movement. Special attention is given to the movement's 
contribution in promoting a non-communal and democratic vision of Malaysian 
politics (ideological) and the formation of a broad-based coalition for political 
change, comprising a wide range of overlapping NGOs and opposition political 
parties (instrumental) that challenged the ruling Barisan Nasional' s race-based 
politics and its political dominance. This chapter also discusses the limits to this 
"new" politics of non-communalism, which in essence, seeks to shift the focus of 
interest articulation and political mobilization from communal to individual. 
Chapter 6 looks at the proliferation of liberal legal meanings in the society 
and the movements for legal change, following the outbreak of Reformasi in 1998 
and the trial and imprisonment of Anwar Ibrahim. This chapter treats the Anwar 
trial as a focal point for augmentation of liberal legal meanings that marked the 
beginning of an open Malay revolt against the Malay-led government. It then 
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discusses the multi-racial initiatives for legal reform, with the Malay segments 
playing more important roles than before. Such liberal reform sought legal 
change along more liberal lines, both to the politically-highly sensitive anti-
subversion and security-related legislation, as well as the less politically sensitive 
"normal" criminal justice system. This chapter also includes an analysis of the 
state's responses, as well as the lack of it, to the proliferation of liberal legal 
meanings following the calls for legal change. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the reinforcement of communally-based 
constitutional-contract politics as a result of fierce contestations between the 
proponents of the secular-liberal vision of law and legal meanings and the more 
conservative Islarnists -both of which had worked hand in hand in pressing for 
political and legal reform during the period of Reformasi. Through examples of 
civil society campaigns and initiatives for religious freedom, and the ensuing 
debates, as well as court decisions on cases which involved religious conversion 
and other related matters, such as divorce, child custody and determination of 
religious status of a deceased person, this chapter attempts at locating the sites 
and the subjects of contestations between the secular-liberal and the Islamic 
mainstream on the visions of law and its meanings. Central to this chapter is the 
political and legal implications of this "communal dimension" of the debate on 
liberal legal meanings. Does it help move the political and legal system in a non-
communal and liberal direction, or does it reinforce communalism and the 
illiberal statist legal system? 
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Conclusion 
The articulation of a non-communal vision of Malaysian politics, especially 
following the outbreak of the 1998 Reformasi, coupled with a clamp down on 
opposition politicians and critics of the government, has led to the proliferation 
of liberal legal meanings in the society, contesting the illiberal statist legal 
meanings. However, the reinforcement of communaiism as the focus of political 
interest and the potential destabilizing forces that it might unleash in the wake of 
contestation behveen competing visions of law held by the "secular-liberals" and 
the "Islamic mainstream", limits the capacity of the proponents of liberal legal 
meanings to effect political and legal change along liberal lines. This concern was 
reinforced by the continuing presence of a conservative judiciary committed to 
the promotion of state policy objectives, especially in politically sensitive areas of 
ethnic relations and national security. This thesis primarily deals with the 
prospects and limits of political and legal change in a communally-divided 
society in which the societal forces for change had to operate within the 
framework of an illiberal-statist legal system. 
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Chapter II 
The Making of Communal-Based Constitutional Contract 
Mainly due to the competitive nature of communal politics in pre-independent 
Malaya, the main features of Malaysia's Federal Constitution embodied the 
terms of a communal-based "constitutional contract" which aimed to 
accommodate competing communal interests as a precondition for independence 
and the creation of a united Malayan identity. The process of constitution-
making itself involved hard bargaining between communal leaders who sought 
to advance communal interests and vindicate each group's vision of political 
community. Communal leaders, as envisaged by Lijphart's model of 
"consociational democracy", engaged in "competitive behaviour" that 
aggravated mutual tension and political instability, but also made "deliberate 
efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural 
fragmentation" .1 Realizing the perils of political fragmentation and immobilism, 
the communal leaders in pre-independent Malaya cooperated with each other 
and accommodated competing group interests which in turn helped form a 
stable semi-democratic government in an ethnically and religiously fragmented 
society. But contrary to the Anglo-American democratic system, which Almond 
described as a system "characterized by homogeneous, secular political culture", 
in which" the great majority of the actors in the political system accept as the 
ultimate goals of the political system some combination of the values of freedom, 
mass welfare, and security'? the heterogenous and hardly secular political 
culture which characterized communal politics in pre-independent Malaya was 
based on the assumption that the desire to form a common nationality, while at 
the same time serving competing communal interests, necessitated some limits 
1 Lijphart {1969: 212). 
2 Almond (1956; 398). 
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on democracy and fundamental liberties. Contrary to the "liberal" terms of the 
Lockean-type of social contract, the main aim of which is to promote individual 
freedom by limiting state powers, the implementation of the main terms of 
Malaysia's communal-based constitutional contract, i.e. the special position of 
the Malays and the legitimate interests of other communities, amidst continuing 
pressures from within each ethnic community for greater rights and privileges, 
necessitated the entrenchment of state power rather than its limitation, often at 
the expense of full realization of individual liberties. 
This chapter looks at the articulation of competing communal interests in 
pre-independent Malaya, and the contestations therewith, which set the stage for 
the making of Malaysia's Federal Constitution. With the entrenchment of the 
Alliance's communal terms in the Constitution, the competing communal 
groups' claims to economic, social and political rights in the new nation were 
accommodated and compromised, with no single group fully accomplishing its 
communal aspirations. However, the terms agreed by the communal leaders, 
which contained the maximum agreement on all sides on the vital issues, was 
not commonly shared by all sections within each ethnic community. Often 
pressures from within each community demanded greater political, economic 
and cultural rights and privileges. This, in turn, opened up spaces for further 
articulation of communal interests, the attendant destabilizing forces of which 
provided justification for the constitutional recognition of far-reaching state 
powers to maintain racial harmony and national unity. Coupled with the threat 
of communist subversion in the nascent state and the need to combat it, the end 
result was a Constitution that was finely crafted not only to serve competing 
communal interests but also to entrench state power. 
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Communalism and Pre-Independence Constitutional Development 
Malaysia is a multiracial country, the "plural society" of which comprises three 
major ethnic groups - Malay, Chinese and Indian· and other ethnic minorities 
like Ceylonese, Portuguese, Arab, Pakistani, Siamese and Orang Asli.3 In the East 
Malaysian states of Sa bah and Sarawak, the native Iban, Kadazan, Murut, 
Bidayuh and Melanau form the majority. Under the Federal Constitution, the 
Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak, or the Bumiputeras (literally means 
the son of the soil) enjoy special position which entitles them to the reservation of 
quotas in government employment, scholarships, tertiary education, licenses and 
permits.4 The government is also obliged to reserve a certain amount of land for 
the Malays.s According to the Malaysian Department of Statistics, 1'1alaysia's 
population as of June 2005 stood at 26.1 million. Of the total, 24.3 million were 
citizens.6 Of the citizens, 65.4 percent were Bumiputeras - 53.9 percent Malay 
Bumiputeras and 11.5 percent non-Malay Bumiputeras. Non-Bumiputeras consisted 
of 25.1 percent Chinese, 7.4 percent Indians and 2.1 percent other ethnic groups.7 
Religion is highly correlated with ethnicity. Islam is associated with Malays, 
Buddhism with Chinese, Hinduism with Indians and Christianity with either the 
Chinese, Indians or other ethnic minorities. Muslims formed 60.4 percent of the 
population, Buddhists (19.2 percent), Christians (9.1 percent), Hindus (6.3 
percent) and believers of other minority religions such as Sikhism, Confucianism 
and Taoism (2.6 percent).s 
The roots of Malaysia's plural society can be traced as far back as the 1 Oth 
century when Arab traders were reported to have established settlements in the 
3 Orang asli refers to the aborigines in Peninsula Malaysia. 
4 See Article 153 of the Federal Constitution. 
s See Article 89 of the Federal Cons ti tu lion. 
6About1.8 million are non-citizens. They are mainly foreign workers from Indonesia, 
Bangladesh, Myanmar, Vietnam, India and the Philippines. 
7 The Star, 16 June 2005. In 2000, of the 21.9 million Malaysian citizens, the Bumiputera constituted 
65. 1 percent, Chinese 26 percent and Indian 7.7 percent (Malaysia 2000). 
a Malaysia (2000). 
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northern part of the Malayan Peninsula, in a place called Kalah.9 By the 16th 
century, Malacca, which emerged as an important port city situated along the 
busy trade route linking China in the East and India and the Arab Peninsular in 
the West, had attracted Chinese, Indian and Arab trader communities to live 
alongside the indigenous Malay community, forming the earliest plural society 
in Malaya. Merchants from the surrounding Malaya-Indonesian archipelago also 
came to Malacca to trade and augmented the plural society. It was through the 
Arab traders that the Malay ruling houses and later the Malay subjects were 
introduced to Islam, the religion that later became the core of Malay identity.to 
Malayan plural society was enlarged during the British colonial period. British 
colonialism, which opened up opportunities for wealth accumulation and 
demands for labor, attracted hundreds of thousands of immigrants from 
Southern China and India to come to Malaya to seek their fortunes in tin mines 
around the Kinta and Klang valleys and in plantations.11 They rapidly grew in 
number and by the Second World War the non-Malay population slightly 
exceeded the Malays with the Chinese and Indian forming 37.5 percent and 14 
percent of the population respectively.12 
From Traditional to Modern Constitutional Ideas 
The advent of British colonialism in the late 19th century and the subsequent 
expansion of the Malayan plural society had brought about significant changes 
to the traditional Malay constitutional ideas. Most notable was the gradual shift 
in the Malay vision of political system from one which was based on the rule of 
9 Andaya & Andaya (1983: 58). I use the term plural society here in a generic sense which is not 
necessarily identical with the peculiar institution socially constructed and politically imposed by 
colonial states as suggested by Furnivall (1944, 1948). 
10 Malays are by definition Muslim. Article 160 of the Federal Constitution defines a Malay as "a 
person who professes the religion ofislam, habitually speaks the lv!alay language, conforms to 
Malay custom ... " 
ll Esman (1994: 49). 
i2 Vorys (1975: 21 ). 
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absolute monarch to a modern form of constitutional monarchy and 
representative government. By the late 1940s, the concept of rakyat,13 which 
originally referred to the Malay subjects, was expanded to include the immigrant 
non-Malay subjects. During the pre-colonial period, the idea of government 
mainly revolved around the exalted position of the Malay Rulers who provided 
political legitimacy to a decentralized system of local government headed by 
local Malay chiefs.14 Within this system, the Ruler, known as Sultan or Raja, acted 
as a symbol of sovereign rule while the exercise of actual power was left to the 
Malay chiefs. The Malay Annals (Sejarah Melayu), an important literary history of 
the tradition and customs of the Malay royal court, depicted the exalted status of 
JV1alay Rulers by infusing the stories about their earthly lives with myths and 
magic and even traced the lineage of the more prominent among them to 
Iskandar Zulkarnain (Alexander the Great).15 Furthermore, with the advent of 
Islam, the Malay Rulers, who assumed the Arabic title of Sultan, were regarded 
as the "Vice-regents of God" on earth,16 symbolizing their exalted position in the 
eyes of their subjects.17 The Sultan-subject relationship mainly revolved around 
the duty of the subjects to give absolute loyalty to the Sultan.18 In return, the 
Sultan had a duty never to shame the subjects even when they were guilty of 
" Literally means subjects or citizens. 
14 Gullick (1965: 3). 
1s It was reported in the Malay Annals that Alexander the Great embraced Islam after his 
conquest of India and adopted the name Iskandar Zulkamain. The second chapter of the Malay 
Annals contained the story of Sang Sapurba, the Ruler of Perlembang (the current Palembang in 
South Sumatera), who was said to be a descendent of lskandar Zulkarnain. See Shellabear (1991: 
5, 16-26). See also Milner's (1982: 96) discussion of Hikayat Deli which portrayed the stately 
manner of the Raja Deli whose lineage was also traced to lskandar Zulkarnain. 
16 Another term used to refer to the Malay Sultan is "dzil Allah ft al-'iilam" (the shadow of God in 
the universe). See Andaya & Andaya (1983: 60). 
11 Hooker (1976: 87). 
rn There were scattered stories about the absolute loyalty of Malay subjects to their Ruler in the 
Malay Hikayats. Hikayat Deli for example reported that an Achenese aristocrat, Mohamed Dalek, 
reminded Achenese chiefs not to rebel against their Ruler, even though he himself left the service 
of the Ruler after learning that the latter had behaved improperly toward his wife. Hikayat Hang 
Tuah also told of the undivided loyalty of Hang Tuah, a Malay warrior, toward a despotic Ruler. 
See Milner (1982: 95). 
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grave offences. The Sultan could only punish them according to hukum syarak 
(Islamic Jaw).19 
But this does not mean that the traditional Malay constitutional ideas and 
political system were primitive or mythical. The Malacca Sultanate (c. 1400 -
1511), which had immense influence on successive Peninsula Malay Sultanates, 
was a well organized political system. At the centre of the system was a 
sovereign ruler drawn from royal patrilineage under whose direction, together 
with other princes of the royal house, the business of the government was carried 
out by ministers or executives from the aristocratic class.zo The more prominent 
among the executives were the Bendahara (Chief Minister), the Temenggung 
(Commander of Troops and Police), the Penghulu Bendahari (Treasurer), Mentri 
(Secretary of State) and the Shahbandar (Harbour Master and Collector of 
Custom). The Ruler also served as the fountain head of justice under whose 
authority laws were administered by local chiefs and village headmen.21 
One important feature of the traditional laws was their affinity with 
Malay custom and Islam. Adat perpateh which served as a source of law for the 
Minangkabau community in Negeri Sembilan for instance demonstrated the 
blending of Malay custom and Islamic law in its unwritten legal codes or 
perbilangan (customary saying).22 Pre-colonial traditional written laws like the 
Undang-Undang Melaka (the Malacca Digest), the Undang-Undang Kerajaan (the 
'' This was the term of a covenant between Sang Sapmba, the Ruler of Perlembang, and Demang 
Lebar Daun, Sang Sapurba's father-in-law and Perlembang's former Ruler, as reported in the 
Malay Annals. See Shellabear (1991: 19-20). 
20 Gullick (1965: 8). 
21 Hooker (1976: 72} however drew a distinction between the "Sultan's law" and the "village 
law". While the former was regarded as universal in scope and "God inspired in quality", the 
latter rested on such mundane factors as preservation of economic and social stability. 
22 Hooker's (1976: 35) translation of the perbilangan below is most useful in showing the blend of 
Malay custom and Lslam in the adat laws: 
Customary law hinges on religious law; 
Religious law on the word of God; 
If custom is strong, religion is not upset; 
If religion is strong, custom is not upset; 
Religious law is the offspring of covenant; 
Customary law also the offspring of covenant. 
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Laws of the Monarch) and the Kedah Port Laws also bear significant influences 
of Islamic law. 23 Islam and Malay custom had always been regarded as being 
under the responsibility of the Malay Rulers, hence symbolizing their special 
position in the traditional Malay political system.24 
British direct rule in the Straits Settlements of Penang,25 J\1alacca26 and 
Singapore,27 which was established in the late 18th century, gradually introduced 
modern constitutional ideas into Malaya. Between 1786 and 1826, the Settlements 
of Penang, Malacca and Singapore were separately administered by the British 
East India Company. The three settlements were joined together under the 
Eastern Presidency in 1826 and then, with the abolition of the Eastern Presidency 
in 1830, became part of the Presidency of Bengal. After the abolition of the East 
India Company in 1858, the Straits Settlements came under the new Indian 
Government until 1867 when its administration was transferred from the India 
Office to the Colonial Office in London.28 In the meantime, the British Parliament 
passed the Government of the Straits Settlements Act 1866 which made the 
Straits Settlements a unitary Crown Colony, the government of which was vested 
23 Sections 24-66 of the Undang-Undang Kerajaan (Laws of the Monarch), which related to Perak, 
Pahang and Johore, are almost entirely Islamic law of the Shaff ie sect. Section 29 of the Kedah 
Port Laws provided that all disputes were to be determined on the principles of Islamic laws. 
Folios 61-62 of the Undang-Undang Me/aka (Malacca Digest) asked forgiveness from Allah since 
some of the laws violated Islamic Jaw. See Hooker (1976: 73-83). 
24 Milner (1982: % ). 
2s The Island of Penang was ceded to the British East India Company in 1786. The island was 
previously under the rule of Sultan of Kedah. In 1800, a sizeable territory on the mainland 
opposite the island, which later became known as Province Wellesley, was also ceded to the East 
India Company. The cession of Penang to the EiC was made after the company's representative 
Francis Light assured the Sultan of Kedah that the British would help protect his kingdom 
against his enemy, the Siamese. But it transpired later that when the Siamese attacked Kedah in 
1821, the British failed to offer the much needed help. See Gullick (1981: 20). 
26 Malacca came under British rule in 1795 when the British occupied all Dutch territories in the 
Far East during the Napoleonic Wars. After the war ended, Malacca was returned to the Dutch 
under the Treaty of Vienna in 1818. However, in 1824, Malacca was ceded to Great Britain under 
the Treaty of Holland. 
27 The Island of Singapore was ceded to the East India Company in 1824. The Island was 
previously under the rule of Sultan of Johore. 
"'Mohd. Hishamuddin (1995a). 
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in a Governor assisted by an Executive29 and a Legislative Council.30 The 
Governor had the power to initiate legislation and assent to Bills or reserve them 
for the British Crown. He also appointed Judges, Commissioners, Justices of the 
Peace and other officers. The Act empowered the British Crown to establish laws, 
institutions and ordinances, and to make provision for the Courts and 
administration of justice in the Straits Settlements.31 
British indirect intervention in the Malay states in the late 19th century 
marked the advent of the modern concept of constitutional monarch in Malaya. 
The Malay Rulers agreed to the intervention, which was primarily motivated by 
the need to protect British commercial interests, 32 in return for assistance offered 
by the British to repel their adversaries and for payment of compensation and 
allowances.33 This in turn paved the way for the introduction of a modern system 
of constitutional monarchy and bureaucracy in the Malay states through an 
administrative system called the Residential System. The Pangkor Engagement 
concluded by the British and the Sultan of Perak in 1874 for the first time 
provided for the appointment of a British officer called Resident to advise the 
Sultan in the administration of the state. Under the treaty, the Sultan was 
required to seek and act upon the Resident's advice "on all questions other than 
29 The Executive Council consisted of the Senior Military Officer, the Colonial Secretary, the 
Resident Councillors for Penang and Malacca, the Attorney General, the Treasurer, the Colonial 
Engineer and two unofficial members (Mohd. Hishamuddin: 1995a). 
"°In 1867, the Legislative Council consisted of the Governor, the Chief Justice, the Officer 
Commanding the Troops, the Lieutenant Govemor of Penang, the Colonial Secretary, the 
Attorney General, the Colonial Engineer and four unofficial members who were Europeans. By 
1931 there were eleven ex-officio members (the Senior Military Officer, the Colonial Secretary, the 
Attorney General, the Resident Counsellors of Penang and Malacca, the Treasurer, the Colonial 
Engineer, the Director of Education, the Secretary of Chinese Affairs, the Principal Civil Medical 
Officer and the Commissioner of Lands), two nominated official members elected by the 
Chambers of Commerce of Singapore and Penang, and eleven nominated unofficial members. Of 
the nominated unofficial members, one had to be a Eurasian, one a representative of the Malay 
race, one a British Indian and three Chinese British subjects from the three Settlements (Mohd. 
Hishamuddin: 1995a) 
31 Mohd. Hishamuddin (1995a). 
"ln particular, it was to ensure a stable supply of tin from the Malay states to the Straits 
Settlements in view of increasing demand for the commodity in the world market. 
"See Gullick (1981: 24}; Andaya & Andaya (1982: 200). 
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those touching ~1alay religion and custom".34 Between 1875 and 1888, three other 
Malay states, namely Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang, entered into 
similar treaties with the British to receive a British Resident in each state. 
Though in theory the Resident was there to advise the Ruler, in practice it 
was the Resident who had actual authority in running the state. This was done 
through the State Council which provided a constitutional framework for the 
government of the state. Though the members of the Council were appointed by 
the Ruler, normally for life, it was the Resident who had the power to nominate 
them for approval by the Governor of the Straits Settlements.35 The Council was 
in fact an important forum for the state government to gather public opinion, 
especially on matters affecting the position of the Malays. However, as the 
Council only convened a few times a year and state administration became more 
complex, its influence on legislation was rather limited. By the 1890s, the 
Council's influence on state administration continued to dwindle, leaving the 
British Resident with enormous power to run the state.36 
Although the Malay Rulers were required to act on the advice of the 
British Residents in matters pertaining to the administration of the state, the 
various treaties concluded by the Rulers and the British made clear that matters 
pertaining to Islam and ~falay custom would remain the sole responsibility of 
the Rulers. In the 1889 treaty between the Rulers of Negeri Sembilan and the 
British, the Rulers expressed their desire "that they may have the assistance of a 
British Resident in the administration of the government of the said 
Confederation37 and they undertake to follow his advice in all matters of 
"There were seeds of conflict in this key clause. In order to make advice workable, the Malay 
traditional political structure, which was not adapted to the British administrative method, had to 
be reformed first. Yet, the traditional struchire was part of the Malay custom on which British 
advice was excluded. See Gullick (1981: 25). 
"'The Council was composed of the Ruler, Malay Chiefs, Chinese leaders and the Resident. 
36 Andaya & Andaya (1983: 2001). 
37 Negeri Sembilan (Nine States) was a confederation of petty states around Suogai Ujong, 
Rembau and Tampin districts which form the present Negeri Sembilan. 
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administration other than those touching the Mohammedan religion".38 
Similarly, Sultan Ahmad of Pahang in a letter to the Governor of the Straits 
Settlements, Cecil Smith, inviting a British Resident to assist in the 
administration of the state in August 1888 wrote: "In asking this, we request that 
the British Government will assure to us and our successors all our proper 
privileges and powers according to our system of government and will 
understand that they will not interfere with the old customs of our country 
which have good and proper reasons and also with all matters relating to our 
religion" .39 
Islam and Malay custom continued to be under the sole responsibility of 
the Malay Rulers when the four Malay states of Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan 
and Pahang were amalgamated as a federation in 1895.'iO Under the Treaty of 
Federation, the Rulers of the four states agreed to accept a British officer, styled 
the Resident-General, as the agent and representative of the British Government 
under the Governor of the Straits Settlements and to follow his advice "in all 
matters of administration other than those touching the Mohammedan 
Religion".41 The position was similar in all other Un-federated Malay States42 
where British Advisers' jurisdiction did not cover matters pertaining to Islam 
and Malay custom, which remained the sole responsibility of Malay Rulers.43 
Up to the outbreak of the Second World War, constitutional development 
in the Malay States and the Straits Settlements marked a significant shift in the 
38 Maxwell & Gibson (1924: 63). 
39 Maxwell & Gibson (1924: 67-69). 
••The four states were known as the Federated Malay States. 
11 Mohd. Hishamuddin (1995a). 
"The states which came to be called the Un-federated Malay States were Kelantan, Terengganu, 
Kedah, Perlis and Johore. The British had less direct control in these states . 
., The agreement for the appointment of British Adviser in Kelantan in 1910 required the Sultan 
to follow the advice of the Adviser in all matters of administration other than those touching the 
Muslim Religion and Malay custom. Similarly, in Terengganu, where a British Advisor attended 
State Council meetings, the state Constitution provided that the functions of the Council were "to 
assist the Raja and the Cabinet of Ministers in governing the country and its subjects in the way 
of making, adjusting and adding to the laws and regulations other than those concerning religion 
and the Mohammedan Law ... " (Mohd. Hishamuddin 1995a). 
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traditional Malay political structure. It no longer centered on the rule of absolute 
monarchs in a decentralized system of local government headed by the more 
powerful local chiefs, but on a centralized system of government by professional 
British administrators in which the Malay Rulers occupied a symbolic position as 
constitutional monarchs. The shift toward a modern form of government run by 
professional bureaucrats had significantly eroded the roles and powers of the 
Malay Rulers as well as those of the Malay local chiefs. Not only did the Malay 
Rulers become ceremonial monarchs, the hitherto more powerful Malay local 
chiefs also found themselves being subdued by British District Officers. They no 
longer had the power to control the peasants or collect taxes, which resulted in 
significant loss of revenues and means of social control. Only a small number of 
them were absorbed into the new administration either as Penghulus (district 
headmen) or members of State Councils. 44 
However, one important feature remained. Islam and Malay custom 
continued to be under the sole authority of the Malay Rulers. While this 
presumably reflected a strategic move on the part of the British administrators to 
appease the Malay Rulers and the aristocratic class,45 upon whose cooperation 
the British relied to advance their colonial enterprise, the preservation of Islam 
and Malay custom in the hands of the Malays Rulers as exhibited in the modem 
constitutional structure also pointed to their perennial "special" position in the 
long history of the Malay monarchy. In fact, the special relationship between 
Malay Rulers, Malay custom and Islam was already well established in the pre-
colonial period. Long before the British started its colonial enterprise in the 
l\1alay states, it was not uncommon to find that in negotiations follmving a 
conquest of the smaller Malay states by a dominant Sultanate, Malay custom and 
Islam would remain in the hands of the Rulers of the Malay states.46 It was 
reported in Ffikayat Deli that when Pahang surrendered to Acheh, the Achenese 
44 Andaya & Andaya (1983: 202-203) 
<S Andaya & Andaya (1983: 200). 
'"Milner (1982: 97). 
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offered Pahang leaders the following generous conditions: "All matters in the 
state of Pahang, all the chieftainships and the (Islamic) law, customs and 
ceremonial (hukum shara', adat and istiadat) are to remain in the hands of the 
ruler; these matters will not be altered on Pahang's becoming a dependency of 
Acheh" .47 The modem constitutional safeguard for Islam and Malay custom, by 
making them the preserves of the Malay Rulers, simply reflects this long-held 
position in the traditional Malay constitutional ideas. 
The Malayan Union: British-r1Jled Malayan Malaya 
Since early 1943, well before the Japanese occupation army surrendered to the 
Allied Forces, the Colonial Office in London started planning for constitutional 
reforms in Malaya. The London planners thought that the present administrative 
structure, with three different political units comprising the Straits Settlements, 
the Federated Malay States and the Un-federated Malay States under varying 
degrees of British control, was administratively impractical and ineffectual.48 The 
experience with Japanese occupation revealed that more co-ordinated control 
with strong central administration was necessary for an effective defence of the 
country against external aggression.49 What is more, the expected liberation of 
Malaya from Japanese occupation was seen by the British government as "a 
supremely opportune moment for revolutionary reform" as the Malay rulers, 
who had previously been obstacles to such an effort, had been "compromised by 
47 Milner (1982: 97). 
41l Allen {1967: 9) . 
., A report by Sir W Battershill, GEJ Gent and WL Rolleston (CO 877 /'25/7 /27265/7, no 1, dated 
4 December 1942) entitled "Lessons From Hong Kong and Malaya" pointed out, among others, 
that "complications of the civil machine owing to the existence as separate entities of the Straits 
Settlements, the Federated Malay States and the Un-federated Malay States" resulted in 
uncertainty and delay in reaching wartime decisions. See Stockwell (1995: 29). 
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the collaboration with the Japanese, and none of the machinery of the 
Government as it existed prior to December 1941 will remain" .so 
The plan for revolutionary reform culminated in the proposals for the 
creation of a strong unitary government combining the nine Malay states, 
Penang and Malacca, excluding Singapore; the acquisition by the British Crown 
of full executive and legislative powers in the Malay states; the creation of a 
common Malayan citizenship for people of all races in Malaya; and, finally, the 
paving of the way for eventual self-government for the Malayan people. An 
informal .tvfalayan Planning Committee was set up, and in July 1943, formalized 
as the .tvfalayan Planning Unit. In January 1944, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Mr 0 F G Stanley, placed a memorandum before the War Cabinet, 
outlining in general terms the need for sweeping constitutional change in .tv1alaya 
and Borneo.st For Malaya, the memorandum for the creation of a Malayan Union 
proposed the signing of fresh treaties with the Malay Rulers to enable the British 
Government to legislate for the states under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act; a union 
of all the Malay states and the settlements of Penang and Malacca with central 
authority representing these states and settlements headed by a Governor who 
would be assisted by an Executive and Legislative Council; the exclusion of 
Singapore from the union, but without precluding the possibility of its future 
fusion; and the accession of the Malay Rulers' authority and jurisdiction to the 
British, but with proper regard to be given to the political, economic and social 
interests of the Malays. 52 On 22 March 1944, the \.Var Cabinet Committee 
so Mohamed Nordin (1976:14). 
"See "Future Constitutional Policy for British Colonial Territories in Southeast Asia" (CAB 
98/ 41, CMB (44) 3) dated 14 January 1944, reproduced in Stockwell (1995: 67). 
52 Though the memorandum did not clearly spell out the policy on Malayan Union citizenship, it 
did express the need to provide the non-Malay Asiatic residents "with adequate prospects of 
participation in the government of the country" (Stockwell 1995: 67). The "Draft of a Directive 
Policy on Malaya" (CAB 98/ 41, CMB (44)4) dated 15January1944, which was prepared for the 
consideration of the War Cabinet Committee, also envisaged the need to "provide for a growing 
participation in the Government by the people of all the communities in Malaya" but "subject to 
a special recognition of the political, economic and social interests of the Malay race". See 
Stockwell (1995: 70). 
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approved the general lines of the policy contained in Mr. Stanley's memorandum 
and subsequently on 31May1944 endorsed them. 
As the policy only set out the general lines to be followed, there were 
suggestions by British officials on the details and direction of the policy. One 
radical suggestion was for the substitution of the present" autocratic political 
system" with a democratic one. This required the replacement of Malay rulership 
with an elected legislature. Admiral Lord Mountbatten, who described the move 
as "progressive in the sound sense of the word and is rationalization which ... 
could only be condemned on feudal or romantic grounds" suggested that the 
Malay Rulers be absorbed into some sort of Upper House in a new legislative 
structure with the more able among them be appointed as the Prime Minister of 
their respective states.53 Lord Mountbatten also proposed that the present" racial 
sectionalism" should be substituted by a "Malayan citizenship", arguing that "by 
getting people, whether Malays, Chinese or Indians, to combine together to deal 
as citizens ... one day they will come to look at the wider problems of Malaya in 
the same light, and at least Malayan-born and Malayan-domiciled Chinese will 
begin to identify themselves with Malaya instead of seeking political guidance 
and interference from China" .54 
Mr. Stanley however believed that eliminating the institution of Malay 
rulership and giving full democratic rights to the Malayan people regardless of 
race would be too risky at that early stage. Not only was it incongruent with the 
objective of maintaining tighter control of the "colonial territory", even if the 
move for self-goverrunent was to be set in motion later, but also grossly 
insensitive to the feelings of the Malays. In his "top secret and private letter" to 
Lord Mountbatten dated 13June1944, Stanley noted that "the presence of 
substantial numbers in Malaya of Chinese and Indians makes the future 
constitutional development a matter of some delicacy, particularly as these 
53 See Mountbatten's letter to Major-General HR Hone, the Head of the Malayan Planning Unit 
dated 4February1944 (CO 825/42/2, no 7) reproduced in Stockwell (1995: 72). 
54 Stockwell (1995: 83). 
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communities are likely to demand a more intimate place in the constitutional set 
up in the future than they have been given in the Malay states in the past" He 
also warned that the great economic power which the Chinese had already 
secured might antagonize the Malays. Even the decision to exclude Singapore 
from the union was made after careful consideration of its implication on the 
potentially explosive nature of inter-communal relations in Malaya.56 On the 
position of the Malay Rulers, though Stanley ruled out the possibility of them 
being ruthlessly deposed, particularly due to their "peculiar status in Islamic 
society", he reiterated that as a vital part of the British plans for the future of 
Malaya, the Rulers "should derive from a central Malayan authority any temporal 
authority which they are to exercise in the post-war arrangement, and that they 
should not be given any grounds for believing that they will have derived 
authority in the constitution - apart from their personal prestige and dignity -
either by reason of delegation from any external British authority or by reason of 
their own royal status".57 
It seemed that the fragile inter-communal relations in Malaya posed 
considerable problem to the London planners' attempt to create a common 
Malayan citizenship. The "Draft Statement of Fundamental Problems in Malaya" 
considered by the War Cabinet on 15 June 1945 mentioned this delicate 
situation.58 "On the one hand", the statement reads, "the relations of the British 
Government with the Malay States are based on recognition of the right of the 
ss See CO 825/423, no 21, reproduced in Stockwell (1995: 81). 
56 Mr. Stanley reasoned, "if we are to secure a greater degree of unification which is dearly 
essential for the wellbeing and security of the country but which must to some degree (emphasis is 
mine} depend on the consent of the Malays, we must have to exclude Singapore from any such 
union, at any rate in the early stages, because of the predominantly Chinese element in its 
population" (Stockwell 1995: 81). Other principal reasons for the exclusion of Singapore were 
essentially economic, military and administrative, i.e. (i) preservation of Singapore's status as a 
"free port"; (ii) its special importance to the United Nations as a naval base; and (iti) as an 
"urban" government, Singapore would have problems different from the rest of Malaya [See 
"Plan for Constitutional Reconstruction in Far East" (CO 825/35/6, no 2, dated 20 March 1943) 
reproduced in Stockwell (1995: 42)]. 
57 Stockwell {1995: 81). 
58 CO 825/43/16, WP (45) 287, dated 7May1945, reproduced in Stockwell (1995: 97). 
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Malay peoples to secure position in their lands and in their educational and other 
facilities for progress. On the other hand, the enterprise and capacity of the non-
Malay peoples of the country, provided they are accompanied by a sense of civic 
responsibility, assert a claim that they should exercise a due share in the 
moulding of Malaya's future". 59 Despite the apparent dilemma, there were other 
factors that forced the British government to make the common Malayan Union 
citizenship the cornerstone of its post-war policy. Among them was the potential 
influence of the Malayan Communist Party's plan for a Malayan Republic, which 
among others promised equal political participation for the Malayan people of 
all races and a form of" representative government". Due to this potential 
influence, British officials believed that their Government must also push its 
post-war policy in a similar if not more favourable direction.60 
Meanwhile, the British Cabinet on 3 September 1945 appointed Sir Harold 
MacMichael as special representative of the British government whose task was 
to approach the Malay Rulers and get them to conclude new treaties with the 
British government on the creation of the Malayan Union. Between 20 October 
and 21 December 1945, MacMichael managed to conclude "snap treaties" with 
so Stockwell (1995: 99). 
60 Mr. ME Dening, Chief Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander of Southeast Asia, 
in a telegram to the Foreign Office (WO 203 / 5642) dated 3 September 1945, drew the latter's 
attention to the Eight-Point declaration signed by the Central Executive Committee of the MCP 
on 25August1945. He commented that "the Communist Party have rather stolen our thunder 
and that we have lost that element of surprise for our own progressive policy which would 
politically have been so valuable". The MCP's Eight-Point declaration set out the aims of the 
party to: {i) support the United Nations of Russia, China, Britain and America and new 
organization for world security; (ii) establish a democratic government in Malaya with the 
electorate drawn from all races of each State and the anti-Japanese Army; (iii) abolish Fascism 
and Japanese political structure laws in Malaya; {iv) enforce freedom of speech, publications and 
societies, and obtain legal status for anti-Japanese Army; (v) reform the educational system and 
improve the social conditions of the people; (vi) improve Jiving conditions, develop industry, 
commerce and agriculture, provide relief for the unemployed and the poor, increase wages to a 
standard minimum and establish eight hour working day; (vii) punish traitors, corrupt officials, 
hoarders and profiteers, and stabilise prices; and (viii) ensure good treatment for the members of 
the anti-Japanese Army and provide compensation for the families of those who died for the 
Allied cause (Stockwell 1995:124). 
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all the nine Malay Rulers.61 Subsequently, on 22January1946, a Vv'hite Paper was 
tabled in the British Parliament outlining the proposals for the Malayan lJnion. 
The White Paper affirmed the earlier proposals contained in the memorandum 
presented to the War Cabinet in 1944. It roped in the Malay States and the 
Settlements of Penang and Malacca, excluding Singapore, in a single 
administrative unit. There would be a central authority consisting of a Governor 
with an Executive and a Legislative Council. In each State and Settlement there 
would be a local Council, which would have such powers of administration and 
subsidiary legislation delegated to it by the central authority. There would also 
be an Advisory Council whose members would help the Governor to enact 
necessary legislation. The administrative and legislative powers of the Malay 
Rulers were inferior to those of the Governor. Though they would preside over a 
Malay Advisory Council in their respective states, the appointment of members 
of the Council would require the Governor's approval. On matters of Islam, 
excepting the collection of tithes and taxes, each Ruler, with the help of his 
Council, would have legislative powers within his State. But legislation would 
require the Governor's assent. There would be a Malayan Union citizenship 
where persons born in the territory of the Union or in Singapore and persons 
who at the stipulated date had been ordinarily resident in those territories for ten 
years out of the preceding fifteen would acquire citizenship. Those acquiring 
'' The ease and swiftness by which MacMichael concluded the treaties could have been due to the 
fact that the Malay Rulers had actually been forewarned by British officials that the British 
government would "bring to justice" those who were found to have been "collaborating" with 
the Japanese during the occupation. Many of them tried hard to show that they hated the 
Japanese and had at all time been loyal to the British. This transpired during the interviews 
Brigadier HC Willan, the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer (Peninsular Malaya), had with the 
Rulers from 8-29 September 1945. For example, after meeting the Sultan of Johore on 8 
September, Brig. Willan recommended that "if the policy of the British Government is to proceed 
with the new constitution and the necessary new treaties, the sooner the Sultan of Johore is 
approached in his present state of mind the better". Brig. Willan went on to suggest a few 
persons to be approached and negotiated "ith, including a person he described as "stupid", 
should the present Rulers refuse to sign the treaties. Those who agreed to sign would be 
confirmed or appointed as Ruler. See "Interviews with the Malay Rulers: Report by Brigadier HC 
Willan" (CAB 101/69, CAB HIST /B/ 4/7) dated 7 October 1945, reproduced in Stockwell 
(1995:142). 
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citizenship other than by birth would be required to affirm allegiance to the 
Malayan Union. In the administration of justice1 there would be a Supreme Court 
of the Malayan Union and a Supreme Court of Singapore, each of which would 
consist of a Court of first instance and a Court of Appeal. Appeals from both 
Appeals Courts would go to the Privy Council in London. A Governor-General 
would be appointed to co-ordinate the policies of the British Government in 
respect to the Malayan Union and Singapore.62 
The .tvfalayan Union proposals generated mixed reactions1 from half-
hearted acceptance to strong protests, both in Malaya and in England. The main 
issues of contention were the abrupt way by which the Malays Rulers were 
coerced to accept the treaties, the alteration in Malaya's status from independent 
protectorates into more closely controlled dependencies and the danger of the 
indigenous community being swamped by alien residents.63 Leading the protests 
in England were former British officials who had previously worked in Malaya 
and enjoyed cordial relationships with the Malayan people, especially the 
Malays.64 But more important was the reactions from various sections of the 
Malayan people themselves. Surprisingly, opposition to the proposal for political 
unification and common citizenship stemmed not only from the community who 
seemed to lose from the new constitutional arrangement, the Malays, but also 
from those who were supposed to reap its benefits, the non-Malays. The protests 
were fomented along two broad lines. First, the propensity to perpetuate 
ascriptive identity of the indigenous community often associated with the 
institution of Malay rulership and Muslim religion, and a set of "privileges" that 
62 Great Britain (1946). 
63 Hawkins (1946). 
64 Among the prominent former members of the Malayan Civil Service (MCS) who led the 
campaign against the Malayan Union proposal in England were Sir George Maxwell (former 
Chief Secretary of the Federated of Malay States (FMS), 1920-1926), LD Gammans MP (MCS, 
1920-1924), Sir Frank Swettenham (former Governor and High Commissioner of FMS, 1901-1904), 
Sir Richard Winsted! (MCS, 1902-1935, former General Adviser of Johore, 1931-1935) and AS 
Haynes (MCS, 1901-1934). These "Old Malayans" wrote letters to the national press criticizing the 
Malayan t:nion proposal and lobbied the Colonial Office to withdraw the plan (Stockwell 1995: 
199). 
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either befitted the community's indigenous status or/and their economic 
alienation. Second, the creation of an independent "Malayan nation", which 
necessarily entailed the existence of a political community that would provide 
equal rights for all, and an end to colonization. 
Leading the protest against the Malayan Union proposal along the first 
line of argument were the Malay Rulers65, Malay aristocrats and Malay civil 
servants. They viewed the accession of Malay Rulers' sovereignty to the British 
Crown and the annexation of the Malay states as a "terrible blow to the Malay 
prestige and self-respect"; and the liberal citizenship proposals for the non-
Malays and the opening up of the civil service to them, coupled with the promise 
of democratization and self-government, as a "terrible threat to, and in part an 
actual reduction of Malay political power and authority".66 The Malay Rulers, the 
first to lose out when the Malayan Union came into being on 1April1946, 
funnelled their opposition through official and legal means. They decided to 
petition His Majesty the King of Great Britain and divulged information to 
former British officials in London who were sympathetic to their cause. They also 
engaged counsel to challenge the new treaties in the British courts, while 
politically denouncing the treaties at home. 
But the protests which had the deepest impact on Malay political 
consciousness were perhaps those led by the Malay aristocrats and civil servants. 
In November 1945, this group of politically conscious Malays formed Kesatuan 
Melayu Johor Gohore Malay Society) with the goal of fighting against the Malayan 
Union proposal. Soon after, many other pre-war Malay associations throughout 
65 A number of Malay Rulers claimed that they signed the treaties for there "were no other 
alternatives". For example, it was reported that the Regent of Kedah, before signing the treaty, 
rose to his feet and declared that "this was the most distressing and painful moment of his whole 
life. Henceforth he would lose the loyalty, the respect and the affection of his subjects, and he 
would be pursued with curses towards his grave by the ill-informed. He called upon Allah to 
witness hts act and to protect him for the future. He would sign because no other course was 
open". See "Notes by Sir Harold MacMichael on Interviews with the Regent of Kedah" (CO 
5-'17 /1541, no 18) dated 30 Nov-3 Dec 1945, reproduced in Stockwell (1995:183). 
66 Mohamed Noordin (1976: 24). 
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Malaya joined the fray. By end of1945, it seemed that the Malays had woken up 
from a long deep slumber and became part of a rising political movement.67 On 
15December1945, MacMichael's arrival in Kota Bharu was confronted by mass 
demonstration of about 10,000 Malays. As if this was not enough, on 10 February 
1946, about 15,000 Malays staged a mass demonstration at the inauguration of 
Movement of Peninsular Malays Gohore). Between 1 and 3 March 1946, 115 
representatives of 42 Malay organizations, setting aside their state parochialism, 
met in Kuala Lumpur to debate the Malayan Union proposal and the future of 
the Malays. The main issue of contention was the liberal common citizenship 
policy, which would mean a large majority of the non-Malay population would 
be accepted as Malayan citizens after the formation of the Malayan Union. The 
Malays, who were already lagging behind the non-Malays, especially the 
Chinese, in the economy were loath to accept the possibility that eventually they 
would also be outweighed by the non-Malays in politics. To pursue the Malay 
cause, the Pan-Malayan Malay Congress in May 1946 resolved to form the 
United Malays National Organization (UMNO), a political organization that later 
emerged as a dominant Malay political party.68 
Among the organizations which fomented opposition along the second 
line of protest was the predominantly Chinese Malayan Communist Party 
(MCP). It should be noted that the party's Eight-Point program for a Malayan 
Republic envisaged an independent Malayan nation which would grant full 
67 Mohamed Noordin (1976: 23) however noted that there was little Malay opposition lo the 
Malayan Union proposal up to the end of 1945. This was due to, among other reasons: (i) the 
extent of Malay goodwill to the British on their return to Malaya; (ii) the apprehensions amongst 
traditional Malay leadership, particularly the Rulers, as regards the initial tough British attitude 
toward those who had "collaborated" with the Japanese; (iii) preoccupation of the Malay Rulers 
and civil servants with "personal rehabilitation", i.e. of being confirmed to their positions by the 
British; and (iv) the absence of an organized Malay political mobilization. 
"'UMNO was formally inaugurated at the meeting of the Pan-Malayan Malay Congress which 
took place inJohore Bharn on 11~13May1946. 
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democratic rights to all ~1alayan people regardless of their race and creeds.69 As 
such, the party viewed Malayan Union proposals, short of granting democratic 
rights and independence to the Malayan people, as antithetical to their vision of 
an independent Malaya. It was, the party believed, an attempt by the British to 
strengthen their control over ~1alaya.70 The exclusion of Singapore was also 
viewed as an attempt by the British to control the Malayan economy through the 
colony's entreport. On the other hand, the party proposed the establishment of a 
National Assembly by universal suffrage; electoral rights to be granted to all 
Malayan people above the age of eighteen; an Executive and Legislative Council 
appointed by the National Assembly; establishment of elected State Councils in 
all states in the Malayan Peninsula; and the inclusion of Singapore in the Union 
governed by a Mayor.71 The radical Malay Nationalist Party (MNP) also opposed 
the Malayan Union on similar grounds.72 Its main concern was the perpetuation 
of British colonial rule through the Malayan Union policy. On the contrary, it 
demanded a form of government based on electoral representation that would 
transfer political power from the hands of the British officials into the hands of 
the Malayan people. The party also criticized the "undemocratic" way by which 
the treaties were concluded; the lack of consultation with the Malayan people; 
the exclusion of Singapore; and the vague definition of citizenship rights 
contained in the proposa!,73 
Though there was no united opposition to the Malayan Union, and in fact 
contradictory grounds of opposition between the conservative Malays, the 
radical Malays and the Chinese, it was quite obvious that the Malayan Union 
69 According to Khong (1984; 92), the ~1CP's program entailed the creation of "bourgeois 
democracy" with Malaya's independence presented as "a terminal goal without mentioning the 
ultimate goal of building a socialist or communist society". 
70 Khong (1984: 90). 
7l Khong (1984: 91) 
72 The MNP at first welcomed the Malayan Union proposal as it promised to create 
administrative uniformity and promoted self~government. The party considered the tiny feudal 
Malay states, which the British were resolved to revamp, as an anachronism (Khong 1984: 88). 
n Khong (1984: 89). 
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plan was not popular among the Malayan population. On 1April1946, the 
Malays gathered in Kuala Lumpur to prevent the Rulers from attending the 
installation ceremony of Sir Edward Gent as the first Malayan Union Govemor.74 
Malay appointees also refused to serve on any council or board established 
under the Malayan Union. In the face of such resistance, the British Government 
had to reconsider its plan for a Malayan Malaya. By this time, it was rather 
obvious that the Malayan Union, instead of being a fait accompli, had turned into 
a failed experiment. Notwithstanding its short-lived existence, the Malayan 
Union plan had raised the political consciousness of the Malayan people, 
especially the Malays, which later became an enduring factor in shaping 
!vfalaya' s constitutional development along communal lines. 
Federation of Malaya: British-ruled Malay-privileged Malaya 
Protests against the Malayan Union proposal along communal lines had a strong 
impact on the way the British planners looked at the Malayan problem. They 
began to realize that communal division was the most precarious aspect of 
Malayan politics, insufficient regard to which might lead to political chaos.75 In 
order to avoid such risk, the British government agreed to postpone the plan for 
common citizenship. There was also suggestion that the Malay Rulers should be 
brought back into the Malayan Union structure on a "strictly constitutional 
74 The Malay Rulers, who had been at the Railway Station Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, met Edward 
Gent on the night of 31 March telling him that they would not attend the installation ceremony 
the next day. They however assured Gent that their non-attendance was not a show of disrespect 
to Hi• Majesty's government. It was rather to avoid being regarded as giving approval to the 
Malayan Union proposal (See "Inward Telegram no. 1 from Sir E Gent to Mr Hall" (CO 537 /1548, 
no 66) dated 1 April 19't6, reproduced in Stockwell (1995: 219)) . 
"By March 1946, the Colonial Office had been furnished with intelligence reports of dissensions 
among Malays and non-Malays as regards to the Malayan Union policy. There had also been 
violent dashes between Malays and Chinese, one of which was at Batu Talam in Pahang where 
27 people were killed. [See "Local Reactions to the Malayan Union: Minute by WS Morgan" (CO 
537 /1669) dated 8 March 1946, reproduced in Stockwell (1995: 208)] 
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basis".76 All this, however, was too late. The Malays, by way of their protests 
against the Malayan Union, had made significant headway toward becoming a 
political force to be reckoned with. 77 Meanwhile, there had also been growing 
influence of "Indonesian elements", which advocated an independent Malayan-
Indonesian nation or Indonesia Raya.78 There were apprehensions that the failure 
on the part of the British to moderate its position would further embolden these 
elements and weaken the British position. The Malays were thus set to demand 
further privileges and the British had to give attention to conciliatory proposals. 
The first step towards such conciliation was to solicit the Malays' opinion 
on Malaya's constitutional reform. On 25July1946, a Working Committee 
consisted of British officials and representatives of the Malay Rulers and 
UMN079 was formed to propose fresh constitutional arrangements "which 
would be acceptable to Malay opinion, and which would provide a more 
efficient administration and form the basis of future political and constitutional 
developments" in Malaya.BO The Committee was tasked to find ways for the 
establishment of a strong central government; the maintenance of the 
individuality of each of the Malay States and the Settlements; the provision of the 
76 It was suggested that the Malay Rulers and the Governor, should assent to State Council 
enactments as well as Ordinances passed by the Central Legislature. Thi.s was different from the 
original proposal in which only the Governor's assent was required (Stockwell 1995: 223). 
77 Sir Edward Gent, upon learning the growing strength of the Malays' political mobilization, 
especially the one which was led by UMNO, reminded the Colonial Office that the Malay consent 
was necessary if the main object of British government, i.e. "cooperation and unity of purpose for 
self-government" was to be achieved. He thus advocated the replacement of the Malayan Union 
with a "Federation", which was in line with the Malay Rulers' proposal. See "Sultan's 
Constitutional Proposals: Inward Telegram no 222 from Sir E. Gent to Mr Hall Recommending 
Conciliation" (CO 537 /1528, no 9SA) dated 4May1946, reproduced in Stockwell (1995: 225). 
7B This was the position taken by the radical Malays in the Malayan Nationalist Party (MNP). 
79 Representing the Malayan t:nion government in this Committee were Mr. AT Newboult (Chief 
Secretary), Mr. KK O'Connor (Attorney-General), Mr. WD Godsall (Finance Secretary), Dr. W 
Linehan (MCS) and Mr. A Williams (MC:S). Representatives of the Malay Rulers were Raja 
Kamarulzaman Raja Mansur (Perak), Dato' Hamzah Abdullah (Selangor), Hj. Muhammad Sheriff 
Osman (Kedah) and Dato' Nik Ahmed Kami! Mahmud (Kelantan). Dato' Onn Jaafar and Dato' 
Abdul Rahman Ismail represented UMNO. The Committee's meeting were also attended by Sir 
Ralph Hone (Observer for the Governor-General), Sir Theodore Adams (Adviser to the Malay 
Rulers) and Dato' R. St. J. Braddell (Ul'v1NO's Legal Adviser). Mr. DC Watherston (MCS) acted as 
Secretary. 
""Malayan Union (1946a: 1) 
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means for self-government; the creation of a common form of citizenship; and 
the provision of special position for the Malays and safeguard for their rights.Bl 
The Committee sat at intervals between August and November 1946. The 
Committee's final report, which was published on 24December1946, contained 
key suggestions on the position of the Malay states, the Straits Settlements and 
the Malay Rulers; the executive and legislative structure of the new political 
entity; citizenship and other matters related to finance and the administration of 
justice. In place of the Malayan Union, the committee suggested the 
establishment of Federation of Malaya, which consisted of the nine Malay States 
and the Settlements of Penang and Malacca. As a federation, there would be 
federal and state governments, each of which would have its own executive and 
legislative structures.82 The federal government would consist of a British High 
Commissioner, a Federal Executive Council and a Legislative Council. The High 
Commissioner would function as the representative of the British Crown as well 
as the Executive Head of the Federation. He would also preside over the Federal 
Legislative Council which would have comprehensive jurisdiction over 
important matters such as defence, external relations, administration of justice, 
maintenance of peace and public order, finance, taxation, banking and regulation 
of societies and trade unions.83 In each Malay state, the government would 
consist of a Malay Ruler, a State Executive Council and a State Council with 
legislative powers. Each of the Malay Rulers would preside over the Executive 
Council in his state, while a Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) would be the President 
of the State Council. The latter would have powers to pass any laws on matters 
pertaining to Islam and Malay custom, except those in respect of which the 
Federal Legislative Council had powers to pass laws. Only the Ruler's assent was 
required for such bills to become law, in contrast to the Malayan Union policy 
" Great Britain (1947: 3). 
B2 This was different from the Malayan Union, which was essentially a unitary state with only a 
central government. 
" See Second Schedule of the draft Federation of Malaya Agreement (Malayan Union 1946a). 
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which required further approval by the Malay Advisory Council presided over 
by the British Governor. This proposal practically restored legislative and 
executive powers on matters related to Islam and Malay custom to the Malay 
Rulers. The establishment of a Conference of Rulers consisting of all nine Malay 
Rulers, chaired by one of them selected by the Conference, was also proposed.84 
As far as the Malay Rulers were concerned, the Working Committee's proposals 
seemed to have safeguarded their position. 
The Working Committee also made other suggestions to protect the 
political position of the Malays. The Malays would form the majority of the 
unofficial members of the Legislative CounciJ.85 More stringent citizenship 
requirements would also be put in place. Under the proposed new Constitution, 
automatic acquisition of citizenship would only be available to the Malays, 
British subjects who were born in the Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca 
and in any other territories to be comprised in the Federation, and any other 
persons who were born in such territories whose parents were also born there. 
Except for the Malays, the three other categories of persons had to meet certain 
residential requirements.86 Others may apply for citizenship if they were born in 
84 The Conference of Rulers would function as a Secretariat through which the High 
Commissioner would communicate with the Rulers and ascertain their views on important 
policies of the Federal Government. The subjects that should be brought to the Rulers' attention 
were, except in case of emergency, Bills which were to be brought to the Legislative Council; 
Federal policy and immigration; new salary scheme or major amendments to existing salary 
scheme of Federal Public Officers; and draft schemes of the creation of major organizations of any 
department of the Federal Government. The Rulers may consider these matters individually or, if 
necessary, convene meetings of the Conference. If the majority of the Rulers differed with the 
High Commissioner on any matters, the point of difference would be referred to the Secretary of 
State for his decision (Malayan Union 1946a: 21). 
ss Seat allocation was based on a hybrid system of functional (e.g. mining, planting, labor, 
commerce, straits settlements, etc.) and ethnic representation Malay unofficial members would 
consist of the nine Menterl Besnr of the Malay states and nine other persons appointed by the 
High Commissioner. The non-Malay representatives to the Council would be six Chinese, three 
Europeans, two Indians, one Eurasian and two from any community. The other two unofficial 
members were representatives of the Settlement Council of Penang and Malacca. The total 
number of Legislative Council members was forty-eight, i.e. three ex-officio members, eleven 
officials and thirty-four un-officials (Malayan Union 1946b: 3). 
86 The British subjects who were born in the Settlements had to be permanently resident, i.e. 
completed a continuous period of 15 years of residence. A British subject other than the 
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any of the territories and had been residing there for not less than 10 out of 15 
years preceding their application, or, if they were not born in the territories, had 
been residents for not less than 15 out of 20 years immediately preceding their 
application; were of good character; had adequate knowledge of the ivlalay or 
English language; had made the Declaration of Permanent Settlement; and were 
willing to take the Oath of Citizenship. 
The debate following the publication of the Working Committee's report 
showed that different communal groups had different visions of the political 
community that would advance their communal interests. This was evident in 
the discussions and representations made by individuals, groups and 
associations to the Cheeseman Consultative Committee on the Constitutional 
Proposals between January and March 1947.87 Deliberating on the issue of Malay 
language and Islam, the Malay Association of Ulu Terengganu drew the 
committee's attention to the special position of the Malays in Malaya. In a 
memorandum submitted to the Committee, the association claimed that Malaya 
"is a Malay country, which has been acknowledged to belong to the Malays from 
time immemorial". Therefore, the position of ivfalay language "is extremely 
important and must be given priority .... If the Malay language is not given 
preference, the Malay race may be regarded as not being in existence and it 
Settlement-born would be entitled to citizenship if his father was born in the territories which 
would comprise the Federation of Malaya or had resided therein for a continuous period of 15 
years. Automatic acquisition of citizenship would also be available to any other person born in 
any of the territories whose parents were born in and have been resident in any one or more of 
such territories for a continuous period of 15 years, and whose father was, at the date of his birth, 
a Federal Citizen (Malayan Union 1946: 7). 
"As regards to the Working Committee's constitutional proposals, the British Government was 
of the opinion that there would be no final decision on any constitutional matters until all the 
interested communities in Malaya had full and free opportunity to express their views. The 
Consultative Committee was thus formed with the purpose of gathering public opinions on such 
matters. The committee was headed by RR Cheeseman, Director of Education. Its members were 
Mr. SB Palmer, Mr. MLR Doraisamy Aiyer, Col. HS Lee, Mr. CF Gomes, Mr. A Arbuthnott, Mr. 
CPR Menon, Mr. Leong Yew Koh, Dr. JS Goonting, Mr. GE Turner (Secretary). Between January 
and March 1947, the Committee conducted six public sessions in Kuala Lumpur, Penang, 
Malacca and lpoh, [t also received 81 letters and memoranda on the constitutional proposals. See 
Malayan Union (1947: 7). 
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means that this country does not belong to the Malays". As the Malays profess 
the religion of Islam, the association demanded that "the religion of Islam should 
be included in the proposals otherwise Islam may be endangered by Christianity 
and other religions".88 The Ceylonese community, which was represented by the 
Ceylon Federation of Malaya also sought to assert their claim for recognition. 
They traced their early association with Malaya as far back as to the 1860s when 
the early Ceylonese community came "in large numbers to assist the 
development of Malaya". Since then, the organization claimed, the Ceylonese 
had "made Malaya their permanent home" and "with traditional loyalty and 
conservatism have given their entire lives exclusively to the service of Their 
Highnesses and the British administrators, while other races ventured into 
vocations of great gains, namely, planting, mining, trading and industry". As 
such, it argued, it would only be appropriate if the residential requirement for 
Malayan-born Ceylonese was reduced to five years, the interests of Ceylonese 
government servants and of those in other employment should not be 
jeopardized, and the Ceylonese community be represented in the Legislative 
CounciJ.89 The members of the Indian Association of Terengganu also sought to 
put forth their claim. "Men's memories", they V.'!ote in their memorandum, "are 
short and hence the tendency is to regard Indians as unwelcome intruders whose 
contribution to Malayan economy is nil and their only contribution is to the 
English language of the word "coolie" which has found a place in school text-
books". While "the Malay conununity may be excused for short memories", they 
said, "the Raj cannot dispute the contributions of India and Indians to the 
extension of its influence in this part of the world from the founding of Singapore 
in the early part of the nineteenth century to the liberation of Malaya a few 
as Malayan Union (1947: 116). 
89 Malayan Union (1947: 123). 
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months ago". As such they pleaded for more generous requirements of 
citizenship. 90 
Two Chinese leaders, HS Lee and Leong Yew Koh, who sat on the 
Consultative Committee, could not agree with the rest of their colleagues in the 
committee on two issues affecting the interests of the Chinese, namely, 
citizenship and representation in the Federal Legislative Council. They sought to 
impress upon the members of the committee that the Chinese and Malay 
population were about equal, and by reason of their early association with 
Malaya, a great number of Chinese had as good claim to be regarded as the sons 
of the soil as the Malays. They argued that as the Chinese had to pay about 70 
percent of the total taxes in the country, they had borne a greater burden in the 
country's economic development Apart from that, they reminded that the 
Chinese had made a noble contribution toward the defence of Malaya and borne 
the brunt of the Japanese fury and terrorism during the Japanese occupation. 
This, they said, was the price for, as well as the symbol of, the Chinese 
community's loyalty for the country. As such, the two Chinese leaders 
demanded, the number of Chinese representatives in the Federal Legislative 
Council should be about equal to the number of Malay representatives and all 
Malayan-born Chinese should automatically acquire Federal citizenship.91 
A multi-communal coalition of radical-nationalist political parties, 
Chinese-based associations and trade unions called the Pan-Malayan Council of 
Joint Action (PMGA) formed in December 1946 claimed that they were the "only 
body which embraced all Asiatic communities in Malaya vlith which the 
Government should have had negotiations on constitutional issues".92 The 
9lJ Malayan Union (1947: 113). 
91 Malayan Union (1947: 181). 
"'The PMCJA comprised of the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU), Malayan Indian Congress 
(MIC), Malayan New Democratic Youth League, 12 Womens' Federation in Malaya, the Malayan 
People Anti Japanese Ex-Service Comrades Association, the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade 
Union (PMFfU), the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP), Angkatan Wanita Sedar (Movement of 
Awakened Women, AWAS) andAngkalan Pemuda Insaf(Movement of Awakened Youth, API), 
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coalition, which was led by a wealthy Chinese businessman, Tan Cheng Lock, 
refused to make any representation to the Consultative Committee on the basis 
that the Committee's method of inviting opinions from "interested individuals, 
communities and groups" would encourage "the presentation of views of 
individuals and groups who represented primarily sectional and communal 
interests". Such a procedure, they argued," deliberately fostered inter-communal 
and inter-sectional hostility and jealousy".93 PMCJA demanded a united Malaya 
inclusive of Singapore, self-government through a fully elected central 
legislature for the whole of Malaya and equal citizenship rights for all who made 
Malaya their permanent home and the object of their undivided loyalty.94 
In February 1947, the radical-nationalist Malay Nationalist Party (MNP), 
Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API, Awakened Youth Union), the Barisan Tani (BAT AS, 
Peasants' Union) and Angkatan \!Vanita Sedar (AW AS, Awakened Women's 
Union) formed Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (PUTERA, Peoples' United Front). PUTERA, 
the coalition of Malay-based organizations, later merged with PM CJ A to form 
PUTERA-AMCJA. As a result of this merger, three more demands were added to 
the original three put forth by the PMCJA. They demanded that the Malay 
Sultans should assume the position of fully sovereign and constitutional rulers, 
accepting the advice, not of the British "advisers", but of the people through 
democratic institutions; matters pertaining to Islam and Malay custom should be 
under the sole control of the Malays; and special attention should be given to the 
advancement of the Malays. These and the original three demands formed the 
six basic principles of the "Peoples Constitution for Malaya" published by 
PUTERA-AMCJA in November 1947.95 The ideological foundation of PUTERA-
AMCJA however could not capture popular support. On the one hand, the non-
The radical-nationalist Malay-based MNP, AWAS and AP! withdrew from PMqA in February 
1947 and formed a new coalition called Pusat Tenaga Rakl;at (Centre for People's Power, PUTERA) 
to focus on Malay issues. 
"'PUTERA-AMCJA (1947: S) 
94 Malayan Union (1947: 183) 
•s PlJTERA-AMCJA (1947). 
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Malay middle classes "were very suspicious of extreme left-wing politics; neither 
were these people sufficiently nationalistic to be inspired by the coalition's anti-
colonial slogans".96 On the other hand, the Malays generally viewed AMCJA as a 
communist tool since most of its members were known to be closely associated 
with the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). 
Reconciling the competing claims and demands, so as to incorporate them 
into a body of constitutional text, was a daunting task Faced with the 
articulation of competing communal interests and various claims to rights and 
privileges in the constitution-making process, the only possible constitutional 
framework to materialize was the one which could provide a basis for 
compromise rather than full satisfaction of any of the competing groups. The 
British rejected the PUTERA-AMCJA constitutional proposals in favour of those 
put forth by UMNO and the representatives of Malay Rulers. Realizing the 
importance of communal representation, the Consultative Committee in its 
report in :March 1947, recommended an increase in the number of the unofficial 
representatives in the Legislative Council from 34 to 52 in order to give greater 
representation to the various communal groups in Malaya. The Malays however 
would still have the biggest share of representation in the Council with 29 
representatives, including nine Presidents of State Councils as official members.97 
The Chinese would have 15 representatives, European seven, Indian five, 
Ceylonese and Eurasian one each,98 and three others from any community.99 
96 Ratnam (1965: 151) 
97 The two Chinese members of the Consultative Committee were against the inclusion of Malay 
Presidents of fhe State Councils as official members as fhis would disproportionately increase the 
ratio of Malay representatives to the Chinese. 
"There was no provision for Ceylonese representation in the Working Committee's proposal. 
"See Malayan Union (1947: 9). In comparison, the new seats allocation proposed by the Working 
Committee showed that the percentage of Malay representation out of the total number of ethnic 
representatives to fhe Federal Legislative Council decreased from 56.3 percent to 47.5 percent. 
Other efhnic comm unities, except Eurasian, enjoyed slight increases. Chinese representation 
increased from 18.8 percent to 24.6 percent, European (from 9.4 percent to 11.5 percent), Indian 
(from 6.3 percent to 8.2 percent) and Ceylonese (from 0 to 1.6 percent). Representation for 
Eurasians and other communities decreased from 3.1 percent to 1.6 percent and from 6.3 percent 
to 5 percent respectively. 
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On citizenship, the Consultative Committee recommended the relaxation 
of the residence qualification for acquisition of Federal Citizenship by 
application. It would be five out of 10 years (instead of 10 out of 20 years) for 
persons who were born in the Federation, and eight out of 15 years (instead of 15 
out of 20 years) for those who were not born in the Federation. Persons over 45 
years of age and with 20 years of residence would be exempted during the first 
two years from the language qualification. It also asserted that all Federal 
citizens who possessed the necessary qualifications would be eligible for 
employment in all services of the Federal and State Governments.100 The 
Committee, however, endorsed the retention of the main structure of the 
Federation proposals and the greater proportion of its detailed arrangements as 
suggested by the Working Committee. The revised constitutional proposals, with 
minor changes, were accepted by the British governntent in July 1947. One 
significant change was the expansion of the size of the Legislative Council to 100 
members with the number of Malay unofficial representatives reduced to 22, 
about the same proportion as recommended by HS Lee and Leong Yew Koh.101 
The exalted position of the Malay Rulers and their powers to legislate on 
matters of Islamic religion and the Malay custom remained. Agreements with the 
Malay states stipulated that a British Adviser would be appointed in each State 
and the Rulers undertook to accept the advice of their Advisers on all state affairs 
other than those relating to Islam and Malay custom. The Rulers also undertook 
to govern their States according to written constitutions and accepted the 
responsibility of encouraging the education and training of the Malay inhabitants 
of the States so as to fit them to take a full share in the economic progress, social 
welfare and government of the States and of the Federation. In this regard, the 
Malays would be given certain privileges which included reservation of quotas 
for admission into the public service, permits, licenses and scholarships. The 
100 Malayan Union (1947: 13). 
101 See Vorys (1974: 82). 
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State Agreements also provided that the Rulers would enjoy their pre-war 
prerogatives, powers and jurisdiction. A Chief Minister and a State Executive 
Council would be appointed in each state to assist the Rulers in the 
administration of their respective states.102 The Federation of Malaya finally 
came into existence on 1 April 1948 with the conclusion of a new "Federation of 
Malaya Agreement" between the British government and the Malay Rulers. A 
Malay-privileged Malaya with the extension of political and economic rights to 
the non-Malays thus came into being. 
Merdeka Constitution: 
The Constitutional Contract for Independent Malaya 
In the early 1950s, as the road to independence became more tenable and self-
government was about to become a reality, contestation started to revolve 
around the terms of a new "constitutional contract" for an independent Malaya. 
As Malayan politics had increasingly been communal in nature, the terms of the 
constitutional contract envisaged hard bargaining between communal leaders 
rather than a covenant between individual members of the society. A formal 
mechanism for communal leaders to negotiate the terms of the constitutional 
contract was first introduced in 1948. The Communities Liaison Committee 
(CLC) brought together prominent leaders of different ethnic communities such 
as Dato' OnnJaafar of UMNO and Tun Tan Cheng Lock of MCA to discuss wide 
range of inter-communal issues prior to independence. These included matters 
pertaining to citizenship, the special position of the Malays, Malay land 
reservation, placement of Malay students in technical schools, racial composition 
in government departments and other issues of general concern such as 
102 Mohd. Hishamuddin (1995b) 
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developments in tin mining, rubber small-holdings and co-operatives.103 
Although the Committee was often devoid of a consensus on those issues, it 
managed to identify salient inter-communal issues and helped forge cooperation 
and understanding among communal leaders, which later proved to be useful in 
their effort to accommodate competing communal interests and lay the basis for 
the creation of a united Malayan people who were ready for independence.104 
By the mid 1950s, three major ethnic-based political parties, namely, 
United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese 
Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), through their 
association in the Alliance,105 had provided a platform for behind closed-door 
but forceful inter-communal bargaining to reach the terms of the constitutional 
contract that would be the basis for the inter-communal constitutional 
arrangement in the independent Malaya. The Alliance leaders, while 
representing their respective ethnic communities, portrayed themselves as the 
leaders of Malayan people irrespective of race in an effort to build a united 
Malayan identity ready for independence. 106 After gaining a large mandate in 
the first Federal Election held in July 1955 by winning 51 out of 52 seats in the 
Federal Legislative Council, the Alliance leaders formed the government and 
were ready to negotiate the terms of independence with the British government. 
In January 1956, a delegation consisting of representatives of the Malay Rulers 
1ru See the minutes of CLC meetings in "Communities Liaison Committee: Drafts and Notes" (SP. 
3/ A/174) in Tun Leong Yew Koh's Papers, National Archive, Kuala Lumpur. 
101 Vorys (1974: 104). 
ms The UMNO-MCA Alliance was formed on the verge of the first Kuala Lumpur Municipal 
Election in 1952. It won nine of the lntal of 12 seats contested in the election. Since then, it won 
most of the municipal elections held in Malaya, with exception of the Ipoh municipal election, 
where the opposition People's Progressive Party made a significant breakthrough. The MIC 
joined the Alliance in the first Federal Election held in 1955. 
!06 But this does not suggest that all was well with the Alliance's rank-and-file. The creation of a 
united Malayan identity was still in its formative stage and mired with deep sectional interests. 
The resignation of MCA President Tun Tan Cheng Lock in July 1954 was reportedly due to his 
disagreement with a clique within the MCA which wanted the party "to be nothing more than a 
vehicle for maintaining and promoting mythical Chinese interests". See "M.C.A or T.L.A (Tolong 
Lah Association)?" The Singapore Standard, 30 July 1954. 
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and the Alliance government, led by UMNO President and Chief Minister, 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, left for London for this purpose. In London, they 
discussed issues relating to the final process of transition to independence and 
the future relationship between Britain and independent Malaya. These included 
matters of defence, internal security, foreign relations, finance and 
Malayanization of the civil service.107 The date for independence was set for 
August 1957. No less important, on 7 March 1956, an independent constitutional 
commission, chaired by Lord Reid, a senior British judge, was appointed by Her 
Majesty the Queen and Their Highnesses the Malay Rulers to propose the 
Constitution for the independent Malaya.ms The commission's terms of reference 
specified its tasks as to make recommendations for a federal form of constitution 
with parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy as the basis of its 
political system. The Federal Constitution would include provisions for the 
establishment of a strong central government with the States and Settlements 
enjoying a measure of autonomy, the safeguarding of the position and prestige of 
the Malay Rulers as constitutional Rulers of their respective States, a 
constitutional Yang di-Pertuan Besar109 as the Supreme Head of the Federation to 
be chosen from among Their Highnesses the Rulers, a common nationality for 
the whole of the Federation and the safeguarding of the special position of the 
Malays and the legitimate interests of other ethnic communities.110 
107 It was agreed that until independence was achieved, external defence and external relations 
should be under the responsibility of the British government. Even after independence, the 
British government would continue to assist in the expansion of the Malayan army. Internal 
security and internal defence, however, would be the responsibility of a Malayan minister. A 
Malayan Minister of Finance would be appointed and an Economic Committee under the 
chairmanship of the Chief Minister would be established. A rapid Malayanization of i:he civil 
service ;vith generous compensation to non-Malayan civil servants would also be set in motion. 
A compensation scheme worth M$74 million was offered to non-Malayan civil servants as a 
"price for independence" (Vorys 1974: 125). 
100 Members of the commi,sion were Sir Ivor Jennings, Master of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, Sir 
William McKell, former Governor-Gene.ral of Australia, Mr. B. Malik, former Chief Justice of the 
Allahabad High Court, and Mr. Justice Abdul Hamid, Judge of the West Pakistan High Court. 
109 The term Yang di-Pertuan Besar was later replaced with the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. 
uo Great Britain (1957b: 6). 
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Upon returning to Malaya, the Alliance set up a \'\forking Party 
comprising representatives of UMNO, MCA and MIC to draft constitutional 
proposals for the independent Malaya.111 By September 1956, the Alliance 
leaders, after thrashing out contentious issues relating to, among others, the 
acquisition of citizenship, the special position of the Malays, the national 
language, the religion of the federation and the institutional set up of the 
independent Malaya, had come up with a political testament containing essential 
terms of the constitutional contract.112 They desired that the country's 
Constitution" must provide for the establishment of a sovereign and fully 
independent State in which the people shall enjoy freedom and equality". 
Presumably taking into consideration the potentially destabilizing nature of 
Malaya's ethnically divided society, the Alliance leaders also agreed that the 
Constitution should "provide for a stable democratic government and ensure 
peace and harmony amongst its people".113 
It seemed that the acquisition of citizenship by the non-Malays and the 
preservation of the special position of the Malays were the tvvo most contentious 
issues discussed by the Alliance leaders.114 Realizing that compromises had to be 
reached on these two issues, the leaders agreed that in return for guarantees of 
the special position of the Malays, generous terms of citizenship for the non-
Malays would be provided in order to create a common nationality.115 This 
m The members of the Working Party were Abdul Kadir Shamsuddin and Senu Abdul Rahman 
(UMNO), Ong Yoke Lin and Y.C Kang (MCA) and A Krishnadas and K Ramanathan (MIC). 
MCA Executive Secretary TH Tan acted as its Secretary. 
112 See the Alliance's memorandum to the Reid Constitutional Commission entitled "Political 
Testament of the Alliance" dated 27September1956 in Tun Leong Yew Koh's Papers (SP. 
3/ A/114), National Archive, Kuala Lumpur. 
m Alliance (1956: 2). 
m See Minutes of Meetings of the Working Party on the Constitution and the Alliance Ad Hoc 
Political Committee in Tun Leong Yew Koh's Papers (SP. 3/ A/114), National Archive, Kuala 
Lumpur. 
ns The Alliance was against the Malay Rulers' proposal to maintain state nationality, which 
would create dual rather than a single common nationality. Apparently, state nationality was 
believed to be relevant for the purpose of eligibility for local election. See Minutes of tl1e Alliance 
Ad-Hoc Political Sub-Committee held on 14 March 1957 at MCA Headquarters, Kuala Lumpur. 
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communal agreement stipulated that all those who were born in Malaysia116 on 
or after independence, including non-Malays, would acquire citizenship by the 
operation of law. Those of alien parents, however, should be free to choose their 
nationality after attaining the age of 21 years. If they chose to be nationals, they 
must make a declaration to that effect within a period of one year after attaining 
that age.117 For those who were born in the Settlements of Malacca and Penang 
who automatically became British subjects, they would be the nationals of 
Malaysia on independence. However, they would be entitled to retain their 
British nationality by making declaration renouncing Malaysian nationality 
within the period of one year after independence. 
Recognizing the fact that a large alien population existed in the Federation 
of Malaya, the continued existence of which would not be in the interest of 
national unity, the Alliance leaders agreed that aliens would be given citizenship 
by registration if they met certain requirements. For those who were born in the 
Federation before independence, they had to be 18 years of age or more, be of 
good character, take the oath of allegiance and abjure allegiance to any other 
country, declare their intention to reside in the country permanently, and to have 
resided in the country for five out of seven years immediately preceding the date 
of their application and have a simple knowledge of Malay.nB For those alien 
residents who were not born in the Federation, they would also be eligible for 
citizenship, provided they had resided in the country for eight out of ten years 
immediately preceding the date of their application and met all other 
requirements set for Federation-born aliens. Though the Alliance leaders, for 
practical reasons, agreed that language qualification for all Federation-born 
This document is available in Tun Leong Yew Koh's papers (SP.3/ A/114) in the National 
Archive, Kuala Lumpur. 
116 UMNO proposed the name "Malaysia" for the independent federation, while the MCA 
preferred it to be called "Malaya", However, the name Malaysia was used throughout the 
memorandum, 
117 There was no consensus on this proviso. The MCA and MIC viewed that a declaration to that 
effect was unnecessary. See Alliance (1956: 13). 
m See Alliance (1956: 16). 
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aliens and alien residents above the age of 45 should be waived for a short period 
of time after independence, they reached no consensus on its exact length. 
UMNO wanted to make it one year, while the MIC preferred it to be two years.119 
Apart from these two categories of citizenship by operation of the law and 
registration, the Alliance leaders also agreed that, in the future independent 
Malaysia, those aliens who wished to become nationals might acquire citizenship 
by naturalization, provided they were 21 years of age or above, had been 
residing in the country for 10 out of 12 years immediately preceding their 
application and met all other requirements set for the alien residents and 
Federation-born aliens.120 
Though the Alliance leaders accepted that "in independent Malaysia, all 
nationals should be accorded equal rights, privileges and opportunities and there 
must not be discrimination on ground of race or creed", they recognized the fact 
that "the Malays are the original sons of the soil and that they have a special 
position arising from this fact, and also by virtue of the treaties made between 
the British Government and the various sovereign Malay States". As such, they 
agreed that the Constitution should provide that the "Yang di-Pertuan Besar 
should have the special responsibility of safeguarding the special position of the 
Malays". In this regard, they proposed that "the Constitution should give him 
powers to reserve for the Malays a reasonable portion of lands, posts in the 
public service, permits to engage in business or trade, where such permits are 
restricted and controlled by law, Government scholarships and such similar 
119 Mr. Devaser, an MIC representative in the Alliance Ad Hoc Political Sub-Committee, 
explained that the longer period of waiver was needed because many non-Malays who lived in 
isolation from the Malays had no opportunity or necessity to learn Ma lay at the time. He cited the 
case of Indian estate workers who only knew Tamil The MCA representatives too, citing 
economic and demographic factors, and the fact that it was not the official policy in the past to 
teach Malay in all schools, contended that the language test should be waived altogether. UMNO 
representatives however contended that the one year period was sufficient since the test would 
be in the simplest form. See Minutes of the Third Meeting of U1e Alliance Ad Hoc Political Sub-
committee held on 27 July 1956 at the MCA Headquarters, Kuala Lumpur in Tun Leong Yew 
Ko h's Papers (SP.3/ A/114), National Archive, Kuala Lumpur. 
120 Alliance (1956: 14) 
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privileges accorded by the Government''. However, in view of the Yang di-
Pertuan Besar' s responsibility to safeguard legitimate interests of other ethnic 
communities, "the Constitution should also provide that any exercise of such 
powers should not in any way infringe the legitimate interests of the other 
communities or adversely affect or diminish the rights and opportunities at 
present enjoyed by them".121 In regard to the acquisition of land, the Alliance's 
political testament also categorically stated that it should be done without 
prejudice to the system of Malay Reservations.122 The Alliance leaders also 
agreed that Malay should be the national and official language of Malaysia123 
and Islam, the religion of the Malay majority, should be the religion of Malaysia. 
The observance of this principle, however, should not impose any disability on 
121 Alliance (1956: 18). The provision for the special position of the Malays however raised 
concerns among some non-Malay leaders in the Alliance, fearing that it would infringe the 
existing rights of the non-Malays. MCA leader Tun Tan Siew Sin in an Alliance meeting in April 
1957 mentioned the case of rice licensing where, according to him, there had been an attempt to 
allocate 50 percent of the licenses to the Malays. Saying that Tun Tan got it wrong, UMNO 
representative Tun Dr. Ismail explained that existing licenses should remain untouched. But in 
future licenses, considering the posslbllily that the rice industry was one aspect of business in 
which the Malays stood a reasonable chance of success, the Malays should be given a certain 
percentage. Dr. Ismail stressed that the grant of licenses to the Malays should not redound to the 
disadvantage of the existing license holders. See Minutes of the Alliance Ad Hoc Political Sub-
committee Meeting held on 2 April 1957 at Alliance Headquarters, Kuala Lumpur. The 
document is available in Tun Leong Yew Koh's Papers (SP.3/ A/114) in the National Archive, 
Kuala Lumpur. 
122 Alliance (1956: 11). It was to be noted that the Working Committee was more explicit in 
qualifying the application of the principle of equality in view of the provision on special 
privileges for the Malays. They stated in the memorandum that: "No discrimination against any 
national on grounds only of religion, race, community, sex, place of birth, or any other, subject to 
the provisions concerning special privileges for Malays and the legitimate interests of the other 
nationals". See Minutes of the Alliance Working Party on Constitution Meeting held on 30 July 
1956 at MCA Headquarters, Kuala Lumpur. The document is available in Tun Leong Yew Koh's 
Papers (SP.3/ A/114) in the National Archive, Kuala Lumpur. 
123 There was dissension within the MCA over the party's decision in August 1956 to endorse the 
Alliance memorandum to the Reid Commission which excluded Chinese as an official language. 
It was reported that the party's general committee decided against the inclusion of Chinese as an 
official language only after a personal plea by MCA President Tun Tan Cheng Lock and the 
Alliance Whip in the Federal Council Tun Dr. Lim Chong Eu. 15 voted against it, 14 for and 31 
abstained. See Straits Times, 28August1956. 
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non-Muslims professing and practising their own religions, and should not 
imply that the State was not a secular State.124 
Meanwhile, the Reid Commission sat in Malaya between June 1956 and 
February 1957. After holding 118 public hearings and receiving some 131 
memoranda, the Commission on 11February1957 concluded its findings and 
presented its report to the British Queen and the Malay Rulers.125 The report 
covered matters relating to the political and administrative structure of the state 
like the Supreme Head of the Federation, the constitution of the Parliament and 
the Executive, the division of legislative and executive powers, the relationship 
between the Federal and the State governments, the judiciary, finance, public 
service, the executive and legislative structures of the States and the Settlements 
and elections; those related to the rights and privileges of the people like 
fundamental liberties, citizenship and special position of the Malays; and other 
general provisions like the national language, the religion of the federation and 
the supreme law of the land. 
The Commission's recommendations were mainly in line with the 
Alliance's proposals, except in four important aspects, namely, citizenship, 
special position of the Malays, religion and language. The Commission 
recommended more lenient citizenship requirements than those proposed by the 
Alliance. Apart from accepting the Alliance's proposal on the exemption of the 
language test, the Commission also recommended that incomplete proof of 
residence would be accepted for applications made within one year after 
independence provided that such incomplete applications should be completed 
within a period of 18 months after independence.126 Contrary to the Alliance's 
opposition to dual citizenship, the Commission recommended that the British 
121 Alliance (1956: 19). 
125 Great Britain (1957b). 
m See Article 18(2) of the Draft Constitution. This proviso was inserted considering the high 
illiteracy rare among the applicants and the fact that proof of residence and birth was difficult to 
obtain in those days. 
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subjects should not be required to renounce their British nationality upon 
acquiring Malayan citizenship. This would mean that those, who by virtue of the 
British Nationality Act 1948 became the citizens of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies, or "Commonwealth Citizens", would be able to retain their British 
nationality without having to renounce Malayan citizenship after 
independence.127 What is more, the Commission also recommended that those 
who were foreign citizens at the time of application may also choose to retain 
their foreign citizenship. 12s 
On the special position of the Malays, the Commission, with Justice Abdul 
Hamid of Pakistan dissenting, found it difficult to reconcile the need to create a 
common nationality with the granting of special position permanently to one 
race. It argued that as common nationality and a democratic form of government 
were the basis upon which a unified Malayan nation was to be created "it was 
inherent that all the citizens of Malaya, regardless of race, creed or culture, 
should enjoy certain fundamental rights including equality before the !aw".129 As 
such, it recommended that the special position of the Malays provided under the 
Federation of Malaya Agreement to be reviewed after 15 years of independence, 
where it would then be up to the legislature whether to retain, reduce or 
discontinue it entirelv.13o It also recommended that there should be no further 
' 
rvralay land reservations and that it should be left to each State to reduce Malay 
reservations in that State at an appropriate time.131 It also rebuffed the Alliance's 
proposal that the Constitution should confer on the Yang di-Pertuan Besar the 
m This would include a large number of Chinese, Indians, Ceylonese and Malays who were born 
in the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, India and Ceylon. 
128 Great Britain (1957b: 14-21). 
129 Great Britain (1957b: 71) 
1w Under tbe Federation of Malaya Agreement, the Malays were entitled to land reservation, 
quotas for admission to tbe public service, permits and licences, and preferences in tbe granting 
of scholarships, bursaries and other forms of aid for educational purposes. 
rn This however subject to two qualifications. First, if any land ceased to be reserved, an 
equivalent arp_a may be reserved provided it is not already occupied by a non-Malay, and second, 
if any undeveloped land is opened up, part of it may be reserved provided that an equivalent 
area is made available to non-Malays (Great Britain 1957b: 72). 
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responsibility to safeguard the special position of the Malays. The Commission 
contended that constitutional provisions on land reservation and quotas for the 
Malays were sufficient to safeguard their special position.132 The Commission 
also rejected the Alliance's proposal to make Islam the religion of the Federation. 
It preferred instead to retain the existing position in the Malay states with regard 
to its recognition and the non-existence in the federation of any provision 
preventing recognition of Islam by legislation or otherwise in any respect which 
did not prejudice the civil rights of individual non-Mus!ims.133 While the 
Commission recommended that Malay should be the national language, and that 
for a period of at least 10 years English should continue to be used as an official 
language, it also recommended that the Indian and Chinese legislators who 
could not speak fluently in either English or Malay be allowed to speak in their 
respective languages in the legislature.134 
Contrary to the Commission's recommendations on the special position of 
the Malays and state religion, Justice Abdul Hamid, in a separate note, drew the 
commission's attention to its own terms of reference that the new constitution 
should include provision for "the safeguarding of the special position of the 
Malays and the legitimate interests of other communities". The special position 
of the Malays, he argued, could only be safeguarded if the Alliance's proposals 
on the matter were adopted.133 He also supported the Alliance's proposal that 
Islam be made the religion of the Federation provided that non-Muslim citizens 
shall not be prevented from professing, practicing and propagating their own 
religions nor shall any citizen be under any disability by reason of his being a 
non-Muslim.136 After all, he justified, no less than 15 countries in the world at 
132 Great Britain (1957b: 71-73). 
133 Great Britain (1957b: 73). 
134 Great Britain (1957b: 74). 
m In addition, he proposed a proviso on quotas for the Malays to be alterable by the Parliament 
only by a majority decision of the total number of members of each house and by a majority of 
not Jess than two-thirds of the members present and voting (Great Britain 1957b: 98). 
J36 Great Britain (1957b: 99). 
64 
the time had a provision on state religion in their constitutions. Finally, he 
argued, these were the essence of the Alliance's memorandum, which contained 
recommendations on politically controversial matters, the agreement of which 
was reached by the communal leaders after long and protracted deliberations. 
Therefore, he reasoned, it was not quite right for the Commission to vary the 
Alliance's recommendations on such politically significant issues.137 
Under the section on fundamental liberties, the Commission had made 
extensive recommendations on the supremacy of the Constitution, rule of law, 
natural justice and the power of judicial review. These are the aspects of the 
Constitution that the Alliance leaders had given little attention to in their 
memorandum.138 It recommended that the Constitution should be the Supreme 
Law of the Federation and that all laws, State Constitutions and executive actions 
which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, to the extent of 
their inconsistencies, shall be void.139 The Supreme Court would have the power 
to declare as void any written laws or executive actions that are inconsistent with 
the Constitution.140 In enforcing the rule of law, the Supreme Court would 
determine whether a public authority exercised its judicial or quasi judicial 
function in accordance with the "principles of natural justice".141 More 
important, the Commission recommended guarantees for fundamental 
individual rights which they viewed as "essential conditions for a free and 
democratic way of life".112 These included provisions against detention without 
137 Great Britain (1957b: 98-100) 
rn Points on fundamental liberties were contained in only a one-page appendix to the main 
memorandum. It only listed in brief the "typical" liberties existing in any democratic society. 
Without sufficient explanation of those liberties, it was hard to ascertain what the Alliance 
leaders really meant by them. In some respect, the liberties listed in the appendix stood in stark 
contradiction to some of the terms contained in the main memorandum. 
139 See Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 3 of the draft Constitution. 
140 See Article 4 of the draft Constitution. 
m Article 4(b)(iii) of the draft Constitution. Justice Abdul Hamid, however, was against the 
inclusion of the principles of natural justice in the Constitution because they are capable of 
innumerable interpretations. The inclusion of the principles, without defining them anywhere in 
the Constitution, he argued, would result in chaos (Great Britain 1957b: 101 ). 
1•2 Great Britain (1957b: 70). 
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legal authority, slavery and forced labour which would apply to all persons;143 
provisions against banishment, exclusion from the Federation and restriction of 
freedom of movement which would apply to all citizens;144 guarantees for 
freedom of speech and expression;Hs guarantees for freedom of religion which 
included the right to profess, practice and propagate one's religion as well as the 
right of each religious group to manage its own affairs, to maintain religious or 
charitable institutions including schools, and to hold property for these 
purposes;146 and provisions against discrimination by law on the ground of 
religion, race, descent or place of birth and discrimination on those grounds by 
any Government or public authority in making appointments or contracts or 
permitting entry to any educational institutions, or granting financial aid in 
respect of pupils or students.147 The Commission also recommended that there 
should be no discrimination with regard to carrying out of any trade, business, 
profession or occupation;148 that no person should be deprived of his property 
save in accordance with law;149 and that any law for compulsory acquisition or 
requisition of property must provide for adequate compensation.150 The 
Commission however cautioned that these provisions "must be modified in 
certain respects to take account of the special position of the Malays" 
The publication of the Commission's report in February 1957 caused a stir 
among various communal groups in Malaya. Two critical points of the 
communal-based constitutional contract, i.e. common citizenship and the special 
position of the Malays, generated heated debates. Malay newspapers were 
sceptical of the concessions given to the non-Malays. The editorial in Warta 
143 Articles 5 and 6 of the draft Constitution. 
144 Article 9 of the draft Constitution. 
145 Article 10 of the draft Constitution. 
146 Articles 11 and 12 of the draft Constitution. 
147 Articles 8 and 12 of the draft Con.•titution. 
148 Article 8(3} of the draft Constitution. 
149 Article 13(1) of the draft Constitution. 
150 Article 13(2) of the draft Constitution. 
m Great Britain (1957b: 71). 
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Negara insisted that "the country had one sovereign nation - the Malays. 
Therefore, independence and sovereignty under British protection would have to 
be handed over to the Malays, who in turn, rather than depending on 
"privileges", would define the terms of citizenship of others" .1s2 Utusan Melayu, 
in a more moderate tone, questioned the merit of imposing a review on Malay 
privileges after a short period of 15 years.153 Malay-based political parties and 
organizations, other than UMNO, took the more radical view. Pan-Malayan 
Islamic Party (PMIP), Parti Negara (Nation's Party) and Parti Ra'yat (People's 
Paty) pledged to prevent the report from being accepted, while the Perak Malay 
Chambers of Commerce demanded that the Commission's report be amended so 
as to recognize the Malays as the "master race" in the independent Malaya. The 
Malay Society of Great Britain sent a cablegram to the Chief Minister informing 
him of its rejection of the commission's recommendations, while 20 Malay 
organizations in Kuala Lumpur decided to send delegates to London to directly 
appeal to the British government against the recommendations.154 
Not unexpectedly, Chinese opinion, as it appeared in Chinese and English 
newspapers, held opposite views about the Malays' special position. They 
considered the commission's report as excessively generous toward the Malays. 
The Chinese daily Kwong Wah fit Poh considered it improper for a democratic 
country to have people of various communities being divided into different 
grades,155 while Nanyang Sum Pau considered the 15-year period for the 
implementation of Malay privileges policy as too long.156 The English-language 
Singapore Standard was even more cynical. fts editorial proclaimed: 
1s2 Warta Negara, 27February1957 cited in Vorys (1974: 131). 
153 Vorys (1974: 131). 
154 Vorys (1974: 132). 
155 Kwong Wah ]it Poh, 28February1957 cited in Vorys (1974: 132). 
155 Cited in Vorys (1974: 132) 
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The greatest defect in the psychology of the Malays is the innate fear that 
they are unable to stand on their own feet within the 15-year period 
during which they would enjoy special privileges. They want this period 
to be for all time. This is tantamount to an admission that they will never 
be able to compete with other races for a proper place under their own 
Malayan sun. This is also an admission that they are not prepared to work 
hard enough for what they want in this world_l57 
However vociferous and potentially explosive these views were, it was 
the Alliance which set the terms of the constitutional contract. The Alliance 
leaders decided to discuss the Commission's recommendations privately in an 
Ad-hoc Political Sub-Committee headed by Tun Abdul Razak and in the official 
Working Party consisting of the High Commissioner and representatives of the 
Malay Rulers and the Alliance Government.158 Describing the Alliance's proposal 
as representing "the maximum agreement on all sides", especially on the issue of 
citizenship, language, religion and the special position of the Malays, the 
Alliance leaders decided to stick to their earlier proposals. Obviously dissatisfied 
with the Reid Commission's deparh1re from the Alliance's proposals on the key 
issues of citizenship, language, religion and the special position of the Malays, 
Tun Abdul Razak remarked that these are delicate and controversial issues 
which should be decided from the political angle and not to be left to the legal 
"experts" to decide.159 As such, while they agreed that the non-Malays should be 
granted access to the political system through a liberal extension of citizenship, 
they rejected the creation of "dual citizenship" for Commonwealth citizens. 
Additional concessions however were given to the non-Malays in which it was 
1s1 The Singapore Standard, 2 March 1957 cited in Vorys (1974: 132). 
158 See Minutes of the Alliance Ad-Hoc Political Sub-Committee between March and April 1957 in 
Tun Leong Yew Koh' s Papers (SP.3/ A/114), National Archive, Kuala Lumpur. 
159 See Minutes of the Alliance Ad-Hoc Political Sub-Committee :v!eeting held on 14 March 1957 
at MCA Headquarters, Kuala Lumpur in Tun Leong Yew Koh's Papers (SP.3/ A/114), National 
Archive, Kuala Lumpur. 
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agreed that physical absence from the Federation for educational purposes 
approved by the appropriate Minister would not be regarded as a break in the 
period of residence. Also the non-Malays' rights to property, culture and 
language would not be arbitrarily circumscribed. On language especially, a 
proviso would be inserted in the Constitution to provide proper safeguards for 
the teaching, learning and use of vernacular languages, other than for official 
purposes, as promised in the Alliance election manifesto.160 
In return for the generous terms of citizenship, the Malays would be 
guaranteed that their special position would be safeguarded under a 
"permanent" rather than "transitional" constitutional provision,161 Malay would 
be the sole official language,162 Islam would be the religion of the Federation, and 
they would share proportionately in economic rewards. Though Islam would be 
made the religion of the Federation, the non-Muslims would be guaranteed their 
right to profess, practice and propagate their religion in peace and harmony .163 
1w See "Report to the Alliance National Council by Dato' Razak b. Dato' Hussien, Chairman of 
the Alliance Ad-Hoc Political Sub-Committee" dated 4May1957 in Tun Leong Yew Koh's Papers 
(SP.3/ A/114), National Archive, Kuala Lumpur. 
1•1 The Reid Commission's recommendation that the Malay special position policy should be 
reviewed after 15 years of independence was rejected. However, on the insistence of the non-
Malay leaders in the Alliance, the Alliance National Council agreed that a proviso should be 
inserted in the Constitution to guarantee that the non-Malays' interests in trade and business 
would not be adversely affected by the creation of quotas for the Malays. Though the special 
position of the Malays is now entrenched in a "permanent" provision, Tun Abdul Razak assured 
his non-Malay colleagues in the Alliance that the policy would be subjected to review from time 
to time. See Minutes of the Alliance National Council Meeting held on 5May1957 at MCA 
Headquarters, Kuala Lumpur in Tun Leong Yew Koh's Papers (SP.3/ A/114), National Archive, 
Kuala Lumpur. 
162 Both MCA and MIC agreed to forego the use of vernacular languages in the legislature. In 
return, UMNO agreed to drop language qualifications for those standing in election. See Minutes 
of the Alliance National Council Meeting held on 5 May 1957 at MCA Headquarters, Kuala 
Lumpur in Tun Leong Yew Koh's Papers (SP.3/ A/114), National Archive, Kuala Lumpur. 
163 Jt should be noted that although the Alliance National Council adopted the Ad-Hoc Political 
Sub-Committee report on the Co11stitution which proposed that "there would be complete 
freedom to propagate and practice all other religions ... ", it was unclear whether the issue of 
propagation of non-Muslim religion among Muslims, which was restricted by Article 11(4) of the 
Federal Constitution, was discussed at all by the Alliance leaders at this stage. Relevant official 
documents on the Alliance leaders' deliberation on the Constitution such as the minutes of 
meetings of the Ad-Hoc Political Sub-Committee and the Alliance l\iational Council and Tun 
Abdul Raz.ak' s report on the Constitution were silent on this issue. It was probable that the issue 
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Procedural mechanisms to ensure Malay political supremacy, such as 
delimitation of electoral constituencies, which would facilitate a Malay majority 
in the legislature, would also be put in place. The goverrunent was to pursue the 
goal of making Malay the official language through its education policy and the 
goal of increasing the Malay's share in the economy through its economic 
policy.164 Finally, it was agreed that the Alliance leaders would be the guardians 
of the "constitutional bargain" and that they would neither be distracted by 
communal pressures nor would they act arbitrarily against the other 
communities.165 
The official Working Party finalized its report in May 1957 and 
immediately left for London to discuss its final recommendations with the British 
Government.100 The recommendations found their way into a White Paper tabled 
in the British Parliament in June 1957. By July 1957, all three Alliance parties 
approved the White Paper and the draft lv1erdeka Constitution.167 The Federal 
Constitution Bill 1957, which was adopted by the Federal Legislative Council in 
August 1957, mainly reflected the wishes of the Alliance leaders on the salient 
communal issues,168 The Alliance's proposal on citizenship was adopted, while 
the Reid Commission's majority view on the special position of the Malays was 
substantially altered. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong169 would have the responsibility 
to safeguard the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of 
was brought to the Working Party level where the Alliance proposals and the Reid Commission 
recommendations were scrutinized. 
16< Vorys (1974: 134). 
165 Despite pressures from within the Chinese community, the MCA agreed not to press for 
demands which went beyond the Alliance proposals. These included the demands of the Chinese 
guilds and associations for nationality by birth Gus soli) to be extended to those born before 
independence, multi-lingual legislatures, equal rights for all citizens and a five-year residential 
qualification for citizenship by registration. See Stmday Times, 5 May 1957. 
"' Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak, Tun Ong Yoke Lin and Tun V.T Sambanthan 
represented the Alliance government in the delegation. 
167 See Straits Times, 8 July 1957. 
'"'Great Britain (1957a). 
m The term Yang di-Pertuan Agong was adopted in the Federal Constitution instead of Yang di-
Pertuan Besar. 
70 
other communities.170 In discharging this responsibility, the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong shall act on the advice of the cabinet. He would be required to exercise his 
functions under the Constitution and the federal laws to ensure the reservation 
of quotas for the Malays, as he might deem reasonable, of positions in the public 
service,171 scholarships, exhibitions, educational or training privileges, and 
permits and licences.172 He would also be empowered to give general directions 
to the appropriate authorities for the purpose of ensuring the reservation of these 
quotas.173 However, in the exercise of his function to safeguard the special 
position of the Malays, no person (presumably non-Malays) should be deprived 
"of any public office held by him or of the continuance of any scholarship or 
other educational or training privileges or special facilities enjoyed by him" .174 
The 15-year cut off point for the enjoyment of Malay privileges as proposed by 
the Reid Commission was dropped from the Constitution. The Malay privileges 
provision under Article 153 would be retained unless and until the Parliament 
amended it with the consent of the Conference of Rulers.175 State Enactments 
amending existing laws on Malay land reservation should not only be passed by 
a majority of the total number of members of the State Legislative Assembly and 
by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting, but 
should also be approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament passed in 
the same way.176 
Malay language also gained primacy in the Constitution. It would be 
made the official language and English would be tolerated as co-equal in official 
business for ten years after independence "and thereafter until Parliament 
170 Article 153 (1) of the Federal Constitution. All Articles of the Federal Constitution mentioned 
here refer to the original Articles in the 1957 Constitution before any amendments. 
m Quotas in public service of a State will be under the responsibility of respective State Ruler. 
172Article153(2) of the Federal Constitution. 
173 Article 153(3) of the Federal Constitution. 
m Article 153(4) of the Federal Constitution. 
175 Article 159(5) of the Federal Constitution. 
176 Article 89(1) of the Federal Constitution. 
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otherwise provides" .177 Contrary to the Reid Commission's recommendation on 
the Chinese and Indian languages, neither would be accepted in official councils. 
On Islam, the Constitution recognizes its status as the official religion of the 
Federation, but without denying the right of non-Muslims to profess and practice 
their own religions.178 However, contrary to both the Reid Commission's 
recommendation and the Alliance memorandum on the freedom to propagate 
one's religion, the Constitution allows State law and, in respect of the Federal 
Territories, federal law to control or restrict the propagation of any religious 
doctrine or belief among Muslims.179 This, as Tun Abdul Razak explained, was 
intended to give power to the Malay Rulers as Head of Religion in their 
respective States "to protect the interest of the religion of Islam against any 
teaching contrary to the true principles of Islam".180 
Though both the Alliance memorandum and the Reid Commission Report 
contained a statement implying that the Malayan state would be secular despite 
Islam being made an official religion, the phrase "secular state" was not inserted 
in the Constitution. This perhaps reflected the special constitutional role of Islam 
which goes beyond the symbolism of an official religion, but also as part and 
parcel of the political and legal system in the new nation, the implication of 
which would negate the proposition that the state was at all secular. Contrary to 
the ordinary conception of a secular state, especially in regard to the separation 
of religion from the state, the Federal Constitution provides for a special role of 
Islam in state administration. It sanctions application of Islamic personal and 
family law over persons professing the religion of Islam, provides for the 
establishment of syari' ah courts run by state officials to administer Islamic law,181 
allows the State to collect Islamic revenues such as zakat, fitrah and baitulmal and 
17'1Article152(2) of the Federal Constitution. 
17!! Article 3and11(1) of the Federal Constitution. 
179 Article 11(4) of the Federal Constitution. 
160 Federal Legislative Council Debates, 11 July 1957, col. 2978. 
m List 11, Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution. 
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consider them as state revenues to be paid to a special fund,182 and provides 
constitutional guarantee for the allocation of state funds to Islamic institutions.183 
While moving the constitutional proposals in the Federal Legislative 
Council on 10 July 1957, Chief Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman spoke on the 
communal formula that laid the basis for the Federal Constitution: 
A formula was agreed upon by which it was decided that in considering 
the rights of the various peoples in this country no attempt must be made 
to reduce such rights which they have enjoyed in the past. As a result you 
find written into this Constitution rights of the various peoples they have 
enjoyed in the past and new rights, in fact, accorded to new people whom 
it was the intention to win over into the fold of the Malayan Nation. I refer 
to the Citizenship rights. It is a right which has given the Malays very 
grave concern and fear. Nevertheless because of their desire and anxiety 
to put Malaya on the pedestal as an Independent Nation, they are 
prepared to give that right to the new people.184 
To ensure successful implementation of this" communal formula", the 
Constitution was devised in a way that it would, in certain circumstances, 
provides room for the State to "transcend" the criteria of democratic politics. 
These included the qualification to the principles of equality in view of the 
constitutional guarantee for the special position of the Malays. In this regard, 
Article 8(2) of the Federal Constitution invalidates state laws that discriminate 
against citizens on the ground only of religion, race, decent or place of birth 
except as expressly authorized by the Constitution.185 In line with Justice Abdul 
Hamid's dissenting view on the innumerable interpretations of the principles of 
182 Article 97(3) and Part II, Tenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution. 
183 Article 12(2) of the Federal Constitution. 
m Federal Legislative Council Debates, 10 July 1957, col. 2841. 
!BS Article 8(2) of the Federal Constitution. 
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"natural justice", the phrase was finally omitted from the actual Constitution. But 
the most significant departure from democratic politics was the Constitution's 
tendency to restrict the exercise of fundamental liberties, which the Alliance 
leaders believed would be necessary to maintain racial harmony. In response to 
the Reid Commission's recommendations on freedom of speech, an MCA 
representative in the Alliance Ad-Hoc Political Sub-Committee conveyed the 
party's opinion that there should be safeguards against the abuse of freedom of 
speech under Article 10(1) of the draft Constitution for the purpose of stirring up 
racial conflict.186 
Though the issue of restrictions on fundamental liberties was not given 
much attention by the Alliance leaders in the four meetings of its Ad-Hoc 
Political Sub-Committee held between March and April 1957, the final 
Constitution contained important provisions which allow the Parliament to 
impose restrictions on the exercise of freedom of movement, speech, expression 
and assembly. 187 In this regard, Article 4(2) of the Federal Constitution provides 
that the validity of any law shall not be questioned on the ground that it imposes 
restrictions on such freedoms. The Constitution went further to state that in the 
case of restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly and association, the validity 
of those restrictions shall be beyond question even though they "were not 
deemed necessary or expedient by the Parliament for the purposes mentioned in 
that Article".188 What is more, the Parliament would be the sole judge in 
determining the reasonableness of the laws it passed. Article 10(1) of the Reid 
Commission's draft constitution reads "Every citizen shall have the right to 
freedom of speech and expression, subject to any restriction imposed by federal 
law." However, in the final Article 10(1), the word "reasonable" which appeared 
11!6 See Minutes of the Alliance Ad Hoc Political Sub-Committee held on 11 April 1957 at the 
AlUance Headquarters, Kuala Lumpur in Tun Leong Yew Koh' s Papers (SP.3 / A/114), National 
Archive, Kuala Lumpur. 
187 Articles 4(2), 9(2) and 10(2) of the Federal Constitution. 
188 Article 4(2)(b) of the Federal Constitution. 
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before the word "restriction" was omitted. Obviously, it was intended that the 
question of reasonableness of the laws passed by the Parliament to restrict the 
exercise of fundamental liberties should be beyond the scope of judicial scrutiny. 
Justice Abdul Hamid in his dissenting note supported this position for it would 
help avoid a situation where legislation on the subject would be challenged in 
court on the ground that it was unreasonable. This, the learned judge argued, 
would cause the law to be lacking in certainty.189 The effect of this provision was 
that the Parliament would have "unfettered" power to pass laws that restrict the 
exercise of fundamental liberties.190 
It seems that the legislative intent behind Articles 4 and 10 of the Federal 
Constitution was to give wide powers to the Parliament to impose restrictions on 
the exercise of fundamental liberties. The omission of the entire Article 4 
(Enforcement of rule of law)191 of the Reid Commission's Draft Constitution and 
189 Great Britain (1957b: 101). 
'"'Explaining the effect of this "unfettered" power of the Parliament to make such laws, the then 
Attorney-General, Mr. T.V.A Brodie Q.C, said "if a restriction is imposed by law passed by 
Parliament, it is not open to somebody to go to Court and say 'Parliament thought it related to 
public security, but I ask you to say that it did nof". See Federation of Malaya Legislative Council 
Debates, 15 August 1957, col. 3144. 
191 Article 4 of the Reid Commission's Draft Constitution 
(1) Without prejudice to any other remedy provided by law -
(a) where any person alleges that any provision of any written law is void, he may apply 
to the Supreme Court for an order so declaring and, if the Supreme Court is satisfied 
that the provision is void, the Supreme Court may issue an order so declaring and, in 
the case of a provision of a written !aw which is not severable from other provisions 
of such written law, issue an order declaring that such other provisions are void; 
(b) where any person affected by any act or decision of a public authority alleges that it 
\Vas void because-
(i} the provision of the law under which the public authority acted or purported to act 
was void, or 
(ii) the act or decision itself was void, or 
(iii) where the public authority was exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function that the 
public authority was acting without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or that the 
procedure by which the act or decision was done or taken was contrary to the 
principles of natural justice. 
he may apply to the Supreme Court and, if the Court is satisfied that the allegation is 
correct, the Court may issue such order as it may consider appropriate in the 
circumstances of the case; 
(c) where it is alleged that a public authority owes a duty under this Constitution, or the 
Constitution of any Stale, and that such duty has been neglected or has not been 
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the deletion of the word "reasonable" in Article 10 (Freedom of speech, assembly 
and association)192 came under fire, especially from two lawyers-cum-legislators 
K.L Devaser and S.M. Yong. Devaser described the omission of the entire Article 
4 of the Reid Commission's Draft Constitution, which would have given 
constitutional recognition to the power of judicial review, is like "giving a right 
but not providing a remedy" .193 On the new Article 4(2), which provides for the 
power of the Parliament to pass law imposing restriction on the right to freedom 
of movement provided under Article 9(2),194 regardless of whether the restriction 
does not relate to the matters mentioned therein, Devaser said that the Article 
was "very dangerous in the sense that Parliament can pass any law and be out of 
Court" .195 On the effect of the deletion of the word "reasonable" in Article 10, 
S.M Yong warned the members of the house that "it might be inferred that 
carried out in accordance with the law, any person aggrieved thereby may apply to 
the Supreme Court for an order requiring the public authority to perform such duty 
in accordance with the law and, if the Court is satisfied that the allegation is correct, 
it may take such order as it may consider appropriate in the circumstances of the 
case. 
(2) Nothing in this Article shall entitle any person to institute proceedings in the Supreme 
Court if he is -
(a) a person subject to military law and he seeks to institute proceedings against a public 
authority to whom he is subject under military law otherwise than for the purpose of 
securing a decision whether that authority acted with or without jurisdiction; or 
(b) an alien enern y. 
m Article 10 of the Reid Commission's Draft Constitution 
(1) Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, subject to any 
reasonable restriction imposed by federal law in the interest of the security of the 
Federation, friendly relations with other couotries, public order, or morality, or in 
relation to contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to any offence. 
(2) Every citizen shall have the right to assemble peaceably and v.ithout arms, subject to any 
reasonable restriction imposed by federal law in the interest of the security of the 
Federation or public order. 
(3) Every citizen shall have the right to form associations, subject to any reasonable 
restrictions imposed by federal law in the interest of the security of the Federation, public 
order or morality. 
m Federal Legislative Council Debates, 11July1957, col 2985. 
194 Article 9(2) reads: "Subject to any restriction imposed by any law relating to the security of the 
Federation, public order, public health, or the punishment of offenders, every citizen has the right 
to move freely throughout the Federation and to reside in any part thereof". 
195 Federal Legislative Council Debates, 11July1957, col 2986. 
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Parliament could impose such restrictions as it deems necessary or expedient 
even if it is umeasonable".196 
Despite the protests, the Federal Legislative Council passed the Federal 
Constitution Bill on 15August1957 without altering its position on fundamental 
liberties. Defending the government's position on the omission of Article 4 of the 
Reid Commission's Draft Constitution and the deletion of the word "reasonable" 
in Article 10, Tunku Abdul Rahman argued that had they been retained, they 
"would have unduly fettered the power of the Parliament to make appropriate 
provision in order to safeguard and protect the rights of individuals and of the 
public". Describing the Parliament as "the true guardian of fundamental rights 
and liberties", the Tunku said that the power to make laws on such matters 
"must remain with the people themselves and entrusted to the safekeeping of 
their representatives in the Parliament" .197 This view might seem to be fairly 
democratic. But in a political and legal system where the laws and legal 
institutions are to serve state objectives, while the Parliament and the Executive 
are dominated by the ruling party, the democratic role of the Parliament to 
safeguard the rights of the individual against their encroachment by the political 
Executive is suspicious. While the Alliance leaders had made significant 
headway in reaching compromises on the sensitive communal issues, the process 
of Malayan constitution-making also demonstrated that constitutional 
guarantees for fundamental liberties had been compromised in favour of the 
entrenchment of state power. 
Conclusion 
As serving competing communal interests formed the basis of the Malayan 
constitutional contract, the conception of state-society relations understood in 
196 Federal Legislative Council Debates, 15August1957, col 3146. 
197 Federal Legislative Council Debates, 15August1957, col 3138. 
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this context departed significantly from that of the individual-based liberal social 
contract. Mixing the conception of right as communal-based on the one hand, 
and individual-based on the other, the Federal Constitution provides guarantees 
for fundamental liberties, but at the same time gives far-reaching powers to the 
State to restrict the exercise of such liberties. Such restrictions were justified on 
the ground that they were necessary to maintain racial harmony and national 
security, especially when destabilizing forces caused by the articulation of 
competing communal interests and threats emanating from communist 
insurgency had the potential to cause political instability in the new nation. What 
followed was the concentration, rather than dispersion, of law-making power in 
the hands of the political elites who controlled the executive and the legislative 
arms of the government. Furthermore, with the Alliance's terms of constitutional 
contract being entrenched in the Federal Constitution, the competing claims of 
each communal group to economic, social and political rights in the new nation 
were compromised, with no one group achieving fully its strictly communal 
interests. This opened up spaces for further articulation of communal interests 
which posed potential threats to the longevity of the agreed terms of the 
constitutional contract. These potential destabilizing forces, in turn, provide 
justification for the prioritization of state power over individual liberties. 
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Chapter III 
The Politics of Constitutional Contract and the Expansion of State Power, 
1957 -1997 
The politics of constitutional contract, which revolves around the debate on the 
special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of other ethnic 
communities, and the resultant prioritization of state power over individual 
freedoms, have been a dominant feature of Malaysian political discourse. As the 
major communal groups continued to pursue their distinct communal interests 
beyond the constitution-making stage, debates on communal issues had become a 
common source of discontent and a platform for unleashing of, whether perceived or 
real, the destabilizing forces in Malaysia's communally divided society. During the 
country's formative years, deep communal cleavages persisted despite efforts by the 
Alliance leaders to forge communal solidarity through compromises achieved in 
closed-door negotiations. However, intense pressures, either for modification of the 
terms of the constitutional contract or for their vigorous implementation, often 
stemmed from the disgruntled sections of each ethnic community. By and large, 
since independence in 1957 until the late 1980s, the constitutional contract issues 
dominated election campaigns and sometimes fueled racial tension. 
This chapter argues that the continued articulation of competing communal 
interests, apart from the existence of communist threat until the late 1980s, had 
provided justification for the government to expand its legal powers and restrict the 
exercise of fundamental liberties, often on the grounds of maintaining racial 
harmony and preserving national security. These powers, however, were sometimes 
used for quite different purposes. The laws, especially the emergency and anti-
subversion laws, had been directed against opposition politicians and government 
critics, and hence enabled the government to effectively silence dissent and diffuse 
challenge to its political dominance. By the 1990s, the government had succeeded in 
consolidating its legal powers and weakening the dissenting voices within the 
society. 
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Meanwhile, mainly due to the upward social mobility of the Bumiputera 
community during the NEP years and the government's more liberal policies on 
non-Bumiputera culture and education in the early 1990s, ethnic relations had 
significantly improved. The long period of communist threat had also ended with 
the official surrender of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) in 1989. With the 
easing of ethnic tension and the absence of the communist threat, the salience of the 
politics of the constitutional contract and the national security ideology appeared to 
be in decline. However, although these developments led to the decrease in the 
actual use of the emergency and anti-subversion laws in the early 1990s, there had 
been no actual reduction in the legal powers of the executive under those laws, 
leaving it with enormous potential powers at its disposal, which could be used to 
silence dissent. 
However, in the absence of convincing justification for the use of such laws in 
normal times, the goverrunent had been more cautious in their application. But the 
government's capacity to control dissent had not been seriously limited. The 
consolidation of the executive power as a result of its expansion during the country's 
formative years and beyond together with the emergence of the more compliant 
judiciary subsequent to the 1988 Executive-Judiciary crisis had increased the state's 
capacity to use the courts and the normal criminal and civil laws as the more 
"legitimate" means to silence dissent. By the 1990s, it was common for the more 
vocal among the opposition politicians and the goverrunent critics to be hauled to 
the courts to face "justice", rather than being detained without trial. Politics has thus 
been "judicialized" in the sense that supposedly pure political battles had been 
pushed into the judicial sphere for adjudication. Those who had the powers to 
prosecute and to exercise control over the judiciary were thus placed in an 
advantageous position to further consolidate their political dominance. 
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The Communist Threat and the Permanency of the Emergency and Anti-
Subversion Laws 
Although militant communist activities had dvvindled by the time Malaya gained 
independence in 1957, the government continued to strengthen and expand its legal 
powers.1 A White Paper published by the government in February 1959 detailed a 
new communist political strategy aimed at creating a communist state through open 
and legal means.2 lt included the formation of a "United Front" composed of pro-
communist organizations, infiltration into existing legal organizations, affiliation 
with international cormnunist organizations, economic subversion and propaganda 
aimed at winning the "hearts and minds of the people" .3 In response to this 
communist offensive, legal development in the post-independent Malaya moved 
toward enhancing the state's capacity to curb subversive activities and maintain 
national security. 
One of the important developments in this regard was the extension of the 
powers of the Executive to detain persons without trial beyond the period of 
emergency. In May 1960, barely two months before the 1948 emergency ended, the 
Parliament amended Articles 149 and 150 of the Federal Constitution. Under the 
original Article 149 (2), an anti-subversion law enacted under the Article would have 
validity for only one year. The amendment changed this position to provide that 
such law ceased to have effect only "if resolutions are passed by both Houses of 
Parliament annulling such law". This amendment paved the way towards a law on a 
more permanent footing, namely the Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA) which was 
subsequently enacted under the amended Article. The Act conferred wide powers 
on the Executive to deal with subversion after the end of the emergency. These 
1 The number of "incidents" due to communist activity had decreased from 507 a month in 1951 to less 
than forty in 1957. During the emergency from 1948 to July 1960, a total of 6, 710 insurgents were 
killed, 2, 700 surrendered and 1, 500 were captured. This reduced the communist strength to only 
about 500 men in 1960. See Federation of Malaya (1957; 6), Paget (1967; 74). 
2 Federation of Malaya (1959) 
3 The government claimed that it had recovered a "secret document" belonging to the then Deputy 
Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Malaya, Yeong Kuo, during an ambush al a communist 
camp in December 1955. The document allegedly contained details of the political offensive strategy 
to supplement the communist armed struggle. Titis included infiltration into village councils, 
students' associations and trade unions. See Federation of Malaya (1957: 10-42). 
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included the power of the police to detain a person without trial for a maximum 
period of 60 days and the power of the Minister in charge of internal security to 
detain a person without trial for a period of two years.4 
Article 150 was also amended to provide that a Proclamation of Emergency and 
an emergency ordinance would cease to have effect only when it is revoked or 
annulled. s Originally, a Proclamation of Emergency would have validity for the 
duration of two months and an emergency ordinance would cease to have force 
fifteen days after the date of both Houses of Parliament are first sitting, unless the 
Parliament decided otherwise.6 The amendment was significant in the sense that a 
Proclamation of Emergency and its ordinances would continue in effect despite the 
restoration of parliamentary government. As such, though the emergency ended in 
1960, the ISA draftsman, Professor Hickling, noted, "the opportunity was then taken 
to strengthen the powers of the executive in countering subversion and dealing with 
a state of emergency"? Defending the amendment, however, the then Deputy Prime 
Minister, Tun Abdul Razak Hussein, asserted that the country was likely to have to 
deal with the remnants of the communist terrorist organization after the emergency 
ended but the government considered it a sufficient safeguard that the Parliament 
could annul the emergency legislation at any time rather than determining a specific 
period.B On the other hand, it opened the way to the possibility of a virtually 
permanent emergency. 
The government persistently relied on the continued existence of the 
communist threat to justify the exi~tence of the emergency and anti-subversion laws 
beyond the period of actual emergency. In a White Paper published in November 
1968, the government claimed that while the Communist Party of Malaya continued 
with its armed struggle, the Communist United Front was geared toward the 
creation of conditions favorable for the banned CPM to gain absolute power.9 The 
4 The two-year period of detention is exlendable by the order of the Minister. 
s Since independence, four emergencies had been proclaimed, i.e. one each in 1964, 1966, 1969 and 
1977. The emergency proclaimed in 1969 has never been revoked, making it to appear that the 
application of emergency laws had become permanent in Malaysian (Harding 1996: 154). 
6 Jayakumar (1978: 334) 
'Hickling (1978: 6). 
a Hansard, 22 April 1960. 
9 Government of Malaysia (1968: v) 
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government alleged that two major left-wing opposition political parties, the Labor 
Party of Malaya (LPlvl) and the Malayan People's Party (PRM), which formed the 
opposition Socialist Front (SF), had been infiltrated by the CPM and acted as the 
leading components of the Communist United Front.10 Apart from the opposition 
political parties, labor unions and Chinese student movements were also said to be 
penetrated by the communist elements.11 The government's education policy, which 
wa5 viewed by the Chinese as inhibiting Chinese culture and democracy, made it 
easy for the Communists to sponsor or operate within Chinese student movements 
which were becoming more sympathetic to the communist slruggle.12 The 
government claimed that some Malay intelligentsia, religious teachers and 
politicians were also influenced by the communists.13 
Not unexpectedly, opposition leaders, union leaders, Chinese educationists and 
leftist Malays often became the target of the emergency and anti-subversion laws. 
They were alleged to have been involved in many security incidents that plagued the 
country thloughout the 1960s. These included the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation 
between 1963 and 1965}4 the1964 communal violence in Singapore, is the March 
10 The main role of l:he United Front was to bring into fruition l:he communist's strategy of combined 
parliamentary struggle and open mass-struggle. This strategy envisaged the working of these political 
parties within the framework of parliamentary democracy while at l:he same time promoting mass 
agitation aimed at arousing people's disaffection with the government. !n pursuance of this policy, 
l:he White Paper states, between October 1966 and November 1968 no less than 250 illegal 
demonstrations were organized by the LPM and the PRM. See Government of Malaysia (1968: 6) 
11 Among l:he unions were l:he Selangor Building Workers Trade Union (SBWTU), the United 
Malayan Estate Workers Union (UMEWU), l:he Electrical Industry Workers' Union of Malaya 
(EIWUM) and the Pineapple Industry Workers' Union (PJWU). The government also claimed that l:he 
communist 11 cells 11 were formed in Chinese secondary schools whose main function was to spread 
Communism and train student cadres for eventual infiltration into left-wing political parties and 
other pro-Communist organizations. See Government of Malaysia (1968: 16) 
11 Since the 1950s, it seemed l:hat Chinese students in Malaya had been influenced by pro-Communist 
elements. As a case in point, l:he banning of pro-Communist Singapore Chinese Middle Schools 
Students' Union (SCMSU) in 1956 prompted Chinese students to stage demonstrations in Penang in 
April 1957 (Means 1976: 273). 
n Government of Malaysia (1968: 30) 
14 Confrontation was a series of political and military offensives launched by Indonesia between 
January 1963 and October 1965 as a response to the formation of Malaysia. Indonesia's President 
Sukarno was against the formation of Malaysia, fearing that the consolidation of Malaya and ex-
British colonies of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak into Malaysia would increase British control over 
the region, hence threatening Indonesia's independence. The formation of Malaysia was also opposed 
by the Philippines, which had made a claim to Sabah. 
15 See Leifer (1964; 1116). 
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1967 labor unrest in Bukit Asahan Malacca,16 the November 1967 hartal (general 
strike) in Penangl7 and the May 1969 racial riot in Kuala Lumpur. This resulted in 
the arrests of opposition politicians under the ISA throughout the 1960s. The more 
prominent among them included PRM President Ahmad Boestarnam, PAS President 
Dr. Burhanuddin AI-Hilmi, LI'l'.1 President Ishak Haji Muhammad, National 
Convention Party (NCP) President Abdul Aziz Ishak, 18 DAP Secretary-General Lim 
Kit Siang, Socialist Front President Hasnul Hadi and LPM/Socialist Front leaders 
Lim Kean Siew and Karam Singh. In Singapore, protests against the formation of 
Malaysia in 1963 resulted in the arrest of more than one hundred opposition leaders, 
mainly of the left wing Barisan Sosialis and the Singapore People's Party.19 While the 
government cited security reasons for the arrest of the opposition leaders under the 
ISA, the law had in fact been a useful tool to eliminate political opponents, especially 
the "leftist" politicians who could easily be linked to the communists for their 
political views.20 
" Following the March 1967 labor umest in Bukit Asahan, Malacca, more than 90 persons were 
detained under the ISA. Among those arrested was Socialist Front leader and Member of Parliament, 
Karam Singh. The Statement of Allegations of Fact furnished to him upon his arrest mentioned, 
among others, his election as legal adviser of two pro-Communist organizations, involvement in 
public rallies organized by the Labour Party of Malaya and the Socialist Front, involvement with anti-
Malaysia elements during the 1964 confrontation with Indonesia, possessing books containing 
Communist viewpoints and playing prominent role in fomenting labor unrest in Bukit Asahan (Karam 
Singh v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia [1969] 2 ML) 129, p.p. 5). 
"Following the devaluation of the British currency in November 1967, the Malaysian government 
devalued its old sterling-based currency, making it 15 percent less valuable than the new gold-based 
currency. This sparked protests from the people, especially the poor, who were concerned about the 
sudden drop in the value of the old currency in their possession. The LPM called for a liartal (general 
strike) to protest against the devaluation. The protest however turned into ethnic violence when 
Malays, who seemed lo ignore the hartal, dashed with non-Malays. 29 people were killed, 200 were 
injured and some 1300 were arrested. The government claimed that the communists were responsible 
for the incident. See Snider (1968: 966). 
"Aziz Ishak was a former Vice-President of UMNO and Minister of Agriculture in the first cabinet of 
Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman. He fell out with the Tunku due to his dissatisfaction with the 
latter's conciliatory attitude toward Chinese businessmen and politicians. See Abdul Aziz (1977). 
19 The arrested leaders were labeled as communists or communist agents. Among them were the 
Barisan Sosialis Secretary-GeneraL Lim Chin Siong, and the People's Party of Singapore Chairman, 
Said Zahari. With most of the opposition leaders in jail, the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) easily 
gained sweeping victory in the 1964 general election. See Said (2001: 198). 
20 See Koh (2004: 42). 
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The Challenge to the Terms of the Constitutional Contract, 1957 -1970 
The main thrust of the constitutional contract, i.e. the special position of the Malays 
and the legitimate interests of other ethnic communities, remained the main subject 
of contestation among the major communal groups in post-independent Malaya. The 
pressures, either for the rigorous implementation or abandonment of the terms of 
the constitutional contract, were fomented not only by the opposition leaders, but 
also by the Alliance leaders and rank-and-file.21 This, in turn, placed the Alliance in a 
difficult position to maintain its policy of inter-communal compromises while at the 
same time commanding solid communal support. Consecutive federal election 
results underlined the Alliance's problem. Its share of popular votes plunged from a 
high as 79.6 percent in the 1955 pre-independence federal election to 51.5 percent in 
1959, and then rose slightly to 58.5 percent in 1964 only to drop again to barely 48.4 
percent in 1969. By 1969, manipulation of communal issues by the opposition in 
order to outbid the Alliance on the terms of the constitutional contract had seriously 
challenged the Alliance's formula of inter-communal compromises. 
Constitutional Contract Issues in Elections 
In three consecutive general elections held after the independence, the Alliance faced 
intense challenge from the opposition political parties which espoused the more 
hard-line approach to communal issues. In the run-up to the 1959 federal elections, 
PAS called for the setting up of an Islamic state and the restoration of Malay 
supremacy.22 Parti Negara, a right-wing Malay political party led by former UMNO 
21 UMNO Vice-President Abdul Aziz Ishak and MCA President Um Chong Eu were vocal in 
promoting communal interests to the extent that they fell out with other Alliance leaders. Aziz left 
UM!\!O to form the National Convention Party (NCI') in 1964 and Lim founded the People's 
Movement of Malaysia Party (Gerakan) in 1969. Both were opposition parties. Gerakan however 
joined the expanded Alliance, the Barisan Nasional, in 1974. 
22 PAS viewed the Alliance's compromises on communal issues as a sell-out to the non-Malays. The 
party thus demanded, an1ong other things, that (1) citizenship laws should be more stringent in the 
case of "non-Malays"; (2) the establishment of Islam as the state religion should have more practical 
consequences favoring the Malays; (3) immigration laws should be more restrictive in regard tu "non-
Malays"; (4) the posts of Menteri Besar, ministers, governors, and heads of armed forces should be 
reserved for Malays; (5) Malay should immediately be made the country's national and only official 
language, and that education policies should be substantially changed so as to produce a far more 
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President, Dato' Orm Jaafar, pressed for more government action to preserve Malay 
rights and privileges. On the non-Malay side, the Perak-based People's Progressive 
Party (PPP) stood for" equality and progress" and demanded amendments to the 
constitution to provide for equal rights and privileges, multi-lingualism and one 
class of citizenship.23 The left-wing Socialist Front (SF), which consisted of the 
predominantly Chinese Labor Party and the Malay-based Parti Rakyat 
(People' sParty), espoused a planned socialist economy and the elimination of racial 
separatism.24 
As new opposition political parties joined the fray, most notably two multi-
racial but predominantly Chinese political parties - the Democratic Action Party 
(DAP) and the Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People's Movement Party, 
Gerakan) - the challenge to the Alliance's communal compromises intensified. 1he 
DAP, in its "Setapak Declaration", which set out its manifesto for the 1969 federal 
election and served as the basis for the party's ideology, rebuked the idea of "racial 
hegemony by one community", meaning Malay hegemony, as inimical to nation-
building. It blamed the Alliance for perpetuating racial discrimination which 
generated deep feelings of cultural insecurity on the part of the non-Malays. Vowing 
to create a "Malaysian Malaysia", the DAP stated its commitment to "a free, 
democratic and socialist Malaysia, based on the principles of racial equality and 
social and economic justice, and founded on the institutions of parliamentary 
democracy" .25 Meanwhile, the Gerakan, with the slogan of "Equality, Justice and 
Equal Opportunity for All", called for special attention not only to the "economically 
weak Malays", but also to "other indigenous peoples, people in rural areas, the 
fishing community, estate workers, resettled new villages, squatters and the urban 
pronounced Malay orientation;and (6) a Malay nationality should be introduced (Vorys 1975: 148). 
2.3 The salient items of PPP's manifesto were: (1) the acceptance of Chinese and Tamil as official 
languages (with Malay recognized as the national language); (2) a common citizenship law for 
everyone, based on the full application of jus soli principle; (3) equal privileges for all Malaysians; and 
(4) the amendment of immigration and education laws, in order to give equal treatment to all 
communities (Vorys 1975: 149). 
"5mi!h(1960: 43-44). 
" DAP website, http://www.dapmalaysia.org/ english/ <led.html (Accessed on 9 December 2005). 
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poor" ,26 Both political parties demanded that Chinese, Tamil and English should be 
accepted as the media of instructions in schools.27 
These opposition political parties managed to gain substantial support in 
elections held between 1959 and 1969. PAS increased its representation in the Dewan 
Rakyat from one seat in 1955to13in1959. Although it only managed to win 9 seats 
in 1964, it won 12 in 1969. The party also captured two east coast-Malay heartland 
states of Kelantan and Terengganu in the 1959 election. While the party lost 
Terengganu to the Alliance in 1961, it continued to govern Kelantan until 1977.28 The 
Socialist Front won eight parliamentary seats and 16 state seats in 1959. However, 
faced with the government crackdown due to its leftist ideology, it only won two 
parliamentary seats and five state seats in 1964.29 The PPP won four parliamentary 
seats and 8 state seats in 1959. Though the party's stake in the federal and state 
legislatures fell to two and five seats respectively in 1964, it regained its strength by 
winning four parliamentary seats and 12 state seats in 1969. The two first timers in 
the 1969 general election, the Gerakan and the OAP, performed more impressively. 
The Gerakan, won eight parliamentary seats and 26 state seats in the election, and 
gained control over the state of Penang.30 The DAP won 31 parliamentary seats and 
31 state seats in the election. 31 In total, the opposition won 55 parliamentary seats in 
the 1969 general election in Peninsula Malaysia as against the Alliance's 66.32 
Stalemate occurred in Selangor when both the Alliance and the opposition parties 
were short of a clear majority to form state government. In Perak, a PAS 
assemblyman held the balance in the state legislature when the other opposition 
political parties, namely the PPP, the Gerakan and the OAP, won a total of 19 seats to 
"'Means (1976: 393-394). 
27 Drummond & Hawkins (1970: 324). The DAP demanded that the three languages be given official 
status. 
28 PAS lost Terengganu to the Alliance after two of its stale assemblymen and all four assemblymen 
from Parti Negara defected to the Alliance in November 196l(Means 1976: 232). The UMNO-Berjasa 
Alliance gained control over Kelantan in the 1978 general election. 
29 The SF was dissolved in 1966. The LPM boycotted the 1969 election, while the PRM proceeded with 
the election but won only two state seats. 
30 The Gerakan's predecessor, the United Democratic Party (UDP), won only one parliamentary seat 
and four state seats in 1964. 
31 The DAP' s predecessor, the Singapore-based People's Action Party (PAP), won only one 
parliamentary seat in 1964. 
n Due to racial rioting in Kuala Lumpur, elections in Sarawak and Sa bah were postponed. However, 
the Alliance's tally rose to 76 with !:he addition of ten unconrested victories in Sabah. 
87 
match the Alliance's 19.33 It became clear that by 1969, the challenge to the Alliance 
and its policy of communal compromises had reached a high water mark 
The 1969 Racial Riots and Emergency Rule 
The manipulation of communal issues for political gain reached its peak when post-
election racial rioting broke out in Kuala Lumpur on 13May1969.34 This in turn 
prompted the government to use repressive Jaws to maintain public order and to 
expand its legal powers. A state of emergency was proclaimed on 15May1969 and 
parliamentary government was suspended.35 The government immediately enacted 
the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No. 1, which gave the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong wide powers to make any regulations which he considered desirable or 
expedient for securing the public safety, the defense of the country, the maintenance 
of public order and of supplies and services essential to the life of the community. 
However, under the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No. 2, the entire 
executive authority of the Federation, and the legislative powers of the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong set out in the Ordinance No. 1, were delegated to the Director of 
Operations, Tun Abdul Razak, who was also the Deputy Prime Minister. Razak led 
the all-powerful J\'ational Operation Council which ran the country's administration 
during the emergency. 
It was during the continuance of the emergency that a number of repressive 
laws were passed. These included the Emergency (Security Cases) Regulations 1975 
(ESCAR), which simplified the rules pertaining to criminal trials in" security 
"'Drummond & Hawkins (1970: 330); Means (1976: 338); Ratnam & Milne (1967: 361). 
34 The racially charged campaign prior to the 1969 general election and a non-Malay victory 
procession held in the heart of Kuala Lumpur one day after the full election results were announced, 
prompted a violent response from radical Malays. Official figures revealed that 196 people were 
killed and 493 injured during the bloodiest racial clash in Malaysia's history (Government of Malaysia 
1969:88-90). For description of events belore, during and after the riots, see Tunku Abdul Rahman 
(1969) and Slimming (1969). 
35 Because the Emergency was proclaimed after the Parliament was dissolved prior to the 1969 
general election, and the election had not been completed in Sabah and Sarawak, there was practically 
no Parliament lo meet (Harding 1996: 42). 
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cases" ;36 the Emergency (Internal Security) (Modification of Laws) Ordinance 1969, 
which extended the use of ISA as an emergency law; the Emergency (Public Order 
and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 (EPOPCO), which provided for preventive 
detention without trial; and the amendment to the Sedition Act 1948, which made 
seditious the questioning of the position of Malay Rulers, the Malay special 
privileges, the legitimate interests of the non-Malays and their citizenship rights. The 
whole country was also designated as a security area under the ISA, making 
unlawful possession of firearms anywhere in the country an offence punishable by 
death.37 As the 1960 amendment to Article 150 envisaged that these emergency 
ordinances would be valid unless and until they were annulled by the Parliament, 
and that there had been no such annulment, the laws not only remained valid but 
also greatly enhanced the state's capacity to deal with subversive elements, as well 
as its political opponents, beyond the period during which the country can properly 
be said to be in an actual state of emergency.38 
Though the main objective of the emergency was to return the country to 
normal parliamentary government, the passage of various ordinances under the 
emergency powers in essence led to the expansion of state legal powers. What is 
more, the emergency and anti-subversion laws became a permanent feature of the 
legal system, the application of which was extended to normal times. In a political 
system where government was dominated by a ruling coalition of political parties, 
the expansion of state legal powers enhanced the ruling coalition's capacity to 
maintain and strengthen itself in power. Indeed, with the proclamation of 
emergency and the suspension of parliamentary government following the 1969 
racial riots, at a time when political competition was intense and the terms of the 
constitutional contract were severely contested, the Alliance was supplanted by 
Barisan Nasional (National Front), an enlarged coalition of ruling political parties 
36 These are cases related to unlawful possession of firearms, ammunition or explosives, and other 
cases certified by the Attorney-General as being security cases. The simplified rules included hearing 
by a judge sitting alone (without jury), the court being specified by the prosecution, no preliminary 
enquiry, allowing combined trial of multiple accused and offences not relevant to each other, non-
disclosure of witness identity, and hearsay evidence being made admissible (Harding 1996: 44). 
"Harding (1996; 43-45). 
"'As the 1969 Proclamation of Emergency has never been revoked, legal experts argued that Malaysia 
is still under the stare of emergency (Harding 1996). 
89 
consisting the original three Alliance parties and the former opposition PAS and 
GERAKAN, with new coalition rules that consolidated the political position of 
UMNO as the backbone of BN and allowed it to determine the future direction of 
policies on communal relations in Malaysia. 
The Re-affirmation of the Pro-Malay Terms of the Constitutional Contract and the 
Expansion of State Power, 1971-1990 
The 1969 racial riots served as an indication that race relations in post-independent 
Malaya were still fragile. The Malays were alarmed by the widening economic gap 
between them and the non-Malays, especially the Chinese, while the non-Malays on 
the other hand were increasingly dissatisfied with the Malay dominance in politics. 
The tendency to openly criticize and ridicule communal interests, as indicated by the 
events leading to the racial riots, proved to be fatal. 
Subsequent to the tragedy, there had been a change of guard in UMNO and 
the realignment of the economic and political arrangement between the major 
communal groups. Tun Abdul Razak, who succeeded Tunku Abdul Rahman as the 
Prime Minister in 1971, pushed through the pro-Malay New Economic Policy in 
response to concerns among the Malays that the Tunku' s more conciliatory attitude 
toward the non-Malays had jeopardized Malay interests. The policy aimed at 
restructuring the society by eliminating the identification of race with economic 
function and eradicating poverty. In this regard, new laws were enacted in order to 
increase the state's interventionist role in the economy. While a new "national 
ideology", called the Rukunegara, 39 was devised with its primary aim to forge 
national unity, sweeping amendments were made to the Federal Constitution and 
the Sedition Act to expand the state's legal powers to curb public debates on 
39 In the aftermath of the May 13 racial riots, fue government was also concerned with the problem of 
national integration which impinged on its own political legitimacy. As a result, fue Department of 
National Unity was set up to study, evaluate and implement economic and social programs designed 
to promote national integration. 11tis new department was also assigned the task to formulate a 
"national ideolo&'Y" which would serve as the nexus uniting the Malaysian people. Consequently, a 
National Consultative Council (NCC) composed of 65 members representing federal and state 
governments, political parties and functional interest groups was set up in January 1970. Its main task 
was to advise the government on ways and means to achieve national integration (Means 1976: 400). 
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communal issues, which were deemed to be sensitive. In a move to minimize 
excessive manipulation of the communal issues for electoral gain, the major 
opposition political parties were co-opted into an expanded ruling coalition called 
the Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front), which replaced the i>Jliance in 1974.40 The 
government also re-delineated electoral boundaries to amplify Malay political power 
and amended the Federal Constitution to re-affirm the pro-Malay terms of the 
constitutional contract. While these measures to some extent helped contain 
communal tension, they had also expanded the state's legal powers and increased 
the government's capacity to consolidate its political position. 
The Rukunegara 
In view of the pressing need to instill a common feeling toward nationhood and 
national unity among Malaysians of all races, the Rukunegara (The Pillars of the 
Nation) was launched on 31August1970.•1 It reminded Malaysians of all races to 
appreciate the diverse social and cultural values that existed in their multiracial 
society and the possible misgivings that such diversity might cause them if no 
serious effort at nation building was done. Toward this end, the Rukunegara set out 
the principles that would serve as guides to common understanding and unity.42 'The 
principles are belief in God, loyalty to the King and the country, upholding the 
Constitution, rule of law and good behavior and morality. Explanation to these five 
principles generally assert that although Islam is the official religion of the 
40 The Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN), which replaced the Alliance in 1974, co-opted two major 
non-Malay opposition parties, the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and the Gerakan, and the 
Malay /Muslim opposition party, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS). 
41 The proclamation reads: 
Our Nation, MALAYSIA, being dedicated 
to achieving greater unity of all her people; 
to maintaining a democratic way of 1ife; 
to creating a just society in which the wealth of the nation shall be equitably shared; 
ID ensuring a liberal approach to her rich and diverse cultural traditions; 
to building a progressive society which shall be oriented to modem science and technology;. 
WE, her peoples, pledge our united efforts to attain these ends guided by these principles -
Belief in God 
Loyalty to King and Country 
Upholding the Constitution 
Rule of Law 
Good Behavior and Morality (Government of Malaysia 1977: 6). 
"Government of Malaysia (1977: 4). 
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Federation, other religions and beliefs may be practiced in peace and harmony. 
Every citizen was expected to be faithful and bear true allegiance to the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong and respect the historical background of the Constitution, which led 
to the provisions relating to the position of Malay Rulers, Islam as the official 
religion, the special position of the Malays and other natives, the legitimate interests 
of other ethnic communities and the conferment of citizenship. The Rukunegara also 
stressed that each and every citizen is equal before the law and he may enjoy his 
rights to fundamental liberties subject only to limitations imposed by law. On 
morality, individuals and groups were expected not to violate any of the accepted 
canons of behavior, which included the abhorrence and rejection of any mnduct or 
behavior which is arrogant and offensive to the sensitivities of any group.43 
The 1971 Constitutional Amendment 
Complementing the Rukimegara was the 1971 constitutional amendment aimed at 
providing further safeguards to the communal terms of the constitutional contract. 
These are the whole of Part III (those provisions relating to citizenship), Article 152 
(Malay as National Language and the position of languages other than Malay), 
Article 153 (special position of the Malays and legitimate interests of other ethnic 
communities) and Article 181 (sovereignty of Malay Rulers). The National 
Operations Council, considering these provisions as a binding agreement between 
the various races in the country, proposed the barring of public debate on the 
sensitive issues relating to the agreement.44 Article 10 of the Federal Constitution 
was amended by inserting a new Clause (4) to allow the Parliament to pass law 
prohibiting the questioning of any matter, right, status, position, privilege, 
sovereignty or prerogative established or protected by the provisions of Part III, 
Article 152, 153 and 181 of the Federal Constitution, other than in relation to their 
implementation as may be specified in such law. The government also felt that the 
prohibition should be extended to the debates in the federal and state legislatures. 
"'Government of Malaysia (1977; 11-15). 
"'Government of Malaysia (1969: 82-85). 
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As such, Article 63 was amended by inserting a new Oause (4) to exempt a Member 
of Parliament from parliamentary privileges if he was charged with an offence under 
the law passed by Parliament under Clause (4) of Article 10 or with an offence under 
the Sedition Act 1948. Article 72(4) was also amended to bar members of the State 
Legislative Assemblies from debating the sensitive issues, except in regard to their 
implementation. 
The ambiguities in the use of Bahasa Malaysia for official purposes were also 
clarified. A new Clause (6) was inserted under Article 152 which defined official 
purpose as "any purpose of the Government, whether Federal or State, and includes 
any purpose of a public authority".45 This amendment, however, did not affect the 
use of English for official purposes in the states of Sabah and Sarawak for a period of 
ten years after Malaysia Day.46 More substantial was the amendment to Article 153 
in regard to the special position of the Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak, 
or the Bumiputeras. A new Clause 8A was inserted to allow the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
to direct universities, colleges and educational institutions providing education after 
the Malaysian Certificate of Education (MCE) or its equivalent to reserve certain 
numbers of places to Bumiputera students.47 This was intended to remedy the 
problem of low number of Bumiputera students pursuing tertiary education in 
professional and technical courses compared to the non-Bumiputera students.48 
Pursuing technical and professional degrees, which provided better job 
opportunities in the modern sector of the economy, was deemed to be one of the 
most important prerequisites to the Bumiputera' s upward social mobility. 
Further safeguards were put in place for the constitutional provisions on the 
sensitive communal issues. Article 159(5) provided that, in addition to the Articles 
45 For a discussion on the meaning of" official purposes" and its relation to the right to teach or learn 
in languages other than Malay, see Sinnadurai (1986: 53-56). 
"The Malaysia Day refers to the day Malaysia was formed on 16September1963. 
47 This was in case where the number of places offered by those institutions for any course of study 
was less than the number of candidates qualified for such places. 
48 The figures for the 1969/1970 enrolment of first year students at University of Malaya showed that 
only five out of 114 students enrolled for engineering courses were Malays. For science courses, it was 
79 out of 307 students, medicine (50 out of 116), and economics and administration (197 out of 505) 
(Means 1972: 45). 
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enumerated in Clause (o) of Article 159,49 no amendment shall be made to the 
provisions contained in Article 10(4) (restrictions on freedom of speech) or any law 
passed there under, Part III of the Constitution (provisions relating to citizenship), 
Article 63(4) (the questioning of sensitive issues in Parliament), Article 72(4) (the 
questioning of sensitive issues in State Legislative Assemblies) and Article 152 
(National Language) without the consent of the Conference of Rulers. Defending the 
exclusion of sensitive issues from the realm of public debate and further safeguards 
for the provisions on the communal agreement, Tun Abdul Razak gave a somewhat 
"balanced" view of the Constitution: 
The basic provisions relating to the acquisition of citizenship represented a fair 
and balanced compromise. The same careful and balanced approach runs 
through the other provisions of the Constitution protecting the legitimate rights 
of all races in Malaysia. Thus, the provisions relating to the special position of 
the Malays are balanced by the guaranteed protection of the legitimate interests 
of the other communities and by the citizenship provisions ... The provisions 
relating to the position of Bahasa Malaysia as the sole official and National 
Language is balanced by the guarantee for the use of the languages of other 
races other than for official purposes. As regards the provision relating to the 
sovereignty of the Rulers, surely no one will agree that their position should 
ever be open to attack or challenge ... These are the main provisions of our 
Constitution relating to issues which may be regarded as sensitive. These must 
be removed from the realm of public discussion which could lead to the 
exploitation of these issues by irresponsible elements to the detriment of all our 
people. The careful and balanced provisions of our Constitution guaranteeing 
legitimate interests of all races in Malaysia are the very foundation upon which 
this nation exists. To challenge them is to challenge the very principle upon 
which the nation rests. so 
"These are Article 38 (the constitution and functions of the Conference of Rulers), 70 (precedence of 
Rulers and Yang di-Pertua Negeri), 71(1) (Federal guarantee for constitutional rights and privileges of 
State Rulers) and 153 (special position of the Malays). 
S<J Hansard, 23 February 1971. 
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The New Economic Policy (NEP) Legislation 
The NEP was introduced in 1971 with the two-pronged goal of reducing and 
eventually eradicating poverty irrespective of race and accelerating the process of 
restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and 
eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function.st While the 
first objective was to be achieved through the opening up of educational and 
economic opportunities for the poorest section of the society, the second objective 
required the implementation of an expanded system of Bumiputera special privileges 
in the grant of government contracts and licenses as well as in the acquisition of 
shares in public and private companies. To ensure upward social mobility of the 
Bumiputera community, the government aimed at increasing Bumi17utera employment 
in the modern sector of the economy from 33.8 percent in 1970 to 62.6 percent in 
1990. Bumi17utera corporate equity ownership was also set to increase from 2.4 
percent in 1970 to 30percentin1990.52 As part of the efforts to increase the upward 
social mobility of Bumiputeras, the government opened up more opportunities for the 
Bumiputeras to get vocational and entrepreneurial training, tertiary educational 
opportunities, scholarships and financial assistance to set up businesses. 
Among the important regulatory legislation which helped the government to 
achieve its social restructuring objective under the NEP were the Industrial 
Coordination Act 1975 and the Petroleum Development Act 1974.53 The "Guidelines 
for Equity Participation under the Industrial Coordination Act 1975" dated 28 
October 1975 stipulated that only up to 30 percent foreign equity participation 
would be allowed for new import substitution industrial projects where local 
s1 Government of Malaysia (1971: 1). 
52 The nan·Bumiputera corporate equity ovmership was set to increase at a slower rate from 34 percent 
in 1970 to 40 percent in 1990. The biggest chunk of the share to help support the restructuring effort 
would come from foreign interests whose assets would be reduced from 63 percent in 1970 to 30 
percent in 1990. 
53 Besides the !CA which served as a regulatory legislation, two administrative regulatory agencies 
dedicated to the realization of the NEP's "social restructuring" objective were the Foreign Investment 
Committee (FIQ and Capital Issuance Committee (CIC). The FIC' s principal purpose was to regulate 
acquisition of assets, mergers and take-overs of companies in the country, while the CIC' s was to 
regulate the issuance of shares by public companies in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). 
Both agencies formed the institutional regulatory superstructure of state intervention in private 
business and industry, so as to ensure the achievement of the NEP objectives (Ho 1988: 213-225). 
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technology was not sufficiently available. 100 percent foreign equity would be 
allowed for projects which were 100 percent export oriented. In all other cases, 
behveen 30 and 75 percent foreign equity would be allowed depending on the use of 
local materials and the portion of units exported. Manufacturing industries were 
required to ensure 70 percent corporate equity ownership by Malaysian citizens by 
1990. In order to exempt small Chinese businesses from the restructuring exercise, 
the government in 1977 adopted the equity ownership requirement only for projects 
with fixed investment amounting to RM 500,000 or more.54 Vigorous implementation 
of the guidelines under the Industrial Coordination Act led to the sudden surge of 
Bumiputera equity in manufacturing projects approved by the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry benveen 1975 and 1985.55 During this period, Bumiputera equity constituted 
no less than 40 percent of all projects approved annually, except in 1978 when it 
dropped to only 33.3 percent. Overall Bumiputera' s corporate equity ownership 
increased from 2.4 percent in 1970 to 19.1percentin1985.56 
Economic recessions in the mid 1980s, coupled with pressures from foreign and 
local Chinese capital, however, set limits to the efficacy of the Industrial 
Coordination Act as a social restructuring instrument. In direct response to the 1985 
recession, corporations producing 80 percent or more for export markets were 
allowed to maintain up to 80 percent foreign equity. The limit to shareholders' fund 
was also raised to RM 1 million with workforce of at least 50 full time paid workers. 
In 1986, the limits to shareholders' fund were raised to RM 2.5 million and the 
number of full-tin1e paid workers to 75. These relaxations allowed smaller 
manufacturing projects to b€ exempted from the ICA's foreign equity requirement, 
causing a sudden drop in the Bumiputera equity in manufacturing projects approved 
by the Ministry of Trade of Industry behveen 1985 and 1990. Bumiputera equity in 
"Yasuda (1991: 336). 
ss Though the non-Bumiputerm; were disadvantaged by the NEP, their share of corporate ownership 
stood at 46.2 percent by 1990, surpassing its 40 percent target. They made gains in sectors which were 
least controlled by the state such as service and construction. Yasuda (1991). 
56 Yasuda (1991: 340). It should be noted however that substantial portion of the equity was owned by 
State Economic Development Corporations. 
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this sector plunged from 54.4percentin1985 to 37.6 percent in 1986, 29.4 percent 
(1987), 12.1 percent (1988), 9.8 percent (1989) and 16.4 percent (1990).57 
Another significant legal instrument for social restructuring under the NEP was 
the Petroleum Development Act 1974, which established the national oil company, 
Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Petronas). SB Prior to the incorporation of Petronas, the 
offshore and onshore exploitation of oil resources was carried out by foreign 
companies which worked under a concession system with the relevant state 
governments. There was no standard agreement between the state governments and 
the oil companies. The states normally acted as tax or royalty collectors, while 
complete freedom in the management of the oil resources was vested in the oil 
companies.59 The oil shortage that plagued the world in the 1970s and the pressing 
need for cheap energy to fuel Malaysia's march toward rapid industrialization 
prompted the government to exercise greater control of its oil resources. 
Furthermore, greater control of the oil industry, with its lucrative downstream and 
upstream activities, would provide important resources for the government to 
finance its social restructuring efforts under the NEP. 
The exclusive control of the oil industry was given to Petronas, a government 
instrument, 60 which is subject to the control and binding direction of the Prime 
Minister.fr! The Petroleum Development Act, vested in Petronas "the exclusive 
rights, powers, liberties and privileges of exploring, exploiting, winning and 
obtaining petroleum whether onshore or offshore of Malaysia".62 The rights so 
vested "shall be irrevocable and shall enure (sic) for the benefit of the Corporation 
"Non-Bumiputera equity also experienced similar drop. The real beneficiary of the policy relaxation 
was foreign investors whose equity in such projects increased from 17.8 percent in 1985 to 28 percent 
in 1986, 49 percent (1987), 57.9 percent (1988), 73.9 percent (1989) and 64.3 percent (1990). See Yasuda 
(1991: 340). 
58 Petronas, modeled afrer Indonesia's national oil corporation, PERT AMINA, is a hybrid of a 
government company and a statutory corporation by virtue of its incorporation under the Companies 
Act 1965 and the conferment upon it of special powers and privileges under the PDA For further 
discussion on its hybrid legal structure see Singh (1976). 
59 Gale (1981: 1131). 
" Petronas' status as a government instrumentality is determined by the degree of Executive control 
over it. See '.¥1oor!hy (1.983: 83. 
" Section 3(2). 
62 Section 2(1). 
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and its successor" ."3 The Act also prohibited the carrying out of "business of 
processing or refining of petroleum or manufacturing of petro-chemical products 
from petroleum" by any person other than Petronas except vvith permission from the 
Prime Minister.64 The amendment to the Petroleum Development Act in 1975 gave 
exclusive rights to Petronas to carry out business in marketing and distribution of 
petroleum and petro-chemical products in order to increase Bumiputera participation 
in downstream activities.65 The law also required companies which carried out 
business in the downstream sector to issue management shares for cash to 
Petronas. 66 
The government control of the oil industry through the Petroleum 
Development Act had opened up opportunities for the Bumiputeras to have greater 
participation in the industry. In 1989, Bumiputera participation was about 45 percent, 
with Petronas alone awarding 73.6 percent or RM 1.2 billion of its jobs to Bumipulera 
companies.67 The entry of Petronas Dagangan Berhad (PDB), a subsidiary of 
Petronas, into retail business in 1982 witnessed the number of Bumiputera·operated 
petrol station soared from 387 (30percent)in1982to1,590 (63 percent) in 2000.68 
Large Bumiputera companies such as Halim Mazmin and Bumi Armada (shipping), 
63 Section 2(3). As Clause 2(c) of the State List under the Federal Constitution provides that "permits 
and licences for prospecting for mines; mining leases and certificates" is within the province of each 
state, Petronas could only have exclusive claim to petroleum resources after various state 
governments transferred their jurisdiction over their petroleum resources to it. Though a combination 
of party pressures and financial inducements was successful in persuading !he states to sign 
agreements giving Petronas exclusive rights over petroleum resources, one state proved to be difficult 
to acquiesce. Sa bah did not sign agreement with Petronas until June 1976. Only when Tun Mustapha 
was replaced by Tun Haji Mohammed Fuad as Chief Minister was the agreement with Petronas 
signed (Singh 1976: 130; Gale 1981: 1133). 
"'Section 6(1). 
65 Gause 2(c) of the Petroleum Development (Amendment) Bill 1975. See also the speech by Deputy 
Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, Datuk Abdullah Ahmad, moving !he Bill in the Dewan 
Raki;at on 4 April 1975. 
00 See Clause 3 of the Petroleum Development (Amendment) Bill 1975. The Parliament however 
repealed the management shares provisions of the PDA in December 1976 after strong protests from 
foreign oil companies. Section 6 of the PDA which requires any persons, other than Petronas, to 
obtain license from the Prime Minister in order to carry on business of manufacturing, marketing and 
distribution of petroleum and petro-chemical products was also amended. The amendment 
empowers the Prime Minister to exempt certain business activities relating to petroleum and petro-
chemical products from the licensing requirement. Section 9 was also amended to provide for 
adequate compensation should no extension was granted to the existing exploration licenses, leases or 
agreements. See Far Eastern Economic Raefew, 10December1976, Hansard, 16 December 1976. 
"Business Times, 27 November 1990. 
6S Out of 526 petrol stations owned by PDB in 2000, 504 (96 percent) were operated by Bumiputeras. 
See Business Times, 3 May 2000. 
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Dialog Group (oil and gas equipment manufacturing) and Ranhill (engineering, 
turnkey construction) also secured lucrative contracts from Petronas. The national oil 
company also helped develop Bumiputera companies through its Vendor 
Development Program (VDP) which was introduced in the early 1990s. By 2000, 42 
Bumiputera companies successfully participated in the VDP program, with six of 
them managed to expand their services overseas.69 
The Pro-Malay Cultural Terms 
At the insistence of the Malay nationalists, the government introduced the J\"ational 
Cultural Polic)' in 1971. The policy recognized the centrality of Malay culture and 
Islam, but accepted elements of Chinese, Indian, Arab, western and other cultures as 
part of the national culture as long as they are consistent with the Federal 
Constitution, the Rukunegara, national interests, universal moral values and spiritual 
values of Islam as the state religion. The Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports was 
tasked with promoting the national culture through active research, education and 
cultural activities.70 
Although the J\"ational Cultural Policy recognized the elements of other 
cultures, including the Chinese and Indian cultures, as part of the national culture, it 
was not uncommon for Malay administrators to consider non-indigenous cultures as 
inimical to the National Cultural Policy.71 In this regard, laws which required the 
issuance of permits or licenses to organize cultural performances in public were used 
to exert more government control on the performing arts which were deemed 
" Business Times, 11 October 2000. 
"'Government of Malaysia (1971). In the 1970s, the Cultural Diviqion of the Ministry of Culture, 
Youth and Sports, headed by a Director, was organized into three sections: (i) Research (into 
indigenous culture); (ii) Promotion and Training (for organizing training programs, festivals, and 
competitions in folk dance, music, handicraft, traditional games, and theatre); and (iii) Cultural 
Productions (comprising a folk dance and music company performing locally and abroad) (Tan 1990: 
138). 
7l For example, performances of "foreign" dances in public and at schools were often restricted. In 
August 1984, the Ministry of Education issued guidelines on approved cultural activities to school 
headmasters. The guidelines mentioned, among others, traditional Malay dances such as irrang, zapm, 
joget and kuda kepang as approved cultural activities. Foreign dances were allowed if they conform to 
the National Cultural Policy (Kua 1990: 36). 
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inconsistent with the National Culture.72 The Police Act1967 (Revised 1988), which 
requires license to hold public assembly,73 was used to control cultural performances 
in public.74 Non-Malay cultural groups complained that applications for license to 
hold cultural performances were sometimes denied. 75 Even if they were allowed, it 
was often at the very last minute and, in some cases, the performance had to be 
cancelled because of extensive government censorship?• 
The position of Malay as the national language was also strengthened as part of 
the effort to promote national unity. This envisaged the conversion of non-Malay-
medium schools into a national system of Malay-medium schools attended by pupils 
of all races.77 In 1970, the Minister of Education invoked his power under section 
21(2) of the Education Act 1961 to convert all English medium national-type primary 
schools into Malay medium national schools. By 1976, all English-medium primary 
schools were completely converted to national primary school~ and, by 1982 all 
English-medium secondary schools in the Peninsular Malaysia were converted to 
national secondary schooJs.78 However, concerned with the possible negative 
n Carsten (1999: 20). 
73 Section 27(2) of the Police Act provides that" Any person intending to convene or collect any 
assembly or meeting or to form procession in any public place aforesaid, shall before convening, 
collecting or forming such assembly, meeting or procession make to the Officer-in-Charge of the 
Police District in which such assembly, meeting or procession is to be held an application for a licence 
in that behalf". 
7< The performing arts are also regulated by the Theatres and Places of Public Amusement (Federal 
Territories) Act 1977, which requires a license to open a theatre or place of public amusement. For the 
purpose of considering the application for a license, a licensing officer may require the applicant to 
furnish him the script and particulars of persons who promote and who have agreed to participate in 
the theatrical performance as well as the interests which they represent, and "the purposes to which 
any profits from the theatrical performance or public amusement are intended to be or have been 
applied". Licensing of theatres, cinemas and places of public amusement is also regulated under 
various state laws. 
75 One such example was police refusal to issue permit to Chinese groups to organize lion dances in 
July 1982. The refusal was made on the ground that official directives permitted the lifting of a ban on 
lion dances only during the Chinese New Year. Defending the decision, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, 
Foreign Minister and an ideologist of the National Culture, argued that only characteristics of art 
which are based on Malay identity could be accepted as elements of the National Culture (Kua 2005: 
27). 
"Tan (1990: 146). 
77 See Government of Malaysia (1964). 
7B Solomon (1988: 46). When the government embarked on the conversion exercise in the 1960s, 55 out 
of 71 Chinese secondary schools were converted to national-type secondary schools, leaving only 16 
independent non-government Chinese secondary schools which used Chinese as a medium of 
instruction. Although the national-type secondary schools used Bahasa Malaysia as the main medium 
of instruction, certain subjects (such as the Chinese language and the Chinese literature) could be 
taught in Chinese for 1/3 of the total number of periods in a week. That worked out to be at least 13 
100 
reactions from the Chinese and Indian communities, the conversion exercise was 
carried out without affecting the status of the Chinese and Tamil national-type 
primary schools.79 By the mid-1980s, all examinations in national schools were fully 
conducted in Bahasa Malaysia. 
In 1970, the country's first Malay-medium university, the Universiti Kebangsaan 
Malaysia (National University of Malaysia), was set up with a mission "to be the 
premier university that affirms and promotes the values of the Malay Language, 
while globalizing knowledge within the framework of the national culture".80 
Beginning with only 192 students, 78 academic staff and three faculties namely, 
Faculty of Arts, Faculty of Science and Faculty of Islamic Studies, the university had 
developed into one of Malaysia's premier public universities by the 1990s. s1 In 1982, 
all public universities were instructed to start first-year courses in Malay.82 The 
position of the Malay language was further strengthened by amendments to the 
National Language Act in 1983 and 1989. The former allowed the coming into force 
of the Act in Sabah and Sarawak, while the latter was to make compulsory the use of 
national language in all court proceedings, except in the giving of evidence by a 
witness. B3 By 1990, the government strictly enforced the use of Bahasa Malaysia for 
official correspondence, and occasionally directed private companies to enhance its 
usage.M 
periods a week. All national-type secondary schools received financial assistance from the 
government. See Yong (2003). 
"'Report of the Cabinet Committee on the Implementation of the National Education Policy 1979, or 
the Mahathir Report, cited "current political climate" as an obstacle to the full implementation of the 
National Language as the sole medium of instruction in all primary schools (Government of Malaysia 
1979: 16). 
BO Abdul Samad et. al. (2002:3) 
" Abdul Samad et. al. (2002:2) 
"During this period, the university intake for Malay students aL5o increased significantly. By 1985, 
the number of Bumiputera students pursuing degree courses in local tertiary institutions surpassed 
that of other ethnic groups. There were 23, 841 Bumiputera students (63.5 percent), 11, 241 Chinese 
(29.9 percent) and 2,473 Indians (6.6 percent) enrolled in the seven public universities,82 MARA 
Institute of Technology (!TM) and the MCA-run Tunku Abdul Rahman College (TAR College). See 
Government of Malaysia (1986: 490-491). 
"'The Court, however, "may either of its own motion or on the application of any party to any 
proceedings and aft€r considering the interests of justice in those proceedings, order that the 
proceedings ... shall be partly in the national language and partly in the English language". See 
Section 8 of the National Language Act. 
84 Straits Times, l3June1990. 
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Apart from the national culture and language, another important pro-Malay 
cultural term that was re-affirmed in the 1970s and 1980s was Islam. Faced with the 
emerging sense of Islamic revivalism among university students in the 1970s, as well 
as the grmving influence of Islamic da'wah organizations, the government introduced 
Islamic-oriented policies, expanded Islamic bureaucracy and set up more Islamic 
institutions entrusted with the task to promote Islamic da'wah,85 education and 
economy. On the verge of the 1982 general election, the then Prime Minister Dr. 
Mahathir Mohamad co-opted the then President of the Muslim Youth Movement of 
Malaysia (ABL\1), Anwar Ibrahim, into the ranks of UMNO. 86 Anwar, who rose to 
become the party's Deputy President and Deputy Prime Minister in 1993, played a 
key role in promoting Islamic oriented policies and in the setting up of state-
sponsored Islamic institutions.87 
Resistance and Control 
The re-affirmation of the pro-Malay terms of the constitutional contract caused 
disaffection among the non-Bumiputeras who viewed this policy as a deliberate 
attempt to disregard their legitimate interests. At the same time, the NEP had also 
" Literally means spreading the teachings of Islam. 
86 Anwar contested the Permatang Pauh parliamentary seat in the 1982 general election as an UMNO 
candidate. He won the election and was subsequently appointed as a deputy minister in the Prime 
Minister's Department In the cabinet, he served as the Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports (1983-
1985), Minister of Agriculture (1985-1986), Minister ofEducation (1986-1991), Minister of Finance 
(1991-1998) and Deputy Prime Minister (1993-1998). He also rose through the ranks of GMNO to 
become its Youth Chief (1982-1987), Vice-President (1987-1993) and Deputy President (1993-1998). Jn 
1998, he was sacked from the government and the party for allegations of corruption and sexual 
mlsconduct. Anwar claimed that the allegations were trumped up by his political enemies in UMNO 
who wanted to end his political career. See further discussion on the Anwar case in Chapters 5 and 6. 
"'These include the introduction of Dasar Penerapan Nilai-Nilai Islam (Inculcation of Islamic Values 
Policy) and the setting up of Islamic institutions such as the International Islamic University Malaysia 
and the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC). Anwar, who became the 
Minister of Education in 1986, also played key role in the formulation of the National Education 
Philosophy which reflects some basic elements of Islamic education. "Education in Malaysia," the 
national philosophy proclaims, "is an on-going effort towards further developing the potential of 
individuals in a holistic and integrated manner, so as to produce individuals who are intellectually, 
spiritually, €1l1otionally and physically balanced and harmonic, based on a firm belief in and devotion 
to God"." The philosophy bears a resemblance to the aim of Islamic education declared at the First 
World Conference on Muslim Education held in April 1977 in Mecca, Syed Muhammad Naqulb Al-
Attas, a leading advocate of Islamic education and one of the key speakers at the conference, was the 
intellectual mentor of Anwar. 
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created greater expectation among the Malays who demanded the government to 
take swift actions to address lhe problem of Malay economic backwardness, 
especially hard-core poverty among the rural Malays. As the NEP objectives could 
only be fully achieved in an expanding economy, depending mainly on rapid 
industrialization, there had also been a need on lhe part of the government to keep 
resistance among the workforce at bay. In all this, law assumed an important 
function as an instrument of political control, which was justified on the grounds of 
maintaining racial harmony, political stability and ensuring economic development. 
(i) The Chinese Education and Cultural Community 
Since the 1950s, the Otinese Education Movement had been wary of the British 
educational policies which were viewed as having negatively affected the future of 
Chinese education in Malaya. These included the policy which required the 
establishment of one type of primary school as an instrument for building a common 
Malayan identity which the movement viewed as inimical to the efforts at 
maintaining Chinese cultural identity. This has given rise to the formation of the 
influential United Otinese School Teachers Association (UCSTA) for the purpose of 
defending Chinese culture and education. During the 1955-1957 period, the UCSTA 
had been working very closely with the MCA to promote Chinese education, but 
beginning from the late 1950s the movement was embroiled in confrontation with 
the Alliance over its insistence on the official language policy. This confrontation led 
to the marginalization of the UCSTA by the MCA and the Alliance in the 1960s.88 
The govemment's pro-Bumiputera educational and cultural policies in the 1970s 
provided the Chinese educationists with new rallying points to pursue their struggle 
to defend Chinese education and culture. These included the governm.ent' s rejection 
of the proposal to set up the Chinese-medium Merdeka University89 and the ban on 
cultural activities which were deemed to be contrary to the National Culture. In 
March 1983, fifteen Chinese organizations issued a joint memorandum on the 
"Tan (1997). 
"See further discussion on the Merdeka University case in Chapter 4. 
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National Culture, which stressed the fundamental aspects of the multi-ethnic and 
multi-religious character of Malaysian society, the acceptance of which was essential 
to national unity.90 Believing that the national policies on language, education and 
culture were "heavily tainted with communalism and tend towards forced 
assimilation", the organizations asserted that the policies had been formulated "from 
the perspective and stand-point of only one ethnic community", obviously the 
Malays.91 A Joint Declaration issued by 24 Chinese guilds and associations in 1985 
urged the government to give equal rights and privileges to all citizens regardless of 
race, religion, language and class, and abolish the distinction between the Bumiputera 
and non-Bumiputera community.92 The joint declaration blamed the New Economic 
Policy as the major cause of ethnic polarization and economic anomalies in the 
country and maintained that it should be eliminated. In place of the NEP, the 
Chinese organizations called for a new policy which would guarantee equal 
opportunities for all ethnic groups to participate in the privatization exercises, the 
"'The organizations were the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, the Penang Chinese Town Hall, the 
Perak Chinese Association, the Federation of Chinese Association (lohore), the Terengganu Chinese 
Assembly Hall, the Kelantan Chinese Assembly Hall, the Federation of Chinese Associations 
(Sarawak), the United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, the United Chinese 
School Teachers' Association of Malaysia, the Pahang Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Malacca 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Kedah Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Perlis Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce, the Perlis Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the Sabah United Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce. See Kua (2005: 125). 
91 A similar view was expressed at the Malaysian Indian Cultural Congress held in May 1984. A joint 
memorandum issued by ten Malaysian Indian organizations in conjunction with the congress warned 
that" any attempt to create a supra·culture (National Culture) artificially, in complete disregard of the 
existing cultural plurality, is to court trouble". The Indian organizations were the Federation of 
Malaysian Tamils, the Dravidian Society of Malaysia, the Tamil Youths' Bell Club Council the 
Malaysian Tamil Youth Council, the Tamil Writers' Association of Malaysia, the National Union of 
Tamil Schoots, the Malaysia Hindu Sanggam, the Tamil Arts Society of Malaysia, the Tamil Literature 
Society of Malaysia and the Malaysian Tamil Artists Association. See Kua (2005: 115 - 128) . 
., The organizations were the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, the Penang Chinese Town Hall, the 
Perak Chinese Association, the Federation of Chinese Association (lohore), the Terengganu Chinese 
Assembly Hall, the Kelantan Chinese Assembly Hall, the Federation of Chinese Associations 
(Sarawak), the United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, the United Chinese 
School Teachers' Association of Malaysia, the Pahang Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Malacca 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Kedah Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Perlis Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce, the Perils Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the Sabah United Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Hokkien Associations of Malaysia, the Federation of Kwan 
Tung Associations of Malaysia, the Malaysia Kwangsi Association, the Federation of Teochew 
Associations of Malaysia, the Federation of Kheng Chew Hwee Kuan of Malaysia, the Associated Eng 
Choon Societies of Malaysia, the Kuala Lumpur and Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, the Nanyang University Alumni AssocJation of Malaysia, the Johore Associated Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce, the United Association of Private Chinese Secondary Schools (Sabah), the 
Federation of Alumni Associations of Taiwan Universities, Malaysia. See Kua (2005: 161). 
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distribution of lands in the new land schemes and in the civil service and the state-
owned enterprises. It promoted the idea of "cultural pluralism", stressing in 
particular the withdrawal of the Malay-centric cultural policy from the public sphere 
as well as the abrogation of all Acts and Regulations which were unfavorable to the 
existence and development of cultures of various ethnic communities. While it 
accepted Bahasa Malaysia as the National Language, it maintained that the different 
languages of Malaysian people were equal in status and should be allowed to be 
used freely in all sectors. 93 
Although the prime movers behind the Chinese community's resistance 
against the government's pra.-Bumiputera policies were apparently the major Chinese 
guilds and associations,94 the Chinese-based political parties also played important 
roles. In November 1986, the Selangor State MCA, headed by the Minister of Labour 
and MCA Deputy President, Dato' Lee Kim Sai, passed a resolution questioning the 
indigenous status accorded to the Malays. This resolution irked UMNO leaders who 
subsequently urged the Prime Minister to sack Lee from the Cabinet.95 The 
controversy however died down when Lee apologized and retracted his statement. 
Another row sparked off in August 1987 when Lee criticized the NEP, prompting 
the UMNO Youth to once again demand his expulsion from the cabinet. Prior to the 
row, racial tension already ran high in a series of controversies involving corrununal 
issues. UMNO Youth had earlier urged the government not to bail out Chinese 
depositors who had lost investments worth about RM 1.5 billion as a result of the 
closure of 24 MCA-backed deposit taking cooperatives amid allegations of fraud and 
mismanagement. The government however proceeded with the bail out plan after 
receiving numerous counter-protests from the MCA and the Chinese community. In 
July, the University of Malaya abolished a few courses taught in Chinese and Tamil, 
prompting yet another protests by the MCA.96 Certainly, when the questioning of 
"Kua (2005: 147-161). 
"' Among the major Chinese organizations were the various slates Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 
!he Chinese Assembly Halls, the Federation of Chinese Associations, the United Chinese School 
Teachers' Association and the United Chinese School Committee Association. 
95 The Sydney Morning Herald, 8 November 1986. 
% Reuters, 3 August1987. 
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NEP by Lim Kim Sai cropped up in August, there had been an air of racial 
antagonism betlveen the Malays and the Chinese. 
It was amidst this air of racial animosity that the government's decision in 
September 1987 to promote non-Mandarin educated staff to senior administrative 
positions in 01inese primary schools caused another blow to Malay-Chinese 
relations. Fifteen major Chinese associations and three 01inese-based political 
parties, namely the MCA, the Gerakan and the DAP, formed a joint action committee 
to protest against the move. In a protest held in Kuala Lumpur on 11 October 1987, 
Lee Kim Sai, in a highly communal tone, pledged that the MCA would take" an 
uncompromising stand to swim or sink with Chinese primary schools whether in the 
cabinet or outside".97 The opposition leader and DAP Secretary-General, Lim Kit 
Siang, described the government's decision as "the most disturbing issue for Chinese 
in recent years and a challenge to their constitutional right to mother tongue 
education". 98 In response to the Chinese protest, UMNO Youth organized an 
approximately 10,000 strong rally on 17October1987 in Kuala Lumpur. In a similar 
communally charged tone, the then Youth Chief Datuk Seri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul 
Razak told the protesters thatthe UMNO Youth "will not allow the sovereignty of 
the government and UMNO to be questioned" .99 The rally also challenged the MCA 
to leave the BN if the party felt it was no longer feasible to remain in the 
government. 
The heightened ethnic tension led to the arrest of more than 100 persons 
under the Internal Security Act in October 1987. Among those arrested in the 
operation codenamed Operasi Lalang were opposition politicians, academicians, 
church workers, social activists and several BN politicians.mo The government 
91 Reuters, 11 October 1987. 
" Reuters, 11 October 1987. A boycott of schools was planned, but later cancelled following the setting 
up of a five-man Cabinet Committee to look into the suitability of teachers appointed to the schools. 
The boycott however was carried out in Penang when an estimated 30,000 pupils stayed away from 
schools. See Kua (2005: 92). 
"Reuters, 17October198i. 
100 Among those arrested were DAP Secretary-General Lim Kit Siang, DAP Deputy Chairman Karpal 
Singh, DAP Deputy Secretary-General P Patto, DAP Socialist Youth leader Lim Guan Eng, Negeri 
Sembilan DAP Chairman Hu Sepang, PAS Youth Chief Abdul Halim Arshad, Penang PAS Youth 
Cltief Muhamad Sabu, PAS Youth Exco Bunyamin Hajl Yaakob, United School Teachers Association 
of Malaysia President Sim Mou Yu, AL!RAN President Chandra Muzaffar, MTUC Secretary-General 
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maintained that the arrests were necessary in order to "maintain peace and 
stability" .101 The government also banned public rallies and tightened control over 
the press. Three newspapers, the English daily The Star, the Chinese daily Sin Chew 
fit Poh and the biweekly Malay language Watan, were ordered to close.102 The 
government claimed that the three newspapers had published news "prejudicial to 
national security and added to racial tension in the country".103 In December 1987, 
the Parliament amended the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 to empower 
the Home Affairs Minister to ban any publication which contained materials 
prejudicial to public order and which is likely to alarm public opinion.104 Those 
found guilty of maliciously publishing false news would be liable to imprisonment 
of up to three years or a fine of RM 20,000 or to both.105 There would be no recourse 
to the court to challenge the government's decision to suspend or revoke a 
publication license.106 The government also had the power to control or stop the 
import and circulation of foreign publications if they were found to contain 
materials prejudicial to public order or the national interest or alarm public 
opinion.107 
In a move to further enhance the power of the government to deal with the 
threats to national security and racial harmony, the Parliament in June 1989 
amended the Internal Security Act 1960 to deny the court the power to review 
preventive detention cases under the Act, except in regard to questions on 
V. David, social activist Dr. Kua Kia Soong, UPM lecturer Dr. Tan Ka Kheng, UKM lecturer Dr. 
Mohamed Nasir Hashim, Consumer Association of Penang Legal Advisor Meenakshi Raman and 
church worker Tan Bee Hwa. Several BN politicians were also arrested. Among them were MCA 
Youth Chief Datuk Yap Pian Hon, MCA Vice-President Chan Kit Chee, MCA Youth Vice-Chief Tan 
Chai Ho, UMNO leader and Member of Parliament for Pasir Mas Ibrahim Ali and UMNO Youth Exco 
members Tajuddin Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Fahrni Ibrahim. See Koh (2004: 312). 
101 Reuters, 28 October 1987. It was important to note that the crackdown on the opposition politicians 
and other political dissidents occurred soon after Dr. Mahathir was almost defeated by Tengku 
Razaleigh in the contest for UMNO Presidency in the 1987 UMNO election. The election results were 
being challenged and the party was declared unlawful by the court. Dr. Mahathir' s position as 
UMNO President and Prime Minister tilted on U1e balance. The use of legal coercion at this point of 
time led to allegations that it was for the purpose of silencing dissent and consolidating political 
power. 
102 The ban on the three newspapers was only lifted in March 1988. 
103 11te Associated Press, 28 October 1987. 
10< Section 7 (1). 
1os Section 8A. 
1°6 Section 13A. 
107 Section 9(1) of PPPA 1984. 
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compliance with procedural requirements.ms Justifying the amendment on the 
ground of maintaining racial harmony, the then Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir said: 
A multiracial society is often prone to internal and external threats to its 
stability and security. We can now see that a number of multiracial countries 
had fallen into the dungeon of racial violence. Amendments to this act are 
deemed necessary in order to enable the government to discharge its duties in 
maintaining peace and order.109 
(ii) Radical Malay Students 
\'Vhile the implementation of the pro-Bumiputera policies generated protests from the 
non-Bumiputeras, the same policies raised Bumiputeras' expectations that the 
government would improve their social and economic position. By the 1970s, the 
radical Malay students emerged as a vocal group which pressed for immediate 
government actions to uplift the economic position of poor rural Malays.110 In the 
1969 general election, many of these students campaigned for the opposition and, in 
the aftermath of the 1969 racial riots, rallied behind Dr. Mahathir who was expelled 
from UMNO following the publication of his letter blaming Tunku Abdul Ralunan 
for his failure to protect Malay interests.111 The Malay students, many of w horn 
hailed from poor families, formed solidarity with the Malay peasants, organized 
field welfare programs in the villages and blamed the government for the failure to 
address the problem of poverty among the rural Malays.112 
Faced with possible student's uprising, the Parliament in 1971 passed the 
University and University Colleges Act, which prohibited student bodies from 
having affiliation with or expressing support, sympathy or opposition to any 
JOB Section BB oi the Internal Security Act 1960. 
JCJ<J Hansard, 23 June 1989. 
110 Among the "radicaf' Malay student bodies were the University of Malaya Malay Language Society 
(UMMLS), the University of Malaya Student Union (UMSU) and the National Union of Malaysian 
Muslim Students' Association (PKP!M), Another important Malay student group, the Gabungan 
Pelajar Melm1u Semenanjung (GPMS), was more pro-government in its approach. 
m Muhammad Abu Bakar (1973: 85), 
m Muhammad Abu Bakar (1973: 28) 
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political parties, trade unions or any unlawful organization, body or group of 
persons.113 University Vice-Chancellors were authorized to suspend or dissolve any 
student body which in his opinion conducted itself in a manner prejudicial to the 
interests or well being of the university or to public order, safety and security.114 
University students were only allowed to form a representative council managed by 
an executive committee.115 Student bodies were also prohibited from having 
association v::ith any political parties, trade unions or any other organizations 
established under the law except with approval of the Vice-Chancellor.116 Apart 
from controlling student activities, the Act also aimed at regulating the 
establishment and administration of higher education institutions.117 Under the Act, 
a university could only be established by order of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, thus 
placing the establishment of universities under full control of the government.118 
Despite the restrictions under the University and University Colleges Act 1971, 
university students continued to be a formidable pressure group in the early 1970s. 
In November 1974, the plight of poor rural Malays in Baling in the northern state of 
Kedah caught their attention. Backed by several academicians at the University of 
Malaya, they held demonstrations in Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh and Penang,119 
demanding the government to immediately help alleviate the hardships faced by the 
poor peasants.120 Following a massive demonstration on 3December1974 in Kuala 
Lumpur, prominent student leaders and university lecturers who supported them 
were arrested under the lSA.121 lnSeptember1974, seven University of Malaya 
113 Section 15. 
114 Section 16. 
115 Section 48. 
116 Section 50. 
117 Section 19. 
118 This provision was also seen as an attempt by the government to foil Chinese educationists' effort 
to establish a Chinese-medium Merdekii University in the late 1960s Ounaidi 1993: 31) 
119 Demonstration first started on the University of Malaya campus in Kuala Lumpur. They later 
spread to campuses of the MARA lnstitote of Technology and the National University, both in Kuala 
Lumpur, and to the Ungku Omar Polytechnic (lpoh) and the University of Science (Penang) (Syed 
Hussin 1996: 2). 
120 SlRD (2000: 72). 
111 Among those arrested were Anwar Ibrahim (ABlM President/Malaysia Youth Council President), 
Syed Hussin Ali (Secretary of University of Malaya Staff Association), Tengku Shamsul Bahrin 
(President of University of Malaya Staff Association), Gurdlal S. Nljhar (University of Malaya law 
lecturer), Ibrahim Ali (President of MARA Institute of Technology Student Union), Kamaruzzaman 
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students were also arrested after they protested against the government move to 
evict poor Malay squatters in Tasek Utara, Johore.122 The arrests were justified on the 
ground of maintaining national security.123 
Following the student protests, the Parliament in 1975 passed amendment to 
the University and University Colleges Act to tighten student disciplinary rules and 
gave more powers to the Vice-Chancellor to take disciplinary actions against the 
students. Among others, it provided that office bearers of student organizations 
would be liable for any criminal offence committed on behalf of the organizations;124 
that any persons found in the possession of books, accounts, writings, etc. which 
relate to an organization would be presumed to be a member of such organization;125 
that a university student who is charged with a criminal offence would immediately 
be suspended from the university;126 that the university Board would have 
disciplinary authority over every staff of the university and would exercise 
disciplinary control over them;127 that the Vice-Chancellor, who is the disciplinary 
authority in respect of students of the university, shall have the power to take 
disciplinary action against the students as may be provided for under any 
disciplinary rules made by the university Board;I28 and that the university Board 
would have the power to make disciplinary rules as it deems necessary or 
expedient.129 With these amendments in place, and strictly enforced by the authority, 
the government had effectively managed to silence the radical student groups and 
curbed student activism.BO 
Yaakob (President of University of Malaya Student Union) and Lau Heng Neng (University of 
Malaya Chinese Language Society leader) (Syed Hussin 1996). 
m Munroe Kua (1996: 82). 
l2l The grounds of detention of one of the detainees in the December 1974 demonstration, University 
of Malaya sociology lecturer and Malaysian People's Socialist Party (PSRM) leader Syed Hussin Ali, 
mentioned his consistent involvement in activities prejudicial to national security. He was alleged to 
have "actively, knowingly and willingly assisted the illegal Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) by 
promoting subversive student activities in institutions of higher learning and the legally registered 
Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia (PSfu\1) in order to overthrow the legally constituted Governn1ent of 
Malaysia by unconstitutional and revolutionary means" (Syed Hussin 1996: 160). 
124 Section 15B. 
125 Section 15C. 
"'Section 15D. 
m Section 16A. 
m Section 16B. 
129 Section 16C. 
uo Junaidi (1993: 52). 
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(iii) Labor 
As the success of the pro-Bumiputera economic policy depended on an expanding 
economy based on labor-intensive industries, there was an urgent need on the part 
of the government to subject labor unions to tighter governmental control. In the 
1950s and 1960s, it was not uncommon for labor unions to organize strikes and 
protests as a means to force the government and employers to listen to their 
demands. To avoid this situation, the Malaysian government put restrictions on 
labor rights by not allowing labor unions to organize strikes over recognition claims 
or to bargain on issues designated as "managerial prerogatives".131 Strikes and lock-
outs could only be carried out after complying with strict requirements. In order to 
insulate labor unions from the activities of political parties, office bearers or 
employees of political parties were not permitted to hold office in unions, while the 
unions were prohibited from establishing political funds.132 
The government was also determined to intervene in disputes between workers 
and employers. Sometimes, this was done by the use of coercion. In 1979, the dispute 
between Airlines Employees Union (AEU) and the government-owned Malaysian 
Airlines System (MAS) led to the detention of 23 union activists under the Internal 
Security Act. 200 employees were suspended and 11 dismissed. Though all the 
detainees were soon released and most of the suspended employees were reinstated, 
the aftermath of the dispute proved to be disastrous for the union. The AEU was 
deregistered and its members were divided into two new unions, namely the more 
docile in-house Malayan Airlirle System Employees' Union (MASEU) and the 
Foreign Airlines Employees' Union (FAEU).133 
Restrictive labor laws and state intervention in industrial relations effectively 
helped the government to reduce labor activism in the 1970s. In most instances, the 
government and the employers ignored workers' demands without much 
m These are matters relating to di~missal, retrenchment, hiring, promotion, transfer and work 
allocation. 
132 Jomo & Todd (1994: 130-131) 
1'3 Jomo & Todd (1994: 142-143). 
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resistance.134 In the 1980s, the labor position was further undermined by the setting 
up of the more docile Japanese-style in-house unions.BS Labor laws also became 
more restrictive. In the 1980 amendment to the labor laws, the right to take industrial 
action was further inhibited, union recognition disputes were no longer considered 
legitimate trade disputes, the definition of strikes was expanded to include 
unauthorized reduction in work, unions in essential services were required to give 
three instead of two weeks notice of their intention to strike and the list of essential 
services was expanded to include banking. There were other restrictions on voting, 
holding of strike and picket, and an increase in the powers of the Registrar of Trade 
Unions.136 
Though the pressures from the international labor organizations in the late 
1980s seemed to ease labor's predicament, state capitulation to foreign capital 
prevailed over the need to liberalize labor policy. Such was the case when the 
government, faced with the possible withdrawal of privileges under GA TI' s 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for violating workers' rights, allowed 
unionization of eledronics workers in September 1988. However, counter-protests 
from the foreign-dominated electronics industry forced the government to confine 
unionization to in-house unions instead of industry-wide unions. All this led to the 
waning of labor activism throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
(iv) Non-Go·11ernmental Organizations 
Another group which was subjected to strict governmental control was the non-
governmental organizations. Vocal NGOs like Aliran Kesedaran Negara ( ALIRAN), 
Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM), Consumer Association of Penang 
(CAP) and Enviromnental Protection Society of Malaysia (EPSM) had strong views 
on issues affecting the public. Some of these NGOs, owing to their network with 
international organizations and funding from abroad, had been labeled as foreign 
agents. What is more, these NGOs were also associated with the opposition for their 
'" Jomo & Todd (1994: 141), 
135 Jomo & Todd (1994: 146). 
136 Jomo & Todd (1994: 147) 
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critical views and activities. Some even campaigned for the opposition during 
elections.137 
It was in response to this development that the Parliament in 1981 passed 
sweeping amendments to the Societies Act 1966.138 It introduced a new category of 
"political society", which was meant for the vocal NGOs, and put more restrictions 
on their activities.139 It alqo gave power to the Registrar of Societies to cancel the 
registration of a society, whose activities violate or militate against the basic 
principles of the Constitution, while the court is shut out from reviewing the 
Minister's decisions made under the Act. t•0 Any affiliation or connection with 
international organizations had also to be approved by the Registrar of Society.1•1 
Notwithstanding such approval, the Registrar could force the societies to cease 
dealings with foreign bodies if satisfied that it was necessary to do so in the interest 
of the society, public order, safety and security.142 Though protests from the NGOs 
caused the "political society" category to be deleted from the Act, most of the 
restrictions on the activities of the societies as well as the expanded power of the 
Registrar of Societies and the Minister remained.143 
(v) The Opposition and Other Political Dissidents 
The use of restrictive laws on the ground of maintaining racial harmony and political 
stability had limited the scope for political competition. More often than not, the 
laws, especially the emergency and anti-subversion laws, had been used against 
opposition politicians and other political dissidents to silence dissent. Sometimes, 
"
7 AB!M, for example, openly campaigned for its former leaders who contested in the 1978 election as 
opposition candidates. 
""'See Barraclough (1984: 454-456) 
139 Sections 2 and 10 of the Societies (Amendment) Act 1981. The term "political society" refers to any 
society which by its objects, rules or conduct, seeks "to int1uence in any manner the policies or 
activities ... or the functioning, management or operation of the Government of Malaysia or of the 
Government of any State, or of any local authority or any statutory authority or of any department or 
agency of any such Government or authority" (Section 2). Special provisions for political society 
provide for the exclusion of non-citizens from membership and the prohibition of foreign fund except 
with permission from the Registrar of Societies (Section 10). 
140 Section 3. 
"' Section 6. 
142 Section 8. 
143 See Gurmit (1984: 30); Barraclough ( 
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the seemingly escalating racial tension and impending threat to public order gave 
credence to the government's claim that the use of such laws was necessary. 
However, such justification is hard to maintain when the laws were used at times 
when political intrigues involving those in power were more obvious than 
indications of racial or other conflicts. 
This was the case in November 1977 when an emergency was proclaimed in 
Kelantan subsequent to the disagreement between PAS and UMNO over the post of 
the state Menteri Besar (Chief Minister ).144 The crisis began when the PAS-dominated 
State Legislative Assembly passed a motion of no confidence against the then 
Menteri Besar, Dato' Mohamad Nasir, a PAS leader who was backed by UMNO. 
Refusing to acquiesce, Mohamad Nasir advised the Regent of Kelantan to dissolve 
the State Legislative Assembly in order to allow a fresh election to be held. In the 
meantime, demonstrations broke out in the state, seemingly in support of 
Mohammad Nasir. Though the demonstrations were minor, the Parliament on 8 
November 1977 passed a Bill to bring Kelantan under emergency rule. As a result, 
Mohamad Nasir retained his post, but the state came under the direct control of the 
Federal Government, administered by a senior federal civil servant who was in tum 
responsible personally to the Prime Minister. V\lith the direct control of the federal 
government, UMNO together with the newly-formed Barisan ]emaah Islamiah Se-
lVfalaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Assembly Front, BERJASA) led by Mohamad Nasir, 
managed to defeat PAS in the 1978 election. The UMNO-BERJASA alliance won 34 
seats in the State Legislative Assembly, leaving PAS with only two seats.145 
Repressive laws were also used against rival factions within UMNO. In the 
1970s, a political schism in the party caused two UMNO leaders, Abdullah Ahmad 
and Abdullah Majid, to be detained under the ISA. Abdullah Ahmad was a deputy 
minister and a long serving political secretary to the second Prime Minister Tun 
Abdul Razak, while Abdullah Majid was a parliamentary secretary and former press 
secretary to Razak. Both men were deputy ministers in the cabinet of Tun Hussein 
144 PAS gained con!rol over Kelanlan in the 1959 election when it was in the Opposition, As the party 
joined the BN in 1974, the UMNO President, who was the BN's Chairman, usually had the final say in 
the appointment of state Menter! Besar (Muhammad Kamlin 1980) 
"'Muhammad Kamlin (1980: 44). 
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Onn, Razak's successor. The two Abdullahs, who were close to Razak, were alleged 
to have been involved in an attempt to oust Datuk Harun Idris, the then Menteri 
Besar of Selangor and UMNO Youth Chief. The ouster of Hamn, who was implicated 
in a corruption case, was seen as a part of the larger move to sideline the "Old 
Guards" within the party. The death of Razak in January 1976 provided an 
opportunity for Harun and his allies to fight back. They accused the two Abdullahs 
of being communist agents and demanded that the government take serious action 
against them.14.6 'The move against the nvo Abdullahs gained momentum after two 
Malay journalists in Singapore were arrested in June 1976 for their alleged 
involvement in a communist scheme allegedly masterminded and directed by 
Samad Ismail, a journalist who was closely associated with Razak. Samad was later 
arrested and made a televised confession that he had, with the help of several young 
UMNO leaders, succeeded in approaching the leadership of UMNO and influenced 
UMNO leaders to see issues and solve them in his way. The younger UMNO 
leaders whom Samad referred to were the two Abdullahs, with whom he had 
worked closely. In November 1976, although the confession was rather 
unconvincing, the Home Minister, Ghazali Shafie, ordered the detention of the duo 
under the Internal Security Act. 
Factionalism within UMNO in the mid 1980s also precipitated the use of law to 
purge rival factions within the party. Faced with a challenge against the legality of 
the 1987 party election, which saw Dr. Mahathir being returned to the post of party 
President with a slim 43-vote majority; and the court's decision which declared 
UMNO an unlawful society,147 Dr. Mahathir initiated an open attack against the 
judiciary, which culminated in the sacking of the then Lord President Tun Salleh 
Abbas and two Supreme Court judges.148 Tun Salleh, who had been critical of the 
146 Abdullah Majid, like Samad Ismail, had a leftist background. His prominence in Razak' s 
administration was perceived as the grov.ing influence of lhe socialists who surrounded the prime 
minister. 
147 The decision was made on the ground that 30 party branches, which send 44 delegates to the 1987 
party general assembly, had not been approved by the Registrar of Societies. Section 12 of the 
Societies Act 1966 provides that, "where a registered society establishes a branch without the prior 
approval of the Registrar such registered society and the branch so established shall be deemed to be 
unlawful society". See Mohamed Noor bin Othma!l v. Mnhamed Yusafffaafar [1988] 2ML)129. 
1
" The two Supreme Court Judges were Tan Sri Wan Sulaiman Pa wan The and Datuk George Seah. 
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government in a number of cases in the mid 1980s, was to preside over the full panel 
of nine Supreme Court judges to hear an appeal against the High Court's decision 
declaring UMNO an unlawful society. The appeal was filed by the rival faction led 
by former Finance Minister Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah. Should the appeal be 
allowed, the old UMNO would be revived and a fresh election would be held. 
Meanwhile, Dr. Mahathir formed UJVL'!O Baru (New UMNO), of which he was the 
President, and excluded the rival faction from the new party and purged them from 
the cabinet. It was after the change of guard in the judiciary that the panel of 
Supreme Court judges presided over by the new Lord President Tun Abdul Hamid 
Omar dismissed the appeal by Razaleigh' s faction, hence assuring the position of 
UMNO Baru as the successor of the Old UMNO and Dr. Mahathir' s position as its 
President. In a move to avoid future party disputes from being put under judicial 
scrutiny, an amendment was made to the Societies Act 1966 to bar intra-party 
disputes from being brought to the courts. 
By the late 1980s, while the destabilizing forces unleashed by the continued 
debate on the constitutional contract issues provided justification for the government 
to use laws to maintain racial harmony, the laws had in fact been directed more 
against opposition politicians and vocal critics of the government. This, in turn, 
weakened the dissenting voices within the society and seriously limited the scope for 
political competition. The government, having its legal powers expanded during the 
tumultuous post-independence years and beyond, had effectively employed the law 
to consolidate its political position. 
The De-politicization of Constitutional Contract Issues, 1990 -1997 
By the 1990s, as a result of the implementation of the New Economic Policy, the 
Bumiputera community, especially the Malays, had experienced significant upward 
social mobility. The Malay middle class expanded and the incidence of poverty 
among rural Malays declined significantly. At the same time, the government had 
relaxed its pro-Malay policy on education and culture, which made it less alienating 
for the non-Bumiputera community. In 1990, the emphasis on national unity and 
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multiculralism gained a new boost with the launch of Malaysia's Vision 2020, which 
made the creation of a united multiracial Bangsa Malaysia (Malaysian Nation) one of 
its main goals. Although the old constitutional contract issues had not completely 
subsided, they no longer dominated election campaigns. There had been an air of 
easing ethnic tension and a move toward greater inter-ethnic understanding. Despite 
this positive development in ethnic relations, the1·e had been no reduction in state 
legal powers. The government continued to use laws to silence dissent, with the 
opposition and vocal critics of the government remained the main targets. 
The Relaxation of Education and Cultural Policy 
Throughout the 1990s, except for the relaxation of the Bumiputera equity condition 
under the Industrial Coordination Act during the 1997 /98 economic crisis, the 
government economic policy continued to be directed toward enhancing Bumiputera 
economic achievement by giving them preferential treatment in the award of shares 
and government contracts, permits and licenses.149 Non-Bumiputera disaffection with 
the NEP thus continued, although the momentum had somewhat dwindled.150 This 
was partly due to the fact that many non-Bumiputera businessmen also benefited 
from the policy. It was a common practice among Malay businessmen to sub-
contract the jobs they received from the government to non-Bumiputera contractors, 
resulting in economic benefits trickling down to the non-Bumiputera business 
community as well. Apart from that, the more politically well-connected non-
Bumiputera businessmen benefited from the government's privatization policy, 
"'Since the early 1990s, although the government continued to give special attention to the 
Bumiputera economic achievement, there had been subtle changes to the government economic 
policy, especially in regard to the liberalization of some key sectors of the economy. Mainly due to the 
pressures of globalization and the need to maintain global competitiveness, the government adopted 
a more market friendly policy in some key sectors such as securities, investment and banking. These 
included relaxation of the foreign equity ownershlp rules in manufacturing firms; revision of 
bankruptcy law to assist credit; lavv reform to make financial sector more efficient and competitive; 
reduction in licensing control for manufacturing companies; amendment to the company laws to 
strengthen shareholders' rights; market-based procedures for commodity trading; and new legislation 
for offshore insurance, banking and trusts to facilitate the creation of the offshore financial market. 
See Pistor and Wellons (1999). 
1so Although the NEP ended in 1990, its main thrust was incorporated in the New Development 
Policy, one of the main aims of which was the creation of the Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial 
Community (BCiq. 
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which began in the early 1980s.151 No less important, by the mid 1990s, the Chinese-
based political parties in the BN had paid more attention to providing better services 
to the Chinese community as part of the efforts to fulfill the community's needs for 
"economic development" .1s2 This development, to a certain extent, helped reduce the 
politicization of constitutional contract issues, especially in regard to the pro-Malay 
economic policy. 
There had been further relaxation of the government's pro-Bumiputera policy 
on education and culture. In 1996, education laws were revamped with the 
introduction of the new Education Act and the Private Higher Education Institution 
Act. These Acts paved the way for the implementation of an education system which 
was more acceptable for the non-Bumiputera communities. The new Education Act 
for instance explicitly exempted the national-type schools from using Bahasa 
Malaysia as the medium of instruction, hence supporting the development of 
mother-tongue education in vernacular schools.153 More significant, the Ministerial 
power to convert these schools into national schools was abolished.154c Apart from 
that, the Minister may exempt any other educational institution from the National 
Language requirement.155 The Private Higher Education Institution Act provides for 
the first time the establishment and regulation of private tertiary education 
institutions. Though the Act requires these institutions to conduct courses in the 
National Language, they may use English as a medium of instruction with the 
approval of the Minister, hence liberalizing the government policy on the medium of 
151 Non-Malay tycoons like Tan Sri Vincent Tan of Berjaya Group, Tan Sri Ananda Krishnan of Maxis 
Communications Berhad and Tan Sri Francis Yeoh of YrL Corporation were among those who 
benefited from the government's privatization policy. Despite this, the policy was said to be 
contributing to the NEP as the government can directly pick Malay businessmen to be awarded 
privatization projects, which was usually done through closed or negotiated tender. 
151 See Loh (2001). 
'"Section 17(1) of the Education Act 1996. The Education Act 1961 does not contain specific section 
on medium of instruction in schools. It however defines a national-type school as a fully assisted 
school that, among others, uses the English, Chinese or Tamil language as the main medium of 
instruction and in which the national language is a compulsory subject of instruction. 
154 Section 28. 
1ss Section 17(1). 
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instruction in education institutions.156 Arabic may also be used as a medium of 
instruction for Islamic courses.157 
One of the important milestones for the non-Bumiputera community, 
especially the Chinese, as a result of the more liberal education policy was the 
establishment of the Dong Jao Zang-run New Era College in May 1997. Funded 
mainly by Chinese philanthropists, the college offered a wide range of diploma and 
associate degree courses in arts, sciences and other professional fields using English 
and Chinese as the medium of instruction. It also offered associate degree program 
in Chinese Language and Literature under its twinning program with the 
universities in China and Taiwan.158 Another important achievement was the 
expansion of the MCA-run Tunku Abdul Rahman College from an institution which 
offered pre-university studies beginning in 1969 to a fully fledged tertiary education 
institution offering certificate, diploma and advanced diploma courses by the end of 
the 1990s. In 2001, the MCA established Tunku Abdul Rahman University (UTAR) 
as an extension of the TAR College. Meanwhile, the mushrooming of private 
colleges offering twinning degree programs with renov.med universities in western 
countries provided the non-Bumiputera community with greater access to higher 
education. In this regard, the more liberal government policy on education had 
remedied one of the main causes of resentment arising from the National Language 
Policy and the pro-Malay university entry quota system under the NEP. 
The more liberal government policy could also be observed in the performing 
arts. Partly due to the need to promote tourism as one of the country's major sources 
of foreign exchange, the non-Malay cultures were increasingly promoted as part and 
parcel of Malaysia's rich Asian cultural heritage.159 Beginning in 2000, a multi-
cultural parade called Citrawama, or the colors of Malaysia, was made an annual 
event. The National Day celebration had also turned into a multi-cultural parade 
showcasing Malaysia's cultural diversity to the world. In both events, the liberty to 
showcase cultures of various races in the state-sponsored events was portrayed as 
156 Section 41(3)(a). 
1&7 Section 41(3)(b). 
'"New Era College (2005)" 
159 Malaysia's tourism motto ''Truly Asia" reflects the govemmen[s effort to promote the country's 
rich Asian cultural heritage. 
119 
not only evidence of Malaysia's cultural richness, but also of its harmonious race 
relations, Apart from these, Malaysia's religious and cultural celebrations like the 
Muslim Eid, Chinese New Year, Deepavali, Christmas and the Dayak' s Gawai were 
portrayed as key events that were celebrated not only by the respective religious or 
racial communities, but also by all Malaysians regardless of race and religion.1w 
By the mid 1990s, the constitutional contract issues had gradually been de-
politicized. Although the Chinese associations continued to champion Chinese 
interests, many had openly expressed support for the government and become more 
aligned toward the MCA or the Gerakan.161 The Chinese political parties in the BN 
too had focused their efforts more on offering services to their constituents rather 
than sensationalizing communal issues. On the other hand, only a handful of 
concerned Malays protested against the gradual decline of Malay special privileges 
as a result of the more liberal government policies on culture and education. One of 
the concerned Malay groups was Kumpulan Prihatin (Concerned Group) led by 
former Malay civil servants and academics.162 However, their activities were much 
resh·ained owing to the lack of wide based organizational support and mass 
following.163 
Ihe Use of Repressive Laws amidst Easing Ethnic Tension 
As ethnic relations improved and social resistance to the government's more liberal 
cultural, education and economic policy subsided, resort to repressive laws to 
maintain racial harmony and political stability had become increasingly difficult to 
justify. What is more, the official surrender of the Communist Party of Malaya in 
tw Jn the 2000s, there have been combined celebrations of Muslim Eid, Chinese New Year, Deepavali 
and Christmas. The government usually sponsored grand "open house" to celebrate these festivals. 
161 Interview with Kua Kia Soong, a Chinese education n1ovement activist and Principal of the New 
Era College, 22 August 2005. 
162 Among prominent members of this group were Datuk Zainal Abidin Wahid (former National 
University of Malaysia senior academic), Tan Sri Ainuddin Wahid (former Vice-Chancellor of 
Malaysian University ofTeclmology), Datuk Hassan Ibrahim (former senior civil servant), Datuk 
Hassan Ahmad (former Director of Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka), Datuk Abu Bakar Hamid (former 
Chairman of Malaysian News Agency) and Dr. Awang Sariyan (President of Malaysian Linguistic 
Society). 
163 Although ABIM and PKPIM were sympathetic to this group, both organizations too lacked mass 
following, thus seriously limited their ability to offer mass support for the group to pursue its cause. 
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1989 ended the long period of communist threat to national security. Reflecting these 
circumstances, not only had the number of arrests and detentions under the ISA 
significantly decreased but, of those detained, an increasing number were held for 
reasons unrelated national security .164 As the traditional communist-linked 
subversive elements and racial extremists faded away, the ISA increasingly focused 
on a new group of common criminals involved in activities like bringing in illegal 
immigrants, counterfeiting currency, phone cloning, falsifying documents and 
possessing firearms without license. 
Nevertheless, repressive measures continued to be taken although on a much 
reduced scale. For example, on a few occasions the ISA was used against members of 
religious groups deemed to be deviationist by the government such as the Shi'ite 
sect165 and the spiritual group Al-Arqam.166 During the 1990s only two minor ethnic-
related incidents prompted the use of ISA. The first was in response to untrue 
rumors on the internet that racial violence had broken out in Kuala Lumpur in 
August 1998. Three persons were soon arrested under the ISA for allegedly 
spreading tlie rumors.167 In the same month, a person was arrested under the ISA for 
distributing seditious pamphlets on an earlier Muslim-Hindu clash in Kampung 
Rawa, Penang.168 The clash had broken out after Muslims who frequented the village 
mosque complained about the loud sound of the bell at a nearby Hindu temple.169 
Four persons were reportedly injured in the incident and the police detained 185 
164 The number of arrests made under the ISA decreased from 6,328 in the 1970s to 1,346inthe1980s 
and 1,066 in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the number of those served with detention orders under the Act 
slightly increased from 559 in the 1980s to 680 in the 1990s. This number, however, was still small 
compared to the issuance of 1,299 detention orders in the 1960s and 1,673 in the 1970s. See Suaram 
(2003: 23). 
1
" In November 1997, 10 followers of the Shi'il€ sect were detained under the !SA for activities 
prejudicial to national security and Muslim unity. The Malaysian government baned the Shi'ite sect 
alleging that its teachings deviated from the mainstream Sunni's. See New Straits Times, 12 November 
1997. 
1
" In September 1994, Ashaari Muhammad, the leader of Muslim spiritual group Al-Arqam was 
detained under the ISA. The government had earlier banned the movement and declared it as a threat 
to national security. Ashaari's wife and a senior leader of the movement were also arrested under the 
ISA. Four other Al-Arqam senior leaders were arrested under the Societies Act. See Straits Times, 6 
September 1994 . 
167 The Straits Times, 14August1998. The fourth suspect, a college student, was detained under the 
Criminal Procedure Code. 
168 The Sun, 18August1998. The 
1
'
9 Four villagers were reportedly injured in the incident and some 200 rioters were detained by the 
police. The clash was soon contained by the authorities. 
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people under remand for allegedly causing riots and possessing dangerous 
weapons. Although the government warned that ISA would be used against the 
rioters, none of them were in fact detained under the law. In relation to the arrests of 
the" cyber rumor-mongers" under the ISA, there had been protests from human 
rights groups arguing that they should be charged under the normal criminal law 
instead. Several rights groups expressed concerns that the arrests could spark fears 
over the possibility of the government's arbitrary actions in dealing with "cyber 
subversion" which did not auger well for the development of the country's 
information and communication technology. Subsequent to the protests, the persons 
arrested for spreading rumors on the internet were charged under the Penal Code 
rather than the ISA.170 
Opposition politicians and NGO activists, however, remained the main targets 
of repressive laws in the 1990s. Several high-ranking members of the opposition Parti 
Bersatu Sabah (PBS) were arrested under the ISA between 1990 and 1991 for allegedly 
plotting to pull Sabah out of Malaysia. Among those who were arrested were Jeffrey 
Kitingan, the brother of PBS leader and Sabah Chief Minister, Datuk Joseph Pairin 
Kitingan; Dr. Maximus Ongkili, a close associate of Pairin; and Benedict Topin, a PBS 
youth leader. All of them, however, were soon released.171 During the outbreak of 
Reformasi following the sacking of former Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, in 
September 1998, about 40 of Anwar' s supporters were detained under the ISA 
Among them were key UMNO leaders and Islamic movement activists who played 
key roles in the Reformasi movement.172 
In November 1996, the police arrested about 100 NGO activists who took part 
in the Second Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor (APCET II). The Malaysian 
government was against the organization of the conference for fear that it would 
sour the country's diplomatic ties with Indonesia.11' Taking cue from the 
170 Bemama, 24 September 1998. 
171 PBS was a BN partner until it left the coalition on the verge of the 1990 general election, in which 
the ruling BN faced the most intense challenge from the opposition since 1969. PBS rejoined BN in 
2002. Dr. Maximus Ongkili is now a PBS Member of Parliament and a Minister in the Prime Minister's 
Deparhnent. 
m See Chapter 5 for further discussion on the 1998 Reformasi and the ISA arrest• occurred during the 
period. 
m The New Straits Times, 11 November 1996. 
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goverrunent' s stand on the issue, a group of UMNO Youth members called Barisan 
Bertindak Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People's Action Front) stormed the conference 
venue on 9 November 1996 purportedly to stop the conference from being convened. 
As a result of this incident, the police arrested 113 persons including foreign NGO 
activists who participated in the conference. All of them were soon released ·with the 
foreign participants deported to their countries for violating social visit passes. 174 In 
December 1996, a group of NGO activists who attempted to hold a forum to discuss 
abuses of police powers were threatened with detention under the Internal Security 
Act, resulting in the forum being suspended indefinitely. 
In view of the increasing NGO activism in the 1990s, the Parliament in 1997 
amended the Societies Act to provide higher penalties for those who violate the law. 
Under the amendment, the maximum fine for those who carry out activities of a 
society before the Registrar of Societies (ROS) approves its application for 
registration was increased from RM 2,000 to RM 5,000.175 The maximum fine for 
office bearers of an unlawful society was increased from RM 10,000 to RM 15,000.176 
Higher fines were also imposed on persons found guilty of allowing unlawful 
societies to use their premises, inciting a person to become member of an unlawful 
society, procuring subscription for an unlawful society, publishing propaganda 
materials of an unlawful society, acting on behalf or representing unlawful societies, 
being office bearers of societies the registration of which had been cancelled, 
displaying flags of unapproved societies, being members of triad societies, misusing 
money or property of registered societies or making false declaration of society 
rules.177 The ROS officials were also given power to seize any documents or 
materials belonging to a registered society if they had reason to believe that such 
documents may be required for proceedings under the Act.178 As a number of 
human rights NGOs were registered as companies or businesses under the 
Companies Act or the Registration of Businesses Act respectively, both Acts were 
174InJanuary1997, four UMNO Youth members who involved in the demonstration at the conference 
venue in Asia Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, faced charges in the court for participating in unlawful 
assembly. See Tlie New Straits Times, 31January1997. 
l?S Section 6. 
176 Section 42. 
I77Sections 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53 and 54. 
m Section 64. 
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amended to allow greater governmental control of the NGO activities. The Registrar 
of Companies (ROC) was empowered to refuse the registration of a company if he 
believed that it was to be used for unlawful purposes or for any other purposes 
prejudicial to national security and public order. As part of the control measure, the 
NGOs which were registered as businesses were also required to submit their annual 
reports to the Registrar of Businesses (ROB). 
The Judicialization of Politics 
Although ethnic relations improved in the 1990s, the government continued to 
consolidate its legal powers and put them to use to silence dissent. It is in this regard 
that the de-politicization of constitutional contract issues, improving ethnic relations 
and the non-existence of a communist threat led to increased questioning of 
repressive laws that had been justified as necessary to maintain national security and 
racial harmony, especially the emergency and anti-subversion laws which had been 
used against dissenting voices within the society. The government therefore turned 
to a more "justifiable" way of legal coercion to bring political dissidents to "justice" 
through normal criminal or civil proceedings. This approach entailed the use of 
normal criminal and civil laws against political dissidents and the role of the courts 
to try and purrish them. Politics was thus "judidalized" in the sense that supposedly 
pure political battles were pushed into the judicial sphere for adjudication, with 
those who had the power to prosecute and to exercise control over the judiciary 
being placed in an advantaged position to consolidate their political position. 
According to Simon Barraclough, the advantage of this form of legal coercion is that: 
it avoids, to some extent, the odium of arbitrary action under the Internal 
Security Act as well as reinforcing the notion of the rule of law. Opponents of 
the regime can be portrayed as acting illegally, and the Government's 
substantial legal and financial resources can be pitted against the limited 
resources of opponents. Even if a prosecution is unsuccessful (as has often been 
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the case), an opponent will have been subjected to lengthy, costly and 
emotionally taxing legal proceedings.179 
Though this kind of judicialization of politics was not new, the conduct of such 
"political trials" in the more compliant courts made the genuineness of outcomes 
very suspect.180 This was evident in a series of court cases involving opposition 
politicians and government critics in the early 1990s. In 1991, Manjeet Singh Dhillon, 
the then Secretary of the Malaysian Bar Council, was found guilty of contempt of 
court for instituting contempt proceedings against the then acting Lord President, 
Tun Abdul Hamid Omar. Manjeet instituted the proceedings in relation to Abdul 
Hamid's involvement in the sacking of former Lord President Tun Salleh Abbas and 
the suspension of five Supreme Court Judges during the Executive-Judiciary crisis in 
1988. In 1995, Tommy Thomas, a prominent lawyer, made some critical comments in 
the International Commercial Litigation magazine about the administration of justice 
in Malaysia. He revealed that another prominent lawyer, Dato' V.K. Lingam,181 who 
represented one of the parties in a high-profile commercial litigation, had "shopped" 
for a certain favorable judge to hear the casernz The comments gave rise to a 
179 Barraclough (1985: 808-809). 
180 The objective of a political trial is "the destruction, or at least, the disgrace or disrepute, of a 
political opponenf'. See Shklar (1964: 49). 
'
61 Dato' V.K. Lingam had been implicated in a number of controversies involving the judiciary. Jn 
1998, a photograph showing Lingam on holiday with former Chief Justice Tun Eusoff Chin was 
widely circulated on the internet. In August 1995, Eusoff presided over the panel of three judges 
which allowed Lingam's clienfs appeal in the controversial Ayer Molek case (see below). In 2007, a 
video tape spotting Lingam speaking on the phone with someone who was supposedly a "senior 
judge" was widely circulated on the internet. The eight-minute video footage, which was recorded in 
2002, showed Lingam having a discussion with the senior judge about his effort to broker the latter's 
appointment as Chief justice. The identity of the "senior judge" was not immediately knov.TL, 
although many believed that he was the then Chief Judge of Malaya, Tan Sri Ahmad Fairuz Sheikh 
Abdul Halim. Fairuz was promoted as the President of the Court of Appeal in December 2002 and 
Chief justice in 20°"3. Lingam said Jn the video that other prominent figures like tycoon Tan Sri 
Vincent Tan (Lingam' s client in the Ayer Molek case) and former Minister in the Prime Minister's 
Department, Datuk Seri Tengku Adnan Tengku Mansur, were also involved in the attempt to fix the 
judicial appointment. 
182 The case was Insas & Metropolitan Nominees v Ayer Molek Rubber Company (the Ayer Molek case) 
which involved a dispute over shares. Lingam, who was the counsel for the plaintiff (Jnsas), filed the 
suit in the Appellate and Special Powers Division of the High Court rather than in the usual 
Commercial Division. In April 1995, High Court Judge Datuk Azmel Maamor who heard the case ex-
parle ordered the defendant (Ayer Molek) to register and transfer 540,000 ordinary shares to Insas 
v.ithin two working days. The judge adjourned the hearing of the defendant's application to set aside 
the order to a date after the period of compliance with the order and refused the defendants' 
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defamation suit by the parties involved in the case against Thomas and his Kuala 
Lumpur-based legal firm, Skrine & Co.183 An out-of-court settlement was brokered 
but Thomas was cited for contempt after he made a statement in a local daily that 
"the actions were settled despite (his) express objections".184 In relation to the same 
case, Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, former United Nations Special Rapporteur for the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers, was also sued for defamation by the parties in 
the case, claiming a total of RM 30 million in damages.185 Param was sued after being 
quoted in the same magazine as saying, among other things, that" complaints are 
rife that certain highly placed personalities in the business and corporate sectors are 
able to manipulate the Malaysian system of justice" .186 The court refused to give him 
legal immunity, which he supposedly enjoyed as an expert performing a mission of 
the UN, until the International Court of Justice made a decision to that effect. 
In 1995, Lim Guan Eng, the then DAP Deputy Secretary-General and Member 
of Parliament for Kota Melaka, was charged under the Sedition Act and the Printing 
Presses and Publications Act for making a statement implying the practice of 
selective prosecution on the part of the Attorney-General in relation to a statutory 
rape case involving an under aged girl,187 in which former UMNO Youth Chief and 
J:v!alacca Chief Minister, Tan Sri Abdul Rahim Tamby Chik, was implicated. The then 
application for a stay of the order pending the hearing of the setting aside application. On appeal by 
Ayer Molek, the Appeals Court in July 1995 reversed the High Court decision. Delivering the Appeals 
Court's decision, justice NH Chan remarked that the conduct of the High Court judge and Llngam 
was "a misuse of the court procedure" and "manifestly unfair". In August 1995, the Federal Court's 
panel of three judges presided by the then Chief justice Tun Eusoff Chin overturned the Appeals 
Court's decL,ion and expunged the judge's remarks from the judgment. In September 2006, High 
Court judge Dato' Hishamuddin Mohd Yun us, dismissing Llngam' s defamation suit against the 
International Commercial Litigation Magazine, refused to be bound the Federal Court's decision in 
the Ayer Molek case arguing that the panel of judges which decided the case was not legally 
constituted. One of the three judges who sat on the panel at the Federal Court was High Court Judge 
Datuk Pajan Singh Gill. Under the Federal Constitution, a High Court Judge cannot be nominated to 
sit on the Federal Court. See "Malaysian justice on Trial", International Commercial Litigation, 
November 1995; Tire New Straits Times, 2 September 2006. 
'"The parties involved in the defamation suit against Tommy Thomas were Dato' V K Llngam, 
tycoon Tan Sri Dato' Vincent Tan Chee Yioun, Berjaya Industrial Bhd, Berjaya Corp (Cayman} Ltd, 
MBf Capital Bhd, MBf Northern Securities Sdn Bhd, Insas Bhd and Megapolltan Nominees Sdn Bhd. 
See MBF Capital Bltd & Anor v Tommy Thomas & Anor & Other Suits [1999] 1 ML) 139. 
'"'Tire Star, 21October1998. 
m See MBF Capital Bild & Anor v. Dato' Param Cumaraswamy [1997] 3 ML/ 300. 
186 International Commercial Litigation, November 1995. 
is7 Under Malaysian law, sexual intercourse with a minor, with or \Vithoutconsent, constitutes 
statutory rape. 
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Attorney-General Tan Sri Mokhtar Abdullah decided not to charge Abdul Rahim, 
while the alleged victim, a fifteen-year old Muslim school girl, was placed under 
"protective custody" at a rehabilitation centre,18B The exact charges against Lim were 
that he had "prompted disaffection with the administration of justice in Malaysia" 
and maliciously printed a pamphlet containing allegedly "false information" in that 
he had used the term "imprisoned victim" in reference to the alleged rape victim. 
The first was an offence under Section 4(1) (b) of the Sedition Act and the second 
under Section SA (1) of the Printing Presses and Publications Act Despite concerns 
from local and international human rights organizations that the charges were 
politically motivated, Llm was convicted on both counts and fined RM15, 000. In a 
rare move, the Attorney-General appealed against the "leniency of the sentence", 
which resulted in Lim' s sentence being increased to three years imprisonment by the 
Appeals Court in April 1998. Lim lost his parliamentary seat as a result of the 
sentence,189 
The use of court proceedings to legitimize punishment of political offenders 
was not without repercussions. There had been strained relationship between the 
Bar and the Bench as a result, with the legal fraternity continuing to publicly 
question the independence and integrity of the judiciary.190 What is more, in 1996, a 
33-page anonymous letter containing various allegations of corruption, abuse of 
powers and judicial misconduct involving twelve senior judges was widely 
188 It was reported that the girl admitted that she had sex with Rahim and 14 olher men. However, 
there was no police report lodged against Rahim. The Malaysian government maintained that it was 
on the basis of the absence of any police report against Rahim that he was neither investigated nor 
prosecuted. All those men, against whom police reports were lodged, were hauled into the court to 
face rape charges. Meanwhile, the girl was transferred by the court to a rehabilitation centre for 
wayward girls for three years, despite continued efforts by her grandmother to secure her release. See 
Inter-Parliamentary Union document on Lim Guan Eng's case at http://www.ipu.org/hr-
e/162/mal11.htm (Accessed on 14 November 2007). See also International Bar Association (2000: 24-
64) 
189 Under Malaysian law, members of Parliament who are jailed more than a year or fined more 
than RM2, 000, automatically forfeit their parliamentary seats. They are also barred from active 
politics for a period of five years after serving their jail sentence. 
1"'The Bar-Bench relation had undergone ups and downs following the Executive-judiciary crisis in 
1988. The Bar Council in September 1988 passed a vote of no confidence against the new Lord 
President, Tun Abdul Hamid Omar, and refused to have any relationship with him. Though 
communication was finally restored, the relationship turned sour after allegations of corrupt practices 
among senior judges cropped up in the mid 1990s. The Bar Council took a strong view on the matter 
and called for the clean-up of the judiciary. 
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circulated among the public.191 These allegations raised further doubts about the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary. The government shot down the 
opposition's call for the setting up of an independent board of inquiry to investigate 
the allegations. A special motion by the Opposition Leader, Lim Kit Siang, to discuss 
the issue in the Parliament was also rejected by the House Speaker.192 The case was 
finally closed by the Attorney-General, who maintained that the allegations were 
slanderous and baseless. Subsequently, a senior High Court judge who purportedly 
wrote the letter resigned, without action being taken against him. According to the 
Attorney-General, the resignation was already" a form of punishment" .193 
These are a number of examples where the administration of justice had been 
turned into a one-sided political arena to try and punish political offenders.1 9'1 The 
trend toward judicialization of politics and the use of repressive laws amidst easing 
ethnic tension indicated that the lack of justification for the use of such laws to 
silence dissent did not lead to the reduction of state legal powers or limit the state's 
capacity to act against political "offenders". State powers have been further 
consolidated even at normal times. 
Conclusion 
Up to the late 1980s, the continuing debate on constitutional contract issues and the 
presence of the communist threat had, to certain extent, generated destabilizing 
forces in Malaysia's multiracial society and provided justification for the state to 
expand its legal powers and limit the exercise of fundamental liberties on the 
grounds of maintaining racial harmony and preserving national security. More 
significantly, these powers, which were strengthened and expanded during the 
191 The New Straits Times, 10 July 1996. 
192 Hnnsard, 10 July 1996. 
193 The New Straits' Times, 2 & 10 July 1996. The author of the anonymous letter was former High Court 
Judge Datuk Syed Ahmad !did Syed Abdullah. He revealed in a press interview in June 2006 tl1at he 
was forced to resign and his allegations were never investigated. See Nr:w Sunday Times, 11 June 2006. 
194 The more glaring example of Malaysia's "political trial" was the corruption and sodomy trials of 
former Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seti Anwar Ibrahim. The conduct of the trials and its impact on 
the public perception about the independence and integrity of the judiciary will be discussed in 
Chapter6. 
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period of emergency, had continued to be further consolidated at normal times, 
leaving the government with enormous powers at its disposal. As these powers, 
especially those under the emergency and anti-subversion laws, had been directed 
toward the opposition politicians and government critics, they had also been a 
potent means by which the government silenced dissent and consolidated its 
political power. Despite easing ethnic tension and the non-existence of communist 
threat in the 1990s, the government continued to use the laws to silence dissent, this 
tin1e round with the normal criminal and civil laws being applied and the courts 
being turned into a one-sided political arena to try and punish political dissidents. 
As a result, by the 1990s, the expansive state legal powers had been further 
consolidated and the scope for political competition had been further limited. 
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Chapter IV 
The Creation of Statist Legal Meanings by the Courts 
The competitive nature of Malaysia's communal politics bears significant impact on 
judicial decision-making. Taking cognizance of the seemingly perpetually unstable 
politics of competing conununal interests, Malaysian judges have been loath to 
inquire into the substantive justness of government policies in relation to ethnic 
relations, national security and economic development. More often than not, the 
judges have no qualms in accepting the necessity of those policies and the objectives 
which they serve. It is in this context of competitive communal politics that 
restrictions on fundamental liberties and encroachment on the rule of law have often 
been justified in order to maintain racial harmony and national security. 
Furthermore, based on the view that fair economic distribution among competing 
communal groups can only materialize in an expanding economy, the judges 
seemed to recognize the law's instrumental role in equipping the dirigiste 
developmental state with necessary legal powers to effect robust economic 
development. 
Though law in this kind of illiberal statist legal system assumes an 
"instrumental" function, it is legal formalism - rather than realism - that provides the 
ideological basis for such a judicial attitude. Legal formalism's separation of legal 
reasoning from normative or policy consideration not only compels the judges to be 
constrained in interpreting legal texts by confining themselves to what the law does 
say rather than what the law should be,1 but also discourages judicial inquiries into 
the appropriateness of government policies. What is more, the concept of decision-
making according to rule, or more precisely, the language in which the rules are 
1 Formalist judges, according to Scalia (1997), should concern themselves with what the legislature 
promulgates rather than what the Jaw.makers had in their mind when they passed the law. Posner 
(1987: 6) however rejected the application of strict fonnalist theory - and for that matter realist as well 
-in constitutional and statutory interpretation. He regarded constitutional and statutory 
interpretation, contrary to comn\on la\v reasoning, as a ''communication" process by which the judges 
are concerned with decoding the message sent by the law·giver, rather than simply deducing legal 
meanings from the legal texts before them. 
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written,2 which lies at the heart of legal formalism, helps produce policy outcomes 
that accurately reflect the intentions of policy-makers. 
But Malaysian judges, imbued by the common law tradition of judicial law-
making, had also developed a strong doctrine of judicial review, which led to judges 
striking down Executive decisions, often for failing to comply with the requirements 
of the law. This raised concern among members of the Executive over the judges' 
independence in making decisions against the intention of the legislature or that of 
the political Executive. As such, there have been numerous attempts by the 
Parliament to make legal texts very clear about its intention, often as the Executive 
views it, by inserting precise words into the statutes, leaving little or no room for 
judicial interpretation. At the same time, in cases of statutory ambiguity, the 
Parliament, through legislation, compels the judges to interpret legal texts in such a 
way that would promote the object of the law. Though this kind of "purposive 
approach" to statutory interpretation has been well received by common law judges, 
statutory recognition of such an approach reflects the government's penchant for 
interpretation that promotes its policy objectives. 
In this kind of legal system, legal formalism has an important role to play. Its 
principle of decision-making according to mle compels the judges to confine 
themselves to the precise words in the legal texts in interpreting the law, hence 
ensuring that the court's decisions are in line with what the Parliament has expressly 
proclaimed in statutes. Furthermore, its doctrine of separation of legal reasoning 
from normative or policy consideration goes a long way to justify judges' restraint 
from inquiring into policy matters, which the judges themselves viewed as best left 
to the Parliament to deliberate. This judicial attitude, operating in an illiberal legal 
system where statutes are designed in such a way as to entrench state power, helps 
maintain statist legal meanings, i.e. laws as proclaimed and intended by the state. 
This, in turn, legitimizes the expansion of state power rather than limiting it. 
1 Schauer (1988: 510). This is called "!extualism", a formalist theory of statutory interpretation which 
requires judges to give literal or ordinary meaning to the words or phrases Jn a statute. The courts, the 
textualists maintained, should listen for "the ring of the words of a statute would have had to a 
skilled user of words at the time, thinking about the same problem" (Manning 1997: 675). 
131 
Authoritarian Statist Legal System: State Policy as Law 
Jayasuria observes that under authoritarian legal systems in East Asia, legal 
institutions are designed to play a policy implementing role in that they serve as a 
means to achieve government policy objectives and to make certain types of 
oppositional political activities illegitimate.3 Contrary to the liberal assumption that 
"the development of rule of law can occur atthe expense of a weakening of 
governmental or public power", the essentially authoritarian notion of rule of law in 
such legal systems "serves to entrench and consolidate public or state power" .4 
Arguing that ideological notions of security and order were constitutive of many 
post-colonial states in East Asia, Jayasuriya describes these states as" enterprise 
associations" / in which "validity of rules springs not from association itself but from 
the ends or purposes of the organization" .5 From this perspective of purposive and 
end-oriented organization, "laws are seen in terms of their capacity to produce 
accurate outcomes that reflect substantial state objectives and interests" .6 In this 
regard, "legal formalism" / which places strong emphasis on adherence to formal 
rules, processes and procedures, regardless of the fairness of substantive outcomes, 
provides an ideological basis for the legal system. 
Malaysian judges are" formalists" in the sense that they normally avoid 
inquiring into the government's policy objectives in interpreting a statute, choosing 
to confine themselves to the law as it is. What is more, taking cognizance of the 
prevailing socio-political condition in Malaysia's ethnically divided society, they 
generally acknowledged the importance of government policies on ethnic relations, 
national security and economic development. Being formalistic, as far as rule 
following is concerned, helped the judges to escape from engaging in normative 
debate about government policies, which in turn insulate the justness of such 
policies from judicial inquiry. But unlike American formalist judges, Malaysian 
judges are not strict "textualists". In cases of statutory ambiguity, it is normal for 
3 Jayasuriya (1996: 369). 
•Jayasuriya (1999: 2). 
s Jayasuriya (1999: 3). 
'Jayasuriya (1999: 3). 
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them to rely on legislative history in order to construe the meaning of ambiguous 
words or phrases in a statute. This approach to statutory interpretation not only 
helped Malaysian judges to avoid conflict with the other branches of the 
government, namely the Executive and the Legislature, except during the brief 
period of fierce judicial activism in the mid 1980s, but also maintained statist legal 
meanings. 
But as the judges, imbued by the common law tradition of judicial law-
making, had also developed a strong doctrine of judicial review, which provided an 
important safeguard for individual Hberties against arbitrary exercise of 
governmental powers, it was not uncommon to find the courts striking down 
executive decisions on the ground that they fell outside the scope of the 
government's legal powers. During the Executive-Judiciary crisis in the late 1980s, 
the Executive fought back by launching an attack on the Judiciary, culminating in 
the sacking of the then Lord President, Tun Salleh Abbas, and two Supreme Court 
Judges for "judicial misconduct". Also, there has been in existence a particular 
legislative style which militated against active judicial scrutiny of executive 
decisions, which in turn constrained the judges' supervisory role. This was done, 
inter alia, by stating in statutes express words indicating the intent of the legislature, 
inserting 'ouster' or 'finality' clauses excluding judicial review and giving statutory 
recognition to "purposive approach" to statutory interpretation. The existence of an 
anti-judicial-scrutiny legislative style, coupled with the judges' acceptance of 
government policy objectives, especially in regard to ethnic relations, national 
security and economic development, helped maintain statist legal meanings, which 
had the tendency to enhance rather than limit the exercise of state power. The 
judges' formalist but non-strict textualist approach to statutory interpretation, in 
tum, provided an ideological basis for the maintenance of such meanings. 
Central to the maintenance of statist legal meanings is acceptance by the 
judges of government policy objectives, which the Jaws are supposed to serve, and 
their obligation, through interpretive power, to interpret the Jaw based on its express 
provisions, without attempting to inquire into the appropriateness of its policy 
objectives. Though it is hazardous to associate judges' decisions with their personal 
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inclination for or against any particular government policy, there have been 
instances where the judges, many of whom hailed from the government's legal and 
judicial service before taking their oath as judges, hold a cautious view of the rule of 
law, tiling into consideration the prevailing socio-political conditions and the 
government policies in that regard. Former Lord President of the Supreme Court, 
Tun Mohamed Salleh Abbas noted in a speech delivered in 1968, "legal concepts 
such as parliamentary government, rule of law, independence of judiciary, and a 
score of other legal and constitutional concepts" could not be "transplanted in toto, 
without some form of modification which would suit local conditions and climate" .7 
He contended that "in a society in which the rumbling thunder heralding the threat 
to the very existence of the institutions from which freedom emanates are constantly 
and clearly heard not far off, a certain amount of control on freedom is inevitable, or 
there would be a breakdown of law and order" .8 Tun Salleh' s assertion of limited 
freedom to safeguard the institution from which freedom itself emanates refers to 
the extensive use of emergency and anti-subversion laws by the government against 
conununists and communal extremists as well as ordinary political dissidents, in the 
face of potential threats that such groups might pose to nascent democratic 
institutions. 
Taking cognizance of the prevailing socio-political conditions, the intention of 
the legislature and the express words in statutes, the judges have been loath to 
review executive decisions on matters of national security on substantive grounds, 
arguing that the executive is the sole judge of what i~ in the best interest of the 
security of the nation.9 Applying the "subjective test" to determine the legality of 
detentions made under the Internal Security Act 1960, the courts would not question 
the subjective opinion of the Minister in issuing the detention orders, and hence 
avoided the obligation to show that the Minister's grounds for acting were 
7 Mohamed Salleh (1984: 82) 
•Mohamed Salleh (1984: 82). 
9 The Federal Court in Karam Sing/1 v. Minister of Home Affairs Malaysia [1969] 2 ML! 129 held !hat" the 
question whether there was reasonable cause to detain the appellant (under the Internal Security Act) 
was a matter of opinion and policy, a decision which could only be taken by the executive", See also 
Harding (19%: 217). 
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objectively reasonable.lo Compounding this judicial attitude were dear and 
unequivocal words in the statutes which exclude substantive judicial review of 
matters of national security, except on issues of procedural compliance with the law. 
Section 8B (1) of the Internal Security Act, an" ouster clause", for example excludes 
judicial review in respect of any act done or decision made by the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong or the Minister in the exercise of their discretionary power in accordance with 
the Act, save in regard to any question on compliance with any procedural 
requirement in the Act governing such act or decision. In the face of the overarching 
government policy on national security and its importation into written laws, the 
application of rule of law has thus been viewed as a matter of expediency rather than 
an absolute value to be maintained. As Harding remarks: 
(The rule of law) is seen as a value to be maintained, but not as an absolute 
value: when policies seen as fundamental come into play, the rule of law is just 
one value among several values, and gives way on occasion to them ... The 
principles of natural justice and reasonable exercise of discretion, for example, 
certainly apply, but only so far as to mitigate the effect of wide administrative 
discretion and untrammelled pursuit of government policy.n 
All this boils down to the maintenance of statist legal meanings by the court, by 
which restrictive laws and the executive's wide discretionary powers were 
legitimated. The consideration of what is just and what is not has often been viewed 
against the backdrop of prevailing socio-political conditions and state policy 
objectives, especially in the key areas of ethnic relations, national security and 
economic development. Operating within a socio-political condition where 
competing communal interests are the source of potential destabilizing forces that 
would endanger national unity, the government found justification for invoking 
repressive laws as a means "to curb the inflammation of racial hatred and bigotry".12 
In this perspective, the official notion of rule of law thus seems to mean, as former 
'°Harding (1996: 217). 
11 Harding (1996: 1:38). 
12 Lee (2004: 226) 
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Minister in the Prime Minister's Department and de facto Law Minister Datuk Seri 
Dr. Rais Yatim put it, while he was in the political wilderness, "no more than rules 
and regulations made by the government (that) must be followed" .13 In the main, the 
judiciary has adopted a more restrictive view of the rule of law when it conflicted 
with the official notion of "national interests", which usually refers to the 
maintenance of racial harmony, national security and the pursuit of economic 
development, giving rise to the maintenance of statist legal meanings by the courts, 
which in turn, legitimizes the expansion of state powers. 
Security Justice 
The illiberal statist legal meanings were very apparent in court decisions in cases 
involving the use of emergency and anti-subversion laws. This is particularly 
evident in preventive detention cases where the courts demonstrated its 
unwillingness to review" subjective satisfaction" of the Minister in issuing detention 
orders, reckoning that the Executive is the best judge on matters of national 
security.14 With this view in mind, the judges would only review detention orders on 
limited grounds such as mala fide on the part of the detaining authority, which was 
normally very difficult to prove, and procedural non-compliance in issuing such 
orders.15 
It is in security cases that the liberal notion of rule of law gives way to the 
illiberal statist notion of rule through law. The Federal Court's decision in Karam 
"Cited in Lee (2004:225). Datuk Dr. Rais Yatim was ousted from the cabinet after supporting Tengku 
Razaleigh Hamzah in the 1987 UMNO election. He then formed Parti Melayu Semangat 46 with 
Tengku Razaleigh and was made the party's Deputy President. He rejoined UMNO in 1996 after the 
dissolution of 546. He was appointed as a Minister in the Prime Minister's Department (de facto law 
minister) in 1999 and Minister of Arts, Culture and Heritage in the new cabinet formed after the 2004 
general ele.:tion 
14 See for example Karam Sing/1 v. Minister of Home Affairs Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129; Yil Han Kit v 
Minister of Hame Affairs, Malaysia & Anor [1988) 2 MLJ 638; and Tiieresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector 
General of Police [1988] MLJ 293. 
is This includes situations in which the grounds of detention stated in the order do not foll within the 
scope and ambit of the relevant legislation, or that a condition precedent for the making or the 
continuance of the order of preventive detention ha.s not been complied with. See Athappen a/I 
Arumugam v Menteri Hal £hwa1 Dalam Negeri, Mala>jsia [1984] 1 ML) 67, 
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Singh v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia illustrates this situation.16 The appellant in 
this case was detained under the Internal Security Act in 1967 and served with a 
detention order under Section 8(1) of the Act which expressed its purpose as being to 
"prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of 
Malaysia/ maintenance of public order therein/ the maintenance of essential services 
therein." The appellant, who was an opposition Socialist Front Member of 
Parliament, was accused of furthering the cause of Communist Party of Malaya 
(CPM). The High Court dismissed his application for writ of habeas corpus and he 
appealed to the Federal Court. He argued, inter alia, that section 8 of the Internal 
Security Act allows a person to be detained on four grounds,17 the order of detention 
stated three grounds in the alternative,18 and the grounds supplied to him stated 
only one ground.19 All this, he argued, showed a casual and cavalier attitude on the 
part of the detaining authority, indicating that they had not given the matter 
adequate consideration, and hence made the order of detention invalid and his 
detention unlawful. Dismissing the appeal, the then Federal Court Judge Tun 
Mohamed Suffian Hashim said: 
When the power to issue a detention order has been made to depend on the 
existence of a state of mind in the detaining authority, which is purely a 
subjective condition, so as to exclude a judicial inquiry into the sufficiency of 
the grounds to justify the detention, it would be wholly inconsistent to hold 
that it is open to the court to examine the sufficiency of the same grounds to 
enable the person detained to make a representation ... it is not for the court of 
law to pronounce on the sufficiency, relevancy or otherwise of the allegations of 
16 Karam Singh v Minister of Home Affairs, Mal111;sia [1969] 2 ML) 129. 
17 The four grounds under Section 8 of the ISA are "acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of 
Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of public order or essential services therein"'. 
1s The order recited three of the four grounds, leaving out" acting in any manner prejudicial to any 
part of Malaysia". See [1969] 2 MLJ, p.p. 132. 
"That applicant had "since 1957 consistently acted in a manner prejudicial to l:he security of 
Malaysia". See [1969] 2ML)129, p.p. 132. 
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fact , .. The discretion whether or not the appellant should be detained is placed 
in the hands of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong acting on Cabinet advice.2D 
It is noteworthy that in arriving at the decision, the court had the opportunity 
to consider a number of Indian and English authorities on the question of whether 
the court should inquire into subjective satisfaction of the Minister in making the 
order of detention. Indian cases, as cited by the appellant's counsel, tended to 
answer this question in the affirmative. In Dwarka Das v State of fammu & Kashmir,21 
Jagannadhadas J said, "where power is vested in a statutory authority to deprive the 
liberty of a subject on its subjective satisfaction with reference to specified matters, if 
that satisfaction is stated to be based on a number of grounds or for a variety of 
reasons, all taken together, and if some out of them are found to be non-existent or 
irrelevant, the very exercise of that power is bad", 22 Similarly, in Jagarmath Misra v 
State of Orissa,23 the order of detention sets out six objects or purposes for the 
detention of the detainee and in the alternative. The affidavit of the Home Minister 
pointed out, however, that the petitioner was detained with a view to preventing 
him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the safety of India and the maintenance of 
public order etc. The court held the view that such discrepancy between the grounds 
mentioned .in the order and the grounds stated in the authority concerned can only 
show an amount of casualness in passing the order of detention and that this 
casualness also shows that the mind of the authority concerned was really not 
applied to the question of the detention of the petitioner in that case.24 
The Malaysian courts, however, as shown in Karam Singh, refused to follow the 
more stringent view adopted by the Indian judges pertaining to deprivation of 
personal liberty in preventive detention cases. Justice Suffian said that although the 
judgments of the Indian Supreme Court were of great persuasive value, the 
judgment should not be followed in Karam Singh. Noting that in M:alaysia, the power 
20 Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri [Minister of Harne Affairs}. Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129 
p.p, 142, 
21 Dwarka Das o State of Jammu & Kashmir AIR [1957] SC 164. 
22 Dwarka Das v State of]ammu & Kashmir AIR [1957] SC 164, p.p. 168. 
"]agrmnath Misra v State of Orissa AIR [1966] SC 1140. 
2• Karam Singh v Menleri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri [Minister of Home Affairs], Malmjsia [1969] 2 MLJ 129, 
p.p.139. 
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of detention was given to the "highest authority" in the land, that is the Yang di-
Pertunn Agong acting on the advice of the Cabinet, which is answerable to the 
Parliament, unlike in India where such power was exercisable by "civil servants who 
are not answerable politically to the Parliament", the learned judge observed: 
The discretion whether or not the appellant should be detained is placed in the 
hands of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong acting on Cabinet advice. Whether or not 
the facts on which the order of detention is to be based are sufficient or 
relevant, is a matter to be decided solely by the executive. In making their 
decision, they have complete discretion and it is not for a court of Iaw to 
question the sufficiency or relevance of these allegations of fact.25 
It seemed that the Malaysian courts preferred to follow English cases rather 
than the Indian cases in determining the justiciablity of the order of detention under 
the ISA. This is understandably so since in England, like in Malaysia, the power of 
detention was exercisable by one of the highest authorities of the state, i.e. one of the 
Principal Secretaries of the State, rather than ordinary officers. Maintaining that the 
subjective satisfaction of the Secretary of the State is beyond judicial enquiries, Lord 
McMillan in Liversidge v Sir John Anderson26 observed that the question of whether 
there was a reasonable cause to detain a person under preventive detention law "is a 
matter of opinion and policy," the decision of which can only be made "by one who 
has both knowledge and responsibility which no court can share" .22 The one with 
knowledge and responsibility was obviously the Executive. Asserting that the 
English courts "took a more realistic view of things" while Indian judges "were 
indefatigable idealists seeking valiantly to reconcile the irreconcilable", former Chief 
Justice of Malaya, Tan Sri Ong Hock Thye in Karam Singh observed: 
25 Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negcri [Minister of Home Affairs], Malaysia [1969] 2 ML) 129, 
p.p.153. 
26 Liversidge v Sir John Anderson [1942] AC 206. 
:v Liversidge v Sir John Anderson [194.2] AC 206, p.p. 253. 
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Under article 149 (of the Federal Constitution), any provision in the Internal 
Security Act designed against action prejudicial to national security is declared 
"valid notwithstanding that it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of 
article 5, 9 or 10, namely, the fundamental liberties. This, of course, means 
sanction of encroachments on the rule of law, justified in the national interest. Under 
the circumstances r think it must be frankly acknowledged that a perfect decision is in 
most cases an unattainable ideal (emphasis is mine),28 
The Malaysian courts after Karam Singh had generally affirmed the non-
justiciability of subjective satisfaction of the Minister in making preventive detention 
orders.29 ln fact, the so-called subjective test was also extended to detention made by 
the police pursuant to section 73(1) of the ISA. This was evident in the Supreme 
Court's decision in 1988 in Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector General of Police.30 
Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows. The appellants were arrested by the police 
under section 73 of the ISA and no counsel was allowed to see them. They applied 
for writ of habeas corpus arguing that their arrest was illegal. The application was 
rejected by the High Court and the appellants appealed to the Supreme Court. They 
argued, inter alia, that the power under section 73 of the ISA to arrest and detain a 
person pending enquiry was open to judicial examination, the test being an objective 
test Dismissing the appeal, former Lord President Salleh Abbas said: 
The expression "subjective and objective tests" is merely a label to show the 
results of the court's attitude as to whether or not it will or it will not exercise 
its jurisdiction. It is descriptive of the result of the court's decision elicited from 
"'Karam Sing It v Menteri Hal Elrwal Dalam Negeri [Minister of Home Affairs), Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129, 
p.p. 141. 
29 See for example Yeap Hock Seng@ Ah Seng v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia [1975] 2 ML] 279; 
Theresa Lim Oiin Chin & Ors v Inspector General of Police [1988] MLJ 293; Minister of Home Affairs 
Malaysia v Karpal Singh [1988] 3 MLJ 29. Edgar Joseph Jr] in Yit Hon Kit v Minister of Home Affairs, 
Malaysia & Anor [1988] 2 ML) 638, however, questioned whether the principle of non·justiciability of 
subjective satisfaction of the Minister as enunciated in Karam Singh was a good law, considering that 
even English decisions of the highest authority had departed from Livcrsidge to use objective tests. 
See for example R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Rossminster [1980] AC 952 and Reg v 
Secretan; of State for tire Home Deportment, ex parte Kiurwoja [1983] 2 WLR 321. 
3!J Theresa Lim C!tin Cliin & Ors v Inspector Grneral of Police [1988] MLJ 293. 
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factual situations reflecting judicial attitude rather than a starting point or a 
legal element from which legal result could be arrived at. In this case, whether 
the objective or subjective test is applicable, it is clear that the court will not be 
in a position to review the fairness of the decision-making process by the police 
and the Minister because of the lack of evidence since the Constitution and the 
law protect them from disclosing any information and materials in their 
possession upon which they based their decision. Thus, it is more 
appropriately described as a subjective test.31 
Obviously, the subjective test as laid dmvn in Liversidge and followed in Karam 
Singh made challenge to the Minister's order a gruelling task. Attacks can only be 
launched on limited grounds like procedural non-compliance and the use of law for 
improper purpose or mala fide.32 The latter is, of course, very hard to prove. The court 
will first assume legality of the detention order, if it.5 authenticity is not challenged, 
and then shift the burden of proving mala fide to the applicant. As Justice Suffian in 
Karam Singh put it, "the onus of proving the legality of the detention is on the 
Minister in the first instance. This he can discharge simply by producing the order of 
detention which, if its authenticity and good faith are not impugned, is a sufficient 
answer. If the detainee alleges ma la fide ... then the onus shifts to him and it is for 
him to prove mala fide" .33 This approach was followed in Yeap Hock Seng {commat] Ah 
Seng v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia,34 a High Court case decided in 1975, where 
Justice Abdookader said that once the detaining authority showed that the detention 
order was made in the exercise of valid legal power, "it is for the detainee to show 
that the power was exercised mala fide or improperly for a collateral or ulterior 
purpose in fraudem legis" .0s 
31 Theresa Um G1in Chin & Ors u Inspector General of Police [1988] ML) 293, p.p. 297. 
31 See for example Re Datuk fames Wang Kim Min [1976] 2 ML) 245; Re Tan Boon Liat [1977] 2 ML) 108; 
Re Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Hanin [1988] 1ML)182; Minister of Home Affairs v lamaluddin bin Othman 
[1989] 1 ML) 418. 
"Karam Singh u Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri [Minister of Home Affilirs], Malw1sia [1969] 2MLJ129, 
p.p. 152. 
34 Yeap Hock Seng [commatJ Ah Seng v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia [1975] 2 ML) 279. 
35 Yeap Hock Seng [commat] Ah Seng!' Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia [1975] 2 ML) 279. 
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But in most instances, where the Minister was aided by extensive police 
machinery to help him gather valuable information before making a detention order, 
it is relatively easy for him to rebut an allegation of mala fide made by the detainee. 
The courts are more inclined to accept classified information known only to the 
Minister as a valid basis for his subjective satisfaction in making the detention order, 
though any of the allegations of fact might turn out to be untrue. In Karpal Singh s/o 
Ram Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor,36 a High Court case 
decided in 1988, the applicant, who was an opposition DAP Member of Parliament, 
was detained under the ISA during the October 1987 Operasi Lalang. He applied for a 
writ of habeas corpus challenging the detention order on the ground of, inter alia, 
mala fide. He claimed that the sixth allegation which mentioned that he, at the place, 
time and on the date stated in the detention order, used the issue of appointment of 
non-Mandarin qualified headmasters and senior assistants in the national-type 
Chinese primary schools to incite racial sentiments of the Chinese community was 
false as he did not on that date, time and place speak of the issue. The Minister also 
admitted that the allegation was an error. The Ipoh High Court allowed his 
application and ordered him to be released from detention.37 In making the decision, 
High Court Judge Datuk Peh Swee Chin observed that "mala fide does not mean at all 
a malicious intention. It normally means that a power is exercised for a collateral or 
ulterior purpose, i.e. for a purpose other than the purpose for which it is professed to 
have been exercised" .38 Using an objective rather than subjective test, the learned 
judge said: 
Viewed objectively and not subjectively, the error, in all the circumstances, 
would squarely amount to the detention order being made without care, 
caution and a proper sense of responsibility. Such circumstances have gone 
beyond a mere matter of form; the sixth allegation, though an irrelevant 
,. Karpal Singh s/o Ram Singh v Menteri Hal Elrwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 468. 
'
7 Karpal was hours later arrested by the police. 
38 Karpal Singh s/o Ram Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malm)Sia & Anor [1988] 1 ML] 468. 
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allegation which the court can enquire into, was also an inaccurate allegation 
that can be treated as being outside the scope of the Act.39 
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the learned High Court judge had 
misdirected himself by failing to distinguish between grounds of detention and the 
allegations of fact supplied to the detainee. Whilst the grounds of detention stated in 
the detention order are open to challenge, the allegations of fact upon which the 
subjective satisfaction of the Minister was based are not.4D Though the sixth 
allegation turned out to be untrue, as admitted by the Minister himself, his 
subjective satisfaction was supported by his affidavit which stated that "reports and 
the information relating to the conduct and activities of the applicant that (he) 
received from the police, (he) was satisfied, notwithstanding that (the respondent) 
was not present at the said gathering, that it was necessary to detain him with a view 
to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia" .41 
The Supreme Court in this case asserted that "the subjective satisfaction of the 
Minister of Home Affairs is not subject to judicial review" 
The more positive judicial attitude in reviewing the legality of detention orders 
on subjective ground was unveiled in Chng Suan Tze v Minister of Home Affairs in 
1988,43 an appeal decided by the Singapore Court of Appeal, the decisions of which 
are persuasive in Malaysian courts. In considering subjective satisfaction of the 
President under Section 8 of Singapore's Internal Security Act, which is in pari 
materia with Malaysia's ISA, the island republic's Court of Appeal held that 
"evidence of the President's satisfaction must be such evidence as would be 
admissible at a trial where neither the recital in the detention order nor an affidavit 
by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs is sufficient". The Singapore 
Parliament, however, thwarted the court's move toward the application of the 
objective test as shown in Cling Suan Tze by amending its ISA in 1989 to exclude 
judicial review of the President's subjective satisfaction. A similar step was taken by 
39 Km-pal Singh s/o Ram Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor [1988] 1 ML) 468. 
'°Minister far Horne Affairs, Malaysia & Anor v Karpal Singh [1988] 3 ML) 29. 
<1 Minister far Home Affairs. Malaysia & Anor v Knrpal Singh [1988] 3 MLJ 29, p.p. 32. 
42 Minister for Home Affairs, Malaysia & Anor v Karpal Singh [1988] 3 MLJ 29, p.p. 33. 
4
' Chng Suan Tze v Minister of Home Affairs [1989] l MLJ 69. 
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the Malaysian Parliament by introducing a new section BB of the ISA, which 
provides that: 
[t]here shall be no judicial review in any court of, and no court shall have or 
exercise any jurisdiction in respect of, any act done or decision made by the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Minister in the exercise of their discretionary 
power in accordance with this Act, save in regard to any question on 
compliance with any procedural requirement in this Act governing such act or 
decision.44 
Within this limited scope of judicial review, the Malaysian courts did in some 
cases invalidate the Minister's order either on the grounds of procedural non-
compliance or that the Minister's action is outside the scope of the Act.45 In Re Tan 
Sri Raja Khalid Raja Hanm,46 High Court Judge Datuk Hamn Hashim held that 
Section 73(7) of the ISA, which deems lawful all detentions made under the powers 
conferred by it, does not mean a complete ouster of the court's jurisdiction to issue a 
writ of habeas carpus. The purpose of subjecting the exercise of power under a statute 
to judicial review is, as the learned judge said, "to ensure that the scope and limits of 
the power were not exceeded" _47 In this case, the applicant was a director of Perwira 
Habib Bank, the majority shareholder of which was the Armed Forces Fund Board, 
and a member of its loans committee from October 1975 to August 1985. It was 
alleged that during his tenure as a Director of the Bank, the applicant had provided 
consultancy services to the bank, which resulted in massive loans by the bank to 
various parties, causing it to suffer substantial losses. In January 1987, the Police 
Conunercial Crime Branch investigated allegations of criminal breach of trust 
involving the applicant, leading to his arrest under Section 73 (1) of the ISA on 13 
January 1987. The arresting officer stated in his affidavit that he had "reason to 
believe that the substantial losses suffered by the bank ... has evoked feelings of 
44 Jntemal Security (Amendment) Act 1988. Similar amendment was made to the Emergency (Public 
Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969. 
"See for example Minister of Home Affairs v Jama/uddin Othman [1989] 1 MLJ 418. 
46 Re Tan Sri Raja Khalid Raja llarun [1988] 1 MLJ 182. 
47 Re Tan Sri Raja Khalid Raja Hmm [1988] l ML) 182, p.p. 183. 
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anger, agitation, dissatisfaction and resentment among members of the armed forces 
and it is likely that such feelings may be ignited and lead to their resorting to violent 
action and thereby affect the security of the country."48 The court however was loath 
to accept that the losses suffered by the commercial bank, whose depositors also 
included members of the public, would likely cause a revolt among the soldiers. As 
the court found no evidence that the applicant had acted in any manner prejudicial 
to the national security, a writ of habeas corpus was granted to him. 
Similarly, in Jamaluddin bin Othman v. Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri & Anor49 
in October 1988, High Court Judge Datuk Anuar Zainal Abidin, ordered the release 
of the applicant, a Malay Christian who was detained under Section 8(1) of the ISA 
for allegedly carrying out missionary activities considered to be prejudicial to 
national security. The grounds of detention served on the applicant alleged that he, 
since 1985, was involved in a plan to propagate Christianity among Malays, which 
the government believed might create tension and enmity between the Muslims and 
the Christians in the country, and hence was prejudicial to national security. The 
allegation of fact stated that he had participated in a workshop and seminar for such 
purpose and converted six Malays to Christianity. Maintaining that grounds of 
detention, rather than allegations of facts, are open for challenge in court, Justice 
Anuar held that the ground of detention supplied to the applicant fell outside the 
scope of the Act. The learned judge reasoned that as Article 149 of the Federal 
Constitution does not invalidate provision in the ISA which is inconsistent only with 
Articles 5 (liberty of the person), 9 (prohibition of banishment and freedom of 
movement), 10 (freedom of speech, assembly and association) of the Federal 
Constitution, provision which is inconsistent with Article 11 (freedom of religion) is 
therefore invalid. As such, the learned judge ruled, the Minister had no power under 
the ISA to restrict the right of the applicant to profess and practice Christianity as 
"Re Tan Sri Raja Khalid Raja Harnn [1988] 1MLJ182, p.p, 183. 
4
' ]amaladdin bin Othman v. Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri & Anor [1989] 1 CL) 448 
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guaranteed by Article 11 of the Federal Constitution.so This decision was upheld by 
the Federnl Court.SI 
The Federal Court's decision in Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis 
Negara & Other Appeals in September 2002,52 marked a shift toward the application of 
an objective test in reviewing detentions made under the ISA. Departing from 
Theresa Lim,53 the Federal Court held that the subjective judgment accorded to the 
Minister under section 8 of the ISA cannot be extended to the police in the exercise of 
their discretion under section 73(1) of the Act The appellants, who were the leaders 
of the opposition National Justice Party (Parti keADILan Nasional, keADILan) and 
refarmasi activists, were arrested and detained under section 73(1) of the ISA for 
allegedly planning a violent street demonstration in Kuala Lumpur in April 2001. 
The police claimed that the appellants, who had allegedly gathered weapons and 
explosives to cause violence in the capital city, had acted in a manner prejudicial to 
the national security, and hence warranted their arrest under the ISA.54 The 
appellants however challenged the legality of their arrests, contending that the 
arrests were not for the dominant purpose of Section 73 of the ISA, that is, to enable 
the police to conduct further investigation regarding the appellants' alleged acts and 
conduct which were prejudicial to the national security, but merely for the purpose 
of intelligence gathering which was unconnected with national security. They 
therefore argued that the exercise of the powers of detention by the respondent 
under s 73(1) of the ISA was mala fide and improper. The High Court and the Court 
of Appeal rejected their application and the appellants appealed to the Federal 
Court. Allowing the appeal, Justice Tan Sri Steve Shim held that: 
The learned High Court judge took the view that the right of non-disclosure 
under Section 16 makes the test under Section 73(1) a subjective one. Here, it is 
so According to Pawancheek (2007: 7), the decision does not indicare that freedom of religion under 
Article 11 is absolute, It only shows that security legislation does not override the right to freedom of 
religion guaranreed by the Article. 
51 Minister of Home Affairs v Jamnluddin bin Othman (1989] 1 MLJ 418. 
52 Mohamad Ewm bin lvfohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals [2002] 4 MLJ 449. 
53 11ieresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector General of Police [1988] ML) 293. 
54 It transpired later that there was no evidence to prove that they had actually gathered weapons and 
explosives as claimed by the police. 
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important to note the actual wording in Section 16. It is expressly stated to be 
applicable only in relation to Ch II, Pt II of the ISA To read it as applying to s 
73 which falls under Pt IV would clearly be contradicting the expressed 
intention of Parliament. Given the enormous powers conferred upon police 
officers including minor officials such as guards and watchmen and the 
potentially devastating effect or effects arising from any misuse thereof, it 
could not have been a matter of accident that Parliament had thought it fit that 
the right of non-disclosure under Section 16 should only be confined to those 
personalities and circumstances falling within the ambit of Ch II of the ISA and 
not beyond. It therefore makes sense that the subjective judgment accorded to 
the minister under Section 8 cannot be extended to the police in the exercise of 
their discretion under Section 73(1).55 
Though the Federal Court's decision in Mohamad Ezam marked a shift toward 
the application of an objective test in reviewing executive detentions under Section 
73(1) of ISA, it did not suggest that the Minister's satisfaction under Section 8 is now 
justiciable. The Federal Court's judgment indicates that the contrary is true. 
Asserting that Sections 73(1) and 8 of the ISA are not "inextricably connected", 
Justice Steve Shim said: 
Inextricably connected would mean that Sections 73(1) and 8 are wholly 
dependent on each other. In the court's view, such a proposition would have 
the effect of inhibiting or restricting the unfettered discretion of the Minister. 
It would mean that the Minister could not, on his own and independent of the 
police, conduct any investigation or take into consideration factors extraneous 
to those arising from police investigation under Section 73 ... In the exercise 
of his discretion he need not necessarily have to consider and rely on police 
investigation. This is implicit in the very nature of an unfettered discretion.56 
55 Moltamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara {1 Otha Appeals [2002] 4 MLJ 449. 
56 Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals [2002] 4 ML] 449, p.p. 451. 
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And, as it turned out, four of the five appellants continued to be detained 
under the ISA since the Minister's order under section 8 had been issued against 
them.57 Obviously, the subjective test as laid down in Uversidge and affirmed in 
Karam Singh still applies to the Minister's order made under section 8 of the Act.58 
Attacks on the Minister's order can only be made on the grounds of procedural non-
compliance with the law, ma la fide or the use of law for improper purposes on the 
part of the detaining authority.59 In the absence of the apex court's decision to depart 
from its earlier position on the non-justiciability of subjective satisfaction of the 
Minister, the present status quo will certainly remain. Amidst recent calls for greater 
respect for human rights and democracy, as well as for the state's accountability and 
transparency, the Malaysian courts seemed unwilling to mitigate the effect of the 
executive's wide discretionary powers in deciding what is in the best interest of 
national security. The Federal Court's decision in lv1ohamad Ezam shows that there is, 
and has been, an overriding view among Malaysian judges that the Minister's 
subjective satisfaction in making detention orders under preventive detention laws is 
non-justiciable. A part from limits drawn by the legislature on the judges' 
supervisory powers, their judicial attitude in the final analysis reflects not only 
acceptance by the judiciary of the specific state-defined policy objectives that the 
laws are supposed to serve, but also a strand of formalist judicial reasoning which is 
divorced from normative consideration. Phrases such as "judges in the matter of 
preventive detention are the executive" and "disclosure of facts would be against the 
57 The four appellants were keADILan Youth Chief Mohamad Ezam Mohd Noor, keADILan Vice-
President Tian Chua, a member of keAD!Lan Supreme Leadership Council and )emaah Isiah 
Malaysia President Saari Sungib, and Reformnsi activist Hishamuddin Rais. Another appellant, Raja 
Petra Kamaruddin, who was the Director of Free Anwar Campaign, was released on 2 June 2001, after 
being detained by the police under Section 73(1) of the ISA for 52 days. See New Straits Times, 11 
September 2002. 
"'See for example Ahmad Yani bin Ismail & A nor v Inspector General of Police & Ors [2005] 4 MLJ 636. In 
recent cases involving preventive detention orders made under Emergency (Public Order and 
Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 and Restricted Residence Act 1933, the court maintained non-
justiciability of subjective satisfaction of the Minister in making such orders. See for example: 
Lee Kew Sang v Timbalan Menter! Da/am Negeri Malmjsia & Ors [2005] 2 ML) 631; Su Yu Min v Ketua Polis 
Negeri & Ors 2005] 6 ML] 768; Tee Yam@ Koo Tee Yam v Timbalan Menter!, Menteri Keselamatan Dalam 
Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2005] 5 ML) 645; Selva Kumar all Tamil Seluom v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri 
[200.5] 7 ML) 548; and Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v Nasharuddin Nasir [2004] 1 CLJ 81. 
;9 See for example Re Datuk James Wong Kim Min [1976] 2 ML) 245; Re Tan Boon Lii1t [1977] 2 MLJ 108; 
Re Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Harun [1988] 1MLJ182; Minister of Home Affairs v Jamaluddin bin Othman 
[1989] 1 MLJ 418. 
148 
national interest" found in landmark decisions reflect this statist judicial attitude, 
which in tum, led to the prioritization of state power over individual freedom. 60 
Communal Justice 
Other than preoccupation with national security, articulation of competing 
communal interests continued to be the main feature Malayan politics after 
independence. Issues of inter-ethnic inequalities, language and culture fuelled 
communal tension in the 1960s, culminating in the tragic racial riots on May 13, 1969. 
Far from easing the tension, the government's enthusiasm in implementing policies 
providing for Bumiputera privileges after the 1969 racial riots caused much 
disaffection among the non-Bumiputera communities. Such disaffection was further 
compounded by the fact that the privileges in securing permits, licences, 
employment in public service and places in public universities worked in favour of 
the Malays who already possessed political control. However, concurring with the 
government on the necessity of such policies in correcting inter-ethnic imbalances 
and promoting national unity, the courts had generally construed the meaning of 
Articles 8 (equality before the law), 152 (Malay as national language) and 153 
(special position of the Malays and natives of Sa bah and Sarawak, or the 
Bumiputeras) of the Federal Constitution in such a way that they accommodated the 
government's policy objectives. Article 153 was put in place on the basis that without 
such protection the Bumiputeras "would be completely overwhelmed by the other 
racial groups, particularly the Chinese, who already control the economy and 
dominate the professions".61 Recognizing the importance of such provisions, former 
Lord President Tun Mohamad Suffian Hashim wrote: 
Protective provisions were written into the Malaysian constitution not with 
the intention of pulling back the advancement of the non-indigenous people 
but with the intention of securing the advancement of the indigenous people 
'°Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector General a/ Poiice [1988] MLJ 293 p.p. 295; Re Tan Sri Raja 
Khalid ltin Raja Harun [1988] 1 MLJ 182. 
61 Sheridan & Groves (1967: 213}. 
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who, through no fault of their own, were and are educationally, socially and 
economically less advanced, and the leaders of the non-indigenous people 
consented to these provisions in return for generous citizenship terms that 
enabled a large number of them to become citizens by a stroke of the pen.62 
The extent to which the judges' ethnic identity influenced their decisions in 
racially charged cases is uncertain. 63 As case laws indicated, there has been no single 
pattern of decisions where the judges can be said to have always decided in favour 
of their respective ethnic community in such cases. Even if they did, the decisions 
seemed to reflect their adherence to legal formalist rules and procedure rather than 
to a communal notion of substantive justice.64 A Muslim judge even decided in 
favour of a Christian applicant who was detained under the Inten1al Security Act 
1960 for propagating Christianity among Muslims.65 Speaking of Malaysian judges' 
impartiality in handling racially charged cases, Justice Suffian once noted that 
"nobody reading our judgment with our name deleted could with confidence 
identify our race or religion". 66 
As communalism lies at the core of the 1957 constitutional contract, it is not 
surprising to find that the principle of equality under the Constitution is qualified by 
provisions which are communal in nature. Article 8(2) provides, "except as expressly 
62 Mohame Suffian (1976: 321). 
" Though the Malaysian judiciary is multiracial in its composition, the majority of the judges are 
Malays. As at 18 July 2007, of the 8 judges sitting in the Federal Court, 7 are Malays (88%) and 1 
Indian (12 % ). Of the 22 judges in the Court of Appeal, 17 are Malays (77% ), 3 Chinese (14 % ) and two 
Indians (9% ). Of the 39 judges in the High Court, 27 are Malays (70% ), 6 Chinese (15%) and 6 Indian 
and other races (15%). Of the 26 judicial Commissioners, 21 are Malays (81%),3 Chinese (12%) and 2 
Indian and other races (8%). Since the first local Lord President (currently known as Chief justice), 
Tun Syed Sheh Barakbah took office in 1966, the highest judicial post has always been held by a 
Malay judge. As a matter of practice, the post of Chief judge of Sabah and Sarawak, the fourth-
highest ranking judicial post, is normally held by a non-Malay judge, while Malay judges normally 
assume the post of President of !he Court of Appeal and Chief judge of Malaya, the second and third 
highest-ranking judicial post respectively. In 1993, of the 53 judges sitting on the bench, listed in 
Foong (1994), 33 (62%) were Malay /Muslims, 12 (23%) were Chinese and 8 (15%) were Indian or 
other race. 
"'See for exam.pie Merdeka University Berhad v. Government of Malaysia [1982] 2 ML) 243. 
65 See Jamuluddin bin Othman v. Men teri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri & An or {1989] 1 CL) 448. See also Teoh 
Ertg Huat v. KadJ1i of Pasir Mas, Kelantan & Anor [1990] 1 CLJ 277 where Lord Presiden!Tun Abdul 
Hamid Omar held !hat a non-Muslim parent had the right under Article 12(4) of !he Federal 
Constitution to decide the religion of his minor child (below 18 years old). In this case, Suzie Teoh, a 
Buddhist under-aged girl, converted to Islam against the wishes of her parent 
"See Harding (1996: 131). 
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authorized by this Constitution, there shall be no discrimination against citizens on 
the ground only of religion, race, descent, place of birth or gender in any law or in 
the appointment to any office or employment under a public authority or in the 
administration of any law relating to the acquisition, holding or disposition of 
property or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, 
vocation or employment". Gause (5) of Article 8, however, does not invalidate or 
prohibit (a) any provision regulating personal law; (b) any provision or practice 
restricting office or employment connected with the affairs of any religion, or of an 
institution managed by a group professing any religion, to persons professing that 
religion; (c) any provision for the protection, well-being or advancement of the 
aboriginal peoples of the Malay Peninsula (including the reservation of land) or the 
reservation to aborigines of a reasonable proportion of suitable positions in the 
public service; ( d) any provision prescribing residence in a State or part of a State as 
a qualification for election or appointment to any authority having jurisdiction only 
in that State or part, or for voting in such an election; ( e) any provision of a 
Constitution of a State, being or corresponding to a provision in force immediately 
before Merdeka Day; and (f) any provision restricting enlistment in the Malay 
Regiment to Malays. 
The Federal Court in Datuk Haji Hamn bin Haji Idris v. Public Prosecutor in 197767 
had the opportunity to interpret the principle of equality under Article 8. Subjecting 
the operation of Article 8 to the limiting princi pies based on the classification 
permitted by the Article, the Federal Court adopted the view that the equality 
provision in Article 8 is qualified and "does not mean that all laws must apply 
uniformly to all persons in all circumstances everywhere" .6B As clause 5 of Article 8 
itself envisages, there may be lawful discrimination based on" communal" 
classifications such as Muslims as opposed to non-Muslims,69 aborigines as opposed 
"Datuk Haji Haron bin Haji Idris v. Public Prosecutor [1977] 2 ML) 155. 
""Datuk Haji F{arun bin Haji ldris 11. Public Prosecutor [1977] 2 ML] 155, p.p. 165. 
""Article 8(5)(b) allows" any provision or practice restricting office or employment connected with the 
affairs of any religion, or of an institution managed by a group professing any religion, to persons 
professing that religion" 
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to non-aborigines,7° Malays and natives of Borneo as opposed to other 
communities/1 and "non-communal" classification such as residents in a particular 
State as opposed to residents elsewhere. n Avoiding excessive idealism in treating 
equality as a legal concept, Justice Suffian in Datuk Harun said: 
(W)hile we are all familiar with the idealistic concept of equality, Indian -- and 
Malaysian judges - are not familiar with it as a legal concept, having been 
introduced in India only in 1949 and in Malaysia in 1957. As a legal concept it is 
easy to state, but difficult to apply -- because, first, equality can only apply 
among equals and in real life there is little equality and, secondly, while the 
concept of equality is a fine and noble one it cannot be applied wholesale 
without regard to the realities of life. While idealists and democrats agree that 
there should not be one law for the rich and another for the poor nor one for the 
powerful and another for the weak and that on the contrary the law should be 
the same for everybody, in practice that is only a theory, for in real life it is 
generally accepted that the law should protect the poor against the rich and the 
weak against the strong. 73 
The communal dimension of the principle of qualified equality under Article 8 
was put to test in Merdeka University Berhad v. Government of Malaysia, or the Merdeka 
University case in 1981.74 The appellant argued, inter alia, that the government refusal 
to allow the setting up of a Chinese-medium university on the basis that the use of 
Otinese language as the medium of instruction violated the national education 
policy, which required the use of National Language, i.e. the Malay language as the 
'"Article 8(5)(c) allows "any provision for the protection, well-being or advancement of the aboriginal 
peoples of the Malay Peninsula (including the reservation of land) or the reservation to aborigines of 
a reasonable proportion of suitable positions in the public service". 
" Article153 states that "it shall be the responsibility of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to safeguard the 
special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and the 
legitimate interests of other communities ... " 
72 Article 8(5)(d) allows "any provision prescribing residence in a State or part of a State as a 
qualification for election or appointment to any authority having jurisdiction only in that State or 
part, or for voting in such an election'' 
73 Datuk Haji Hamn bin Haji Idris v. Public Prosecutar [1977] 2 MLJ 155, p.p. 165. 
74 Merdeka University Ber/tad v. Gm;ernment of Malmjsia [1981] 2 ML) 356; Merdekn University Berltad v. 
Government of Malmjsin [1982] 2 MLJ 243, 
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medium of instruction, was discriminatory in nature, and hence contravened Article 
8 of the Federal Constitution. High Court Judge Justice Abdoolcader held that the 
government refusal was not discriminatory since Article 8(2) of the Federal 
Constitution does not treat language as one of the grounds of discrimination 
prohibited by the Article.75 Giving a strict construction to Article 8(2), the learned 
judge said: 
Article 8(2) further refers to discrimination purely and solely on account of all 
or any one or more of the grounds mentioned in that clause and cannot apply if 
it is alleged to be on one or more of those grounds and also on other grounds as 
well (Datuk Harnn bin Haji Idris [1976] 2MLJ116, 119, 120 (at page 119)). 
Language in any event is not one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination in 
Article 8(2). 
The setting up of f..1erdeka University was proposed by Chinese associations in 
the late 1960s with the primary aim to provide tertiary education for private Chinese 
secondary school graduates whose access to the government-funded tertiary public 
educational institutions had been adversely affected by the post-1969 pro-Malay 
education policy. The government maintained that the use of the National Language 
as the medium of instruction in public educational institutions, as was envisaged in 
the national education policy set out in the preamble to Education Act 1961, was 
necessary for national unity. Agreeing ·with the government on such a policy 
objective, Justice Suffian, delivering the Federal Court's majority decision upholding 
the decision of the High Court in the Merdeka University case, said: 
In any event, bearing in mind the history of education in this country and the 
divisive results of allowing separate language schools ... and the 
determination of Parliament to so regulate schools and universities and 
education generally as an instrument for bringing about one nation out of the 
disparate ethnic elements in our population, we have no choice but to hold, as 
75 M.erdekti University Berhad v. Government of Malaysia [1981] 2 ML) 356, p.p. 363. 
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we have already held, that Merdeka University if established would be a public 
authority within Article 160(2) of the Constitution and that accordingly 
teaching in Chinese there would be use of that language for an official purpose, 
which use [sic] may be prohibited under Article 152.76 
Article 152 (1) of the Federal Constitution provides that the national language 
shall be the Malay language and shall be in such script as Parliament may by law 
provide: Provided that - (a) no person shall be prohibited or prevented from using 
(otherwise than for official purposes), or from teaching or learning, any other 
language; and (b) nothing in the Clause shall prejudice the right of the Federal 
Government or of any State Government to preserve and sustain the use and study 
of the language of any other community in the Federation. The majority decision in 
Merdeka University suggested that as the proposed university, which was to be 
established under the University and University Colleges Act 1971, is a "public 
authority" and the use of Chinese as a medium of instruction falls within the scope 
of "official purpose" under Article 152, and hence was limited by Clause l(a) of the 
Article. 
It is to be noted however that Justice Datuk George Seah, in hi9 dissenting 
judgment disagreed ·with the majority view on the status of the proposed university 
as a public authority. The bone of the learned judge's contention was that, "since a 
university incorporated under the Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 
would not be exercising governmental or quasi-governmental powers vested in it by 
Federal law ... such a university would not be a public authority" .77 It follows that 
the use of Chinese as a medium of instruction at the proposed university is not for 
an official purpose within the meaning of Article 152. Offering a more liberal 
construction of the Article, the learned judge said: 
"(u)sing" does not mean "speaking" and it would be wrong to give such a 
narrow and artificial construction to the word "using" when the only 
"Merdeka University Berlmd '" Goveniment of Malaysia [1982] 2 ML) 243, p.p. 252. 
7l Merdelai University Berlmd v. Government of Malaysia [1982] 2 ML) 243, p.p. 254. 
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restriction imposed by Article 152(1)(a) is limited to using any other language 
or the Chinese language for official purposes ... There is nothing in Article 
152(1) (a) to prohibit or prevent the using of the Chinese language for non-
official purposes, and it is within the legitimate right of a businessman to put 
up his business signboard in the Chinese language as well as in the national 
language. In my opinion, this constitutional privilege guaranteed by Article 
152(1) (a) should be given a liberal interpretation and no attempt should be 
made to whittle it down.7B 
The Malaysian courts also defended the purpose for which Article 153 is to 
serve, that is to safeguard the special position of the Malays and the natives of Sabah 
and Sarawak through reservation of quotas for them in respect of employment in the 
public service, permits, licences, scholarships and education.79 The courts too, taking 
into consideration the sensitive and potentially inflammable nature of open debates 
on the issue of Bumiputera special privileges and the legitimate interests of other 
communities, adopted the more restrictive view of the right to freedom of speech 
and expression if such freedom amounts to questioning the special privileges 
guaranteed by the Constitution. In Public Prosecutor v Fan Yew Teng, so the defendant, 
who was the Deputy Secretary-General of the Democratic Action Party (OAP) and 
the editor of the party's official organ, the Rocket, was convicted under the Sedition 
Act 1948 for publishing an article questioning Bumiputera special privileges. The 
article entitled" Alliance Policy of Segregation 'Evidence Galore' listed by Dr. Ooi" 
published in the December 1970 issue of the Rocket, in the main, questioned the 
dominant position of one ethnic community, apparently the Malays, in the army, 
police, education institutions, land schemes, public housing, business and industry. 
Parts of the article read: 
There is evidence galore of the Alliance policy of segregation. 
7S Merdeka University Berhad v. Government of Malm1sia [1982] 2 MLJ 243, p.p. 253. 
79 See Fan Yew Teng v. Public Prosecutor [1975] 2 ML] 235; TSC Education Sdn. Bhd. v Kolej Yayasan 
Pelajaran Mara & Anor [2002] 2 CL) 581. 
so Public Prosecutor v fan Yew Teng [1975] 1ML]176. 
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No. 1. Take our Malaysian Army. New and better battalions are being formed 
from members of one ethnic group. Here you have an excellent opportunity 
for integration in a vital part of our national structure but this opportunity is 
being missed. 
No. 2. New police contingents. Here again recruitment mainly from one 
ethnic group. Another excellent opportunity for integration (is) being missed. 
No. 3. Schools, colleges and universities are being organised by different 
ethnic groups, and everybody is moving along his own separate path. 
Therefore, the cleavage between our future leaders and intellectuals will be all 
that more difficult to bridge in years to come. 
No. 4. Public housing. Another avenue for integration (is) not being exploited. 
Instead, housing and shopping complexes for one ethnic group are still being 
built all over the country. 
No. 5. Land Schemes. Vast land schemes with real opportunities for people of 
all races to live and work and grow up together. Here again a golden 
opportunity being missed. 
No. 6. Gigantic business and industrial concerns are being organised, not for 
the benefit of ALL poor Malaysians, but again only for the benefit of one 
ethnic group. The latest of these is the National Corporation. Even the Prime 
Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, says blatantly that this is for the benefit of one 
ethnic group, although this huge multimillion dollar Corporation is called a 
'national' corporation Can't the Alliance Government imagine for a minute 
what the reaction of the country will be, and the far-reacting implication of 
calling this huge corporation a 'national' corporation when it serves the 
interests of only one ethnic group? Is it being suggested that other groups in 
this country are not part of the national structure? Or is this another bad 
example of governmental arrogance?Sl 
., See the full text of the article which wa• reproduced in Public Prosecutor v Fan Yew Teng [1975] 1 MLJ 
176, p.p. 177. 
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The article was originally the text of a speech delivered by a DAP leader, Dr. 
Ooi Kee Saik, on 22November1970 at a dinner to celebrate the release of DAP 
Secretary-General, Lim Kit Siang, from ISA detention. During the trial at the High 
Court, the counsel for the defendant argued that the defendant was entitled to his 
right to freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed by the Federal 
Constitution, and hence he should not be convicted for sedition. The trial judge 
Justice Abdul Hamid, however, maintained that the right to freedom of speech and 
expression is not an absolute right, and the Parliament, considering the multiracial 
composition of Malaysian population, may by law impose restrictions to these 
rights. Finding the defendant guilty of the offence in January 1975, the learned judge 
made the following observation: 
Speaking of the freedom of speech and expression ... this is the right of every 
citizen and it is guaranteed by our Constitution, the supreme law of the 
country. That may well be, although I do not conceive it can ever be seriously 
suggested that such right to freedom of speech and expression is absolute. 
Clause (2)(a) of Article 10, for example, clearly empowers Parliament to 
impose, by law, "such restrictions as it deems necessary or expedient in the 
interests of the security of the Federation ... public order or morality ... " While 
I quite agree t11at there is no ambiguity in regard to this aspect of the citizen's 
fundamental liberty, there is equally no ambiguity that the right is subject to 
certain restrictions that Parliament may by law impose. It simply means that 
one is free to say or express as one pleases so long as one does not offend tl1e 
provisions of such law. I will not profess tl1at I am qualified to question the 
wi~dom of Parliament for enacting particular legislation. This, I think, is a 
matter for the elected representatives to decide whether Malaysia, with her 
multi-racial society, and in view of the composition of her people, there is a 
need for a legislation, in the interests of security, to adequately and effectively 
deal with those words which are expressive of a tendency not to promote 
peace but to excite illwill [sic] and hostility. There must be adequate provision 
to effectively extinguish a spark without waiting for it to enkindle a flame. w· e 
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have witnessed a tragic incident and I have no doubt it is the earnest hope of 
every peace-loving citizen that he may not live to witness yet another incident 
or even a spark that may enkindle a fire that would burst into a sweeping and 
destructive conflagration.az 
Justice Abdul Hamid's contention reflects the formalist strand of argument for 
it refused to question the wisdom of the Parliament in determining policy issues 
while at the same time, taking into consideration the potentially inflammable 
consequence of communal conflict in Malaysia's ethnically divided society, 
recognized the necessity of laws which limit the exercise of freedom of speech and 
expression. This position was upheld by the Federal Court in July 1975. Defending 
the constitutionality of the government policy on Bumiputem special privileges, 
former Chief Justice of Borneo Tan Sri Lee Hun Hoe said: 
That the Yang Dipertuan Agong is to safeguard the special position of the 
Malays and the natives in Sa bah and Sarawak and the legitimate interest of 
other communities is clearly spelt out in Article 153 of the Federal Constitution. 
These provisions cannot be questioned and are necessary to assist the less 
advanced or fortunate in the light of the conditions prevailing in the country at 
the time of independence. rt may take time, certainly not in our generation, for 
the provisions to become redundant. But as Iong as the provisions are there it 
is mischievous to seek to attack the Government for doing something in 
accordance with the Con~titution. 83 
Even legislators cannot plead parliamentary privileges when they are 
prosecuted for making speeches on sensitive racial issues. In Mark Kading v Public 
Prosecutor,84 the accused, who was a Member of the Dewan Rakyat, made a speech in 
Parliament in October 1978 questioning the existence of Chinese and Tamil schools, 
as well as signboards written in both languages. He advocated the closure of the two 
s2 Public ProsecutlJ1' v Fan Yew Teng [1975] 1MLJ176, p.p. 177. 
81 Fan Yew Teng 11. Public Prosecutor [1975] 2 MLJ 235, p.p. 238. 
"Mark Koding v. Public Prosecutor [1982] 2 MLJ 120. 
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vernacular school streams and the complete restriction of the two languages on 
signboards. 1be failure to do so, the accused said, would mean "to ignore the trust of 
the people and frustrate the wishes of the new generation who do not want their 
country to be identified with the alien identity" .ss He was subsequently charged 
under the Sedition Act 1948 for uttering seditious words. During the trial at the High 
Court, the trial judge referred to the Federal Court the question of whether the 
accused person's right to free speech as a Member of Parliament had been validly 
limited by Article 63(4) of the Federal Constitution as amended in 1971. Article 63 (2) 
of the Federal Constitution exempts a person from any legal liability "in respect of 
anything said or any vote given by him when taking part in any proceedings of 
either House of Parliament or any committee thereof". Clause 4 of the Article 
however provides that "Oause (2) shall not apply to any person charged with an 
offence under the law passed by Parliament under Clause (4) of Article 10 or with an 
offence under the Sedition Act 1948(Act15) as amended by the Emergency 
(Essential Powers) Ordinance No. 45, 1970". While holding that such a right was 
validly limited by the amendment to Article 63(4), Justice Suffian went further in his 
judgment to state the legitimate basis for such limitation was on Malaysia's own 
experience of fragile ethnic relations. In this regard, the former Lord President said: 
Malaysians with short memories and people living in mature and 
homogeneous democracies may wonder why in a democracy discussion of 
any issue and in Parliament of all places, should be suppressed. Surely it 
might be said that it is better that grievances and problems about language, 
etc. should be openly debated, rather than that they be swept under the carpet 
and allowed to fester. But Malaysians who remember what happened during 
May 13, 1969, and subsequent days are sadly aware that racial feelings are 
only too easily stirred up by constant harping on sensitive issues like 
85 Part of the accused person's speech in Malay is reproduced in Justice Mohd Azmi's written 
judgment in Public Prosecutor v Mark Kading [1983] 1MLJ111, p.p. 112. 
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language; and it is to minimize racial explosions that the amendments were 
made.B6 
The operation of Bumiputem special privilege under Article 153 itself was 
dealt with in TSC Education in 2000.87 The issue at hand was whether Rule 2 of Majlis 
Amanah Rakyat (Yayasan Pelajaran MARA) Order 1969 should be given wider 
interpretation so as to allow Chinese students from the People's Republic of China to 
study at Kolej Yayasan Pelajaran MARA, a corporation established under the Majlis 
Amanah Rakyat Act 1966 (Revised 1992) and the Order. Rule 2 of the Order 
specifically outlines the corporation's purposes as follows; (i} to provide educational 
and training facilities for the Bumiputeras; (ii) to encourage Bumiputeras' education 
and training; and (iii) to provide scholarships, loans and other financial assistance to 
Bumiputeras for the purpose of enabling them to further their studies. Applying a 
literal construction of the clear and unequivocal words in the Order, and relying on 
the provisions in Article 153 of the Federal Constitution, High Court Judge Datuk 
Abdul Malik Ishak held that the corporation was not empowered to provide training 
and educational facilities tonon-Bumiputeras, As to the plaintiffs counsel's argument 
that neither the Act nor the Order contained express or implied provisions which 
prohibited foreign students from studying at the college, and that allowing their 
entry would promote, stimulate and facilitate economic and social development of 
the country, the learned judge said: 
In simple language, it means this. What the statute does not expressly or 
impliedly authorize is to be taken as prohibited. Likewise here, the said Act 
and the said Order did not expressly or impliedly authorise the defendants to 
take in the China students and that must be taken to be prohibited. I am 
constrained to hold that the whole purpose of the said Act and the said Order 
being enacted was exclusively for the advancement of Bumiputera students. It 
would certainly be absurd if foreign students from the People's Republic of 
""Mark Kading 11 Prtblic Prosecutor [1982] 2 MLJ 120, p.p. 123. 
87 TSC Education Sdn. Blid. v Kolej Yayasan Pelajaran Mara & Anor [2002j 2 CLJ 581. 
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China, the China students, were allowed entry but, on the other hand, the 
entry oflocal students who are non-Bumiputeras are disallowed. To adopt the 
argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff would defeat the purpose of 
enacting the said Act and the said Order. The plaintiff seemed to suggest and 
advocate that local non-Bumiputera students should also be allowed entry 
because this would also "promote and stimulate the economic and social 
development of Malaysia". But the long line of authorities as alluded to earlier 
would certainly put an end to that kind of suggestion. The exclusive rights of 
the Bumiputeras are enshrined in the Federal Constitution. Article 153 of the 
Federal Constitution provides for reservation of special benefits for the 
Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak ... llll 
It seems that Malaysian judges, apart from being constrained by the legal 
texts in interpreting laws on Bumiputera special privileges and legitimate interest of 
other communities, had also accepted the necessity of government's efforts to correct 
imbalances among ethnic groups through implementation of positive discrimination 
policy in favor of the Bumiputeras. Furthermore, taking into consideration the 
potentially inflammable consequence of open debates on such issue, what is more 
questioning government policies on ethnic relations, the judges tended to view that 
the untrammeled exercise of freedom of speech and expression would not be in the 
interest of the nation. This, in turn, led to the legitimization by the court of the 
''wisdom" of the Parliament in enacting laws that limit the exercise of fundamental 
liberties for the purpose of maintaining racial harmony. In racially charged cases, the 
notion of national interest, which also means valorization of state power, gained 
priority over individual freedom. 
Developmental Justice 
The primary role of law and legal institutions viewed in the context of the dirigiste 
developmental state has been to facilitate and not to impede economic development 
88 TSC Educatirm Sdn. Bhd. v Kolej Yayasan Pelajaran Mara & Anor [2002] 2 CL) 581, P-P· 600. 
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as defined and initiated by the state. This idea is well encapsulated in the notion of 
developmental justice that prioritizes economic development over individual rights 
and freedom. While the former is an object of state policy, the latter is regarded as its 
main obstacle.89 It is in this context that the judiciary in an illiberal statist legal 
&ystern is expected to vindicate the government's economic development policies, 
even though the implementation of such policies raised human rights and 
environmental concerns. Former Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, in his 
speech delivered in Montevedio in 1997 affirmed that "a requisite for development is 
a judicial system that understands and supports the aspirations of the people for 
development and justice" .90 What is more, rapid economic development has also 
been viewed as a necessary means to correct economic imbalances among the 
country's major communal groups, especially between the Malays and the more 
economically advanced Chinese. 
\Vhile the Malaysian state has been pro-active in instituting a market friendly 
legal framework in order to promote economic development, the Executive has 
wielded wide discretionary powers in guiding economic policies and programs.91 
Statutes such as the Industrial Coordination Act 1975 and the Land Acquisition Act 
1960 contain provisions which not only confer wide discretionary powers to the 
executive,92 but also exclude judicial review of the executive action.93 Delegated 
legislation has also been invoked, sometimes by making orders with retrospective 
effect, to validate executive actions in the implementation of development projects.94 
Maintaining that 'industrial harmony' is necessary for the country's economic 
B9 Soyinka (1999). 
"' Mahathir (1997). 
91 Pistor & Wello11s (1999: 91) 
"Section 3 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act gives wide discretio11ary powers to the State Authority to 
acquire "any land which is needed-
( a) for any public purpose; 
(b) by any person or corporation for any purpose which in the opinion of the State Authority is 
beneficial to the economic development of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the public generally or 
any class of the public; or (c) for the purpose of mining or for residential, agricultural, commercial, 
industrial or recreational purposes or any con1bination of such purposes. 
93 On aggrieved parties' appeals to the Minister regarding revocation,. variation or refusal of licences, 
Section 13(2) of the Industrial Coordination Act 1975 provides that "The Minister may after hearing 
the appeal make such order as he deems fit and that order shall be final and shall not be questioned in 
any court". 
"See Ketua Pengara/J /abatn11 Alam Sekitnr & Anor v. Kajeng Tubek & Ors and otlier appeals [1997] 3 M. l.j 
23. 
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growth, the government introduced labour legislation which severely restricted 
labour rights. 'Finality' clauses which render the Minister's decision final and 
conclusive were also put in place.95 All this amounts to enhancing state authority in 
furthering its economic development programs, while circumscribing judicial 
scrutiny in this key policy area. 
Very often, the pursuit of breakneck economic development brings to the fore 
tussles between sectional interests as represented by large corporations backed by 
the state on the one hand, and ordinary people who were displaced as a result of 
implementation of the so-called economic development projects.% This undermined 
the very claim of economic development supposedly inherent in the notion of 
developmental justice. There are sections of displaced Malaysian communities who 
find themselves trapped in the" development vs. human rights" conundrum, and 
who believe that economic development and social justice are antithetical to each 
other, that economic development benefits only a few and victimizes many others.97 
It is in these tussles that the courts had to consider the issue of whether a 
private citizen has locus standi to file a legal suit against project proponents. Two 
controversial cases, in particular, set limits to such rights. In Gm>ernment of Malaysia v 
Lim Kit Siang in 1988,98 the respondent, who was the Opposition Leader, sued for a 
declaration that a letter of intent pertaining to construction of the multibillion ringgit 
North-South Highway given to United Engineers Malaysia (UEM), a company 
linked to the ruling UMNO, was invalid and for an injunction to restrain UEM from 
signing any contract pursuant to the letter of intent. He alleged that the ministers 
involved in making the decision to grant the contract were guilty of criminally 
corrupt practices, in that they were biased in favour of the UEM. He alleged that the 
95 See for example Section 9 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 on the recognition of trade unions. 
Subsection (6) 0£ the said section provides that" A decision of the Minister under subsection (5) shall 
be final and shall not be questioned in any court". The court however assumed its power of judicial 
review in cases where the Minister has erred in Jaw in making such decision. See Paterson Candy 
(Malaysia) Sdn Blu! 11. Minister for Labour and Manpower & Ors [1978] 1 LNS 141. 
"Tan (1997). 
97 This includes the plight of the Penan community in the interior of Sarawak who were displaced as a 
result of logging activities and the construction of the controversial Bakun dam in the state. In 2003, 
the people of Braga in Selangor objected the state's proposed RM 1.5 billion incinerator project, which 
was to be built in their vicinity, citing health hazard as the main reason. ln July 2007, the government 
decided to scrap the proposed project, citing its high cost as a reason (MalITTJSiakini, 7 J u!y 2007). 
"[1988] 1 MLJ 50; [1988] 2MLJ12. 
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decision had discriminated against two other companies which offered lower 
tenders, and by rejecting their offers in favour of UEM' s higher bid, the government 
had incurred huge expenditure from public funds. Lim' s motion for an interim 
injunction was granted by the Supreme Court. On the application by the government 
to set aside the injunction on the ground of lack of standing, the Supreme Court, by a 
majority of three to two, overruled its previous decision and decided in favour of the 
Government. On the issue of locus standi, the majority held that, where a statute 
created a criminal offence but no civil remedy, the Attorney-General was the 
guardian of public interest and he alone could enforce compliance with the law. Lim 
failed to show that he suffered special damage peculiar to himself and, therefore, his 
claim for locus standi on this ground could not stand. As the Leader of the 
Opposition, the court said, "Lim' s remedy in this matter does not lie with the court, 
but with Parliament and the electorate."99 
Similarly, in Ketua Pengarah fabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v. Kajeng Tubek & Ors 
and other appeals in 1997,10° which is better known as the Bakun dam case, the Court 
of Appeal refused to grant locus standi to private citizens seeking injunction to stop 
work on one of the main infrastructure projects in Malaysia. Bakun dam in the 
interior of Sarawak, the construction of which began in the early 1980s, was to have a 
power-generating capacity of 2,400MW, approximately ten times more than the 
projected energy need for the whole of Sarawak in 1990. As a spin off effect, the 
project would attract foreign investment to Sarawak, and hence boost the state's 
industrial development. After several hiccups in the project's preparatory stages, 
due to economic recessions in the 1980s, a RM 15 billion contract to build the dam 
and an undersea transmission cable to supply power to Peninsular Malaysia was 
finally awarded to Ekran Bhd, a construction company owned by a politically well-
connected businessman, Datuk Ting Pek Khiing.101 Ekran also stood to reap other 
accompanying benefits like RM 1 billion worth of timber, which would be cleared 
for the dam project. Ekran' s plan to set up a plant to manufacture high tension cables 
" [1988] 2 ML) 12, p.p. 25. 
100 Ketua Peng11rah fnbatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v. Kajeng Tubek f.1 Ors and other appeals [1997] 3 M.LJ 23. 
101 Asian Wall Street Journal, 31January1994. 
164 
for the undersea power transmission project was also underway.102 Despite the fact 
that the project would involve flooding of about 70,000 hectares of tropical rainforest 
and displacement of approximately 10,000 indigenous people, the government in 
February 1995 gave the go-ahead to the project proprietor to start work on the darn 
without waiting for a report on its environmental impact being cornpleted.103 
It was against this backdrop that three longhouse residents who were affected 
by the construction of the dam filed a suit in the High Court seeking a declaration 
that the project was illegal.1™ They claimed that the Government and Ekran failed to 
comply with Environmental Quality Act (EQA) 1974 which requires the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report to be completed before work on the 
prescribed activities could begin. In March 1995, a Minister's Order was made with 
retrospective effect to exempt the application of EQA 1974 to prescribed activities in 
Sarawak. The order practically excluded the Bakun dam project from EQA' s 
requirements, which included the public's entitlement to a copy of the EIA report 
and their rights to give comments on it,105 
The plaintiffs in the Bakun dam case claimed that they had been deprived of 
their rights to obtain a copy of the EIA report, to be heard and to make 
representation prior to the approval of the report They also claimed that "their 
homes and land would be destroyed, their lives uprooted by the project and that 
they would suffer far more greatly and directly than other members of the public as 
their land and forest are not just a source of livelihood but constitute life itself, 
fundamental to their social, cultural and spiritual survival as native peoples" .106 In 
allowing the plaintiffs' application, High Court Judge Dato' James Foong held, inter 
alia, that" a valid assessment of an EIA prepared by the project proponent of the 
prescribed activities cannot be made without some form of public participation" .107 
He added that "this is essential, for interaction between people and their 
102 Business Times, 31January1994. 
'"'' Kua (2001: 55) 
'°' Kajeng Tubek & Ors v. Ekran Bird. & Ors [1996] 2 M.L.J. 388, p.p. 389. 
10s Business Times, 7 April 1995. 
106 Kajeng Tubek & Ors v. Ekran Blul. & Ors [1996] 2 M.L.J. 388, p.p. 389. 
107 Kajeng Tu'1ek & Ors'" Ekran Blui. & Ors [1996] 2 M.L.J. 388, p.p. 412. 
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environment is fundamental to the concept of environmental impact" .1oa As such, "a 
right is vested on the plaintiffs to obtain and be supplied with a copy of the EIA 
coupled with the right to make representation and be heard".109 The court therefore 
granted a declaration that the Environmental Quality (Prescribed Activities) 
(Environmental Impact Assessment) (Amendment) Order 1995 was invalid, and that 
Ekran, before it could begin work on the dam, had to comply with the EQA, and 
with any regulations and guidelines made under the Act. 
The Court of Appeal, however, allowed Ekran' s ex-parte application for an 
interim order to suspend the High Court's decision. In the inter-parte proceedings 
that followed, Ekran' s counsel argued that unlike the residents, "Ekran would lose 
substantially if the effect of the declaration was not suspended pending appeal" .no 
He added that" dislocation would defer the immense benefit from the project 
accrued to the nation", because the project "would make cheap power available to 
consumers" .111 A final mortal blow to the Ionghouse residents was dealt by the 
Court of Appeal which overturned the High Court's decision. Allowing Ekran' s 
appeal, Court of Appeal Judge Dato' Gopal Sri Ram held that the respondents lacked 
substantive locus standi because they were, in substance, attempting to enforce a 
penal sanction, which was a matter entirely reserved by the Federal Constitution to 
the Attorney-General. The respondents also did not suffer any special injury over 
and above the injury common to others so as to make them entitled to standing in 
court. The court held that deprivation suffered by the respondents, a claim made 
under Article 5{1) of the Federal Constitution, was" in accordance with the law". 
They therefore suffered no injury and there was no necessity for a remedy.112 As 
regards to the question of substantive locus standi, Justice Gopal Sri Ram said: 
108 Kajeng Tubek & Ors v. Ekran Bhd. & Ors [1996] 2 M.L.J. 388, p.p. 412. 
109 Ka;eng Tubek & Ors v. Ekran Bltd. & Ors [1996] 2 M.L.J. 388, p.p. 412. 
110 The New Straits Times, 12 July 1996. Similar argument was accepted by the Supreme Court in Asian 
Rare Earth Sd11. Bhd. V. Woon Tan Kan & Ors [1992] 4 CL) 2207. The court allowed the appellant's 
application to suspend the injunctions restraining it from producing, storing and keeping its toxic 
waste pending appeal because the injunctions "would cause harm to the appellant and hardship to its 
workers if they were allowed to operate before appeal is heard and disposed of". 
111 Tire New Straits Times, 12 July 1996. 
112 Ketua Pengarah fabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v. Kajeng Tubek & Ors and other appeals [1997] 3 M.L.) 23. 
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The factors that go to a denial of substantive locus standi are so numerous and 
wide ranging that it is inappropriate to attempt an effectual summary of them 
... As regards subject matter, courts have --- by the exercise of their 
interpretative jurisdiction --- recognized that certain issues are, by their very 
nature, unsuitable for judicial examination. Matters of national security or of 
public interest, or the determination of relations between Malaysia and other countries 
as well as the exercise of the treaty making power are illustrations of subject matter 
which is ill-suited for scrutiny by the courts. Jurisdiction is declined, either because 
the supreme law has committed such matters solely to either the Executive or 
the Legislative branch of Government - which is termed as 'the political 
question' by jurists in the United States - or because the court is entirely 
unsuited to deal with such matters.113 
Justice Gopal Sri Ram also took the trial judge to task for not taking into 
account relevant considerations when deciding whether to grant declaratory relief. 
In particular, the appeal judge claimed that the trial judge" did not have sufficient 
regard to public interest, i.e. the failure to consider the interests of justice from the 
point of view of both the appellants and the respondents" .114 Above all, the appeal 
judge concluded that the trial judge had erred because, 
He failed to ask himself the vital question: are public and national interest 
served better by the grant or the refusal of the declarations sought by the 
respondents? ... The affidavit evidence filed on the respondents' behalf reveals 
that they were not against development in the national interest. They were 
merely concerned that, in respect of the project, there should be compliance of 
written law ... (The trial judge) certainly took into account the interests o( 
justice from the respondents' point of view. However, he does not appear to 
have taken into account the interests of justice from the appellants' point of 
m Ketua Pengarali Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v. Kajeng Tubek & Ors and other arrpeals [1997] 3 M.L.j 23, 
p.p.41. 
114 Ketua Pengaralt jabata:n Alam Sekitar & A nor v. Kajeng Tubek & Ots and other appeals [1997] 3 M.L.J 23, 
p.p. 23. 
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view as well. This omission fatally flaws the exercise of discretion. Justice is not 
meant only for the respondents. The appellants are equally entitled to have 
their share of it.115 
The court's acceptance of the need to support development in the national 
interest and its preference to see justice from the appellant's point of view represents 
a dominant perspective which prioritizes state-led economic development even 
though such a view would fly in the face of individual rights. After all, giving 
limited meaning to the rule of law, the court conveniently concluded that no remedy 
is available for encroac!nnent of individual rights done in accordance with the law. 
In treating both parties to the proceeding as equals, the court missed the fact that the 
tussle was actually between powerless private citizens and a giant corporation 
backed by the might of state power, in which no level playing field could be 
expected. 
Apart from the courts' apparent acceptance of the state-defined economic 
development objectives, expressed provisions in the statutes, which give broad 
discretionary powers to the Executive to act on matters pertaining to economic 
development, left the courts "With very limited space to strike down executive 
decisions. One such example is the provisions in the Land Acquisition Act 1960, 
which gives broad power to State Authority to acquire lands for public purposes. 
Section 3 of the Act provides that "State Authority may acquire any land which is 
needed-(a) for any public purpose; (b) by any person or corporation for any purpose 
which in the opinion of the State Authority is beneficial to the economic 
development of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the public generally or any class 
of the public;l16 or (c) for the purpose of mining or for residential, agricultural, 
commercial or industrial purposes". This section had enabled state authorities to 
acquire lands for a wide range of purposes like development of townships, ports, 
m Ketua Pengara/1 fabatan Alam Sekitar & A nor v. Kajeng Tubek & Ors and other appeals [1997] 3 M.L.) 23, 
p.p.46. 
116 Before amendment in 1991, section 3(b) reads, "by any person or corporation undertaking a work 
which in the opinion of the State Authority is of public utility". The amendment further broadened 
the scope o! section 3. 
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residential areas and industrial zones,117 construction of roads and causeways,118 
reservation for public parks,119 and even tourism.12ll 
In such cases, what constituted public purpose is up to the acquiring authority 
to determine, while the courts were left with limited room to intervene. In Syed Omar 
bin Abdul Rahman Talu1 Alsagoff & Anor v The Government of the State of ]ohore,121 the 
Privy Council held that the declaration issued under Section 8(3) of the Land 
Acquisition Act 1960 shall be conclusive evidence that all the scheduled land is 
needed for the purpose specified therein.122 The declaration can only be nullified on 
the ground of improper use of the statutory powers conferred to the acquiring 
authority or by reason of bad faith.123 This principle was followed in Kulasingam & 
Anor v. Commissioner of Land, Federal Territory & Ors, 124 when the Federal Court held 
that: 
The purpose of the acquisition can be questioned but only to the extent that it 
be shown that the acquiring authority has misconstrued its statutory powers or 
that the purpose stated does not come within section 3 of the Land Acquisition 
Act, 1960 or if bad faith is established.125 
Referring to the 1991 amendment to s 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, High 
Court Judge Justice Mohamad Ghazali in Honan Plantations Sdn Bhd v Kemjaan Negeri 
Joiwr & Ors126 observed that the powers of a State Authority had been broadened in 
117 See for example Yew Lean Finance Development (M) Sdn Bhd v Director of Lands & Mines, Perwng 
[1977] 2 MLJ 45. 
118 See for example Buan Joong Sdn Bltd v Superintendent of Land & Surveys Kuching Diinsion [2005] 5 
ML) 404; United Malacca Rubber Estates Blid v Pentadbir Tanah Daerali Johar Bohrn & Anor [1997] 4 MLJ 1. 
119 See for example Madeli Bin Sal/eh (suing as Administrator of the estate of Sal!e/1 bin Kilong, deceased) v 
Superintendent of Lands and Surveys. Miri Division & Anor [2005] 5 ML) 305. 
'"'Ahmad bin Soman v Keraj1um Negeri Kedah [2003] 4 ML) 705. 
121 Syed Omar bin Abdul Ralmum Taha Alsagof! & Anor v The Government of the State of Johore [1979] l MLJ 
49. 
122 judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London continued to hear civil appeals from Malaysia 
until such practice was abolished on 1January1985. Criminal and Constitutional appeals to the Privy 
Council was abolished on 1January1978. 
m For useful discussion on the use of statutory powers for improper purpose, see Jain (1997: 466-474). 
See also Pengarah Tanah dim Galian fl\lilayah Persekutuan, KL v Sri Lempah Enterprises !1979] 1 MLJ 135. 
111 Ku/asingam /"~ Anor v. Commissioner of Land, Federal Territon; fr Ors [1982} 1 MLJ 204. 
125 Kulasingam fr An or v. Commissioner of Land, Federal Territory fr Ors [1982] 1 :.~LJ 204. 
12
' Honan Plantations Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Jo/tor & Ors [1998] 5 ML) 129. 
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that it could now" acquire any land which is needed by any person or corporation, 
for any purpose which in its opinion is beneficial to the economic development of 
Malaysia or any part thereof or to the public generally or any class of the public''. As 
in the Honan Plantation case, the court viewed that the proposed construction of a 
second causeway between Malaysia and Singapore and the development of Gelang 
Patah into a new to;vnship would definitely amount to a purpose which was 
beneficial to the economic development of that part of the State of Johor and also to 
the public residing within the surrounding areas. The State Authority, the court 
maintained, is the best judge of what amounts to a purpose which is beneficial to 
economic development wilhin the contemplation of s 3(b). Though the plaintiff's 
appeal to reverse the High Court decision was allowed by the Court of Appeal, on 
the ground that it had reasonable cause of action to file the suit, Appeal Court Judge 
Dato' Gopal Sri Ram affirmed the settled principle in land acquisition cases, that is, 
"an acquisition made under the provision of the Act cannot be challenged unless a 
plaintiff establishes that the acquiring authority had misconstrued its powers or had 
acted in bad faith or with gross unreasonableness" .127 
It seemed that the above view not only affirmed the executive's wide 
discretionary power in determining what constitutes a public purpose, but also 
made challenge to such power an extremely difficult task. Proving bad faith or mala 
fide on the part of the acquiring authority is not an easy task. In Yeap Seok Pen v 
Government of the State of Kelantan, 128 the appellant applied to the High Court for a 
declaration that the acquisition of her land by the State Government was invalid 
because the acquiring authority had acted in mala fide. She claimed that her land was 
selected for compulsory acquisition because she was not of Malay origin and that the 
government used its compulsory purchase power as a device to prevent her, as a 
Chinese Malaysian, from becoming the owner of the land. The High Court rejected 
her claim; so did the Federal Court. On appeal to the Privy Council, Lord Griffiths 
said, "bad faith of this order is an exceedingly serious allegation to make and she, 
'"Honan Plantations Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri folwr & Anor and Another Appeal [1998] 2 MLJ 498, p.p. 
502. 
""Yeap Seok Pen v Government of the State ofKefrmtan [1986] 1 ML) 449. 
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who makes it, has a heavy burden to discharge the onus of proving it",129 Dismissing 
the appeal, His Lordship continued: 
A person who asserts bad faith has the burden of proving it and mere 
suspicion is not enough. In considering whether the burden is discharged, the 
court will consider all the evidence before it including any explanation given 
by the Minister and any inference to be drawn from the failure to give an 
explanation.130 
Having shut themselves out from intervening in executive actions on 
substantive grounds, the courts were fairly vigilant when it came to scrutinizing the 
State Authorities' compliance with the procedures and legal requirements set out in 
the statute. In Pemungut Hasil Tanah, Daerah Barat Daya, Pulau Pinang v Ong Gaik 
Kee131, the then Chief Justice of Malaya Tun Salleh Abas asserted that "every exercise 
of statutory power must not only be in conformity with the express words of the 
statute but above all must also comply with certain implied legal requirements". His 
Lordship further asserted that the exercise of such power is an abuse if "it is done for 
an inadmissible purpose or on irrelevant grounds or without regard to relevant 
considerations or with gross unreasonableness" .132 The Federal Court in this case 
agreed with the High Court that the seven-year delay between the declaration to 
acquire the land made under section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act and the holding 
of an inquiry to assess payment of compensation to the respondent was 
unreasonable. The High Court's certiorari order to quash the acquisition proceedings 
was upheld by the Federal Court. 
Express words in the statute giving wide discretionary powers to the 
Executive, coupled with the court's acceptance of state-defined economic 
development goals, makes attempts to challenge executive actions in pursuing state-
129 Yeap Seok Pen v Government oftlie State ofKelantan {1986) 1 ML) 449, p.p. 451. 
no Yeap Seok Pen v Gtwemment of the State ofKelantan [1986] 1 MLJ 449, p.p. 453. 
131 Permmgut Hasil Tanah, Dnerah Barat Dm;a, Pu/au Pinang v Ong GaikKee [1983] 2 ML) 35 
102 Pemungut Hasil Tanah, Daerah Baral Daya, Pulau Pinang v Ong Gaik Kee [1983] 2 MLJ 35, p.p. 37. 
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led economic development objectives almost a futile exerdse.m Only in rare cases 
were such attempts successful.134 In land acquisition cases for example, litigants are 
more inclined to challenge acquisition of their lands on the ground of inadequate 
compensation rather than seeking the nullity of such executive action.BS Justice is 
thus se1ved by awarding compensation to the aggrieved party while allowing state-
led economic development to take its course. The courts seemed to be content with 
the literal interpretation of Article 8 of the Federal Constitution which provides that 
no person shall be deprived of their property save in accordance with law and 
subject to the payment of adequate compensation.136 
Limiting Interpretive Jurisdiction of the Courts 
The doctrine of legal formalism has been a potent ideological tool for the judges to 
stick to the legal text in interpreting a law, and avoid inquiring into its policy 
consideration, which is a matter for the Parliament to decide. This certainly worked 
well for the legislature. It ensures that judges interpret laws according to what the 
legislature has proclaimed, and more important, by not inquiring into its policy 
consideration, promote the government policy objectives. But once the circumstances 
within which the law operates change, it is the judges' prerogative to interpret the 
actual legal text based on the exigency of the changed circumstances. What is more, 
imbued by the common law tradition of judicial law-making, Malaysian judges had 
developed a strong doctrine of judicial review. This, in tum, provided a space for the 
judges to take a more activist line in judicial reasoning as transpired during the 
133 See for example Syed Omar bin Abdul Rahman Taha Alsagoff & Anor v Government of 111£ State o!Johore 
[1975] 1 MLJ 241 (mala fide); Ahmad bin Saman v Kerajaan Negeri Kedalz [2003] 4 MLJ 705; Lau Kieng 
Kang & Ors v Minister for Resource Planning & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 443 GalsttfUn & Anor v Attarney-
General [on appeal ta 111£ court of appeal: see civil £rPpeal no. 59 of1980) [1981) 1 ML] 9; (abuse of statutory 
powers); Yew Lean Finance Dirue/opment (M) Sdn Bhd v Director ofLands & Mines, Penang [1977] 2 ML) 
45 (vague purpose). 
134 See for example Stamford Holdings Sdn Bltd v Kerajaan Nege:ri Johar[.; Ors [1998] 1 MLJ 607. 
m Interview with Ahmad Shabrimi Mohd. Sidek, Advocate & Solicitor (counsel for plaintiffs in a case 
involving acquisition of an agricultural land in Kerpan, Kedah - unreported), 6 July 2004. 
136 See Kam Gin Paik v Pemungut Hasil Tanah, Daerah Barnt Drn;a, Pulau Pinang [1983] 2 ML) 59. 
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short-lived fierce judicial activism in the mid 1980s.137 In the aftermath of the 
watershed Executive-Judiciary crisis in the late 1980s, former Lord President of the 
Supreme Court Tun Salleh Abbas wrote about this space for judicial activism: 
Judges, of course, do not become involved with the functions of the 
Legislative arm of Government. However wise they may be, they cannot 
participate in making laws which they will later have to interpret. No one can 
anticipate what use any particular law would be put to when they are writing 
the law. Judges have to interpret the laws according to the circumstances at 
hand. Laws can become obsolete and meaningless when changes take place in 
society, and again, only judges can decide how to view the law in a new 
circumstance. Therefore the power to make laws and the powers to interpret 
them must lie in clearly separate compartments.BS 
The judges on many occasions struck down executive decisions or even 
declared laws passed by the Parliament as unconstitutional, resulting in a period of 
tension between the Executive and the Judiciary in the late 1980s. Thinking that the 
court had gone too far in reviewing executive decisions, and that the dividing line 
between the executive and judicial powers needed to be clarified, the Parliament in 
1988 amended Article 121 of the Federal Constitution to remove the exclusive 
vesting of judicial power in the High Courts and the inferior courts.139 According to 
Harding, while the amendment was apparently an attempt to codify the separation 
of powers in the Constitution, "it is heavily implicit this meant restricting the power 
of the judiciary to introduce into statute law and the Constitution concepts which do 
not expressly appear in them" .140 This in particular refers to the application of 
"' It seems that Dr. Mahathlr' s direct intervention with the judiciary in the 1980s prompted the 
previously very conservative judges like Tun Salleh Abbas and Tun Suffian Hashim to become quite 
;<liberal" in their views. 
"" Mohamed Sall eh & Das (1989). 
"'In March 1987, the Supreme Court in Dato Yap Peng declared Section 418A of the Criminal 
Procedure Code unconstitutional on the basis that the said section, by allowing the Attorney-General 
to transfer a case from a Session Court to the High Court, is inconsistent with Article 121 which 
vested judicial power only in the courts. 
1<0 Harding (1996: 134). 
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English common law and the unwritten concepts of natural justice and judicial 
review by the Malaysian judges to strike down executive decisions and acquit critics 
of the government in a string of high-profile cases in the mid 1980s.141 However, the 
far-reaching impact of the amendment on judicial power of the courts is a matter of 
some doubt. At best, it would only prevent the courts from striking down legislation 
which interferes with its judicial powers.142 
It is noteworthy at this juncture to briefly look at the cases which formed the 
bedrock of fierce judicial activism in the mid-1980s. In January 1986, the Kuala 
Lumpur High Court in Public Prosecutor v Param Cumaraswamy,143 acquitted the 
defendant, who was former Vice-President of the Malaysian Bar Council and a stern 
critic of the government, of an offence under the Sedition Act 1948. The defendant in 
July 1985 called a press conference at the Selangor and Kuala Lumpur Bar 
Committee, calling the Pardons Board to commute the death sentence of a Chinese 
convict, Sim Kie Chon, who was found guilty for possessing firearms without 
licence, an offence under the Internal Security Act 1960. He drew the Board's 
attention to its earlier decision to commute the death sentence of Dato' Mokhtar 
Hashim, a former UMNO Minister who was found guilty for murder. But the 
allegedly seditious nature of his speech was contained in the following statement he 
made during the press conference: 
On records before the courts, Sim's case certainly was less serious than 
Mokhtar Hashim's case yet the latter's sentence was commuted. The people 
should not be made to feel that in our society today the severity of the law is 
meant only for the poor, the meek and the unfortunate whereas the rich, the 
powerful and the influential can somehow seek to avoid the same severity.144 
Finding it difficult to concur with the prosecutor that the defendant's 
statement was likely to cause dissatisfaction among different classes of the 
w See Dr. Mahathir's speech moving the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 1988, Dewan Rakyat, 17 
March 1988. 
m Harding (1996: 134). 
143 Public Prosecutor v Param Cumaraswamy (No. 2) [1986] 1 MLJ 518. 
l44 Public Prosecutor'' Param Cumaraswamy (No. 2) [1986] 1 MLJ 518, p.p. 523. 
174 
population, and hence was seditious, High Court Judge Justice N.H Chan made 
strong assertion about judge's independence from the Executive in deciding what is 
seditious and what is not: 
The line between criticism and sedition is drawn by a judge who is 
independent of the party in power in the State ... A judge has to ask himself if 
it is in his honest judgment that the statement was likely to create 
dissatisfaction among the people. If it is likely to do that then the statement is 
seditious. If in his honest judgment he does not think that the words were 
likely to create dissatisfaction among the people, then he has to find that the 
words are not seditious. In my judgment, I do not think that words which 
were used to point out to the Pardons Board that the people should not be 
made to feel that the Board was discriminating between Mokhtar Hashim and 
Sim Kie Chon are words which were likely to create discontent or 
dissatisfaction among the people.145 
What is more significant in Justice Chan's judgment was his reference to 
English cases and works by English jurists which affirmed the doctrine of separation 
of powers, rule of law and judicial independence. To stress his point, the learned 
judge quoted the following passage from Lord Denning' s The Family Story, which 
sent a strong message to the Executive not to interfere with judges' decisions: 
The keystone of the rule of law in England has been the independence of the 
judges. It is the only respect in which we make any real separation of powers. 
There is here no rigid separation between the legislative and the executive 
powers, because the ministers, who exercise the executive power, also direct a 
great deal of the legislative power of Parliament But the judicial power is 
truly separate. The judges for nearly 300 years have been absolutely 
independent ... No member of the government, no member of Parliament, and 
no official of any government department, has any right whatever to direct or 
ws Public Prosecutar v Param Cumanwwamy (No. 2) [1986] l MLJ 518, p.p. 525. 
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to influence or to interfere with the decisions of any of the judges ... The 
critical test which they must pass if they are to receive the confidence of the 
people is that they must be independent of the executive,146 
In some cases, not only did the judges decide against the Executive, but also 
made critical remarks about the introduction of a Bill in the Parliament, which took 
effect retrospectively, for the sole purpose of frustrating an on-going legal suit 
seeking review of an executive decision. In Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS) & 
Anor v Cheah Kam Chiew, 147 the Supreme Court in February 1986 dismissed an 
appeal by the national oil company Petronas and the government against a High 
Court's decision to grant cost to the respondent in a legal suit against the appellants. 
In December 1984, the respondent, who was a member of the Democratic Action 
Party and an account holder of government-owned Bank Burniputra Malaysia 
Berhad (BBMB), filed a suit against Petronas and the government seeking declaration 
that Petronas' acquisition of RM 2.488 billion worth of bad loans from BBMB was 
ultra-vires the Petroleum Development Act 1974. This was done to rescue the bank 
from heavy losses in the wake of the notorious financial scandal involving 
Burniputra Malaysia Finance (BMF), a subsidiary of BBMB. Before the case was 
disposed by the High Court, the Parliament in 1985 amended the Petroleum 
Development Act, giving necessary power to Petronas "to take over or acquire by 
agreement, assignment, purchase or by any other means the whole or any part of 
any commercial undertaking, business or enterprise of whatever form of any person 
or body of persons".148 This amendment was made retrospective to have effect from 
1October1974, i.e. the date when the Act first came into force. This left the 
respondent with no reasonable cause of action to proceed with his legal action given 
that Petronas, by virtue of the amendment, had the power to acquire the bad loans. 
Considering the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court refused to interfere 
with the High Court Judge Justice Datuk Harun Hashim's discretion in granting the 
cost to the respondent. Delivering the decision of the Supreme Court, Justice Tan Sri 
'"Denning (1981: 191-192). 
147 Petroliam N111iio11al Berhatl (PETRONAS) & Anor v Clieah Kam Chiew [19S7j 1 MLJ 25 
148 See Section 3A of the Petroleum Development Act 1974. 
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Hashim Yeop A. Sani apportioned the blame to the government for "taking a Bill 
through Parliament which altered the very basis on which (the respondent) relied for 
his application for the declarations".149 
Furthermore, trained in English common law, it is natural for the judges to base 
their reasoning on the "unwritten" common law principles, the application of which 
sometimes produced results that ran counter to the wishes of the government. This 
transpired in JP Berthelsen v Director-General of Immigration, Malaysia, where the 
Supreme Court, with its quorum made up of Lord President Tun Salleh Abbas and 
Supreme Court Judges Tan Sri Wan Suleiman Pawan Teh and Tan Sri Eusoffe 
Abdoolcader, ruled on 3November1986 that the Home Ministry's suspension of the 
Asian Wall Street Journal and the expul~ion of its correspondent JP Berthelsen were 
wrong.150 Relying on English cases, the court held that the failure on the part of the 
Immigration Department to give the journalist a fair hearing before the decision to 
cancel his employment pass was made violated the requirement of natural justice.151 
Delivering the Supreme Court's decision, Justice Abdookader said: 
In the light of the authorities we have adumbrated, we regard the appellant as 
so circumstanced in relation to the action of the first respondent as to be 
entitled to the observance of the rules of natural justice. Whatever the 
grounds be upon which the first respondent was proceeding, the appellant 
might, in addition to attacking those grounds, also desire to refer to any 
matters of special hardship which the cancellation of his employment pass 
would impose upon him and he should have been invited to do so. If, having 
done all this, the first respondent then gives consideration to the appellant's 
representations, the requirements of natural justice will have been satisfied 
and it would be for the first respondent to make his decision whetl!er or not 
to cancel the employment pass in the exercise of the discretion conferred upon 
him by regulation 19 of the Regulations.1s2 
"'Petroliam Nasional Ber/zad (PETRONAS) & Anor v Cliea/z Kam CJ1iew [1987f 1 MLJ 25, p.p. 27. 
"" J.P Bertlielsen v Director-General of Immigration, Malaysia [1987J 1MLJ134. 
151 J.P Berthelsen v Director-General of Immigration, Malaysia [1987J 1MLJ134, p.p. 134. 
1s2 J.P Berthelsen v Director-General of Immigration, Malaysia [1987] 1 MLJ 134, p.p. 138. 
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In arriving at this decision, the Court refused to follow the Federal Court! s 
decision in Andrew s/o Thamboosamy v Superintendent of Pudu Prison, Kuala Lumpur153 
which held that the Immigration Ordinance 1959 did not give the right to a hearing 
before detention order is issued against the applicant for entering the country 
illegally. Unlike Andrew, who was an illegal immigrant, Berthelsen, the Court said, 
possessed a valid employment pass before the Immigration Department decided to 
cancel his pass, and hence he had "legitimate expectation" for a hearing. This 
decision, according to Harding, "was remarkable because it extended the scope of 
natural justice into an area where security consideration~ might be thought to 
negative the application of natural justice".154 The cancellation of Berthelsen's 
employment pass, as well as that of another AWSJ journalist Raphael Pura, was 
made subsequent to publication of a number of articles exposing irregularities in 
Malaysia's corporate and financial affairs in the Asian edition of Wall Street Journal 
in 1985 and 1986.155 These included an article about Mahathir-sanctioned failed 
attempt to comer the world's tin market in late 1981 and early 1982, using funds 
from state-owned Bank Bumiputra, resulting in losses of more than US$190 
million.156 
There were other higll-profile cases in the late 1980s in which the courts 
decided against the wishes of the government. In 1987, the Supreme Court reversed 
the Penang High Court's decision refusing an ex-parte application by DAP 
Secretary-General Lim Kit Siang for an interim injunction against the United 
Engineers Malaysia (UEM), an UYlNO-Iinked company, to restrain the company 
from signing a government contract to construct the multibillion North-South 
Highway, linking Perlis in the North and Johore in the South of Peninsular 
153 Andrew s/o Thamboosamy v Superintendent of Pu du Prison, Kuala I.umpur [1976] 2 MLJ 156. 
154 Harding (1996: 143). 
155 See "Malaysia Claims Bank Executives Accepted Gifts", The Wall Street Joumal, 3 January 1985; 
"Malaysia Panels Faults Loans of Bank Bumiputra", Tlze Wall Street foumal, 12 March 1986; 
"Malaysian Political Party Funds Used in Failed Rescue Bid for Pan-Electric", 11ie Wall Smet Journal, 
16 May J 986; "Malaysia's Tin Scheme Stuns the Industry", Tiu: Wall Street Journal, 25 September 1986. 
156 See "Malaysia's Tin Scheme Stuns the Industry", The Wall Street Journal, 25September1986. 
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Malaysia.157 Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision, the government and UEM 
applied to the High Court to set aside the injunction. High Court Judge Justice VC 
George in October 1987 refused the application on the ground that, inter alia, Lim 
had locus standi to bring the suit.158 This decision was however reversed by a 
majority decision of the Supreme Court in early 1988. 159 In Persatuan Aliran Kesedaran 
Negara v Minister of Home Affairs,160 the High Court in December 1987 struck down 
government refusal of a licence to ALIRAN, a human right5 movement, to publish 
its magazine in Malay. High Court Judge Dato' Harun Hashim held that "allthough 
the discretion exercised by the Minister (to refuse the application for license) was 
absolute, it was not unfettered, and therefore the exercise of the discretion was 
subject to judicial review" .161 As discussed earlier, in Karpal Singh s/a Ram Singh v 
Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anar,162 the Ipoh High Court in March 
1988 allowed an application by DAP Member of Parliament and State Assemblyman 
Karpal Singh for writ of habeas corpus and ordered him to be released in an ISA case, 
Karpal was earlier detained under the ISA during the Operasi Lallang in November 
1987 for allegedly using the issue of government appointment of non-Mandarin 
qualified headmasters and senior assistants in the national-type Chinese primary 
schools to incite racial sentiments of the Chinese community.163 
'The court also ruled against the wishes of the federal government in a case 
involving the appointment of Chief Minister of Sabah after the conclusion of the 1985 
J57 The judges who decided the case were Chief Justice of Borneo Tan Sri Lee Hun Hoe and Supreme 
Court Judges Tan Sri Wan Suleiman and Tan Sri Wan Hamzah. 
'"Lim Kit Siang v United Engineers (M) Blid & 3 Ors (No 2) [1988] 1 ML) 50. 
m Lord President Mohamed Salleh Abbas, Chief Justice of Malaya Abdul Hamid, Supreme Court 
judge Hashim Yeop A Saru were in the majority, while Supreme Court Judges Seah and Abdookader 
dissenting. See Gwemmeal of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang [1988] 2ML)12. 
''" Persatuan A!irar. Kesedaran Negara v Minister of Home Affairs [1988] 1 MLJ 440. 
'" Persatuan Aliran Kesedaran Negara v Minister of Home Affairs [1988] 1 ML) 440, p.p. 440, Justice 
Harun's decision was however reversed by the Supreme Court in January 1990. Maintaining that 
under Section 12(2) of the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 the Minister of Home Affairs 
had 'absolute discretion to refuse an application for a licence or permit', Supreme Court Judge Dato' 
Ajaib Singh held that "unless it can be dearly established that the Minister for Home Affairs had in 
any way exercised his discretion wrongfully, unfairly, dishonestly or in bad faith, the High Court 
cannot question the discretion of the Minister''. See Minister of Horne Affairs v Persatuan Aliran 
Kesedaran Negara [1990] 1MLJ351, p.p. 351. 
'" Karpal Singh s/o Ram Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malm;sia & A nor [1988] 1 ML) 468 
163 Ki!rpal Singh s/o Ram Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor [1988] 1 ML) 468, p.p. 
468. 
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Sabah State elections. In Tun Datu Haji Mustapha bin Datu Harun v. Tun Datuk Haji 
Mohamed Adnan Robert, Yang di-Pertua Negeri Sabah & Dato' Joseph Pairin Kitingan (No 
2),164 the Kota Kinabalu High Court in April 1986 ruled that the appointment of Tun 
Datu Haji Mustapha, President of the Federal Government-backed United Sa bah 
National Organization (USNO) as the Cltief Minister of Sa bah by the Yang di-Pertua 
Negeri of Sabah was void, and that the subsequent appointment of Dato' Jospeh 
Pairin Kitingan, the President of Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) as the Chief Minister was 
valid. High Court Judge Tan Chiaw Thong said in his judgment that "there was 
sufficient cogent evidence in this case to conclude that there was a conspiracy to 
effect the entry of the plaintiff to the Istana and to have rum appointed as Chief 
Minister and that the first defendant was to be persuaded to do so".165 
In 1987, the Supreme Court also declared two federal laws as unconstitutional. 
In Dato' Yap Peng v Public Prosecutor,166 the majority decision of the Supreme Court in 
March 1987 declared Section 418A of the Criminal Procedure Code as 
unconstitutional for it allowed the Attorney-General to interfere with the judicial 
power of the court.167 The section allowed the Attorney-General to withdraw 
criminal cases before the lower courts, even after the court was seized of the case, 
and send them to the High Court. Similarly, inMamat bin Daud & Others v 
Government of Malaysia,168 the Supreme Court in a majority decision in October 1987 
struck down section 298A of the federal Penal Code for it was, "in pith and 
substance, a law on the subject of religion with respect to whlch only the states have 
power to legislate" .169 
It was against this backdrop of fierce judicial activism that the Executive 
launched an open attack on the Judiciary. One of the first signs of the attack came 
'"' Tun Datu Haji Mustapha bin Datu Harun v. Tun Dafuk Haji Mohamed Adnan Robert, Yang di-Pertua 
Negeri Sabalt & Dato' Joseph Pairin Kitingan (No 2) {1986] 2 MLJ 420. 
"'Tun Datu Haji Mustaplta bin Datu Harun v. Tun Datuk Haji lv!olwmed Adnan Robert, Yang di-Pertua 
Negeri Sabah & Dato' Joseph Pairin Kitingan (No 2) [1986] 2 MLJ 420, p.p. 421. 
'"Dato' Yap Peng'' Public Prosecutar [1988] 1 MLJ 119. 
167 Chief justice of Borneo Tan Sri Lee Hun Hoe and Supreme Court Judges Tan Sri Mohamad Azmi 
and Tan Sri Abdoolcader were in the majority, while Lord President Tun Mohamed Salleh Abbas and 
Supreme Court Judge Tan Sri Hashim Yeop Sani dissenting. 
1&' lvfumat bin Daud & Others v Gavernment of Malaysia [1988] 1MLJ119. 
'"Lord President Tun Mohamed Salleh Abbas and Supreme Court judges Tan Sri Mohamad Azmi 
and Tan Sri George Seah were in the majority, while Supreme Court Judges Tan Sri Hashim Yeop A 
Sani and Tan Sri Abdoolcader dissenting. 
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soon after the Supreme Court's decision in JP Berthelsen in November 1986. In an 
interview published in the Time magazine on 24November1986, the then Prime 
Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad made remarks which indicated his dissatisfaction 
·with judges' decisions which flew in the face of the Executive and his penchant for 
statutory interpretation that would be in tandem with the wishes of the Executive. 
The former Prime Minister was reported to have said: 
The Judiciary says (to us), 'Although you passed a law with a certain thing in 
mind, we think that your mind is wrong, and we want to give our 
interpretation.' If we disagree, the courts will say, 'We will interpret your 
disagreement.' If we go along, we are going to lose our power of legislation. 
We know exactly what we want to do, but once we do it, it is interpreted in a 
different way, and we have no means to reinterpret it our way. If we find out 
that a court always throws us out on its own interpretation, if it interprets 
contrary to why we made the law, then we will have to find a way of 
producing a law that will have to be interpreted according to our wish.170 
In response to the statement, Opposition Leader Lim Kit Siang applied for a 
leave from the Kuala Lumpur High Court to apply for an order of committal against 
the Prime Minister for contempt of court. Lim claimed that Dr. Mahathir had 
scandalised the Judiciary and brought it "into disrespect, disrepute, offended its 
dignity and were an affront to its majesty" and amounted to "a challenge to the 
authority of the Judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers guaranteed by 
the Federal Constitution".171 High Court Judge Justice Datuk Harun Hashim, in his 
judgment dated 3 December 1986, found an opportunity to rebut Mahathir' s 
"misconception" about the role of the judiciary. Saying that the "court does not 
substitute the intention of the legislature with that of its own" the learned judge 
asserted that the role of the court is merely to interpret legislation. In so doing," a 
judgment of the Court triggers off new legislation because the legislature cannot be 
'
70 See"! Know How the People Feel", Time, 24'.\:ovember1986, p.p. 18. 
171 Lim Kit Siang v. Dato Seri Dr. Maliathir Moliamad [1987] 1ML)383, p.p. 383. 
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expected to foresee all the possibilities of the future". If the court gives an 
interpretation different from that intended by the Executive, the learned judge 
suggested, "the remedy is to amend the law". Furthermore, to avoid difficulties in 
determining the intention of the Legislature when the provisions contained in 
statutes are ambiguous, the learned judge said "the time has arrived to design a new 
format for Acts of Parliament either by means of a comprehensive preamble to the 
Act declaring the intentions of the legislature or in an introductory part in the main 
body of the Act stating the objects and reasons for the Act, so that the intention of the 
Legislature is clear to all, including the judiciary" .1n 
TI1ough the High Court dismissed Lim' s application, Justice Harun took a 
swipe at the Prime Minister and the Executive. The learned judge cynically 
remarked: 
The impugned statement, read objectively is not even a criticism of the Court 
far less scandalizing it or a threat to the independence of the Judiciary. In 
essence it is the despair of a Prime Minister on the inadequacies of the law 
and more particularly the officials whose duties are to translate into law the 
policies and aims of the administration to ensure a more effective 
Government. But however comprehensive laws might be there is still no 100% 
guarantee that the Government will win its cases in Court all the time. If that 
were so, the public will lose confidence in the Judiciary altogether. Apart from 
the law, the decision in a case much depends on the facts arld it is in this area 
that improper or poor enforcement of the law by the Executive and its 
agencies which results in failure of Government cases in the Courts.173 
Dissatisfied with the High Court's decision, Lim appealed to the Supreme 
Court. The apex court in a unanimous decision in December 1986 upholding the 
High Court's decision seemed to have flexed its muscle. Describing Dr. Mahathir' s 
statement as "an articulation of the executive's frustration in not being able to 
m Lim Kit Siang "'· Dato Seri Dr. Mahalhir Mohamad [1986] CLJ 462, p.p. 466-467. 
173 Lim Kit Siang v. Dato Seri Dr. Ma!uitltir Mohamad [1986] CL) 462, p.p. 468. See also Harding (1996: 
144). 
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achieve its objects in matters where the intervention of the courts has been sought to 
some avail" it gave a long lecture on the doctrine of separation of powers and re-
affirmed the court's power of judicial review. In this regard, Lord President Tun 
Salleh Abbas said: 
V'v'hen we speak of government it must be remembered that this comprises 
three branches, namely, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The 
courts have a constitutional function to perform and they are the guardian of 
the Constitution within the terms and structure of the Constitution itself; they 
not only have the power of construction and interpretation of legislation but 
also the power of judicial review - a concept that pumps through the arteries 
of every constitutional adjudication and which does not imply the superiority 
of judges over legislators but of the Constitution over both. The courts are the 
final arbiter between the individual and the State and between individuals 
inter se, and in performing their constitutional role they must of necessity and 
strictly in accordance with the Constitution and the law be the ultimate 
bulwark against unconstitutional legislation or excesses in administrative 
action. If that role of the judiciary is appreciated then it will be seen that the 
courts have a duty to perform in accordance with the oath taken by judges to 
uphold the Constitution and act within the provisions of and in accordance 
with the law,174 
Apparently, Dr. Mahathir held on to his own conception of separation of 
powers, particularly on the power of the Parliament, not the court, to make laws. 
While moving the motion to pass the Official Secrets (Amendment) Bill 1986 in the 
Dewan Rakyat on 5 December 1986, Dr. Mahathir denied that the government was 
"confused" when it made laws or "frustrated" when the courts decided against its 
wishes. The Parliament, the former Prime Minister maintained, "has made adequate 
provisions and used accurate words when it enacted laws". But the problem, 
according to him, occurred when "other parties interpreted the law quite 
174 Lim Kit Siang v. Dato Seri Dr. Mahnthir Mohamad [1987] 1 MLJ 383, p.p. 386-387. 
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differently" by "ignoring the written law and upholding the unwritten ones" _175 
Stressing that it is the right of the Parliament to make laws, Dr. Mahathir urged the 
judges to apply a "purposive approach" in interpreting a statute by looking at the 
speech of the member who moved the Bill in the Parliament and the parliamentary 
debate that ensued in order to determine the meaning and object of the law. The 
amendment to the Official Secrets Act 1972 in December 1986 was itself an attempt 
to clarify the intention of the legislature in passing the law, expecting that it would 
deliver accurate results. In so doing, the Parliament not only defined the word 
"official secrets" more clearly, but also introduced mandatory jail sentences, the 
purpose of which, as Dr. Mahathir indicated in his speech, was to prevent judges 
from using their discretionary power to impose lesser punishment, such as fines, 
that would minimize the deterrent effect the punishment would bear on the 
offender _176 
It was amidst this Executive-Judiciary face-off that an imminent political crisis 
was brewing in UMNO. Dr. Mahathir' s presidency was challenged by his nemesis, 
former Finance Minister Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah in the 1987 UMNO election. Dr. 
Mahathir only managed to retain his presidency by a slim majority of 43 votes. 
Dissatisfied with the election results, Razaleigh' s supporters challenged the legality 
of the election on the ground that delegates from the party's unregistered branches 
had attended the annual assembly and took part in the election. The case, lvfohamed 
Noor bin Othman v. Mohamed Yusof!Jaafar,177 better known as the U:MNO election 
case, set the stage for an Executive-Judiciary crisis and a series of government 
broadsides against the courts and the judges. The plaintiff, a supporter of the 
defeated Team Bled by Razaleigh in the 1987 UMNO election, filed a suit 
challenging the legality of the election and sought orders to hold fresh party 
elections. He contended that, among other irregularities, the presence of 44 delegates 
from 30 unregistered branches rendered the elections invalid. But it was the 
contention of the defendant's counsel, Gopal Sri Ram, that by virtue of Section 12 of 
the Societies Act 1966, the party itself was made unlawful. The section reads, "Where 
175 Maha!hir (1986: 7) 
l76 Mahathlr (1986: 5) 
177 Mohamed Noor bin Othman v. Mohamed Yusofffaafar [1988] 2MLJ129. 
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a registered society establishes a branch without the prior approval of the Registrar 
such registered society and the branch so established shall be deemed to be unlawful 
society" .178 Instead of calling for fresh election, High Court Judge Datuk Harun 
Hashim, applying strict construction of the law as suggested by the defendant's 
counsel, declared UMNO an urdawful society. 
What happened next revealed the likely effect of judicial independence on the 
power struggle between rival factions within the ruling party, and the extent to 
which the political Executive would go to limit such independence. The defendant in 
the UMNO Election case appealed to the Supreme Court, the hearing of which was 
set for June 1988 before the full panel of nine judges. In the meantime, the Team A 
faction led by Dr. Mahathir formed Ul\.1NO Baru (New UMNO), excluding the 
supporters of Team B from its pro-tern committee, and hence practically ruled out 
any possible challenge against Dr. Mahathir' s presidency in the new U11NO. But the 
problem was, should the court allow the appeal and grant an order for a fresh 
election to be held, not only would the old UMNO be revived but Dr. Mahathir's 
position as UMNO President would also be open for challenge. It was possible that 
the Supreme Court judges, including Tun Salleh who had earlier involved in a 
protracted war of words with the Prime Minister, would allow the appeal. 
It wa5 against this backdrop that the Executive-Judiciary crisis took a new tum. 
In May 1988, Dr. Mahathir started necessary process to remove Tun Salleh by 
recommending to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to set up a tribunal under Article 125 of 
the Federal Constitution to hear charges of judicial misconduct and incompetence 
against the Lord President.179 The charges, among other things, related to a letter he 
wrote to the Yang di-Pertuan A gong on behalf of other judges expressing concerns 
over the Executive broadside against the Judiciary and several speeches he made on 
the role of judges which were construed as open criticism of the government. 
17ll The new section 12(3) as amended by Societies (Amendment) Act 1988 provides that "(w)here a 
registered society establishes a branch without the prior approval of the Registrar the branch so 
established shall be an unlawful society", 
m 18 years later, Dr. Mahathir admitted that as an alternative to being subjected to trial by the 
tribunal he did ask Tun Salleh to resign, promising him a high-paying job as a director of an Islamic 
Bank in Jeddah. The latter rejected the offer. See "Or. M: I Personally Asked Sall eh to Resign", The 
Star, 27 September 2006. 
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Despite objection from Tun Sall eh and the Bar on the constitutionality of the 
tribunal, mainly on the fact that the tribunal was made up of former judges lower in 
rank than Tun Salleh and headed by Acting Lord President Tun Abdul Hamid Omar 
who stood next in line to succeed Tun Salleh as the Lord President, the tribunal 
proceeded to hear the charges in July 1988 and found Tun Sal!eh guilty. Two other 
Supreme Court judges, Tan Sri Wan Sulaiman Pawanteh and Datuk George Seah 
were also dismissed. Wan Sulaiman and Seah, with three other Supreme Court 
Judges, Tan Sri Eusoff Abdul Kadir, Tan Sri Azmi Kamaruddin and Tan Sri Wan 
Hamzah Mohamad Salleh, were earlier suspended from their job for allowing an 
application by Tun Salleh for an order restraining the tribunal from submitting its 
report to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. The change of guard in the judiciary was 
politically significant. It was after the change that the Supreme Court heard the 
appeal in the UMNO Election case and unanimously dismissed it. UMNO Baru led 
by Dr. Mahathir continued to be the legitimate successor of the old UMKO, and as 
such inheritor of its power, while Razaleigh and his supporters had to be content 
with their new role as opposition politicians in the newly formed opposition party 
Semangat 46 (Spirit of 46). 
Apart from taking action against the judges, the government also reacted to the 
fierce judicial activism by amending the Constitution with a view to curtail judicial 
power of the court. The Constitution (Amendment) Bill 1988 amended Article 121 of 
the Federal Constitution by deleting the words vesting 'judicial power' in the courts. 
The new Article 121(1) only states that "there shall be two High Courts of co-
ordinate jurisdiction and status" without mentioning where the judicial power is 
specifically "vested". The Prime Minister in his speech moving the Bill in the Dewan 
Rakyat reasoned that the amendment was necessary so as to make explicit the 
separation of powers between the judiciary and the Executive.180 The Supreme Court 
in Dato Yap Peng1s1inMarch1987 had relied on the original Article 121 to declare 
Section 418A of the Criminal Procedure Code unconstitutional for allowing the 
Attorney-General to interfere with the court's judicial power. 
iao Hansard, 17 Mac 1988. 
1s1 Dato' Yap Peng v Public Prosecutor [1988] 1MLJ119. 
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As a direct reaction to the Berthelsen's case, the Parliament in December 1987 
amended the Printing Presses and Publication Act 1984. A new Section SA was 
inserted into the Act to make those found guilty for maliciously publishing false 
news liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine not 
exceeding RM 20,000 or to both.182 The new Section 13A made Minister's decision to 
refuse to grant or to revoke or to suspend a license or permit final and not to be 
questioned by any court on any ground whatsoever.183Section13B excluded one's 
right to be heard with regard to his application for a license or permit or relating to 
the revocation or suspension of the license or permit.184 This amendment was 
indicative of the government's effort at making the legal text expressly clear on its 
intention, leaving the judges with little or no room for judicial interpretation. While 
criticizing the judges for applying unwritten laws such as the English common law, 
natural justice and the doctrine of judicial review in striking down Executive 
decisions, Dr. Mahathir categorically said: 
The amendments are made because it is important that the powers of the 
government be made dear in written laws. The amendments are even more 
necessary due to the inclination of certain parties to use unwritten laws to 
obstruct the functions of the government. It is difficult for the Government to 
accept unwritten laws because it will never be able to know what it can do and 
what it can't. Under this unclear circumstance, government administration will 
be topsy-turvy. Anybody can challenge the Government and obstruct actions 
that the Government deems legaJ.185 
To avoid the recurrence of legal complications sinillar to the UMNO Election 
case, the Parliament in March 1988 amended the Societies Act 1966. Section 12(3) of 
the Act now states that "where a registered society establishes a branch v-.>ithout 
m See Section 4 of the Printing Presses and Publication (Amendment) Act 1987. 
m See Section 9 of the Printing Presses and Publication (Amendment) Act 1987. 
184 See Section 9 of the Printing Presses and Publication (Amendment) Act 1987. 
135 See Dr. Mahathir's speech to move the Printing Presses and Publication (Amendment} Bill 1997 at 
the Dewan Rakyat on 3 December 1987. 
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prior approval of the Registrar the branch so established shall be unlawful society" .186 
This was certainly to avoid the recurrence of the UMNO election case where the 
party, rather than only the branch, was declared unlawful by the court. Section 17 of 
the Act was also amended to facilitate the transfer of UMNO' s properties to UMNO 
Baro (New U1v1NO), a new political party formed by Dr. Mahathir' s faction after the 
old UMNO was deregistered. Another amendment was made to the Societies Act in 
1990 to shut out the court from intervening with party matters. A new section 18C, 
an' ouster' clause, made" decision of a political party or any person authorised by it 
or by its constitution ... final and conclusive and such decision shall not be 
challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court 
on any ground." Furthermore, "no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain or 
determine any suit, application, question or proceeding on any ground regarding the 
validity of such decision",187 
Tbe amendments were made as a result of the fierce judicial activism in the mid 
1980s and the UMNO litigation debacle that followed. This was notlNithstanding the 
fact that there had already been many ouster clauses in existing statutes which 
aimed at limiting the interpretive jurisdiction of the courts. Among these are section 
29(3) (a) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 regarding awards granted by the 
Industrial Court; section 9(6) of the Industrial Relations Act regarding the Minister's 
decision pertaining to Trade Union's claims for recognition; Section 2, Part III, 
Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution regarding Federal Government 
decisions to deprive a person of his citizenship; section 15(1) of the Control Rent Act 
1966 regarding Board of Appeal decisions on appeals from rent tribunals; and 
section 68 of the Land Acquisition Act regarding the setting aside of an award or 
appointment under the Act. Though the courts had creatively interpreted these 
ouster clauses so as not to preclude judicial review altogether, the existence of these 
clauses pointed to a particular legislative style which eschews close judicial scrutiny 
of executive actions. In June 1989, while tabling amendment to the Internal Security 
Act 1960, which excluded judicial review of decisions made by the Yang di-Pertuan 
'"Section 12(3) of the Societies Act 1966. See also Section 5 of the Societies (Amendment) Act 1988. 
1s7 Section 18C of the Societies Act 1966. See also Section 2 of the Societies (Amendment) Act 1990. 
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Agong and the Minister to detain a person under the Act, except on the question of 
compliance with procedural requirements, Dr. Mahathir again repeated his 
uneasiness with the power of judicial review. The former Prime Minister said: 
Foreign courts' interventionist role by which the courts substituted decisions 
made by the Executive with its own decisions cannot be followed because it is 
contrary to the concept of separation of powers between the Executive and the 
judiciary as practiced in this counhy. If the courts are allowed to reverse the 
Executive's decision, the Executive cannot do anything for fear that its 
decisions will be reversed by the courts. The Government cannot operate 
because it has to wait for court's decisions and the outcome of appeals to 
higher courts.188 
It was obvious that Mahathir' s notion of separation of powers necessarily 
means that the Executive should be left alone in carrying out its functions without 
interference from the Judiciary. Ironically, this belief in "Executive supremacy" 
militates against the main purpose of separation of powers, which entails checks-
and-balances among independent arID!l of the government. In a further move to 
ensure that the judiciary interpret laws in line with the government's policy 
objectives, the Parliament in 1997 passed an amendment to the Interpretation Acts 
1948 and 1967. The new section 17 A of the Act provides, "in the interpretation of a 
provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose or object 
underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or 
not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or 
object". In determining the object of the law, the courts can make reference to the 
Parliamentary Hansard, "provided always that the statement reported in the 
Hansard was made by a Minister or other promoter of the Bill" .1s9 It is to be noted 
that long before section 17 A was introduced, Malaysian judges, relying on English 
"'Hansard, 23 June 1989. 
189See Federal Court's decisions in Chor Phaik Harv Farlim Properties Sdn Bild [1994] 3 ML) 345; DYTM 
Tengku Idris Slwlt ibni Sultan Salaltuddin Abdul Aziz Sllalr v Dikim Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anar [2002] 2 ML] 
11. 
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cases, had applied the purposive approach to statutory interpretation in cases where 
the words in a statute are ambiguous or their strict literal construction led to absurd 
meanings. 190 Referring to the trend toward the application of the purposive 
approach in statutory interpretation since Lord Dip lock's decision in Kammins 
Ballroom191 in 1971, Federal Court Judge Tan Sri Chang Min Tat in United Hokkien in 
1979 observed that the approach "is not a modem fashion. Since the 17th century, it 
has been the task of the judiciary to interpret an Act according to the intent of them 
that made it" .192 
Given that the judges, by avoiding strict textualism, had already accepted the 
purposive approach in corrunon Jaw, the amendment to the Interpretation Acts did 
not bring about much change to the existing trend in statutory interpretation. Even 
without relying on the new section 17 A, the judges held that the purposive approach 
was to be regarded as the most important rule of interpretation.193 The only effect of 
the amendment was perhaps that the judges have since felt more compelled to 
comply with the object of the law in interpreting it.194 But this does not mean that 
express words in statutes are now substituted with that of the legislators. Federal 
Court Judge Datuk Augustine Paul in All Malayan Estates Staff Union195 in September 
2006 held that when the meaning of a statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, 
section 17 A of the Interpretation Acts would have no application as "the question of 
another meaning does not arise" .196 In such a case, literal construction of the words is 
to be preferred, lest it would lead to importing into the legislation words which are 
not intended by the legislature itself. It seems that the Federal Court, by resorting to 
the literal rule in interpreting clear and unambiguous words, despite the existence of 
section 17 A, implied that other common law rules of statutory interpretation still 
190 See Federal Court's decisionss in United Hokkien Cemetries, Penang v The Board, Majlis Perbandaran 
Pulau Pinang [1979] 1 LNS 122; Chor Phaik Harv Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 ML) 345. 
191 Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd. [1971J AC 850. 
"2 United Hokkien Cemetries, Penang v TJw Board, Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang [1979] 1 LNS 122. 
193 See dissenting judgment of Federal Court judge Dato' Peh Swee GUn in Kesultanan Palwng v 
Saihask Realty Sdn. Bhd. {1998] 2 CL) 559. 
194 See Federal Court's decisions in Lam Kong Company Ltd. v Tiwng Guan Co Pte Ltd [2000] 3 CL) 769; 
DYTM Tengku Idris Shah ibni Sulttm Salalmddin Abdul Aziz Shah v Dikim Holdings Sdn Bltd & Anor [2002] 
2MLJ 11. 
'"All Malayan Esta/es Staff Union v Rujasegaran & Ors [2006] 4 CL) l 95. 
1
" [2006] 4 CL) 195, p.p. 210. See also Malaysian Bar v Dato' Kanugalingum Veluppillni [2004] 4CLJ194. 
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apply. Be that as it may, statutory recognition of the purposive approach to statutory 
interpretation goes a long way to reflect the government's penchant for the 
interpretation that promotes its intended objectives. 
Conclusion 
The doctrine of separation of powers demands that each branch of the government 
must be independent of each other in carrying out its functions. But in an illiberal 
statist legal system, where the political Executive stands paramount in determining 
government policy objectives, and the courts are expected to serve them, there have 
been attempts by the former to ensure that the latter interpret laws in a way that 
would help produce appropriate policy outcomes. Though the courts seemed to 
have made decisions on settled principles of law, judges' explanations of the 
decisions indicated an inclination toward recognizing state-defined policy objectives, 
particularly in matters pertaining to national security, ethnic relations and economic 
development. The judges, taking cognizance of prevailing socio-political conditions 
in a communally divided society, recognized the necessity of goverrunent policies in 
regard to them, although such recognition means allowing encroachment on the rule 
of law justified in the national interest. This led to the legitimation by the court of 
illiberal statist legal meanings, based on a limited notion of the rule of law, which 
tends to enhance state powers rather than limiting them. Coupled with the existence 
of an illiberal legislative style that eschews close judicial scrutiny of executive 
decisions, and legislation that contains dear and unequivocal words expressing the 
intent of the legislature, the judges were left with a very limited space to come up 
with alternative legal interpretation that would promote the liberal notion of the rule 
of law. However, the judges' vigilance in developing the doctrine of judicial review 
indicated that the courts had not transformed themselves into a full-fledged policy 
implementing agencies of the government. Malaysian judges, as case laws indicate, 
can still be expected to strike down executive actions, though it was rarely in highly 
sensitive political cases. But as long as the goverrunent continues to entrench a 
particular legislative style in the legal system that eschews judicial review, especially 
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in matters related to national security and the exercise of fundamental liberties, and 
as long as the judges have no qualms about accepting the importance of government 
policies in those matters, and the purposes of which they are to serve, there is little 
prospect for a drastic substitution of illiberal statist legal meanings with more liberal 
ones in Malaysian courts. It is in this context that the politics of competing 
communal interests and the formalist but non-strict textualist approach to judicial 
reasoning provides an ideological basis for the maintenance of illiberal statist legal 
meanings. 
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Chapter V 
The 1998 Refonnasi and Non-Communal Politics 
The Reformasi movement, which exploded onto the political scene following the 
dismissal of former Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim in September 
1998, served as an ideological conduit as well as an instrument for political change. 
Ideologically, it attempted to shift the focus of political interest from one which was 
essentially communal to individual, by prioritizing individualism over 
communalism in conceptualizing Malaysian politics. This alternative non-communal 
vision contested the communal underpinnings of politics based on the constitutional 
contract pursued and perpetuated by the ruling Barisan Nasional. In so doing, the 
movement aimed to forge a new non-communal social contract among multiracial 
Malaysians, the main objective of which was to promote democracy and dismantle 
communalism as the main basis for group mobilization and interest articulation in 
Malaysia. As an instrument for political change, the movement began as a 
conglomeration of non-governmental organizations, opposition parties, trade unions 
and individuals across races pushing for political reform. This non-communal and 
cross-sectional mass movement, which rallied behind Anwar in the aftermath of his 
dismissal, soon metamorphosed into a formal coalition of political parties, the 
Alternative Front (Barisan Altematif, BA), seeking political, social and economic 
reform. Despite initial optimism that the BA could help bring about political reform 
along democratic and non-communal lines, developments following the 1999 
general election showed that it was an uphill task. The BA itself was composed of 
ideologically distinct political parties like the predominantly Chinese Democratic 
Action Party (DAP) and the Malay /Muslim-based Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), 
which had been promoting different communal interests. However, as the 
movement operated within both the realm of civil and political society, the 
expectation that a broader political change was underway led to a sense of euphoria. 
This chapter argues that while the Reformasi' s non-communal vision of 
Malaysian politics paved the way for the formation of multiracial but non-communal 
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coalitions for political change that posed a challenge to the ruling Barisan Nasional' s 
communal vision of politics and its political dominance, the process of 
internalisation of the non-communal political vision among the rank-and-file of the 
Reformasi movement, and later the Barisan Alternatif, remained slow and halting. The 
general election precluded any attempts at thrashing out core ideological differences 
between the main actors of Reformasi, including PAS and DAP, and a host of secular 
NGOs and Islamic groups, which held different views on important issues like the 
role of Islam in the modem state, the philosophy and scope of human rights and 
individual liberties, and the special position of Bumiputeras in multiracial Malaysia. 
The non-communal "social contract", as was evident in the Barisan Alternatif s 
election manifesto in the 1999 general election, was a modest attempt at dismantling 
communalism as a basis for interest articulation and political mobilization. But 
beyond the polls, the sources of differences between the main actors of Reformasi, 
especially PAS and DAP, had mainly revolved around the themes of the old 
communal politics of race and religion, and hence called into serious question the 
ability of the Reformasi movement to forge a new non-communal vision of Malaysian 
politics, and to bring about political change along the more democratic and non-
communal lines. 
The 1998 Political Crisis: From Elite Rivalry to Refonnasi 
Hari Singh offers two distinct but not necessarily mutually exclusive models of 
political reform prior to and during the heyday of Reformasi in 1998. The first 
involves a struggle over political power and a kind of elite displacement process 
within the UMNO oligarchy in which rival factions comprising UMNO politicians 
and their allies in the business community and bureaucracy sought to restructure the 
oligarchic distribution of political powers within the party.1 This struggle spilled 
over into the public domain after one faction was booted out from the oligarchy, 
resulting in a mass struggle against the oligarchy as a whole. The second model 
pertains to a genuine process of democratization taking place within the context of 
1 Hari (2000: 540) 
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wider socio-political change since the 1980s marked by the expansion of a multiracial 
middle class, an easing of ethnic tension and a growing civil society's call for 
democracy and human rights. According to this second model, the Anwar saga and 
the Reformasi that followed was only incidental to the democratic ferment that had 
already taken place within the context of a democratizing society.2 
The First v\1w Brooked No Equals 
In the traditional Malay oligarchy, Hari Singh points out that power distribution 
between the Sultan and the territorial chiefs was pluralistic. While the Sultan 
occupied a symbolically exalted position, the powers of the territorial chiefs in 
practice were equal to, if not greater than, those of the Sultan. Applying the 
traditional Malay oligarchic model to the power distribution among the elites within 
the government and the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), Hari Singh 
shows that characteristics of the pre-colonial traditional system continued in the 
post-independence era. During the premiership of the first three Prime Ministers, 
cabinet portfolios were distributed among senior party officials based on the 
hierarchical order within the UMNO Supreme Council, with important cabinet 
portfolios often given to the most senior among them. Under this system of power 
distribution, the Prime Minister, like the earlier sultans, occupied the symbolically 
exalted position but in reality he was just "the first among equals" in his relationship 
with his colleagues in the party. State institutions like the Malay Rulers, the 
Parliament and the Judiciary also remained as important power bases, enabling a 
system of checks and balances to function within the government. 
However, since Dr. Mahathir's ascendancy to political power, heading both 
the ruling party and the government since 1981, power distribution among the party 
elites was less pluralistic, but increasingly concentrated in one man's hands. This 
was attributable to Dr. Mahathir' s OV>'Il personal traits as well as the politico-
business relations that permeated UMNO politics since the 1980s. The close nexus 
between UMNO, the government and business escalated power rivalry within 
' Harl (2000: 536) 
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UMNO as UMNO politicians saw party posts as important stepping stones for more 
strategic positions in the government and state enterprises, which in turn opened up 
access to a web of lucrative patronage networks. Securing positions in the party 
alone, however, did not always lead to appointments to important positions in the 
government and state enterprises. Faced with challenges from within the party and 
potential consequences on the dynamics of the party's patronage dispensing 
function, especially among the business and corporate elites, Dr. Mahathir placed his 
supporters in strategic government positions and sidelined non-supporters. In so 
doing, he ignored the hierarchical order within the UMNO Supreme Council or the 
State Liaison Committees in distributing cabinet portfolios and chief ministerial 
posts.3 Furthermore, direct challengers like Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah and Tan Sri 
Musa Hi tam had to make an early exit from UMNO politics. On the contrary, 
staunch supporters like Tun Daim Zainuddin, Datuk Seri Rafidah Aziz and Tan Sri 
Sanusi Junid had a different fate when they found themselves in powerful 
government positions despite losing their posts in party elections.4 Datuk Seri 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who was expelled from the cabinet for supporting 
Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah in the 1987 UMNO elections, was retained as a cabinet 
minister despite failing to retain his Vice-President post in the 1993 UMNO elections, 
presumably to check Anwar Ibrahim's increasing influence in the party.s 
'Current Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi was an elected Vice-President in the 
1987 party election. But he was excluded from the new cabinet line up formed after the 1987 UMNO 
crisis for having been a member of Team B faction led by Tengku Razaleigh. Similarly, Anwar' s 
closest ally in the 1993 party election and the most senior Vice President, Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin, 
was appointed as Youth and Sports Minister, a relatively junior portfolio in the new federal cabinet 
formed after the 1995 general election. Muhyiddin was previously the johore Chief Minister. His 
posts as the Chief Minister and the State UMNO Liaison Chief were taken over by Dr. Mahathir's 
loyalist Dato' Abdul Ghani Othman. 
'Sanusi who lost in the contest for the Vice President post in the 1993 party election and failed to 
defend the Langkawi Divisional Chief post in the 1995 divisional election was appointed Kedah Chief 
Minister in June 1996 replacing Tan Sri Osman Aroff, an Anwar supporter. Daim who withdrew from 
the contest for the Merbok Divisional Chief post in the 1995 divisional election was appointed to the 
powerful position of Special Functions Minister in charge of economic affairs in 1998. Despite failure 
to defend the Women's Chief post in the 1996 party election, Rafidah was retained as the Minister of 
International Trade and Industry, a high profile portfolio in the federal cabinet. 
s This account was given by Tan Sri Sanusi Junid, former UMNO Vice-President and Kedah Menteri 
Besar in his speech at the opening ceremony of the National Seminar on 50 Years of Merdeka: 
Malaysian Political Development in Perspective organized by the International Islamic University 
Malaysia's Political Science Department in Gombak, Selangor on 8 December 2007. 
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Apart from packing the government with his supporters, Dr. Mahathir also 
strengthened his grip on the party apparatus. Especially after Anwar and his 
Wawasan Team made a dean sweep by capturing all the posts of Deputy President 
and the three Vice-Presidents in the 1993 party election, the party introduced several 
measures that reduced the possibility of a successful challenge to Dr. Mahathir' s 
presidency. These included the abolition of the bonus vote system that worked well 
for Anwar in winning the Deputy Presidency in the 1993 party election, and the 
passage of a resolution in the 1995 UMNO Annual General Assembly that 
discouraged contests for the presidency and deputy presidency in the 1996 party 
election. By so doing, Dr. Mahathir secured his position as the UMNO President, 
while freezing Anwar in his post as deputy. In preparation for the 1996 party 
election, Dr. Mahathir also made full use of his prerogative as the UMNO President 
and the Chairman of Barisan Nasional to carefully select the candidates for the 1995 
general election, and hence ruled out any possibility of Anwar supporters 
dominating the list.6 Though Anwar rose through the UMNO hierarchy to be its 
Deputy President and simultaneously the Deputy Prime Minister in 1993, it was Dr. 
Mahathir who determined power distribution within the government. In this regard, 
Dr. Mahathir's exalted position in the party and the government was unmatched by 
the power and position of his colleagues, especially that of his deputy and heir 
apparent Anwar. Breaking the tradition of the UMNO oligarchic hierarchy, Dr. 
Mahathir put himself as the first who brooked no equals. 
Power relations between important state institutions too had gradually been 
subjected to the increasingly dominant position of the Executive. The first few years 
of Dr. Mahathir' s premiership witnessed successful attempts by the Executive to 
reduce the powers of the Malay Rulers and curb the independence of the judiciary. 
This included a constitutional amendment in 1983 which limited the power of the 
Malay Rulers to withhold royal assent to the Bills passed by the Parliament. Another 
'See Case (1997: 398). In hindsight, Dr. Mahathir himself admitted that holding the party election 
after the general election gave enormous advantages to the party President. He said, "I was the leader 
of the party many times after the election. At that time you are very powerful because you got 
appointed as the Prime Minister. You are going to decide who is going to be your deputy, who are 
going to be ministers and who are going to be chief ministers. At that time you can do what you like. 
So you can structure it that in the party election you can always win". See Malaysiakini interview 
with Dr. Mahathir at http://www.malaysiakini.tv I (Accessed on 17 May 2007). 
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amendment in 1993 stripped the Malay Rulers of their legal immunities. In 1988, an 
amendment to Article 121 of the Federal Constitution limited the judicial powers of 
the courts by having the words vesting judicial powers in the courts deleted from the 
original Article which now only states the existence of two High Courts of 
coordinate jurisdiction in Malaysia. The amendment, which was made following 
several court rulings that overturned executive decisions during the executive-
judiciary crisis in the late 1980s, revealed Dr. Mahathir' s uneasiness with pluralistic 
arrangement of power distribution within the government. 
Given Dr. Mahathir's enormous political influence within the UMNO 
oligarchy and the government, it was almost impossible for anyone from within the 
party to mount an open challenge against him. It was not surprising therefore that 
Anwar as a politician who was seeking elite displacement within the party 
constantly pledged his loyalty to Dr. Mahathir, while at the same time carefully 
planning his move to rise to the top while guarding against the manoeuvres of other 
UMNO politicians. Though Anwar avoided direct confrontation with Dr. Mahathir, 
he strengthened his political base by expanding his patronage networks within the 
party and the business community in preparation for a smooth succession. However, 
Anwar' s expansion of his political base led to confrontations between his supporters 
and those of Dr. Mahathir in the party and the business community. Between 1993 
and 1998, it was not uncommon for UtvINO politicians to be associated with either 
Anwar or Dr. Mahathir when they contested party elections. Within the business 
community, the competition for major privatization contracts and licences had been 
mainly between Anwar and Dr. Mahathir' s associates, as well as those of Daim. 7 
The Anwar-Mahathir Ideological Tussle 
Another dimension of the Anwar-Mahathir rift, which was to contribute to the 
Reformasi movement's role as an ideological conduit for political change, was the 
ideological differences behveen the two leaders. Though both leaders shared some 
values in common, such as the idea of progressive and moderate Islam and the need 
7 See Gomez (2002). 
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to promote the welfare and advancement of Muslirru,8 there was an ideological 
tussle between them in conceptualizing freedom and development. As one of the 
longest serving Prime Ministers in Asia at the time when the region was 
experiencing tremendous economic and social transformation, Dr. Mahathir believed 
that there was a different political dynamism at work in Asia. Defying what many 
would beli.eve as the inseparability between economic development and freedom, 
Dr. Mahathir attributed the rise of Asia to the" Asian" way of governance which 
prioritized poli.tical stability over personal freedom. To Dr. Mahathir, the 
communitarian values of Asian societies, which hold sway over individualism, had 
contributed to the maintenance of political stability, which in turn set the stage for 
robust economic development to take place. Asian nations, Dr. Mahathir asserted, 
could not afford the Western model of liberal democracy for it would allow 
destabilizing forces within their societies to disrupt political order, frustrate 
economic development and breed anarchy.9 Jt was in this context that Dr. Mahathir 
believed for Asian nations to thrive on their own, their governance must be based on 
a different form of democracy in which individual rights are subservient to the 
community's right to development. In a speech delivered at the Conference on New 
Asia held in January 1996 in Kuala Lumpur, Dr. Mahathir spoke of his vision of the 
"Asian Renaissance" and the Asian way of democracy and human rights: 
(The) Asian Renaissance must be a psychological and cultural rebirth, freeing 
us from the bonds of mental servihtde and enriching our arts and our 
cultures. It must be an economic renaissance, vigorously propelling our 
material condition of life forward whilst ensuring social and economic justice 
for all our citizens. It must be a political renaissance, founded upon the richest 
development of different fonns of democracy and the greatest respect for and 
nourishment of all rights of the individual person in the context of community 
''!be late Dr. Ismail R. Faruqi, a professor of Islamic Studies at the Temple University, in his letter to 
Anwar Ibrahim inviting him and ABIM to support Dr. Dr. Mahathir and the government in 1981, 
observed that both Anwar and Dr. Mahathir shared the same goal in promoting Islrun and the welfare 
of the Muslim ummah. See Dr. Ismail Faruqi's letter to Anwar Ibrahim dated 26 January 1981, 
published in Harakilh, 12 October 1998. 
• Mahathir (1996: 6). 
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rights in which the individual exists ... Asians interpret human rights and the 
rule of law as being for the good of the majority, not the freedom for a few 
politicians, or for that matter the leaders of the perpetually disgruntled 
minority parties or trade unions. They can have their freedom but their right 
is restricted to hurting only themselves. If they hurt innocent bystanders then 
they are abusing their democratic right. They must not hold others, hold 
society at large to ransom.10 
Given Anwar' s background as a former ABIM leader whose struggle 
encompassed not only Islam, but also democracy, individual freedom, social justice 
and inter-civilizational co-existence, he developed an ideological approach which 
contrasted with Dr. Mahathir' s espousal of the essentially communitarian Asian 
values and scepticism toward the Western liberal democracy. In his book Tire Asian 
Renaissance published two years before his dismissal, Anwar wrote: 
If the term Asian values is not to ring hollow, Asians must be prepared to 
champion ideals which are universal. It is altogether shameful, if ingenious, to 
cite Asian values as an excuse for autocratic practices and denial of basic 
rights and civil liberties. To say that freedom is Western or unAsian is to 
offend our own traditions as well as our forefathers who gave their lives in 
the struggle against tyranny and injustice. It is true that Asians lay great 
emphasis on order and societal responsibility. But it is certainly wrong to 
regard society as a kind of deity upon whose altar the individual must 
constantly be sacrificed. No Asian tradition can be cited to support the 
proposition that in Asia, the individual must melt into a faceless 
community.11 
But Anwar too was cautious in articulating his more liberal ideas on 
democracy and civil society. Taking into con5ideration the different stages of 
10 Mahathir (1996: 6-7). 
11 Anwar (1996: 28). 
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economic development as well as the cultural diversity that existed in Asian 
societies, Anwar noted: 
The fact that Asian countries are in different stages of economic development 
suggests that each country will negotiate its way to democracy and civil 
society at its own pace. Tiris is further attenuated by the diversity of cultures, 
social systems and historical experiences. While accepting that all 
humanitarian ideals are universal, we cannot deny that cultural diversity 
exerts a powerful influence on the social and political processes.12 
Being part of the UMNO oligarchy, it was not always easy for Anwar to 
articulate more liberal political ideas beyond what was permitted by the conventions 
within the party. Often he had to balance his lofty ideological ideals which he had 
developed while he was outside the UMNO oligarchy with justifications of the 
policies of the party and the government of which he was part. His view on 
detention without trial law under the ISA, of which he was once a victim, illustrated 
this delicate balancing game. Speaking at a conference in Singapore in December 
1992, Anwar tried to maintain his ideological position intact by opposing the 
traditional way of using the ISA as a means to silence critics of the government. But 
at the same time he defended the need to selectively retain the law" as long as 
Malaysia's multi-cultural and multi-religious society remained fragile" No matter 
how balanced Anwar' s view was, articulating unconventional ideas within a 
political culture which had not been accustomed to a plurality of views, especially 
among the top echelon of party leaders, had its own limits. What is more, within a 
political culture where loyalty to the leader at the apex of the political hierarchy is 
paramount, holding any views different from his equated with treachery. In March 
1994, barely four months after Anwar was appointed as the Deputy Prime Minister, 
his loyalty to Dr. Mahathir was put to test when they held different views on the 
National Censor Board's decision to ban Steven Spielberg's Oscar-winning film 
12 Anwar (1996: 51). 
n Straits Times, 9 December 1992; Business Times Singapore, 9 December 1992. 
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Schindlers List. The banning of the film, which featured the story of a German 
wartime profiteer, Oskar Schindler, who saved the lives of hundreds of Polish Jews 
from the Nazi holocaust, drew strong criticism from local film makers as well as the 
international film industry. Jewish lobby groups in the United States even accused 
Dr. Mahathir of anti-Sernitism.14 Dr. Mahathir, who claimed himself to be anti-
Zionist rather than anti-Semitic, maintained that the government had the right to ban 
the film. Anwar, on the other hand described the film as a "powerful moral voice 
against crime toward humanity" and called for the lifting of the ban.15 The ban was 
finally lifted by the cabinet when Anwar chaired a meeting in March 1994, while Dr. 
Mahathir was overseas.16 
Though Anwar maintained that Dr. Mahathir had been consulted before the 
cabinet decision was made, the controversy over the issue brought to the fore glaring 
ideological differences between the two leaders. The Schindler' s list saga, as well as 
several other issues including Anwar' s attendance at the meeting of Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Finance Ministers in March 1994, despite Dr. 
Mahathir' s earlier disapproval of the move to formalize APEC as an institution, later 
put much strain on the Anwar-Mahathir relationship.17 Rumours circulated within 
the party that the two leaders had fallen out Though both dismissed the rumours, 
with Dr. Mahathir describing them as a "wishful thinking on the part of those who 
want to see problems",18 his remarks in a speecli delivered during an UMNO Youth 
event in April 1994 gave impetus to the rumours when he said that UMNO members 
who aspired to become leaders should not be "in too much of a hurry".19 The 
remarks were made in response to an article in the April issue of the Far Eastern 
Economic Review which highlighted Anwar' s ideological differences with Dr. 
Mahathir, as well as Anwar' s increasing influence in Malaysian politics, as signs of 
his impatience for the top job.20 In a move to diffuse tension, Anwar supporters 
14 International Herald Tribune, 24 March 1994. 
1s AFP, 26 March 1994. 
16 Straits Times, 31 March 1994. 
17 Far Eastern Economic Rev-fen1, 21 April 1994. 
" Straits Times, 20 April 1994. 
19 Straits Times, 23 April 1994. 
:ro See "The Waiting Game. Is Anwar Impatient for the Top job?", Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 
April 1994. 
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claimed that the rumours of a split between the two leaders were the work of "some 
businessmen who were accustomed to favours before Anwar became Finance 
J..,furister" and who now aimed "to fuel suspicions between the two top leaders in the 
hope that Dr. Mahathir might then seek to replace his deputy" .21 
Though Anwar constantly pledged his loyalty to Dr. Mahathir, it was obvious 
that he too wanted to prove himself to be a different breed of Malay-Muslim political 
leader in the new club of emerging Asian leaders such as Indonesian Vice-President 
B.J. Habibie and Thailand Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan.22 Through the Institute 
for Policy Research, a political think-tank headed by Datuk KamaruddinJaafar, 
Anwar' s long time ABIM friend and a rising UMNO politician and corporate figure, 
Anwar organized a series of conferences on renowned Asian thinkers such as Jose 
Rizal, Rabindranath Tagore and Muhammad Iqbal, whose thoughts on the 
universality of human dignity and personal freedom laid an ideological foundation 
for Anwar's view on the Asian Renaissance. As a Finance Minister, Anwar too 
articulated more liberal economic and monetary policies and listed as his friends the 
proponents of free market economy such as the IMF chief Michael Camdessus and 
the World Bank President James Wolfensohn. At home, Anwar gained popularity by 
pursuing socio-economic projects for the poor as well as his rhetoric about fighting 
corruption, cronyism and nepotism. 
The 1997 Financial Crisis and Anwar's Dismissal 
As the 1997 Asian financial crisis deepened, the Anwar-Mahathir ideological 
differences became more marked, eventually turning into a policy battle and, more 
dramatically, a politico-business factional tussle. Anwar was obviously supportive of 
21 Straits Times, 20 April 1994. 
22 It is noteworthy that by the mid 1990s, Anwar was increasingly associated with Habibie whose 
leadership of the Indonesian progressive Islamic movement, Ikatan Cendakiawim Muslim Indonesia 
(!CM!), resonated with Anwar' s long time involvement in ABIM. Surin, another progressive Muslim 
who was associated with Anwar, commented on An\var' s arrest that Anwar had been 11caught up in 
that wave of confrontation between those who want to see some reform, as in other countries in Asia, 
and those who are still comfortable with the traditional way." (International Herald Tribune, 7 October 
1998) 
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IMF-style economic crisis management which favoured the tightening of monetary 
policy and shelving public spending. Dr. Mahathir on the other hand opted for 
Keynessian economic pump-priming measures by expediting mega projects and 
increasing public spending as a means to boost the ailing economy. Though the 
differences were seemingly about how the two leaders evaluated the economic crisis 
from two different perspectives, it had deep-rooted political ramifications for it 
affected the balance of power in the politico-business area. In this regard, the 1997 
East Asian financial crisis, which saw the exchange rate of the Malaysian Ringgit 
depreciate from RM 2.50 per US Dollar to about RM 4.00 in July 1997, exacerbated 
the tension between Anwar's faction and those who were opposed to his rapid 
ascendancy in the party and the government. In the wake of the crisis, Anwar was 
not only opposed to Dr. Mahathir' s reflationary economic measures, but also to the 
bail outs of some well-connected firms, particularly, Renong, a conglomerate linked 
to Daim, and companies owned by Dr. Mahathir's son Mirzan.23 Anwar's stance 
seemingly confirmed rumors of an irreconcilable Anwar-Mahathir rift. 
Adding to the intensity of the rift was concern among Dr. Mahathir' s loyalists 
that Anwar was also plotting their forced exit from UMNO. When Anwar was the 
Acting Prime Minister for two months in mid 1997, he stepped up his anti-
corruption drive with the passage of the _t\nti-Corruption Act. It was rumored that 
Anwar would use the law as a means to get rid of Dr. Mahathir' s loyalists. The 
Anwar-Mahathir rift grew more intense in the run up to the 1998 UMNO General 
Assembly in June. A cabinet reshuffle in May saw the appointment of UMNO 
Deputy Youth Chief Hishamuddin Tun Hussein as Deputy Minister of Primary 
Industry, sidelining the UMNO Youth Chief and Anwar loyalist, Datuk Ahmad 
Zahid Hamidi. To compound the matter, just a few days before the delegates were to 
meet in Kuala Lumpur, Zahid launched veiled attacks on Dr. Mahathir. He criticized 
the government for practicing cronyism and nepotism in the award of government 
contracts to private firms and individuals, an attack which seemed to be targeted at 
Dr. Mahathir's selective bail outs of ailing companies during the 1997 economic 
"Anwar strongly opposed the national oil company Petronas' acquisition of stakes in Mirzan' s ailing 
Konsortium Perkapalan Berhad (KPB), which he believed was an attempt by Dr. Mahafhlr to bail out 
his son. See Gomez (2002). 
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crisis.24 Zahid repeated his criticism during his opening speech at the UMNO Youth 
delegates' meeting, held a day ahead of the opening of the 1998 UMNO General 
Assembly. But there was more to his criticisms. As an Anwar protege, Zahid 
appeared to be the mouthpiece of Anwar, the actual man behind the mounting 
criticism against Dr. Mahathir and his economic policies. 
In an extTaordinary counter-attack to silence his critics, Dr. Mahathir 
disclosed the names of those who had received privatized contracts, licenses and 
special share allotments for Bumiputeras. The lists which were distributed to UMNO 
delegates in the 1998 party assembly and publicized in the mainstream press, 
included Dr. Mahathir's detractors in UMNO Youth, members of Anwar's family 
and businessmen closely associated with the former Deputy Prime Minister.2s Also 
listed were family members of Dr. Mahathir, serving UMNO ministers, former 
ministers and Malay and non-Malay tycoons closely connected to top UMNO 
leaders.26 Acting under pressures from Dr. Mahathir and fellow UMNO leaders, 
" Zahid in particular criticized the government over the allocation of minor government contracts 
through an umbrella body controlled by big corporate players. This system, he argued, benefited only 
"big boys" who would take all big contracts, leaving little to small contractors. The system which 
came under the purview of Rural Development Minister., Datuk Annuar Musa, a potential contender 
for the post of UMNO Youth OUef held by Zahid and a Dr. Mahathir loyalist, was scrapped in 
)une1998 ("Die Sun, 18June1998). Zahid's salvo was however directed against the practice of closely 
negotiated government contracts which has becon1e a nom1 during Dr. Mahathir's tenure as Prime 
Minister, and in the wake of the 1997 economic crisis, the bail outs of ailing companies belonging to 
politically well connected individuals including Dr. Mahatlrir's son Mirzan's shipping company. 
While party leaders rapped Zahid for his criticism of the government and top leadership, Anwar on 
the other hand echoed Zahid' s concern, adding that bold reform must take place if the country's 
economy is to be revived (The Sun, 17June1998; AFP, 18June1998). 
25 Among them were Anwar's father Datuk lbrahlm Abdul Rahman who received an option for 3.7 
million shares of Nissan-Industrial Oxygen (IOI) incorporated, Anwar's UMNO politician-cum-
businessman loyalist Datuk Kamaruddin jaafar who received an option for a total of 125 million 
shares in various public listed companies and Zahld Hamidi himself whose company was awarded a 
contract to redevelop Kampung Abdullah Hukum, an urban settlement on the outskirts of Kuala 
Lumpur. See the full list of companies awarded privatization projects (Bemama, 20June1998) and the 
list of special share allotment to individual bumiputeras (Beniarna, 21June1998). Zahid however 
defended Wmself that his name was included in the list in his capacity as a trustee of a foundation 
which was awarded the privatization project by the government (Tile New Straits Times, 22 June 1998). 
26 They include Dr. Mahathir's sons Mirzan and Mukhriz (development of Tanjung Jara Beach Hotel), 
Mohamed Nazir Tun Abdul Razak, the son of former Prime Minister the late Tun Abdul Razak and 
brother of the present Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Mohd. Najib Tun Abdul Razak (420,000 
shares of Gemtech Resources Berhad), former Deputy Prime Ministers the late Tun Ghafar Baba (5 
million shares of Pan Malaysian Cement Works Berhad) and Tan Sri Musa Hitam (747,000 shares of 
Bright Packaging Industry Berhad), cabinet ministers Datuk Seri Mohd. Naz:ri Abdul Aziz (700,000 
shares of Super Ent Holdings Berhad) and Datuk Seri Hishamuddin Tun Hussein (3 million shares of 
Nanyang Press (M) Berhad), and a host of prominent tycoons like Tan Sri Halim Saad, Tan Sri 
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Zahid was forced to retract his claims about cronyism and nepotism by saying that 
such practices did not exist in Malaysia.27 
But a more drastic move to halt any challenge from Anwar was the 
distribution of a book entitled "50 Dalil Mengapa Anwar Tidak Baleh Menjadi Perdana 
Menteri" (50 Reasons Why Anwar Cannot Become Prime lvfinister) which found its 
way into the bags of the delegates to the 1998 UMNO General Assembly. The way in 
which copies of the book were distributed precluded any possibility that it was done 
without Dr. Mahath:ir's sanction.28 The book listed a host of moral improprieties 
allegedly committed by Anwar, including homosexual acts and treason. These 
allegations, which were contained in a poison pen letter, had been around for quite 
some time before the annual assembly and had been dismissed by the Prime 
Minister as baseless. However, it was during the assembly that these allegations 
resurfaced and later served as a basis for Anwar' s forced exit from UMNO. On 2 
September 1998, a day after Dr. Mahathir introduced sweeping capital controls in a 
move to insulate the country's economy from the volatility of the free global 
financial market and keep the ringgit from falling, Dr. Mahathir sacked Anwar from 
the cabinet. Though no reason was given for the dismissal, local newspapers and 
television networks highlighted the contents of affidavits filed in court in relation to 
a criminal charge against Anwar's businessman associate, Dato' Nallakaruppan.29 
The affidavits implicated Anwar in numerous cases of sexual misconduct including 
a sexual relationship with the wife of his aide and sodorny.30 Nallakaruppan was 
mentioned in the 50 Datil book as Anwar's tennis partner who also "supplied" 
women to Anwar. 
Tajuddin Ramli, Tan Sri Tiing Pek Khiing, Tan Sri Vincent Tan and Tan Sri Yeoh Tiong Lay who were 
closely associated with either former finance minister Tun Daim Zainuddin, Anwar or Dr. Mahathir 
himself (Bemama, 20 June 1998; Bernama, 21 June 1998). 
27 New Straits Times, 10 July 1998. 
2J! See Hwang (2003: 290). 
" Nallakaruppan was a director of Magnum Corporation, one of the country's Jargest licensed 
gaming operators. 
30 See" Affidavit· Anwar Sodomized Man 15 Times", Tlie Mallt':f Mail, 3 September 1998; "Ex-DPM 
Implicated in Sexual Misconduct", Tlw New Straits Times, 4 September 1998; "CID· Anwar Involved in 
Sexual Misconduct'', The Sun, 4 September 1998. The country's biggest private television network TV3 
too broadcast !he allegations contained in !he affidavit in its afternoon news on 3 September. 
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It transpired later that the N allakaruppan' s case had been used by the 
authorities to nail Anwar. ln the course of police investigation into the 50 Dalil book, 
the police raided Nallakaruppan' s house in the elite enclave of Bukit T unku in Kuala 
Lumpur in July 1998 and found in his possession 125 rounds of ammunition for 
which he had no valid license.31 Although such an offence is punishable under 
Section 8 of the Firearms Act 1960, which carries a maximum sentence of seven years 
inlprisonment or a fine of ten thousand ringgit or both, the Attorney-General 
preferred against him a heavier charge under Section 57 of the Internal Security Act, 
which carries a mandatory death penalty.32 Nalla's counsel, Manjeet Singh Dhillon, 
claimed in a statutory declaration that two senior officers at the Attorney-General's 
office, the then Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor Dato' (now Tan Sri) Abdul Gani 
Patail and the then Head of the Prosecution Division (now Dato') Azahar Mohamed, 
used the heavier charge to extort from Nalla evidence of Anwar' s sexual 
misconduct.33 Manjeet stated in a letter he wrote to Attorney-General Tan Sri Mohtar 
Abdullah that Abdul Gani, in a meeting with him and another lawyer Balwant Singh 
Sidhu on 2 October 1998, had said he wanted Nallakaruppan, in exchange for a 
reduced charge under the Arms Act which did not carry mandatory death sentence, 
to co-operate \-vi.th the prosecutors and to give information against Anwar, 
specifically on matters concerning "several married women". 34 
A day after Anwar was removed from office, the UMNO Supreme Council in 
an emergency meeting chaired by Dr. Mahathir, decided to expel Anwar from the 
party. Dr. Mahathir gave no immediate reason for the expulsion, stating only that 
Anwar was "not suitable" for the post, that the matter was exclusively internal to the 
party and he owed no obligation to explain it to the people.35 But on 8 September, 
'
1 The New Straits Times, 13August1998. 
"The New Straits Times, 13August1998. 
33 See Manjeet Singh's Statutory Declaration dated 9November1998. The Statutory Declaration can be 
accessed at http://members.tripod.com/-Anwarite/manjeet sd.htm (Accessed on 1 February 2005). 
The two senior officers mentioned by Manjeet were later promoted. Abdul Gani Pa tail was appointed 
as Attorney-General in January 2002 and Azahar Mohamed was made a Judicial Commissioner in 
July 2004. 
"'See "Letter from Manjeet Singh Dhillon to Tan Sri Mohtar Abdullah (Atromey-General)" dated 12 
October 1998. The letter can be accessed at 
http://m.~mbers.tripod.com/-Anwarite/Jetter 12 Oct.htm (Accessed on 1February2005). 
"See press interview with Dr. Mahathir, The Sun, 5 September 1998. 
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Dr. Mahathir briefed UMNO grassroots leaders on the reasons for Anwar's 
expulsion, stating that his former deputy had "low morals". 36 Speaking to reporters 
after the briefing, Dr. Mahathir referred to the police investigation into the 
allegations of Anwar' s sexual misconduct contained in the "50 Dali!" book and 
revealed that he too had conducted "his own investigation" into the matter after 
which he concluded that Anwar "was not qualified to lead the country" .37 
The Birth of Refonnasi: A Battle on Ideological Grounds 
It was at this juncture that Anwar, after being deprived of all avenues to displace Dr. 
Mahathir from within the UMNO oligarchy, turned to the masses outside the party 
for political support. Though it was difficult to deny that elite rivalry within the 
UMNO oligarchy played major role in Anwar' s fallout with Dr. Mahathir, the battle 
cry of Reformasi pointed to the more substantial issue of ideological differences 
between the two leaders as the underlying motivation for a revolt against the 
government. It was in this context at the height of Refarmasi, that Dr. Mahathir' s 
promotion of an illiberal democracy for a mainly economic purpose was viewed by 
the Refermasi activists as nothing more than an excuse to perpetuate undemocratic 
rule pure and simple.38 Backed by his espousal of freedom as an individual right, 
Anwar turned his ideological differences with Dr. Mahathir into a pivotal ideological 
tool to legitimize his challenge against the government. Claiming that the allegations 
of sexual misconduct were part of a high level conspiracy to topple him, Anwar 
called for a complete overhaul of the government to stem abuse of powers and 
corruption, and to create ·wider spaces for democracy. Dr. Mahathir's 17 years long 
tenure as the Prime Minister, his knov..n antagonism toward liberal democracy and 
the West, his shoddy track record in dealing with the independence of the judiciary, 
and the allegations of cronyism, nepotism and corruption involving himself, his 
family members and cabinet ministers close to him, were easy targets for Anwar to 
stage a political battle on ideological grounds. 
"'AFP, 8 September 1.998; Business Times, 9 September 1998. 
"Business Times, 9September1998. 
"Syed Hussin (2004: 14!J..144), 
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The "Permatang Pauh Declaration", launched on 12 September 1998, laid the 
ideological basis for the Reformasi movement. The essentially democratic and non-
communal political statement sets out the philosophy and key objectives of the 
Reformasi movement.39 It started with the recognition of the nobility and freedom of 
man and condemning any form of restrictions to that freedom "without following 
the due process of law" .40 It then promised to establish justice for all and "preserve 
the institutions and processes of law from defilement of graft and abuse of power" .41 
It also pledged to sanctify the power of the people through democratic means, 
champion economic justice, eradicate graft and reinforce faith in noble cultural 
traditions. Above all, it assured the people that the movement was a peaceful one 
launched in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution and in observance of the 
rule of law.42 With such lofty ideals, Anwar' s reform movement aimed to shift 
Malaysian politics away from its authoritarian and communal bases toward one 
which was democratic and non-communal, the goal of which was the widening of 
the democratic space and the dismantling of communalism as the main basis for 
group mobilization and interest articulation. As uncontrolled articulation of 
communal interests had often been made valid justification by the government to 
limit the scope for political competition and discard democratic practices, the 
dismantling of communalism was intended to remove this main obstacle to 
democracy. 
However, this articulation of the democratic and non-communal political 
ideals was not altogether new. It bears close ideological resemblance to the ideas that 
had long been articulated by the democratic elements within the society especially 
since the 1980s. What made the 1998 Reformasi politically significant was its 
organizational and mobilizational aptitude. As a broad-based non-communal and 
cross sectional mass movement, the Reformasi brought together key opposition 
parties, Islamic movements, conglomerations of NGOs and trade unions, and other 
activists cooperating across sectors and issue areas into a coalition for political 
"See Permatang Pa uh Declaration at http:/ /members.tripod.com/~ Anwarite/ archive.htmlltdeclare 
(Accessed on20/12/2005). 
40 Permatang Pauh Declaration. 
41 Permatang Pauh Declaration. 
42 Permatang Pauh Declaration. 
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refonn.43 The inclusion of the predominantly Chinese secular social democratic DAP, 
the Islamic party PAS and the socialist PRM in a single platform for political reform 
was a remarkable milestone in dismantling communalism as the main bases for 
group mobilization and interest articulation.44 These parties were then joined by the 
newly set-up multiracial but non-communal National Justice Party (Parti KeADILan 
Nasional, keADILan) led by Anwar's wife Datin Seri Dr. Wan Azizah Wan Ismail. 
Within the civil society, there had been a kind of conjunction between the secular 
human rights groups like SU A RAM and ALIRAN, which had been at the forefront 
of the struggle for democracy and human rights in Malaysia, and established 
mainstream Islamic movements like ABIM and JIM, which played signilicant role in 
wooing Malay support for Reformasi. The rest were ordinary citizens whose 
association with the movement found expression in their participation in street 
demonstrations, ad-hoc political ceramahs and voluntary Reformasi work - from 
distributing Reformasi pamphlets to providing legal, financial and emotional support 
to the Reformasi detainees and their family members. Other than these, an important 
section of Reformasi actors were anti-Mahathir webmasters and alternative media 
practitioners who helped disseminate valuable Reformasi write-ups and updates on 
Reformasi activities. 45 
Another significant aspect of the Reformasi movement was that it was a largely 
Malay-based movement with support from the more progressive and anti-
establishment sections within the non-Malay communities. This was quite different 
from most of the democratic and human rights movements since the 1980s, which 
had been predominantly non-Malay with little support from the Malay masses and 
the Malay-based organizations.46 On the day Anwar was sacked, steady streams of 
supporters, most of whom were his Malay supporters in UMNO and ABIM, 
thronged his official residence in Kuala Lumpur. The Malay support for Anwar was 
given further boost when ABIM, the National Union of Malaysian Muslim Students' 
"Weiss (2006: 133). 
44 This cooperation was not entirely new. In the 1990 general election, PAS, DAP, PRM and Sernangat 
46 formed overlapping alliances to face the BN. 
45 Reformasi websites like Mal=alim, Malwfiraun, Pemantau, Minda Rakyat, Komentar and PAS' organ 
Harakah were the main sources of information for Reformasi activists, 
46 Perhaps, the exceptions were the coalition of NGOs opposing the amendment to the Societies Act in 
1981 and the outburst of the democratic forces on the verge of the 1990 general election, 
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Associations (PKPIM), Jamaah Isiah Malaysia (JIM) and the Malaysian Academy of 
Islamic Sciences ( ASASI) launched a "reformation movement" in Kajang four days 
after his sacking, vowing to arouse public awareness about "injustices" done to 
Anwar.47 The majority of those who attended his nightly political ceramahs outside 
his private residence in the elite enclave of Bukit Damansara near Kuala Lumpur for 
weeks following his sacking were Malays. The majority of thousands of 
demonstrators who took part in the weekend street demonstrations in Kuala 
Lumpur, as well as those who flocked to his public rallies held in Penang, Kedah, 
Selangor, Malacca, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang and Kelantan following his dismissal 
were also Malays.48 There was a psychological and moral motivation behind the 
overwhelming Malay support for Anwar. As Anwar's longtime loyalist, former 
ABlM President and former keADILan Deputy President Dr. Muhammad Nur 
Manuty put it, it was the sense of gross injustices meted out to Anwar that became 
the prime motivator for the Malay masses to support him.49 Politically, it was the 
beginning of a large-scale Malay revolt against the Malay-led government giving an 
impression that a significant political change was underway. 
Meanwhile, the Reformasi movement's articulation of the non-communal 
political ideology, coupled with the overwhehning Malay "revolt" against the 
Malay-led government, had resonance with the more progressive and anti-
estabiishment sections within the non-Malay communities. Coincidentally, several 
weeks before Anwar' s sacking, Lim Guan Eng of the DAP was jailed for sedition. 
Guan Eng's trial and conviction arose in connection with a statutory rape case 
involving an under-aged Malay girl. Former Malacca Chief Minister Tan Sri Abdul 
Rahim Tamby Chik was implicated in the case but was not prosecuted. Anwar was 
quick to express his solidarity with Guan Eng for sacrificing his career and liberty to 
assist a girl "who was not of his race or religion", showing his good will to Guan Eng 
"Tlze New Straits Times, 7 September 1998. 
48 Foreign press and newswire estimated the size of the crowd at each of Anwar' s rallies as follows: 
Permatang Pauh, Penang (10,000), Jitra, Kedah (50,000), Malacca (20,000), Bangi, Selangor (30,000) and 
Kota Bharu, Kelantan (40,000). (AFP, 12 September 1998; AFP, 13 September 1998; Sydney Morning 
Herald, 18 September 1998; AFP, 20 September 1998) 
"Informal discussion with Dr. Muhammad Nur Manuty, former ABIM President/keAD!Lan Deputy 
President, Taman Tun Dr. Ismail, Kuala Lumpur, 18 April 2007. 
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as well as to the non-Malays at large.so At the height of Reformasi, many NGOs with 
largely non-Malay membership began to associate with Anwar's call for political 
reform, giving the Reformasi movement a more multiracial outlook, rather than being 
solely a "Malay phenomenon". For the first time since the 1990 General Election, the 
more progressive and anti-establishment sections within the non-Malay 
communities were convinced that the democratic wave to challenge the Barisan 
Nasional's political hegemony was under way.51 
The Anwar-led Reformasi movement however faced an early set back when 
Anwar was arrested under the ISA on the evening of 20September1998 after he led 
a massive public rally at Merdeka Square in Kuala Lumpur. While under police 
custody, Anwar was beaten by none other than the Inspector-General of Police, Tan 
Sri Rahim Noor. Anwar was then hauled to the court to face charges of corrupt 
practices and sodomy. His key supporters were also arrested under the ISA while a 
number of them fled the country leaving the nascent Reformasi movement in 
disarray.s2 In the largest crackdown since the 1987 Operation Lallang, about 40 
Reformasi supporters were arrested under the ISA while many others faced illegal 
assembly charges in court. Similar to the 1987 UMNO elite rivalry, the winning 
faction once again put the repressive state apparatus to use in a move to halt a 
possible challenge from the losing faction. But more serious than the crisis in 1987 
was the role of the repressive state apparatus - the police, the courts and the 
Attorney-General's office - that were forced to play a far more direct part in 
suppressing the challenge to the winning faction's political dominance. The losing 
faction, however, also failed to garner the support of the top echelon of party 
so Khoo (2003: 113). 
si Interview with Kua Kia Soong, former member of Parliament for Petaling jaya and a Chinese 
educationist movement activist, Kajang, 22 August 2005. 
" Among Anwar's key loyalists detained under the ISA were UMNO Youth Chief, Ahmad Zahid 
Hamidi; UMNO divisional heads, Kamaruddin jaafar (Tumpat, Kelantan), Kamaruddin Mohd. Noor 
(Pasir Puteh, Kelantan), Tamunif Mokhtar (Bandar Tun Razak, Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur); 
and Asma'on Ismail (Bandar Tenggara, Johar); Lumut UMNO Divisional Youth Chief, Dr. Zambry 
Abdul Kadir; Negeri Sembilan UMNO Youth Chief, Ruslan Kassim; AB!M leaders, Ahmad Azam 
Abdul Rahman (President), Mokhtar Redzuan (Deputy President), Shaharuddin Badaruddin 
(Secretary General) and Abdul Halim Ismail (freasurer); International Islamic University Deputy 
Rector and former ABIM Vice-President, Dr. Sidek Baba; and PKP!M leaders, Amidi Abdul Manan 
(President) and Ahmad Shabrimi Mohamed Sidek (Secretary General). All of !hem were released after 
several weeks of detention. Among those who fled the country were Ezarn Mohd Noor (Political 
Secretary), Khalid jaafar (Press Secretary) and Abdul Rahim Ghouse (Pemmg Youth Chief). 
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leaders, leaving them with no viable alternative but to turn to the masses and the 
opposition parties for political support.53 Though the absence of top echelon party 
leaders' support for Anwar' s Reformasi, let alone support from top civil servants, 
judges or police personnel, indicated growing consolidation of Dr. Mahathir' s 
personal political power, the Reformasi movement's "forced" turning to the masses, 
which meant to ordinary citizens across class and communal division, opened up 
opportunities for articulation of the democratic and non-communal political vision 
outside the UMNO oligarchy. 
Assessing Harl Singh' s model of" oligarchic restruchtring" and "genuine 
democratization" against the backdrop of the 1998 Refornw:si, one could argue that 
both models had been at work in the aftermath of Anwar' s sacking. Anwar espoused 
democracy and human rights as an ideological stance that contrasted with Dr. 
Mahathir' s semi-authoritarian approach to political authority in his attempt to 
legitimize his challenge against the government. In this regard, Hari Singh argued, 
"Reformasi was an extension of the democratic reform that Anwar had articulated 
within the party as a strategy for elite displacement", which later spilled into the 
public domain after he was deprived of the opportunity to mount a challenge from 
within the UMNO oligarchy.54 However, "while involvement of the masses in 
checking political decay may be a function of strategic manipulation by UMNO 
elites to reorder the power distribution within the oligarchy, it is also a reflection of 
growing public discont<:.'11t within the entire UMNO oligarchy, with the Anwar case 
being merely incidental and instrumental in a process where the masses seek to 
SJ Even key Anwar loyalists who were detained under the ISA like Youth Chief Zahld Hamidi, 
Divisional Heads Kamaruddin Mohd Noor (Pasir Puteh, Kelantan), Tamunif Mokhtar (Bandar Tun 
Razak, Kuala Lumpur) and Asma' on Ismail (Bandar Tenggara, )ohor), and Divisional Youth 01ief 
Zambry Abdul Kadir (Lumut, Perak) remained in UMNO and pledged their loyalty to Dr. Mahathir 
soon after they were released from !SAit was related that Special Branch (SB) officers continued to 
keep an eye on the movement of these former detainees after their release from ISA, making it 
difficult for them to have any kind of communication with Anwar and his supporters, even ii they 
would have wished to do so. The detainees too had to convince the SB officers that they were 
completely "clean" by shutting down all communication channels with their former allies in Anwar's 
camp. The extent to which SB' s surveillance was conducted is pervasive. One of the detainees 
revealed that his phone conversation had been intercepted by the SB, and the details of his 
conversation were shown to him while he was under detention. He believed that the SB continued to 
monitor his phone conversation after his release. Confidential discussion, 10 October 2004, Kuala 
Lumpur. See also Saari (2001) and Raja Petra (2001) for useful information on SB's surveillance and 
scare tactics. 
"'Harl (2000: 542). 
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restructure the power relationship between the rulers and the ruled". ss It was in this 
context that the power struggle within the UMNO oligarchy spilled into the public 
domain, giving greater momentum to democratic ferment, the struggle for which 
had previously been pursued mainly by the select groups of NGO activists and 
opposition politicians. 
New Opposition and the Non-Communal Social Contract 
One of Reformasi' s main contributions to Malaysian politics was its espousal of an 
alternative political vision which transcends communal divisions. This vision of 
Malaysian politics beyond communalism conceptualizes political struggle in a plural 
society not as an inter-communal bargain by which each communal group agrees to 
cooperate in a multi-communal coalition of political parties while at the same time 
seeking to maximize distinct communal interests but an attempt to create a non-
communal "social contract" among individuals across communal divisions, the 
primary aim of which is the replacement of communalism with racial equality and 
democracy as the focus of political struggle.56 This vision of politics necessitated the 
creation of a community- neutral coalition of political parties, the leaders of which 
agree not only to act as leaders of their own communal group but also of others. 57 
This section will show that although the process of internalization of non-communal 
vision of politics among the Reformasi activists remained slow and halting, 
articulation of such a vision served as a basis for the launching of the multiracial 
non-communal National Justice Party (keAD!Lan) in April 1999 and the Barisan 
Alternatif (BA), a united opposition front comprising Malaysia's main opposition 
political parties to challenge the BN in the 1999 general election. 
There had been in the past attempts at catapulting to prominence such an 
alternative democratic and non-communal vision of Malaysian politics and 
ss Hari (2000: 526). 
"See Syed Hussin (2004: 46). See also Permatang Pauh Declaration at 
http://members.tripod.com/-Anwarite/ archive.html#declare (Accessed on 20/12/ 2005). 
57 Anwar for example persistently stressed that he is the leader of the "people", rather than of the 
Malays or Muslims, signifying a shift from an essentially communal vision of politics. See for example 
excerpts of his speech delivered at his Damansara home after his removal from office in September 
1998 (The New Straits Times, 15 September 1998). 
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leadership. The pre-independence PUTERA-AMCAJA coalition and the 1990 
Gagasan Rakyat electoral pact were more or less echoes of such vision. Throughout 
the 1980s, various coalitions of issue-oriented NGOs also generally espoused a 
democratic and non-communal vision of Malaysian politics and society. But the 
support base for these coalitions and initiatives, except the 1990 Gagasan Rakyat, were 
confined mostly to the urban educated middle-classes, thus seriously limiting their 
capacity to shift the foundation of Malaysian politics away from its communal 
underpinnings more broadly. By the early 1990s, however, subtle changes had 
occurred in the landscape of Malaysian communal politics. As Loh Kok Wah 
observes, developmentalism had emerged as a new political culture.5B 
Developmentalism, which valorized economic growth, rising living standards, a 
consumerist style and most of all, political stability, had begun to contest ethnicism 
as the overwhelmingly dominant component in Malaysia's political discourse. 
The global surge of capital flows in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which 
coincided with the end of NEP, forced the government to adopt new policies of 
economic deregulation and privatization. There were, at least, two main 
consequences of the more liberal economic policies that eventually had a significant 
impact on communal politics. First, the more liberal policies led to rapid growth, 
new economic opportunities and better employment prospects for Malaysians of all 
races, the "trickle down" effects of which led to the growth of a sizable multi-racial 
middle classes. Second, as non-Malay capital had been seriously constrained during 
the NEP years, the adoption of more liberal economic policies presented new 
opportunities for the non-Malay business and industrial community to reap larger 
economic benefits. Meanwhile, there had been greater appreciation of the non-Malay 
cultures in the public sphere. These had contributed to the eventual easing of ethnic 
tension and, consequently, a new lurch toward sustained economic growth and 
political stability. Apart from that, since 1990, Dr. Mahathir's Vision 2020, which 
marked a halting departure from the ideology of a protectionist Bumiputera state 
toward greater economic and cultural liberalization that envisioned a united Bangsa 
ss Loh (2003: 261). 
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Malaysia (Malaysian Nation), in which all Malaysians regardless of race would 
gradually have a fair share in fully developed Malaysia by the year 2020. 
Another salient impact of economic growth and the expansion of the 
multiracial middle class on Malaysian politics and society by the late 1990s was that 
this class demonstrated greater support for the advocacy of social and 
environmental issues, which had previously been the almost exclusive concern of 
select groups of mainly urban educated NGO activists. These were concerns over 
day-to-day livelihood issues such as rising living costs, increasing crime rate, 
environmental degradation and other consumer-related issues. Over the years, 
politically highly sensitive issues also generated wide public debate. These included 
public calls for government's transparency and accountability, judicial 
independence, media freedom and electoral reform. Specific human rights issues 
such as women's rights, workers' rights and the rights of immigrants and other 
minority groups also gradually took the centre stage in the human rights discourse 
in Malaysia. 
It was against this backdrop that Anwar' s Reformasi movement struck a chord 
with the human rights activists and their sympathizers among the members of the 
urban middle class. As communalism had never been the main rallying point for 
these activists in mobilizing support for their cause, it was easier for them to accept 
Anwar' s democratic and non-communal vision of politics as a new agenda for 
comprehensive political reform.59 It was not surprising therefore that prominent 
human rights activists like Chandra Muzaffar (former President of Aliran Kesedaran 
Negara, ALIRAN/President of JUST World Trust), Irene Fernandez (Director of 
Tenaganita), Chua Tian Chang (Voice of Malaysian People, SUARAM 
activist/ Chairman of Coalition for People's Democracy, GAGASAN) and Sivarasa 
Rasiah (SUARAM activist) played important roles in the Reformasi movement, and 
later being part of the Opposition. Also, an important development in this regard 
was the formation of two important coalitions, the Gagasan Demokrasi Rakyat 
(GAGASAN, Coalition for People's Democracy) and the Gerakan Keadilan Rakyat 
59 Interview with Ahmad Shabrimi Sidek, Personal Aide to Anwar Ibrahim and former Secretary-
General of National Union of Malaysian Muslim Students' Associations, 20 April 2007, Kuala 
Lumpur. 
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Malaysia (GERAK, Malaysian People Movement for Justice), consisting of 
overlapping NGOs and opposition political parties, including PAS and DAP, 
pushing for political reform in the heyday of Reformasi. GERAK, headed by PAS, 
included more Islamic groups than the NGO-led GAGASAN.60 Both coalitions 
focused their struggle on challenging the BN' s authoritarian rule, with GERAK 
primarily seeking the abolition of ISA. 
Another coalition was Pergerakan Keadilan Sosial (ADIL, Movement for Social 
Justice), a loose multiracial but non-communal movement for political reform led by 
Anwar' s wife, Wan Azizah. Launched in December 1998, ADIL espoused the same 
aims as those of GAGASAN and GERAK, i.e. democracy, human rights, social justice 
and the like. But unlike GERAK and GAGASAN, ADIL could be joined by 
individuals. Detached from organizational constraints, leading individual ADIL 
members had more leeway to rally behind Anwar in pursuing political and social 
reform as individuals. Also, being a loose-knit reform movement rather than a 
formal political party, ADIL attracted a wide range of endorsees including 
prominent academicians, professionals, religious leaders, student activists, women's 
rights activists and other NGO activists. 61 
Formation of the National Justice Party 
After a few months of campaigning, and claiming about 70,000 endorsements, ADIL 
formed the basis for the setting up of a formal political vehicle for Reformasi 
activists.62 But the road to forming a formal political platform to pursue the Reformasi 
movement's agenda for political change through electoral means was bumpy. 
60 Weiss (1999: 430). 
61 The members of ADIL Pro-Tern Committee include Dr. Chandra Muzaffar (deputy president), 
ABIM President Ahmad Azam Abdul Rahman, JIM President Saari Sungib, former Bar Council 
President Hendon Mohammad, former ABIM President Dr. Muhammad Nur Manuty, women's 
rights activist Irene Fernandez, prominent academic Assoc. Prof. Maznah Mohamad and political 
analyst Rustam A. Sani. Among the endorsees were Anwar Ibrahim, prominent academics Prof. 
Johan Saravanamuttu, Prof. Francis Loh Kok Wah, Assoc. Prof. Mustaffa K Anuar, Prof. Shahrir 
Mohd Zain and Assoc. Prof. Khoo Boo Teik; and human rights lawyer Sivarasa Rasiah. See the full list 
of committee members and endorsees at 
http://members.tripod.com/GERAK ADIL/ declaration.htm (Accessed on 3 February 2007). 
62 Weiss (1999). 
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ADIL' s attempt to register itself as a society under the Societies Act was rejected by 
the government. An attempt by a group of Reformasi supporters to register a new 
political party, Himpunan Angkatan Keadilan (HAK, Assembly of Movement for 
Justice), was also foiled.63 Due to the government's unwillingness to allow 
registration of new political parties to cater to the Reformasi' s struggle, Anwar 
loyalists, mostly young activists in ABIM, discreetly "took over" Parti Ikatan 
Masyarakat Islam Malaysia (IKA TAN, United Malaysian Muslim Society Party), a 
nearly defunct political party based in Terengganu. The takeover occurred around 
the same time ADIL was launched in December 1998.64 The new office bearers of 
IKA TAN kept a low profile for quite some time, during which an Extraordinary 
General Meeting was held to change party's name, flag and constitution.65 The party 
was renamed Parti KeADILan Nasional (keADILan, National Justice Party)66 and the 
new constitution was to reflect the Reformasi movement's aspiration for democracy, 
human rights and social justice. The party's membership was to be opened to all 
Malaysian citizens, regardless of race or religion. The changes were then approved 
by the Registrar of Societies in early 1999. Just before the "new" party was launched 
in April, its office bearers resigned en-mass to allow the election of a new leadership, 
headed by Wan Azizah as its new President. 67 
The discreet way in which keADlLan was formed gave leeway for Anwar to 
hand pick its office bearers in order to reflect the party's non-communal and cross-
sectional features. Main office bearers of the party such as Chandra Muzaffar 
63 The initiator of HAK was former UMNO Youth Executive Secretary and Anwar supporter, 
Hanafiah Man (Straits Times, 27 March 1999) 
64 The takeover took effect when the old office bearers of !KAT AN resigned en-masse to pave way for 
the appointment of new office bearers consisting of young ABIM activists. IKATAN's constitution 
allowed its President to appoint new members of the Central Leadership Council, without requiring 
any election to be held, in the event any of its members resigned. 
65 The party's EGM was a completely tame affair. Because all of its branches are "non-existent", many 
of them are already defunct or de-registered, the EGM was only attended by its new office bearers. 
This allowed the EGM to complete its work "discreetly". 
66 The acronym keADILan, with the word" ADIL" (which means justice) spelt in capital letters, was 
intended to highlight the struggle for justice as the party's main rallying point as well as to tap on the 
popularity and goodwill of ADIL as prime mover of Reformasi. Though there has been no formal 
connection between ADIL and keADILan, the initiators of keADJLan sought to impress upon the 
public that the party was a continuation of ADIL's struggle for reform, and that the party was the 
formal political platform for Reformasi activists. 
67 This account is based on the author's personal involvement in setting up keADILan. He was the 
Executive Secretary of the party between April and September 1999. 
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(Deputy President), Sheikh Azmi Ahmad (Vice-President) and Mohd Annuar Tahir 
(Secretary-General) were Anwar' s longtime friends who had longstanding 
involvement in either human rights advocacy or Islamic activism. Chandra Muzaffar 
was a former President of Aliran Kesedaran Negara (ALIRAN), an issue-oriented 
NGO focusing mainly on human rights advocacy. Sheikh Azmi and Mohd. Annuar 
were former ABIM leaders. Anwar continued to maintain close ties with these 
people when he was in the government. Some had even occupied high-ranking 
government positions. Chandra was the Director of the Centre for Civilizational 
Dialogue at the University of Malaya, the setting up of which received Anwar' s 
strong backing. Sheikh Azmi was the Chief Judge of Federal Territory Syariah Court 
before joining keADlLan, while Mohd. Annuar was the Executive-Director of 
Yayasan Salam, a semi-government foundation set up to coordinate voluntary relief 
work locally and abroad. The membership of the party's Majlis Pimpinan Tertinggi 
(MPT, Supreme Leadership Council) was mixed, with members representing diverse 
groups within Malaysia's pohtical and civil society. They included non-Malay 
human rights activists, prominent members of Islamic movements, a church leader, 
former opposition leaders, ex-UMNO members and ordinary professionals.68 Unlike 
Parti Semangat 46, which was formed following the 1987 UMNO crisis, no UMNO 
big guns joined keADILan.69 The fear of being reprimanded by Dr. Mahathir, losing 
government jobs or, even worse, facing criminal charges might have deterred some 
of Anwar' s sympathizers in UMNO from rallying behind him. 7o 
68 Among the MPT members were Marina Yusoff (Vice President/former opposition Semangat 46 
Vice-President), Tian Chua (Vice-President/human rights activist), Mohd. Ezam Mohd. Noor (Youth 
Chief/ former UMNO Deputy-Divisional Chief), Goh Keat Peng (Member/ church leader), Irene 
Fernandez (Member/women's rights activist), N. Gobalakrishnan (Member/ former Malayan Indian 
Congress (MIC) leader), Zainur Zakaria (Wilayah Persekutuan Liason Chief/ former President of Bar 
Council). 
69 Anwar's closest allies in UMNO like Youth and Sports Minister Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin and Back 
Bencher's Club Chairman and Member of Parliament for Parit Sulong Ruhanie Ahmad never left 
UMNO for keAD!Lan. Both were present at Anwar's official residence the night he was sacked, but 
their show of support ended there. Other known staunch supporters like Deputy Ministers in the 
Prime Minister's Department, Datuk Ibrahim Saad and Datuk Fauzi Abdul Rahman, and Minister in 
the Prime Minister's Department and Wowen's Chief Datuk Dr. Siti Zaharah Sulaiman also remained 
in UMNO. 
7o Anwar mentioned in passing that not all of his sympathisers had "clean records", indicating that 
they might face retaliation, legal or otherwise, should they choose to break rank. Interview with 
Anwar Ibrahim, 26 December 2004, Kuala Lumpur. 
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The more substantial attempt to present the party as a conduit for Reformasi's 
democratic and non-communal ideology was the party's constitution. The party's 
new constitution, the objectives of which were personally written by Anwar, vowed 
to create a just society and a progressive democratic nation. With its motto of 
"Justice for All", the party pledged to uphold the rule of just law and the 
independence of the judiciary as well as to guarantee freedom of thought, speech, 
movement, assembly and association for all. Operating under a situation where the 
mainstream media hardly gave favorable media coverage to the opposition parties 
and those who were critical of the government, keADILan emphasized the need to 
promote media freedom. The more substantial attempt at dismantling communalism 
as the basis of political struggle was the party's resolve to substitute the BN's race-
based socio-economic distribution policy with one that promotes equitable 
distribution regardless of race. While the party pledged to continue to improve the 
socio-economic condition of the poor and the marginalized among the Bumiputeras, 
it also promised to look after the welfare of the less fortunate among the non-
Bumiputeras. While promoting a just, dynamic and robust economy, the party 
condemned wastage, misuse of public funds and concentration of wealth among the 
select few of the country's elite. On the issue of religion, the party recognized the 
position of Islam as the Religion of the Federation, while it guaranteed the right of 
the non-Muslims to profess and practice their religion of choice. Pledges were made 
to provide public goods such as affordable public education, health services, public 
housing and transport especially to cater to the needs of the low and middle income 
groups. It also vowed to fight for the rights of workers and the aborigines, and to 
enhance the status of women.71 
Except for maintaining commitment to two important cultural terms of the 
communally-based 1957 constitutional contract, i.e. Islam as the Religion of the 
Federation and the Malay language as the National Language, 72 keADILan' s vision 
of Malaysian politics departed significantly from that of the BN. Rejecting BN' s 
espousal of an essentially communal vision of politics, which is rooted in the 
71 Parti keAD!Lan Nasional (1999: 2-3) 
72 Parti keAD!Lan Nasional (1999: 2-3). 
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understanding that Malaysian society is a grouping of competing communal groups 
recognizing Malay dominance, keADlLan treats Malaysians of all races as co-equals 
who should have their fair share in the country's economy and politics. Party leaders 
believed that discriminatory race-based policies, such as the New Economic Policy 
(NEP), should be reviewed and substituted with alternative policies which are more 
democratic.73 Criticizing BN' s perpetuation of discriminatory race-based policies and 
arguing for a communally neutral vision of Malaysian politics as well as the 
widening of the democratic space, Anwar noted: 
When government policies are drawn along chauvinistic lines and marked by 
discriminatory practices, discontent is bound to foment. This problem must be 
tackled at the core while allowing for civil society to blossom. Democratic 
space must continue to be opened and not further eroded. ln Malaysia, the 
call by dissident voices has been to move beyond the decades-old paradigm 
of the New Economic Policy and forge a blueprint to narrow the economic 
divide regardless of ethnic lines.7• 
By dismantling the communal division, and shifting the focus of political 
interest from communal groups to individuals, the party strove to pave the way for 
greater appreciation among Malaysians of all races of a new politics which 
prioritized, among other things, the virtues of non-communalism, participatory 
democracy, personal freedoms and social justice, over preoccupation with state 
power and communalism.75 But this does not mean that all was well with the 
nascent keADILan. Despite its claim to be a multiracial and non-communal party, its 
members were largely Malays with only pockets of non-Malay supporters 
comprising activists of human rights groups and some DAP and MIC dissidents. 
There were at least three reasons why the party failed to attract large non-Malay 
following. First, the Reformasi which gave the impetus for the formation of the party 
73 Informal discussion with Sivarasah Rasiah, PKR Vice-President, 9 September 2006, Kuala Lumpur. 
74 Anwar (2006). 
75 Interview with Mustafa Kami! Ayub, Secretary-General of PKR, 18 January 2005, Sungai Petani, 
Kedah. See Syed Hussin (2004), Mohd. Nor Nawawi (2000). 
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was mainly regarded as a "Malay phenomenon" in which non-Malay participation 
was only ancillary to the mainly Malay open revolt against the Malay-led 
government. Second, most of the non-Malay leaders who were appointed to the 
party's MPT were NGO leaders who were pohtically detached from grassroots 
support. Devoid of the most important link to the grassroots, the non-Malay leaders 
failed to attract mass following from their respective ethnic communities. Third, as a 
non-Malay political commentator noted, the non-Malays, especially the Chinese, 
were quite apprehensive about Anwar' s "Islamic image". 76 Not surprisingly, 
keADILan Deputy President Chandra Muzaffar, in an open letter to Lim Guan Eng, 
welcoming his release from prison in August 1999, admitted that the reform 
movement, though it was multiracial in orientation, was still predominantly Malay. 
He thus invited Lim to help "transform the movement into a powerful political force 
that transcends ethnic boundaries" _77 
Meanwhile, being a nascent party, keADILan had to grapple with its own 
"teething problems" too. There were internal fault lines within the party. The first 
was between the politician camp and the NGO activist camp which were in conflict 
over how to best manage the party. As many of the party's main office holders were 
former NGO activists who had httle experience in active partisan politics, they had 
been the main target of ridicule by the more seasoned politicians, most of whom 
were former members of UMNO and S46, for being inefficient in handling party 
matters. The bulk of criticisms were about the slow progress in recruiting new 
members, inefficiency in dispensing party funds and inabihty to deal with internal 
disputes. The second fault line was between ABIM and JIM, the two Islamic 
movements which had been at odds with each other since the 1980s. Not only was 
cooperation between party leaders who hailed from the two organizations shallow, 
there was also a strong tendency among them to form competing alliances within the 
party. Another fault line was between the non-communalist NGO leaders and the 
more communahst grassroots leaders. For instance, there had been tussles between 
the Tamil-speaking grassroots leaders and the English-speaking Indian NGO 
" See Quek (1999). 
77 See Chandra's open letter to Lim Guan Eng, "Welcome to a New Malaysia", in Harakah, 28 August 
1999. 
222 
activists over who had the better right to represent the Indian community in the 
party's MPT. Down to the grassroots, problems cropped up when different groups 
of party activists formed overlapping pro-tern committees at the divisional level, 
each trying to lay claim to the right to lead the troubled divisions. The party leaders 
spent much of their time during the first few months of the party inception to solve 
the "teething problems", while the internal power struggle between the competing 
groups continued to build up. With Anwar behind bars and the party left to novices 
in partisan politics, keADILan faced initial setbacks as a formal political vehicle for 
Reformasi activists.7B 
Formation of the Alternative Front (Barisan AltematifJ 
While keADILan was grappling with its "teething problems", party leaders 
continued to focus on their efforts to unseat the BN in the impending General 
Election. For Anwaristas, winning the election was the only way to get Anwar out of 
the jail. But it was impossible for the nascent party to achieve this goal if it were to 
work alone. The party had no experience in contesting any election and also lacked 
strong networks of grassroots supporters to face the gigantic and better oiled BN 
machineries. Though keADILan managed to recruit about 30,000 new members in 
the first few months after its inception, organization and mobilization processes at 
the division and branch level remained slow and halting.79 This was due to the 
registration process itself which allowed direct registration with the party's 
headquarters rather than through divisions or branches, which were in any case still 
in the process of formation. Even after the divisions and branches were formed, 
78 Information in this paragraph is based on the author's personal knowledge of keAD!Lan's internal 
affairs in his capacity as the party's Executive Secretary between April and September 1999. He was 
then privy to the party's MPT meetings and responsible for the day-to-day management at the party's 
headquarters in Kuala Lumpur. 
79 The slow and halting process can be illustrated by the following facts and figures. In 2004, 5 years 
after its formation, keADILan/PKR had managed to form 163 divisions comprising only 445 branches 
nationwide. Only 14 divisions had more than 10 branches, the largest of which were Gombak (27 
branches), Permatang Pauh (26 branches) and Pasir Salak (25 branches). 92 divisions (56 percent of the 
total divisions) had no branches at all (People's justice Party 2004: 13-23). This is way behind the 
width and breadth of the UMNO network which comprised about 19,000 branches nationwide 
(Utusan Malaysia, 24 jun 2004). 
223 
there were difficulties in tracking down the new members and channeling them to 
their respective branches and divisions. Furthermore, organizing a party at the 
grassroots level on a large scale required a strong working network of party 
supporters as well as considerable funding. As the party's sources of access to 
organized networks were mainly limited to Islamic movements like ABlM and JIM, 
the grassroots network of which had been seriously dwindling since the late 1980s, 
as well as other sporadic individual-based networks among former UMNO, 546 and 
MIC leaders who now supported keADILan, the party had no capacity to organize 
and mobilize its grassroots supporters on a large scale. The party therefore needed 
reliable allies among the opposition parties that already had their own webs of 
grassroots networks and popular support in order to mount a formidable challenge 
against the BN. On 4April1999, while addressing a 3000-strong audience at the 
launch of the party, which was also attended by the leaders of PAS, DAP and PRM, 
Wan Azizah emphasized the need for the opposition parties to work together "in 
order to achieve the larger goal of forging a credible alternative to the Barisan 
Nasional" .so 
There had been seeds of cooperation between major opposition political 
parties right after Anwar was sacked from the government and UMNO. Leaders of 
all three major opposition political parties - DAP, PAS and PRM - visited Anwar at 
his house after his sacking. 81 Though Anwar initially denied any pact with the 
opposition parties, the parties had given him much needed platform to launch 
attacks on the government in his brief nationwide tour which ended with his abrupt 
arrest under the ISA on 20 September 1998. With the launch of keADILan, the efforts 
at uniting opposition parties on a single platform to challenge the BN gained more 
momentum. It was clear then that keADILan would be the main political vehicle for 
Reformasi supporters, though they were free to join other political parties. Anwar 
would then play a unifying role of sorts, from behind bars. But the objective was to 
bring the opposition parties together in a single grand coalition. Party leaders 
viewed that it was important at this juncture that Anwar did not join any one of the 
so See Sabri Zain (1999). 
81 The New Straits Times, 5 September 1998; Berita Harian, 8 September 1998. 
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opposition political parties, including keADILan, so as to emphasize his somewhat 
neutral position when communicating between the opposition leaders. 82 
There had been encouraging developments to this end. On 14 April 1999, the 
day the High Court found Anwar guilty of corruption, GERAK , led by PAS, 
announced its "April 14 Declaration", which aimed at changing the Government 
through the electoral process. In view of this aim, the organization issued a 
statement calling for formation of a coalition to form a new government.83 But 
forming a grand coalition among the ideologically incompatible political parties like 
PAS and DAP was not an easy task. PAS had always been known for its propagation 
of the Islamic state objective, with the implementation of Hudud (Islamic criminal 
law) lying at the core of its political agenda. The DAP on the other hand is a secular 
social democratic political party which had always been opposed to any move to 
form an Islamic state in multiracial and multi-religious Malaysia. Both parties 
appealed to different constituents as well as having limited short-term electoral 
goals. Focusing on the predominantly Chinese-majority urban and semi-urban 
constituencies, the DAP' s short-term electoral goal had always been to deny the BN' s 
two-thirds majority in the Parliament as well as wrestling control over the Chinese-
majority state, Penang. Being a predominantly Chinese party, the DAP fared better 
in areas where a large majority of voters (i.e. more than two-thirds of the registered 
voters) were Chinese.84 As the number of such constituencies was only 12 out of 193 
parliamentary seats in 1999, it was understandable that the DAP did not overstate its 
short-term electoral goal. PAS on the other hand appealed to the rural Malay voters 
in the Malay heartland states of Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Perlis and regions 
like upper Perak. Its immediate electoral goal had always been to win as many seats 
as possible in the Malay heartland and wrest control over one or two of those states. 
The radical Malay-based PRM, which was part of the influential left-leaning Socialist 
Front in the 1950s and 1960s, remained a fringe party after the 1960s. 
s2 Interview with Mustafa Kami! Ayub, Secretary-General of PKR, 18 January 2005, Sungai Petani, 
Kedah. See also Hilley (2001: 227). But it was an open secret that Anwar, through his "prison notes" 
and emissaries, did send messages to party leaders expressing his views on party matters. More often 
than not, party leaders took his views as necessary instructions from him. 
83 The New Straits Times, 15 April 1999. 
84 Marzuki (2004). 
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Given this scenario, keADILan' s resolve to unseat the BN in the general 
election was somewhat overstated. But the euphoria caused by the Refonnasi 
movement had given a boost to the opposition political parties. PAS membership 
has grown from 500,000 in 1998 to 700,000 a year later.SS More significantly, the party 
drew growing support from Malay professionals and the urban middle class, 
indicating an expansion of its support base beyond the traditional Malay heartland 
states. The prospect of a significant swing of support to the opposition, especially 
among the Malay voters, emboldened the party leaders to seriously think about 
winning the election at the national level. 86 Some Malays too started to show open 
support for the DAP. It was not uncommon to see hundreds of Malays attending 
ceramahs organized by the DAP at the height of Reformasi. To a certain extent, the 
Lim Guan Eng saga had helped cast the DAP' s "chauvinist Chinese" image away 
from the Malay mindsP As the Refannasi movement drew greater public support, 
there were signs that the opposition parties could make a significant electoral 
breakthrough. But different from PAS and keADILan, the DAP looked at the 
Reforrnasi and the election that followed in more realistic terms. Should they fail to 
unseat the BN at the national levet the election was still an opportunity for the party 
to win more seats and eventually to be better positioned to press the government for 
greater political reform. As the DAP Secretary-General Lim Guan Eng put it: 
The goverrunent will never have the drive to reform. It has got to be pushed 
to do that, and this is where the people come in. If the people do not want to 
push for reform, the goverrunent will never be pressed for it. As for the D AP, 
provided we win, the goverrunent cannot afford to ignore us. If we win more 
votes, more seats then the goverrunent will be under pressure to change.88 
After much deliberation on the longstanding issues of differences between 
PAS and DAP, especially PAS' s espousal of the idea of Islamic State and the DAP' s 
85 Weiss (1999: 432) 
''Press interview with Dato' Hj. Fadzil Mohd. Noor, PAS President. The New Straits Times, 11 April 
1999. 
87 Khoo (2003: 113). 
SS Interview with Lim Guan Eng, DAP Secretary·General, Petaling Jaya, 25 April 2005. 
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secular Malaysian Malaysia concept, as well as several hiccups regarding DAP 
members joining keADILan, four major opposition parties - keADILan, DAP, PAS 
and PRM - announced the formation of a single coalition of opposition parties, 
Barisan Alternatif (BA, Alternative Front) on 24October1999. The launch of the new 
opposition front, which coincided with a large gathering of about 100,000 guests at 
the glittering new Bukit Jalli National Stadium on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur to 
celebrate the 25th Anniversary of Barisan Nasional, marked a concerted effort by the 
opposition to challenge the BN. Formed just before the 1999 General Election, the BA 
was the first successful attempt to bring together all major opposition parties on a 
unified political platform. It was an attempt to build an alternative two-party 
system, with a host of alternative programs and policies, the primary aim of which 
was to end BN' s dominance in Malaysian politics. 
The BA Common Manifesto: The Making of a Non-Communal Social Contract 
As a coalition, rather than an ad-hoc electoral pact, the BA came up with a common 
election manifesto which emphasized the creation of a democratic and non-
communal social contract. Blaming the BN government for its failure to live up to 
the people's aspiration for a just and democratic Malaysia, the common manifesto, 
"Toward a Just Malaysia", listed the major problems associated with the BN. These 
included concentration and personalization of power in the hands of the Prime 
Minister which resulted in the crippling of the system of checks and balances and 
growing oppression, corruption, cronyism and nepotism. It also criticized the 
government for manipulating the New Economic Policy (NEP) to enrich a small 
group of politically well-connected individuals, while the country's economic 
competitiveness and resilience were on the decline. It also took the BN to task for 
resorting to slander, persecution of political opponents and excessive use of public 
funds as a means to stay in power. The manifesto claimed that human rights and 
democracy suffered a major setback under the BN rule. The BN government, the 
manifesto asserted, had denied people's rights to freedom of expression, peaceful 
assembly and association, curbed media freedom and damaged the integrity of 
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public institutions such as the Parliament, the judiciary, the public service and the 
police.89 It also claimed that the BN government's penchant for mega projects rather 
than socio-economic initiatives for the poor had further increased the gap between 
the haves and the have-nots across racial groups.90 In view of the people's increasing 
awareness about the weaknesses of the BN' s development policy and the more open 
expression of dissent, the manifesto warned that: 
the BN government has attempted to frighten the people by threatening that 
such dissent will result in racial conflict. They threaten that chaos will result 
should the strong position of the BN government be questioned. They have 
mobilized the mainstream mass media which is completely under their control, 
and have used it to vilify the dissent, spreading lies and fear. Their sole aim is 
to cause fear and disunity. They hope their campaign of lies and fear-
mongering will prevent the people from coming together for change towards a 
just and democratic nation.91 
In its attempt to rally support against the BN, the BA promised in its 
manifesto a set of alternative economic and social policies, which it claimed would 
benefit Malaysians of all races. These were the terms of the "new" non-communal 
social contract. While the BN, especially its political anchorage UMNO, was quite 
apprehensive in promoting the non-Malays' right to mother tongue education, the 
BA openly recognized and promoted their right. It also pledged to protect non-
Muslims' right to freedom of worship, while maintaining the position of Islam as the 
Religion of the Federation.92 On the question of Malay special privileges, the BA 
seemed to be quite careful in not rejecting the policy entirely, but to condemn its 
abuses, while it pledged to extend affirmative action programs to the weak and 
marginalized groups among the non-Malays.93 This rather ambivalent position 
toward the Malay special privileges policy was essential since revamping the policy 
"Barisan Altematif (1999: 1-2). 
90 Barisan Alternatif (1999: 3). 
91 Barisan Alternatif (1999: 4). 
"Barisan Alternatif (1999: 5, 23). 
93 Barisan Alternatif (1999: 23). 
228 
entirely would not go down well with the Malay-majority, the backbone of the 
Reformasi movement and the new opposition. As such, the focus of BA' s criticism 
was on the implementation of those policies which the opposition front claimed only 
benefited a handful of the Malay elite rather than the Malay masses. These included 
the allotment of shares, approved permits, state lands and privatization projects to 
politically well-connected Malay individuals. As far as the non-Malays were 
concerned, the BA was trying to be more even handed by pledging to extend a 
genuine affirmative action policy to help the poor and marginalized among them. 
The manifesto too promised to pay special attention to the Orang Asli 
(indigenous people) communities and the indigenous people of Sabah and Sarawak. 
This included the establishment of a commission to protect the Native Customary 
Rights (NCR) land and to promote their cultures and traditions.94 Other pledges 
were essentially those relating to the provision of public goods such as low cost 
health services, affordable housing schemes for the low and middle income groups 
and comprehensive, fair and efficient social services. The BA also promised to 
formulate a long-term sustainable development policy, strengthen consumer 
protection laws, repeal or amend laws which restrict worker's rights, promote 
women's rights, empower the youth and safeguard the welfare of the elderly and 
pensioners. 95 
An important development in the BA' s attempt to forge a new democratic 
and non-communal social contract was the exclusion of the Islamic state agenda in 
the common manifesto, despite the fact that PAS was one of its major partners. This 
can be attributed to developments within PAS itself. Since 1999, a growing force 
within PAS, the so-called the "mainstreamers", had espoused a more moderate and 
democratic view of Islam and played down the Islamic state agenda in order to 
facilitate multi-ethnic coalition building among the opposition parties.96 But as the 
party also needed to respond to the demands of the "purists" within the party for 
the maintenance of its theocratic agenda, as well as to the possible criticisms from its 
competitor in the Malay /Muslim constituency - UMNO - its supplementary 
94 Barisan Alternatif (1999: 23) 
95 Barisan Alternatif (1999). 
96 Liew (2007: 112). 
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manifesto for Kelantan and Terengganu, the two Malay-heartland states in which the 
party had substantial footing, was directed towards the attainment of such goal. 97 
But the exclusion of the Islamic state agenda in the common manifesto itself 
indicated that PAS tried to soften its approach to political Islam and attempted to 
tum its Islamic image into a more democratic outlook in order to expand its support 
base beyond the traditional Malay heartland states. To this, PAS President Dato' Hj. 
Fadzil Mohd Noor gave an ambivalent explanation. Although the party did not drop 
the idea of creating an Islamic State, he said, the party's struggle "is through the 
democratic process, that is, giving the rakyat the right and freedom to elect the 
government". 98 
Above all, the BA promised to build a democracy which provides 
"meaningful space for the people to express their views and to participate in various 
processes of daily administration".99 Central to this pledge was the BA's promise to 
abrogate the Internal Security Act and other detention without trial laws, form an 
Independent Commission to review all repressive laws with the ultimate objective of 
repealing whatever laws that violate basic human rights. As part of the measures to 
promote media freedom, the BA promised to corporatize the national broadcast 
agency, the Radio and Television Malaysia (RTM), and subject it to an independent 
Broadcasting Commission. It also promised to ensure that the Malaysian Human 
Rights Commission is independent and has representation from all major groups. In 
a move to promote transparency, the BA proposed to formulate a Freedom of 
Information Act as well as to enact a law to protect "whistle-blowers". In a further 
move to ensure that the protection of basic human rights was up to the international 
standard, the BA promised to sign and ratify the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, as well as improving the quality and effectiveness of human rights 
education in the country.mo 
97 Straits Times, 27 November 1999. 
"See "Fadzil: Islamic State is Our Objective" (The New Straits Times, 11April1999). 
"Barisan Alternatif (1999: 24). 
100 Barisan Alternatif (1999: 24). 
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Complementing the BA' s common manifesto was a plethora of civil society 
campaigns for political reform. An online "People Are the Boss" campaign initiated 
by a group of Chinese journalists and professionals in August 1999 called upon all 
Malaysians "to insist on their right and dignity" as bosses by expressing their wishes 
and aspirations in unequivocal terms and ask political parties and candidates to 
fulfill their wishes. The document reminded the people as the "bosses" that they 
should not treat the election as an obligation to return favor to the ruling party for 
the development that they had been enjoying and that the ruling party should not 
use deprivation of the people's right to development as a threat against voting the 
opposition.101 A resounding call for political change also came from ALIRAN. The 
Aliran Monthly magazine had a special coverage on the general election with its 
"thinking voter's checklist" enumerating demands for abolition of repressive laws, 
judicial independence, press freedom, restoration of local council election, 
eradication of money politics, de-privatization of public goods and amenities, better 
healthcare services, affordable housing scheme for the low income group and 
stoppage of mega projects.102 Above all, the A URAN' s organ called for a shift 
toward a two-party system and an end to the BN's political dominance. And yet 
there were other less publicized civil society campaigns for political reform such as 
Women's Agenda for Change's (WAC) Women Candidacy Initiative (WCI) which 
supported the candidacy of women in the election; the Indian Malaysians' petition 
for greater representation of ethnic Indians in politics, business and education; the 
Penang-based Citizen's Health Initiative's (CHI) campaign against privatization of 
public hospitals; the Coalition of Concerned Trade Unions' call for the protection of 
worker's right to organize, access to comprehensive social security system and a 
minimum wage legislation; and the wish list of the Gerakan Demokratik Belia dan 
Pelajar Malaysia (DEMA, Malaysian Youth and Students Democratic Movement), 
calling for a freer and democratic Malaysia.103 
101 See the text of "Declaration on the People's Awareness" at http://bosses.faithweb.com/ (Accessed 
on 21 November 2006). See also Weiss (2006: 134). 
102 See "Vote for a Better Government: The Thinking Voter's Checklist'' (Aliran Monthly, Oct - Nov 
1999, p.p. 6-10). 
103 Netto (1999); Weiss (2006: 135). Other pro-opposition student groups included Persatuan 
Kebangsaan Pelajar Islam Malai;sia (PKPIM, National Union of Muslim Students' Associations of 
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But the most significant demand for political reform was an election appeal 
by an influential group of Chinese associations and guilds, Suqiu, which was 
endorsed by about 1,800 Chinese organizations.104 The 17-point document launched 
in August 1999 covered wide range of democratic aspirations such as the demands 
for greater press freedom, protection of women's rights, respect for workers' rights, 
restoring the independence of the judiciary and repeal of the Internal Security Act. It 
also sought the review of privatization projects, a curb on corruption and affordable 
housing for the people. Others were the usual Chinese demands such as an increase 
in the number of Chinese schools and modernization of Chinese new villages.105 The 
most crucial part of the "appeal" was the call for the abolition of the quota system 
based on race, which had its origin in Article 153 of the Federal Constitution and 
later become the main thrust the Malay-favored New Economic Policy. Calling for a 
fair and equitable economic policy, Suqiu stressed that "businesses must be allowed 
the opportunity to compete on a fair basis regardless of race, and contracts and 
shares must not be given out through nepotism, cronyism and corruption" .106 Suqiu 
then took the government to task for neglecting the "modernization and 
development of small and medium industries", which had largely been associated 
with the Chinese-owned enterprises, while it continued to "focus on the business 
and industrial development of the Bumiputeras during the last thirty years".107 
The above wish lists indicated a shift away from the BN' s espousal of the 
communal terms of the 1957 informal constitutional contract- i.e. special privileges 
for the Malays in return for political and economic rights of the non-Malays. With 
exception of the communally-oriented part of the Suqiu' swish list, all the lists were 
Malaysia), Gabungan Mahasiswa Islam Semenanjung (GAMIS, Peninsular Muslim Students' Coalition), 
Barisan Bertindak Mahasiswa Negara (BBMN, National Students' Action Front) and Universiti Bangsar 
Utama (UBU). 
104 Netto (1999). 
105 The full document is reproduced in Kua (2005: 187-195). The initiators of the appeal are 11 
influential Chinese organizations: United Chinese School Committees Association of Malaysia (Dong 
Zong), United Chinese School Teachers Association of Malaysia Giao Zong), United Chinese Schools 
Alumni Association of Malaysia, Nanyang University Alumni Association of Malaysia, Taiwan 
Graduates Alumni Association of Malaysia, Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, Federation of 
Guangdong Associations of Malaysia, Federation of Guangxi Associations of Malaysia, Federation of 
Sanjiang Associations of Malaysia, Federation of Fuzhou Associations of Malaysia and Huazi 
Research Centre. 
100 Kua (2005: 189). 
107 Kua (2005: 189). 
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non-communal in nature and aimed at creating a more democratic Malaysia. But 
even the communally-oriented part of the Suqiu' swish list struck at the heart of the 
BN' s espousal of the communally-based constitutional contract for it called for the 
dismantling of the Malay special privileges policy in favor of the one which would 
promote racial equality. However, fearing that this part of the Suqiu' s wish list 
would not go down well with Malay voters, the BA parties, especially PAS, were 
quite cautious in not adopting the election appeal in total. It rather said that it 
accepted most of the appea1s.10s 
As the open Malay revolt against the BN did not auger well for the ruling 
coalition to face the impending general election, it was not surprising that it was the 
BN which came into the open to pledge full support for the appeals. The cabinet 
ministers who headed the three predominantly Chinese parties in the BN, namely 
MCA, GERAKAN and SUPP, at a meeting with the Suqiu' s 11 initiator-organizations 
on 23September1999, accepted the appeals hoping that the Chinese would support 
the BN in the general election.109 MCA President Datuk Seri Dr. Ling Liang Sik who 
headed the Chinese ministers said that the appeals were not a "threat" to the BN and 
that "the principles (contained in the appeals) are universal and meant for all races, 
not the Chinese alone" .110 They also promised to hold further dialogues with the 
Chinese associations and recommended that the government appoint a few 
representatives from these organizations to sit in the National Economic 
Consultative Council II, which was responsible to devise proposals for Malaysia's 
10-year development plan.111 
The 1999 General Election 
The open Malay revolt, coupled with the presence for the first time ever of a unified 
opposition coalition force, struck the BN / UMNO with its "most historic challenge" 
10s Haraka11, 22October1999. 
109 Loh (2000). 
110 Quoted in Loh (2000). 
111 Berita Harian, 23Sept1999; New Straits Times, 24Sept1999. 
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in the 1999 General Election.112 Though the BN maintained its two-thirds majority in 
the Parliament by winning 148of193 parliamentary seats, UMNO suffered a decline 
of support in the Malay-majority constituencies. The party's representation in the 
Peninsular Malay-majority parliamentary constituencies was reduced from 87 in 
1995 to 66 in 1999. Its overall share of the national popular votes also dropped from 
36.5 percent in 1995 to 29.5 percent in 1999.113 The major setbacks were in the large 
Malay-majority constituencies especially in Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu. Out of 
59 parliamentary seats in these areas, UMNO won only 27 seats, compared to 47 
seats in 1995. Its share of popular votes in these constituencies also dropped from 62 
percent in 1995 to 49 percent.114 Adding to the setbacks were the defeats of several 
UMNO ministers, all of whom contested in the large Malay-majority constituencies. 
They were Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, Tan Sri Abdul Hamid 
Othman (Baling, Kedah), Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs Minister, Datuk Seri 
Megat Junid Megat Ayub (Parit, Perak), Rural Development Minister, Datuk Seri 
Annuar Musa (Peringat, Kelantan), Entrepreneurship Development Minister, Dato' 
Mustapa Mohamad (Jeli, Kelantan) and Terengganu Chief Minister, Tan Sri Wan 
Mokhtar Ahmad (Cukai, Terengganu). Even the then most senior UMNO Vice-
President, Datuk Seri Mohd. Najib Tun Razak, won the Pekan parliamentary seat 
with a slim majority of 241 votes, indicating a large withdrawal of Malay support 
from UMNO. The party however fared better in the medium Malay-majority 
constituencies, where the Malay voters constituted between 50 to 66 percent of the 
electorates. UMNO won all 39 parliamentary seats in these areas, but with a decline 
in its share of the popular votes from 77 percent in 1995 to 62 percent.115 This 
indicated that the UMNO candidates might have depended on the non-Malay votes 
to win. 
UMNO's arch-rival PAS triumphed in Kelantan and Terengganu. The Islamic 
party strengthened its position in Kelantan by winning 41 of the 43 seats in the state 
legislature, leaving UMNO with only two seats. It also won ten of the 14 
112 Maznah (2003). 
m Marzuki (2004). 
114 Marzuki (2004). 
11s Marzuki (2004). 
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parliamentary seats in the state, while keADILan won three seats. UMNO only 
managed to retain its Gua Musang parliamentary seat through its candidate, former 
Finance Minister Tengku Razaieigh Hamzah. The opposition had done even better 
than the 1995 general election when the Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah, a PAS-led 
coalition, won 12 of the 14 parliamentary seats and 36 of the 43 state seats in 
Kelantan. In neighboring Terengganu, a large swing of Malay votes toward the 
opposition helped PAS seize the state from UMNO. PAS won 28 of the 32 state seats, 
while UMNO won the remaining four seats in the state. PAS also won seven of the 
eight parliamentary seats in the state, while keADILan won the remaining one seat. 
This reversed the result of the 1995 general election in which the BN won 25 of the 32 
state seats and seven of the eight parliamentary seats in the state. Outside Kelantan 
and Terengganu, the Malay votes were quite divided in the large Malay-majority 
constituencies. In Kedah, PAS won 12 of the 36 state seats, one seat short of denying 
the BN of its two-thirds majority in the state's legislature. The party also managed to 
win eight of the fifteen parliamentary seats in the state, while the BN won the 
remaining seven seats. 
Overall, the BA made successful inroads into a number of central west-coast 
states like Selangor and Perak, hitherto BN' s strongholds. In Selangor, the BA failed 
to win any parliamentary seat but won six state seats while in Perak it won three 
parliamentary seats and eight state seats. This was a remarkable achievement given 
previous lackluster performances of the opposition, especially PAS, in these states.116 
Among all the BA parties, PAS emerged as the main gainer by winning 98 state seats 
and 27 parliamentary seats. The DAP came next by winning 11 state seats and 10 
parliamentary seats, while the nascent keADILan was less successful, winning only 
five parliamentary seats and four state seats, all of which were located in the Malay 
116 In Selangor, PAS emerged victorious in the state seats of Sungai Besar, Sungai Burung and 
Gornbak Setia, all of which were previously held by UMNO. In Perak, the Islamic party won state 
seats of Titi Serong, Gunong Semanggol and Belanja, while wresting from UMNO the parliamentary 
seats of Parit Buntar and Parit. 
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majority areas in Peninsula Malaysia.117 Wan Azizah herself won the Malay-
majority Permatang Pa uh parliamentary seat previously held by Anwar. 
The DAP' s performance, however, was not encouraging. The party gained 
one extra parliamentary seat from nine in 1995, but party stalwarts like Secretary-
General Lim Kit Siang and Deputy Chairman Karpal Singh lost theirs. It also failed 
to attract a large Chinese vote swing toward the BA. In fact, there was a slight drop 
in its share of popular votes in the large Chinese-majority areas from 52 percent in 
1995 to 51.2 percent in 1999.llB This indicated that while the revolt against the BN 
government had largely been a Malay phenomenon, which resulted in the 
significant swing of votes toward the BA in the large Malay-majority areas, the 
Chinese voters remained divided right down the middle. 
As PAS won the most number of seats among the opposition parties, its 
president Dato' Hj Fadzil Noor was elected as the Opposition Leader in the 
Parliament, replacing DAP Secretary-General Lim Kit Siang. The open Malay revolt 
resulted in, for the first time ever, a direct face-off between the Malay-led BN and a 
Malay-led opposition in the Parliament, defying the hitherto ethnic equation of 
Malay-supported goverrunent and Chinese-supported opposition. The election 
results show that opposition to the government, like support for it, had been 
multiracial, with the Malay segment of the electorate increasingly supporting the 
opposition. 
As the BN's hegemonic stability had always been legitimated upon the basis 
of the communally-based constitutional contract, the BA' s democratic and non-
communal social contract, coupled with the numerous civil society actors' wish lists 
struck at the heart of the BN' s legitimacy itself. All the more so, a fusion of formal 
and informal political activism - as represented by coalitions of political parties and 
civil society actors in fomenting demands for political change, as well as NGO 
leaders' candidacy in the election - gave a boost to the democratic ferment in the 
117 The parliamentary seats were Permatang Pauh (Penang), Kemaman (Terengganu), Kola Bharu 
(Kelantan), Tanah Merah (Kelantan) and Peringat (Kelantan). The state seats were Cini (Pahang), 
Penanti (Penang), Bola (Perak) and Hulu Kelang (Selangor). 
ns Its actual votes in 12 large Chinese-majority parliamentary constituencies (where Chinese voters 
constituted more than 66 percent of the electorates) in the Peninsular Malaysia however increased 
from 260,953 in 1995 to 290,357 in 1999. See Marzuki (2004). 
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run-up to the 1999 General Election.119 Furthermore, as civil society actors played 
more significant roles in the election campaign, they had either directly or indirectly 
catapulted to prominence their democratic and non-communal vision of politics, 
hence supplementing that of the BA. State repression against Anwar and his 
supporters, coupled with the wide coverage the Anwar saga received in the 
alternative print and internet media, emerged as a focal point for valorization of 
democratic values and practices especially among the young and middle-class 
Malays, as well as the anti-establishment sections within the non-Malay 
communities - mostly supporters of the opposition keADILan and DAP and the 
educated urban NGO activists. The result was that the BN' s highly divisive 
communal politics based on the communal constitutional contract has been 
increasingly challenged by an emerging new political force, however nascent and 
amorphous, desiring abrogation of the terms of the old communally-based 
constitutional contract and its replacement with a non-communal social contract 
built upon multiracial commitment to democracy, individual freedom and equality. 
Beyond Refonnasi: Whither Non-Communal Politics? 
The task to envision non-communal politics had been all the more important since 
the 1998 Reformasi and the conclusion of the 1999 General Election. Reformasi actors 
had to deal with perennial issues of race relations, religion and state repression in 
more concrete terms beyond the immediate goal of ending BN' s dominance in an 
impending election. As for the BA parties, holding to common long-term goals and 
policies, as well as maintaining a truly communally neutral vision of politics, beyond 
the election proved to be a daunting task. While trying to be committed to the long-
119 Kuttan (2005). Civil society activists like Chandra Muzaffar, Tian Chua, Sivarasa Rasiah and Zaitun 
Kassim contested in the election as opposition candidates though all of them lost. Muslim activists 
from ABIM and JIM also contested in the election as opposition candidates but only a handful of them 
were successful. keADILan candidates, Ramli Ibrahim and Muhammad Mustafa, both of whom were 
former ABIM leaders, won large-Malay majority parliamentary seats of Kota Bharu and Peringat, 
both in Kelantan. While civil society activists' candidacy has given a boost to opposition's struggle for 
democracy, active participation of Muslim activists from leading Islamic organizations such as ABIM 
and JIM in opposition politics lends the opposition a sort of Islamic legitimacy, supplementing that of 
PAS. 
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term goal of building an alternative multiracial opposition coalition to challenge 
BN' s dominance, individual parties in the BA, especially PAS and DAP, also need to 
respond to the forces within their own constituencies, which have been very much 
community-oriented in the past. While staunch PAS followers were adamant to see 
the establishment of Islamic state in Malaysia, the DAP supporters were vehemently 
against such an idea. There lies a great question of how the BA parties are to move 
from Reformasi to building a non-communal political system in Malaysia. In the realm 
of informal politics too, the question has been how far Reformasi actors of different 
social and religious backgrounds could further solidify efforts at building a common 
coalition for political reform. Civil society's encounter with issues of race, religion 
and repression in different sites of domination and opposition are more complicated 
than meets the eye. 
In the midst of these uncertainties, some reformist intellectuals tended to read 
emerging signals in positive ways. Khoo Boo Teik, a political scientist at the 
University of Science Malaysia and an ALIRAN member, was optimistic that real 
political change was underway. Noting that the politics of "Chinese chauvinism" 
and "Islamic extremism" were on their way out, he observes: 
For three decades after 1957, the social contradictions of colonial capitalism, 
experience with decolonization, and hangovers from separate Malay, Chinese 
and Indian nationalisms easily inflamed interethnic passions ... Those 
passions have largely burned themselves out,120 
Khoo based his observation on a number of exciting developments ahnost one 
year after the conclusion of the 1999 General Election. On 29 October 2000, about one 
thousand people from BA parties, NGOs and concerned individuals gathered 
outside the Kamunting detention camp to protest 40 years of ISA. What is exciting 
was not the number of people gathered but the fact that "past anti-ISA protests 
hadn't seen Malay protestors outnumbering non-Malay protesters by such a wide, 
120 Khoo (2000: 5). 
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wide margin" .121 Barely one week after the protest, on 5 November, keADILan' s 
"100,000 Persons Rally" along the KESAS Highway near Shah Alam, about 30 
kilometres west of Kuala Lumpur, attracted thousands of protesters who were 
predominantly Malays.122 Adding to the excitement was BA's victory in a by-election 
at Lunas on 29 November 2000. The election was held following the murder of BN 
assemblyman, Dr. Joe Fernandez. The electoral victory in Lunas, a racially mixed 
state constituency in Kedah, the home state of Dr. Mahathir, symbolized BA' s 
capability to win support of multiracial voters, hitherto the BN' s preserve, hence 
making an alternative multiracial two-party system more likely. Sharing the same 
sentiment was another prominent political scientist and, up to October 2001, the 
Deputy President of keADILan, Chandra Muzaffar. Commenting on BA' s victory in 
the Lunas by-election, he observes that "a multi-ethnic, loosely cobbled opposition is 
beginning to take shape and form" .123 He attributed such an emerging trend to the 
existence of a common enemy, Mahathir and his iron-fist leadership, and to a lesser 
extent, the ability of BA leaders, supporters and the voting populace to overcome the 
"seemingly insurmountable barriers separating the different communities" ,124 At 
least, these developments indicated that opposition to the government had taken a 
multiethnic rather than a mono-ethnic character. It was no longer a highly divisive 
ethnic affair in which non-Malay opposition forces are pitted against a Malay-
dorninated government. Opposition forces too have been ethnically mixed, with the 
Malay segment seeming to be taking the leading role, like in the government. 
But beneath these optimistic observations about the emerging new politics of 
non-communalism, lies the old politics of race and religion. In the run-up to the 
Lunas by-election, the choice between a DAP Indian candidate and a Malay 
keADILan candidate to represent the BA was an issue of much contention. 
keADILan Vice-President, Tian Chua, quit his party post in protest against BA's 
121 Khoo (2000: 2). 
122 The national news agency Bernama reported the number of protesters was 500 while the 
Associated Press, quoting the Inspector-General of Police, Tan Sri Norian Mai, stated the number at 
5,000 (Bemama, 5 November 2000; Associated Press, 5 November 2000). The local Chinese press 
diplomatically reported the size of gathering as "too many to count'' (quoted in Khoo (2000: 4)) 
123 Chandra (2000: 16). 
124 Chandra (2000: 16). 
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decision to field S. Neelamekan, an ethnic Indian from DAP.125 When the BA, after 
last-minute lobbying by keADILan leaders, finally changed its decision and fielded 
Saifuddin Nasution, a Malay member of keADILan's Supreme Leadership Council 
as its candidate, Perak DAP Secretary-General, M. Kulasegaran, resigned from his 
party post "in a symbolic gesture of protest against the opposition front's treatment 
of non-Malays" .126 DAP Secretary-General, Kerk Kim Hock, while urging voters to 
support Saifuddin, reviewed his party's position in the BA as a result of the 
dispute.127 Though the BA' s final decision to field Saifuddin was a "strategic 
decision", as Chandra explained, "to harness the tilt, i.e. the growing antagonism 
towards Mahathir within the UMNO rank-and-file, the pro-PAS-keADILan mood in 
Kedah and the advantage that Saifuddin had as the BA Parliamentary candidate in 
the area in the 1999 General Election", the ruckus that resulted from the dispute was 
full of racial overtones.128 Furthermore, the main issues that fuelled BA's campaign 
in the by-election, other than Anwar's incarceration and a host of other "injustices" 
associated with the BN, were essentially communal. These include the Chinese 
community's objection to the assimilationist tendency of the government's Vision 
School project and Mahathir's remarks in his Merdeka Day speech which equated 
the Chinese educationist movement Dong Jiao Zang with communism.129 These issues 
could have angered the Chinese community who in turn voted for the BA candidate 
in the by-election. Less explicit was the talk in town that ex-Lunas assemblyman, Dr. 
Joe Fernandez, was a Christian preacher and his murder was related to his 
missionary activities within the local Malay community. This fact, or rather 
m The Sun, 20 November 2000. Tian Chua, however, retracted his resignation after keADILan 
candidate, Saifuddin Nasution, was fielded as BA candidate in the by-election. 
126 The Straits Times, 24 November 2000. Lunas had previously been considered as an Indian seat 
where in the previous election the constituency was won by an MIC candidate. Again, this time, the 
BN fielded an Indian candidate, S. Anthonysamy, from MIC to contest in the by-election. 
127 The Straits Times, 24 November 2000. 
12ll Chandra (2000: 16). 
1
" Vision School is an integrated school system proposed by the government in its effort to forge 
national unity among students of various ethnic groups. Under this system, national schools and 
Tamil and Chinese vernacular schools will be built in the same compound and students will share 
facilities. However, the emphasis on a common administrative structure of the Vision School invites 
objection from the Chinese community fearing that it would erode the identity of Chinese vernacular 
schools. 
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perception, might have bolstered Malay voters' rejection of the BN candidate, S. 
Anthonysamy, who was a Christian. 
But much deeper than election fissures was the need on the part of individual 
BA parties to respond to forces within their own constituencies which remained 
largely communal. Two days after being swept to power in Terengganu, PAS 
Deputy President and the state Menteri Besar (Chief Minister), Datuk Seri Abdul 
Hadi Awang, vowed to implement strict Islamic laws, including closure of gambling 
joints and the curbing of alcohol sales, as steps toward the establishment of an 
Islamic state.130 The DAP objected and strongly opposed any move by PAS to create 
an Islamic state. DAP Deputy Chairman, Karpal Singh, called on PAS to honour its 
commitment to the opposition pact, which excluded the creation of an Islamic state 
in its common manifesto, otherwise DAP would not hesitate to review its position in 
the coalition. Bl Such a reaction from DAP was understandable. PAS, by winning 27 
parliamentary seats, was now the biggest opposition party in the Parliament and 
would certainly have more clout in the BA. DAP only won 10 parliamentary seats 
and three of its heavyweights, Secretary-General Lim Kit Siang, Chairman Dr. Chen 
Man Hin and Deputy Chairman Karpal Singh lost in the election.132 The tide now 
favoured the Islamic party PAS, while the DAP was far from reviving its heyday of 
the 1980s. Party leaders believed that its affiliation with PAS had turned many 
Chinese voters away from DAP, which in turn resulted in the party's less than 
expected showing in the election.133 The only way for the DAP to revive its influence 
among Chinese voters was by distancing itself from any move by PAS to implement 
Islamically inclined policies, otherwise the party would lose its clout in its traditional 
constituencies, the Chinese-majority areas. With PAS at the helm of the opposition, 
and UMNO attempting to regain its lost ground in the Malay heartland states, the 
130 Agence-France Presse, 1 December 1999. 
131 Bemama, 1December1999. 
m DAP's poorest showing in a general election was in 1995 when the party managed to win only 9 
parliamentary seats, a big plunge from the 20 seats it won in 1990. 
133 Interview with Lim Guan Eng, DAP Secretary-General, 25 April 2005, Petaling Jaya. Karpal Singh 
attributed DAP's poor showing in the 1999 General Election to MCA's exploitation of the party's 
association with PAS. Referring to PAS's Islamic State manifesto for Terengganu, he said "MCA fully 
exploited tills against us by emphasizing our association with PAS. We lost a lot of ground as a result 
of this" (The Sun, 25 July 2001). 
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pursuit to out-do each other in the Islamization race could further weaken DAP' s 
position within the opposition coalition, and erode further its credibility in the eyes 
of Chinese community. Such an apprehension could have not been more apparent 
when Lim Kit Siang, in his letter of resignation as DAP Secretary-General stated, 
"the next five years will principally become the battleground between UMNO and 
PAS for the hearts and minds of the Malays in the Malay heartland, resulting in a 
spiral of Islamisation policies -- threatening a democratic secular Malaysia and 
sidelining all other great issues" .134 
The death knell for the DAP-P AS coalition, however, came in September 2001 
when DAP finally decided to pull out from BA over PAS' s ambition for an Islamic 
State. Earlier, the PAS-led Terengganu government had introduced a host of Islamic 
laws and policies such as the kharaj tax (business tax) on non-Muslims, a ruling on 
the wearing of the tudung (veil) for women and the implementation of Islamic 
criminal laws, including hudud, in the state. The implementation of the kharaj tax was 
however put off due to growing resentment from non-Muslims, including strong 
objections from DAP, while the Shariah Criminal Bill (Hudud and Qisas) was finally 
passed by the state legislature in July 2002, amidst protests from non-Muslim 
community, women's groups and the Federal Government. Adding to the 
complexity of PAS' s Islamic state proposal was the worldwide Islamophobia 
following the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States and ISA arrests of 
members of Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM, Malaysian Mujahidin Group, 
which was later called as Kumpulan Militan Malaysia by the government) for their 
alleged involvement in militant activities. One of the arrested KMM members was 
Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz, the son of PAS' s spiritual leader and Kelantan Chief 
Minister, Dato' Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat. Despite PAS's assurances that its Islamic 
State concept would not disadvantage the non-Muslims, DAP leaders remained 
unconvinced. 135 The fear over the Islamic party's apparent penchant to put Malaysia 
134 Agence France-Presse, 2 December 1999. 
13s Abdul Hadi, for example, gave his assurance that non-Muslims would be exempted from 
enforcement of Islamic laws on "specific matters", though they have to abide by the law just as 
Muslims would do on matters of public interest such as land and traffic rules (The New Straits Times, 3 
July 2001). 
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under a seemingly theocratic rule was too powerful among non-Malays for PAS' s 
assurances to be accepted. 136 
The nascent keA DILan too continued to grapple with its teething problems. In 
the lead up to party elections in November 2001, factionalism within the party 
became more apparent. While party factionalism is nothing new, it was a cause for 
concern in the case of keA DILan. Since its inception, the party's strength was built 
upon its ability to hold together distinct social and religious groups by incorporating 
Islarnists, NGO activists, social democrats, former UMNO leaders and plain 
Anwaristas in a rainbow coalition within the party. What transpired in the lead up to 
the party elections was the break up of that rainbow coalition. There had been at 
least three major factions within the party - the ABIM camp, the Jamaah Isiah 
Malaysia GIM) camp and the former ex-UMNO camp. To compound the matter, the 
ABIM camp's opposition to Anwar' s proposal to merge keA DILan with Parti Rakyat 
Malaysia (PRM) became a major election issue. The three major factions had 
realigned themselves into two factions, i.e. the pro-merger faction consisting mainly 
of ex-UMNO and JIM members, supported by the NGO activists, and the anti-
merger faction comprised mainly ABIM members. The tussle between these two 
factions had taken a religious slant because the ABIM camp's opposition to the 
merger was, among other things, due to its uneasiness with PRM's "socialist" 
ideological leaning.137 The result was a blow to ABIM when its key affiliates lost, 
except Sheikh Azrni Ahmad who retained the Vice-Presidency. Four key ABIM-
linked candidates who lost in the party election refused to accept appointment as 
MPT members.138 Though not all ABIM members deserted keADILan after the 
136 Equating Taliban to PAS was obviously an exaggeration, however, since the party has not been as 
intolerant to religious freedom as Taliban. In PAS-led Kelantan for example, a Buddhist temple with 
the largest statue of Buddha in the region was declared open in September 2001 (Agence France-Presse, 
9 September 2001). 
137 Interview with Shamsul Iskandar Mohd. Akin, Vice Chief of Angkatan Muda, PKR, 10 October 
2006, Kuala Lumpur. See also Kabilan (2001). 
138 The four were Dr. Muhammad Nur Manuty (former ABIM President/keADILan Deputy President 
candidate), Mohd. Anuar Tahir (former ABIM Secretary-General/Vice-President candidate), Mustaffa 
Kami! Ayub (former PKPIM President and ABIM Exco member/Vice Youth Chief candidate) and 
Ruslan Kassim (Vice-President candidate). Ruslan, who had no previous position in ABIM but was 
closely associated with the Islamic movement, later accepted his appointment as keADILan's 
Information Chief. He, however, left keADILan to rejoin UMNO before the 2004 General Election. 
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polls,139 ABIM started to distance itself from the party and concentrated more on its 
work in Islamic activism and, to certain extent, Malay nationalism.140 Remaining 
ABIM supporters in keADILan continued to oppose the merger plan, both on tactical 
and ideological grounds. The reason for ABIM' s objection to the merger plan, as 
ABIM President Ahmad Azam Abdul Rahman explained, was "not to let PRM's red 
(socialist) history to be a burden to keADILan", which had started with a clean 
slate.141 However, with the departure of anti-merger ABIM faction from party's key 
leadership positions, the pro-merger faction had been gaining more ground in the 
party. The merger was finally materialized when a two-thirds majority vote in its 
November 2002 Annual General Meeting agreed to amend the party constitution in 
relation to the merger. The party's name was changed to Parti keADILan Rakyat 
(PKR, People's Justice Party) to reflect the presence of PRM leaders in the new 
entity.142 
Conclusion 
The 1998 Reformasi occurred during a period when previous justifications for 
authoritarian controls had lost much of their relevance. There was no communist 
threat, ethnic tensions had eased and multi-racial middle class was expanding. This, 
in a way, helped the Reformasi activists to articulate a non-communal vision of 
Malaysian politics and forge new multiracial coalitions for political change. The 
struggle was premised on a non-communal social contract, aimed at widening the 
democratic space and shifting the foci of political interest from comrnunalism to 
1
" Mustaffa for example remained in the party and was appointed Secretary-General in April 2003. 
He did not contest in the 2004 party polls, but was appointed Vice-President afterwards. The party's 
constitution provides for the appointment of two Vice-Presidents, in addition to the three elected 
Vice-Presidents. 
140 ABIM had since worked very closely with a group of Malay nationalists called Kumpulan Prihatin 
(Concerned Group). The group's "Malay Agenda" initiative calls upon all Malay-based organizations 
and political parties to work together to ensure the survival of Malay ummah. See the speech of 
Ahmad Azam Abdul Rahman, ABIM President, at the opening of Malay Agenda Assembly, 8 March 
2004. The text of his speech can be accessed at 
http://www.abim.org.rny/web/modules/news/article.php?storyid=306 (Accessed on 26 November 
2006). 
141 See Kabilan (2001). The same 'tactical' reason was shared by Hassan Karim, a PRM party leader. 
See Hassan (2001). 
142 Up to June 2007, PRM has yet to be deregistered and remained as a legal entity. 
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individualism. To this end, the Reformasi movement served as an important 
ideological conduit for political change, posing a challenge to the Barisan Nasional's 
espousal of highly contentious communally-based constitutional-contract politics. 
The opposition's historic electoral show-down against the Barisan Nasional in the 
1999 General Election proved that the Reformasi movement too was an important 
instrument of political change. But as Reformasi also occurred at a time when political 
power had been strongly consolidated and highly personalized in the hands of the 
Prime Minister, challenging the ruling government's political ascendancy was an 
uphill task Thour,h the results of the 1999 General Election dealt a costly blow to 
UMNO, the political anchorage of Barisan Nasional, the ruling coalition easily 
managed to retain its control over the government. Meanwhile, the articulation of a 
non-communal political vision among the Reformasi movement's rank-and-file 
remained shallow, and communally-based interest articulation remained significant, 
even among the main Reformasi actors like PAS and DAP. Beyond the polls, both 
parties had to grapple with longstanding ideological differences pertaining to the 
role of Islam in the modern state. The Reformasi' s role as a conduit of political change 
was soon called into serious question. The PAS and DAP break-up on the heels of 
the September 11 attack on the United States, as well as the skirmishes between 
various groups in the nascent keADILan seemed to suggest that the internalisation 
of non-communal vision of Malaysian politics among the main Refomiasi actors 
themselves leaves much to be desired. 
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Chapter VT 
The Proliferation of Liberal Legal Meanings and the State's Response 
The Reformasi movement's articulation of a non-communal vision of Malaysian 
politics not only brought together political and civil society actors across communal 
and religious cleavages into a new broad-based coalition for political change, but 
also facilitated the proliferation of a more liberal vision of state law than the 
prevailing illiberal statist notion. This chapter argues that the articulation of 
Reformasi's non-communal ideology helped de-communalize the legal discourse and 
pulled together anti-repressive law activists across races calling for comprehensive 
legal reforms along more liberal lines. It was in this context that the articulation of 
Reformasi's democratic and non-communal ideology, coupled with the numerous 
exposes of government and judicial misconduct during the infamous Anwar trial, 
facilitated the rise of liberal legal meanings, catapulting to prominence the liberal 
conceptions of the rule of law, personal freedoms and natural justice. Reformasi, 
which shifted an essentially communal discourse on rights and interests to one 
which stressed the individual, helped unleash a whole set of liberal legal meanings 
which augmented individual rights and liberties rather than the prioritizing of state 
legal powers as a means to regulate and control inter-communal relations. 
Supporters of Reformasi sought the repeal or review of laws that limit or regulate the 
exercise of personal freedoms.I 
But there were limitations to the spread of the new liberal legal meanings 
more widely within the society. This legal vision was mainly confined to the more 
reformist sections within the society, comprising mainly human rights activists and 
lawyers, supporters of opposition parties, some sections within the Islamic 
mainstream and anti-establishment student groups. Furthermore, as ethnic-based 
interest articulation within Malaysia's multiracial society remained significant, the 
1 These included the Internal Security Act 1960, which provides for detention without trial, Police Act 
1967 (restrictions on peaceful assembly), University and University Colleges Act 1971 (restrictions on 
student activism), Printing Presses and Publication Act 1984 (limitations on press freedom), Official 
Secrets Act 1972 (denial of public access to "official secrets"), Sedition Act 1972 (restrictions on 
freedom of speech) and the like. 
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government justified the continued existence and use of repressive laws as a 
necessary means to maintain racial harmony, and following the September 11 attack 
on the United States, to curb Islamic militancy. In view of this limitation, the 
government was less responsive to demands for legal changes in politically sensitive 
areas, such as anti-subversion and national security-related legislation than to calls 
for legal reform in politically less sensitive areas, such as those related to the 
"normal" criminal justice system, though the actual process of change remained 
slow and halting in those areas also. 
Anwar's Trial and Contested Legal Meanings 
The more compliant judiciary which emerged after the 1988 judiciary crisis set the 
stage for the use of courts by the government as one-sided political arenas to purge 
political opponents. Ever since, it has not been uncommon for criminal prosecutions 
and civil suits to be initiated against critics of the government.2 Moreover, those in 
authority became increasingly inclined to use court proceedings as a means to 
disgrace and humiliate political opponents. The Anwar trial and his subsequent 
conviction for corrupt practices and sodomy illustrate the use of political trials in 
Malaysia.3 But as Anwar's trial also indicated, excessive use of courts as one-sided 
political arenas to try a political opponent could lead to a serious erosion of public 
confidence in the independence of the judiciary, which in turn gave rise to greater 
articulation of liberal legal meanings among the reformist sections of the society, 
contesting the restrictive understandings that the government, through the courts, 
sought to articulate and disseminate. As a prominent lawyer and the then head of 
the Bar Council's criminal law section, Dato' Mohamed Apandi Ali (he was later 
2 See for example Attorney General, Malaysia v. Manjeet Singh Dhillon [1991] 1 M.L.J.167; MB/Capital 
& Anor v. Tommy Thomas & Anor [1991] 1 M.L.j. 139; Lim Guan Eng v. Public Prosecutor [1998] 3 
M.L.J. 14; Dato' Param Cumaraswamyv. MB/Capital Bhd [1997] 3 M.L.j. 300; INSAS Bhd. & Anorv. 
Param Cumaraswamy [2000] 4 M.L.J 727; Re Zainur Zakaria [1999] M.L.j. 577. 
3 The objective of a political trial is "the destruction, or at least, the disgrace or disrepute, of a political 
opponent" (Shklar 1964: 49). Not only do these "political trials" aim at eliminating political 
opponents, but also serve as a medium by which the political regime articulates its version of 
"legality". Once the court decides against the political "offender", he becomes an ordinary criminal 
who deserves legal retribution. In this regard, normal civil and criminal law legitimizes the state's 
domination by transforming political conflicts into legal battles. 
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appointed as a High Court Judge), put it, "Malaysians not only want to find out if 
the allegations (against Anwar) are true, but whether the judiciary is truly 
independent".4 
Anwar, while still being held under the ISA (during which time he was 
beaten by none other than the then Inspector-General of Police, Tan Sri Rahim Noor) 
was hauled into the courtroom on 5October1998 to face charges of corruption and 
sodomy. ln fact, allegations of Anwar's sexual misconduct had been on the cards 
since 1997 when Urnmi Hafilda, a sister of Anwar's private secretary, Azmin Ali, 
wrote a letter to Dr. Mahathir accusing Anwar of sodomizing the family driver, 
Azizan Abu Bakar, and having an illicit affair with the wife of her brother .s These 
allegations were then published in a book entitled "50 Dalil Mengapa Anwar Tidak 
Boleh Jadi Perdana Menteri" (50 Reasons Why Anwar Cannot Be Prime Minister), 
copies of which found their way into the bags of UMNO delegates to the party 
assembly in June 1998. Ironically, though Dr. Mahathir initially appeared hesitant to 
take the allegations seriously, it was those allegations that Dr. Mahathir referred to 
later as "incontrovertible evidence" against Anwar. 6 ln relation to these allegations 
Anwar, as a member of the government, faced charges of corrupt practices under 
section 2(1) of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No 22 of 1970 for 
directing Special Branch officers to obtain written admissions from Azizan and Umi 
Hafilda denying their allegations of sexual misconduct and sodomy. Anwar's 
alleged purpose was to protect himself against criminal proceedings.7 The charge 
carried a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment. Anwar, together with his 
adopted brother Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat :Madja, also faced charges of sodomy, 
which were tried separately. These charges came under section 377B of the Penal 
Code and carried a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment.B Earlier, Sukma 
and Anwar's speech writer, Dr. Munawar Anees, were sentenced to six months 
4 The Sun, 2 November 1998. 
'The letter entitled "Perihal Salah Laku Timbalan Perdana lvlenteri ,i.,talaysia" (On Misconduct of the 
Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia) dated 5August1997 was reproduced in Public Prosecutor !J Dato' 
Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim (No 3) [1999] 2 MLJ l, p.p. 34 - 42. 
'See Case (2003: 123). 
7 Public Prosecutor v. Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim [1999] 2MLJ1, p.p. 23-24. The' corruption' allegations 
against Anwar did not relate to the illegal acquisition of wealth but the misuse of political power. 
8 Public Prosecutor v. Dato' Seri Anwar fbralzim & Anor [2001] 3MLJ193. 
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imprisonment by the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court after they pleaded guilty to 
allowing Anwar to sodomize them. Munawar was a Pakistani national who served 
as an advisor to Anwar between 1991 and 1998. A biologist by training, he wrote 
extensively on Islam and science, and founded an internationally respected journal, 
Periodica Islamica. Both Sukma and Munawar denied later that the alleged crime had 
ever taken place, stating that their guilty pleas were obtained under duress.9 
Anwar claimed that the charges were trumped up by conspirators in high 
offices. The prosecutors however maintained that Anwar was a common criminal 
and the trial was a normal legal process. Anwar insisted that he was a victim of a 
political conspiracy, his trial was politically motivated, and he above all was 
innocent. It was in this context that both the prosecution and defence teams sought 
to prove their respective claims within the contested sphere of the legal process. The 
prosecution team argued against evidence of political conspiracy being adduced in 
court and sought to confine the trial strictly to "legal" matters. The defence counsels 
were instead adamant that the claim of political conspiracy was their client's only 
defence and the exclusion of such evidence would frustrate the justice that the court 
ought to dispense. In Anwar' s corruption trial, High Court Judge Dato' Augustine 
Paul ruled that the defence based on political conspiracy was irrelevant.10 This ruling 
came after the trial judge allowed the prosecution to drop from the proffered charges 
9 Reuters Neius, 23October1998. Munawar Anees narrated in vivid detail how he was made to confess 
to the offence while he was under police custody. He mentioned in his statutory declaration dated 7 
November 1998 that the police interrogators threatened him with all sorts of grave consequences 
including indefinite detention under the ISA, threats to the safety of his family members and 
cancellation of his application for American citizenship should he refuse to confess. The text of the 
statutory declaration can be accessed at 
http://www.malaysiakini.com/link/eNoFwVEKgCAMANAbObWf6jljqGTQmszF8Pa9183GCeDuo 
WQ!ohcwPbTmTVAbSIEqC7QNUZtw7CnHDaeRYWOF+Xv!STGmOI1/KeQbpw (Accesed on 23 
November 2006). Sukma too told the High Court in June 1999 that he was forced by the police to 
confess to the crime otherwise a bullet would be planted in his car and he could face charges of 
illegally possessing ammunition, a crime that carries the death penalty. See "Anwar1s Brother: Threats 
Forced Sex Confession" (BBC News, 30June1999, http://www.freeanwar.net/news/bbc300699.html, 
accessed on 7 October 2004) 
10 Some quarters within the legal fraternity questioned the selection of Augustine Paul, a relatively 
junior judge then, to hear a high profile case involving none other than the former Deputy Prime 
Minister. Paul was appointed a High Court judge in May 1998, just a couple of months before the trial 
began. Prior to his appointment as a High Court judge, he was a judicial Commissioner in the 
Malacca High Court. Many in the legal fraternity believed that a more senior judge should have 
handled the case. Interview with Dato' Shaik Daud Mohd Ismail, former judge of the Court of 
Appeal, 17 November 2006, Bukit Damansara, Kuala Lumpur. 
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the words "sexual misconduct and sodomy committed" by Anwar, though 
"evidence" of such offence had been adduced before the court, rendering any 
attempts by the defence team to rebut those allegations by adducing evidence of 
"political conspiracy" irrelevant. Put simply, the amendment, which was made at 
the end of the prosecution case effectively barred the defence team from rebutting 
the prosecution's "smear campaign" against Anwar. 
At this juncture, it is pertinent to illustrate how the process of smearing and 
humiliating a political offender was systematically carried out in the court of law 
and reproduced by the media. From the very beginning, Malaysian newspapers 
published in minute detail the contents of an affidavit filed by the police prosecutor, 
Senior Assistant Commissioner II Dato' (now Tan Sri) Musa Hassan (later promoted 
to Inspector-General of Police) in the related Nallakaruppan case which implicated 
Anwar in many instances of sexual misconduct.11 The affidavit, which was filed a 
day after Anwar was removed from office, was in support of an application to 
enable Dato' Nallakaruppan to be held in the Bukit Aman police lock-up in order to 
assist in the police investigation into his alleged offence of illegal possession of 
ammunition.12 The Malay Mail screamed "Affidavit- Anwar Sodomised Man 15 
Times" while the New Straits Times pronounced "Ex-DPM Implicated in Sexual 
l\1isconduct".l3 Another daily, The Sun, stated "CID-Anwar Involved in Sexual 
Misconduct". Bernama, the national news agency, also joined the fray by stating 
"Anwar Had Homosexual Relationship, Tried to Seduce Man's Wife"14 Inside the 
news stories were lurid details of the alleged sexual misconduct, supposedly 
revealed by Nallakaruppan and other witnesses in the course of police investigation 
n See for example T7w Malay Mail, 3 September 1998; T7ie New Straits Times, 4 September 1998. Dato' 
Nallakaruppan Solaimalai was an Indian businessman who was associated with Anwar. One of the 
allegations contained in a book entitled "50 Dalil Mengapa Anwar Tidak Boleh fadi Perdana !vfenteri" (50 
Reasons Vvny Anwar Cannot Become Prime Minister) was that Dato' Nalla acted a pimp for Anwar. 
The book was widely circulated during the 1998 UMNO general assembly. See discussion on the 
Nal!akaruppan case In Chapter 5. 
"ln a blatant attempt at intimidation, Nallakaruppan was charged with an offence under the ISA 
carrying the death penalty. His offence was the unlawful possession of 125 unregistered bullets but 
withou~ a weapon to fire it These bullets, along with their accompanying pistot had previously been held 
lawfully under a permit/ but when Nallakaruppan returned the pistol to his business partner (the principal 
licensee) on the expiry of the permit in 1992,. he had neglected to reh1m the accompanying 125 bullets. See 
HAKAM's website at htljl://www.hakatn.org/isaamnesty.htn1 (Accessed on 24 November 2007), 
1
' The Malay Mail, 3September1998; Tire New Straits Times, 4September1998. 
14 Bernama, 3 September 1998. 
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into Nalla' s case. The Malay Mail reproduced excerpts from the affidavit which, 
among other things, stated that a male witness (Azizan Abu Bakar) admitted to 
being sodomised 15 times by Anwar and this homosexual activity took place in 
several places including the Tivoli Villa apartments, which were said to be owned by 
Nallakaruppan in Bangsar, an upper class residential area on the outskirts of Kuala 
Lumpur.ls Another witness, Ummi Hafilda, gave a statement that she suspected her 
sister-in-law had a sexual relationship with Anwar.16 Nallakaruppan's former 
private driver also gave a statement that he had brought Anwar and Nallakaruppan 
to certain places for seks haram (illicit sex).17 As if this was not enough, The Sun 
reported parts of the affidavit which stated that Chinese, Mexican and Eurasian 
prostitutes were "supplied" to Anwar through Nallakaruppan.18 Bemama also 
reported that an unnamed corporate figure had lodged a police report claiming that 
Anwar had tried to seduce his wife when he and his wife were part of an official 
delegation to Washington led by Anwar.19 TV3, Malaysia's premier private 
television station, also broadcast allegations made against Anwar contained in the 
affidavit in its afternoon news on 3 September. The court had earlier allowed 
reproduction of those allegations despite objection from defense counsels on the 
basis that the affidavit itself had not been read in court.20 
While many other allegations were laid against Anwar, ranging from bribery 
to jeopardizing national security, it was the six-month jail sentence handed down on 
Sukma and Munawar for allowing Anwar to sodomize them that provided more 
ammunition for the smear campaign against the sacked Deputy Prime Minister. The 
headline "We Were Sodomized" filled the front page of The New Sunday Times on 
20 September 1998, noting that Sukma and Muna war had pleaded guilty to acts of 
gross indecency during their brief court appearances on 19September1998, a day 
before Anwar was arrested. 21 Berita Minggu had it that "Anwar Sodomized Two 
Men", while Mingguan Malaysia carried "Admission of Sodomy by Anwar" on its 
15 The Malay Mail, 3 September 1998. 
16 The Malay Mail, 3 September 1998. 
17 Tlie Malay Mail, 3 September 1998. 
"The Sun, 4 September 1998. 
19 Bernama, 3 September 1998. 
20 See "Ex-DPM Seeks Legal Opinion on MM, TV3 Reports", Tlie New Straits Times, 5September1998. 
21 New Sunday Times, 20 September 1998. 
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front page although this was not substantiated in its report.22 Both newspapers are 
owned by UMNO-linked companies. The Sunday Star, owned by an MCA-linked 
company, screamed "Two Jailed for Sodomy: They Implicate Anwar in Unnatural 
Sexual Acts". 23 During Anwar' s trial itself, detailed accounts of the charges and lurid 
explanations of Anwar' s alleged sex offences as described by prosecution witnesses 
made headlines in mainstream newspapers. A photo of a semen-stained mattress 
purportedly used by Anwar and his "sex partners" during his trysts was also 
reproduced by the local media. That the government was resolute in using the court 
as an arena to legitimize the humiliation of a political offender and vindicate the 
government's action was evident when the then UMNO Vice-President and 
Education Minister, Datuk Seri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak, told reporters that 
"once the evidence that has been accumulated against (Anwar) unfolds in court, 
more and more people will come to believe in what the government has been doing 
and saying thus far" ,24 The court did just that. In sentencing Anwar to nine years 
imprisonment for sodomy, which was to run consecutively after the expiry of the 
six-year imprisonment for the earlier conviction of corrupt practice, High Court 
Judge Dato' Ariffin Jaka slammed Anwar for "being the number two in the 
hierarchy of the country's administration", and yet "has not shov.n a high moral 
standard by committing sodomy, an offence which demands outright 
condemnation" .25 Key defence points raised by the defence teams in both the 
corruption and sodomy trials, the most important of which were inconsistencies in 
the testimony of Azizan Abu Bakar,26 the prosecution's star witness in the corruption 
trial, and evidence of Anwar' s alibi, were ignored by the court. 
The case was an attempt to legitimize the humiliation of a political offender 
by interweaving legal precepts with moral standards generally accepted by the 
22 Berita Minggu, 20 September 1998; Minggua11 Malaysia, 20September1998. 
"'Sunday Star, 20September1998. 
24 The New Straits Times, 30 September 1998. 
"Public Prosecutor v. Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim & Anor [2001] 3MLJ 193, p.p. 319. 
" In cross examination by Anwar' s lead cournel, Christopher Fernando, Azlzan admitted three times 
!:hat Anwar did not sodomise him. The trial judge however dismissed his admission as irrelevant 
because what mattered was the existence of the allegation !:hat Anwar had sodomised him (Azizan) 
and not the truth or falsity of such allegation. Public Prosecutor v Dato' Seri Anwar /Jin Ibrahim (No 3) 
[1999] 2 MLJ 1, p.p. 90. 
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society, creating a sense of meaning the state sought to articulate - that the crime 
was "demeaning", that the court was a legitimate arena to dispense "justice", that 
Anwar had committed a heinous "crime", and that it is only just and reasonable for 
the court to punish him with the most severe possible punishment for such a grave 
offence. In response to criticisms that the Anwar trial was devoid of due process, Dr. 
Mahathir unwittingly said, 
"Anwar Ibrahim could have been held under the lSA for as long as it was 
necessary but the government allowed police to take action through trial in 
open court ... the trial lasted one year and was conducted in English ... and 
Anwar was defended by nine of the country's best lawyers ... and yet they 
say there is no due process ... I do not understand the due process (which 
they mean)".27 
Anwar as a "political offender", believing that the court had been turned into 
a one-sided political arena, the main objective of which was the destruction of his 
political career and to caste aspersions on his morality, had chosen to turn the court 
into a contested political arena. Throughout the trials, Anwar revealed the inner 
working of his opponents' political machinations by raising political conspiracy as 
his main defence. These included revelations of his stressful relationship with some 
senior ministers whom he alleged were involved in corruption, and who later 
worked in concert to purge him;2B the circulation of poison pen letters by the then 
Minister of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs Datuk Seri Megat Junid Megat 
Ayub and his artiste wife Ziela Jalil alleging Anwar's sexual misconduct; 
involvement of Dato' Abdul Aziz Shamsuddin, the then Political Secretary to the 
Prime Minister (later Minister of Rural and Regional Development), in a plot to 
topple him; the Prime Minister's directive to the Anti-Corruption Agency to close a 
corruption case involving Tan Sri Ali Abul Hassan Sulaiman, the then Director-
27 Bernama, 6 November 2000. 
28 The ministers who were known to have tense relationship with Anwar included Minister of 
International Trade and Industry Datuk Seri Rafidah Aziz and former Malacca Chief Minister Tan Sri 
Abdul Rahim Tamby Chik. 
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General of the Economic Planning Unit, one of the most influential government 
agencies under the Prime Minister's Department; a Malaysian diplomat's attempt to 
bribe a limousine driver in Washington to induce the latter to fabricate evidence of 
Anwar' s sexual misconduct; and a failed attempt by two senior officers of the 
Attorney-General's Chamber to fabricate evidence against him ,29 But the most 
fundamental claim in Anwar' s arsenal was his insinuation that the court was biased, 
and that the country's highest ranking judge was involved in the scheme to finish 
him off, shattering the whole basis of the court as a legitimate arena to try the case 
fairly. Anwar revealed: 
I have ample evidence to show that the Chief Justice craved for an additional 
six months extension, to ensure that no action would be preferred against 
him, and to ensure that I fail in my appeal. I am also privy, then as Deputy 
Prime Minister, to the fact that the Anti-Corruption Agency had prepared a 
preliminary report against the Chief Justice in 1998 over corruption ... And 
with the issue of corruption left hanging, would the CJ dare cause displeasure 
of the Prime Minister?30 
In his statements from the dock, Anwar attempted to hold the moral high 
ground. He revealed corrupt practices involving senior judicial officers and 
29 Public Prosecutor v. Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim & Anor [2001] 3 ML) 193, p.p. 288-303. 
30 Anwar Ibrahim (2000: 2). The Chief justice was Tun Eusoff Chin who had been subjected to 
allegations of judicial misconduct after he and his wife were pictured in a photograph with a 
prominent lawyer, Dato' VK Lingam, while they were on vacation in New Zealand in 1994. The 
photograph was widely circulated on the internet. In 1995, Lingam won a controversial multimillion 
ringgit commercial case, in which Eusoff sat as presiding judge when the case reached the Federal 
Court. Earlier, the Court of Appeal in its judgement dated 31July1995, reversed the High Court's 
decision favoring Lingam, rapping the counsel for filing the case in the wrong division of the High 
Court, stating that such an act gave the impression that litigants can choose a judge whom they 
preferred to adjudicate their case. On 12 August 1995, the Federal Court, presided over by Eusoff, 
quashed the Court of Appeal's decision and expunged the remarks criticizing Lingam from the 
record. The Federal Court proceeding was tainted with controversy when P.S Gill, a High Court 
Judge, was allowed to sit as a judge, whereas in normal circumstances no judges lower in rank than a 
Judge of the Court of Appeal can be allowed to sit as a judge in any proceedings at the Federal Court. 
This raised suspicion among the legal fraternity that the selection of PS Gill as a member of the panel 
of judges was manipulated by Eusoff in a move to favour his decision. See also Ayer Molek Rubber Co 
Bhd & Ors V Insas Bhd & Anor [1995] 2 ML) 734 and Insas Bhd & Anor v Ayer Molek Rubber Co Bhd & Ors 
[1995] 2 ML) 833. 
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members of the administration, including a report by an unnamed senior judge 
handed personally to him while he was the Deputy Prime Minister, revealing 
personal misbehaviour and professional misconduct by judges. He also revealed that 
a senior minister allegedly involved in corrupt practices was spared criminal 
prosecution, despite the recommendation of the Anti-Corruption Agency and the 
Prosecution Division of the Attorney-General's Chamber that she should be 
prosecuted.31 Above all, he attempted to impress upon the public that it was because 
he opposed corruption that he was expelled from office and that his case could not 
be tried fairly. Describing the court's decision to convict him as "stinking to high 
heaven", Anwar asserted that the trial had been a "political persecution hiding 
behind the cloak of law".32 
The courts in both the corruption and sodomy trials finally convicted Anwar 
on all the charges proffered against him, and sentenced him to a total of 15 years 
imprisonment. 1bus, wifu a five-year ban on contesting elections for political office 
after serving the sentence, observers were convinced that Anwar would remain on 
the sidelines "beyond the time frame of Dr. Mahathir' s political life".33 The clouds 
over political motives behind the trial, however, tarnished Dr. Mahathir's credibility. 
William Case, in his analysis of the trial notes: 
Dr. Mahathir leaves a complex legacy ... Nor can one gainsay his country's 
rapid industrial progress. But the obduracy with which he has dealt with 
opposition forces while pursuing these aims - then tapped the country's 
judiciary so deeply for legitimacy that he has deadened it - forges an old 
trajectory in which the country modernizes its industrial base while its 
political institutions are demeaned.34 
" lt transpired later that the senior minister whom Anwar referred to was Datuk Seri Rafidah Aziz, 
Minister of International Trade and Industry and UMNO Women's Chief. 
32 Anwar Ibrahim (1999: 2). 
"Case (2003: 128). 
34 Case (2003: 130). 
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Open Malay Revolt and the Proliferation of Liberal Legal Meanings 
The Anwar trial dramatically exposed the coercive function of the law to the extent 
that not only was it used by those in authority to stifle dissent, but also to disgrace a 
political opponent. Not unexpectedly, the Anwar saga, as some scholars argue, set 
the stage for a Malay cultural revolt against the political establishment.35 This was 
evident in the changing conceptions of the "rule1" and the "ruled" taking place 
among the Malays - the UMNO' s constituency. Hari Singh traces the concept of 
loyalty to the ruler, which is part of the ethos of Malay political culture, to the 
narrative in the Malay annals (Sejarah Melayu) in which it was understood that 
subjects owe loyalty to their ruler as long as the ruler does not shame them.36 In this 
sense, loyalty to the ruler is absolute. Those who withdraw their loyalty are 
considered as traitors and as such are subject to punishment. The ruler, on the other 
hand, has a moral obligation to act as "protector" of his subjects. He may punish 
them if they are guilty of offences, but must not in any circumstances humiliate 
them.37 This ethos was breached when Anwar was not only convicted for the crime 
which he claimed was trumped up, but also accused of committing sodomy, the 
most heinous of sexual crimes in the eyes of the Malays. The reformist Malays 
reacted to this humiliating and "unjust" episode by thundering into the streets, 
braving water cannons at "illegal" assemblies, and flocking to the opposition's 
"illegal" ceramahs in small towns and villages. This indicated the withdrawal of their 
loyalty from, and an open revolt against, their hitherto "ruler" and "protector" - the 
UMNO establi5hment. To these reformist Malays, the Anwar saga was a turning 
point for their "cultural revolt", because not only was it a breach of their cultural 
ethos, but also unjust. The concept of justice in Islam - a defining element of Malay 
identity - was also evoked to justify their abhorrence of the court's verdict on 
Anwar. An Aliran eyewitness account quoted a member of the public as saying "(i)n 
Islam, we prize above all the Jaw of Allah which ensures justice. But in this case, it is 
35 Hari (2000); Maznah (2003). 
"' Hari (2000). 
"Chandra (1992: 4) 
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difficult to see the court being just" ,38 'The western conception of natural justice also 
came into play. The Malay-based Islamic movement, ABIM, described Anwar's 
sodomy conviction as one that" smacked of political persecution and revenge that is 
devoid of natural justice". The "hate verdict", the movement asserted, "came from a 
cruel source with no regard for fairness and justice" .39 
This sentiment however was not shared by the pro-establi'ihment section 
within the Malay community. There were moves by the UMNO leaders to defend 
criminal prosecution against Anwar by explaining the situation to the grassroots 
supporters.40 Other Malay-based organizations reacted to the episode by lashing out 
at the foreign critics of Anwar' s trial and conviction. The UMNO-linked Federation 
of Malay Students in the Peninsula (Galnmgan Pelajar Melayu Semenanjung, GPMS) 
and the Malaysian Youth Council (MYC) publicly criticized Singapore Senior 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew who described Anwar' s trial as a "sad saga" for the people 
of Malaysia and its neighbours.41 The then GPMS PresidentSuhaimi Ibrahim 
criticized Lee for meddling in Malaysia's domestic affairs, while the JvfYC President 
Saifuddin Abdullah said that Lee's statement was very much unexpected.42 
Responding to the move by seven US congressmen to introduce a resolution calling 
for Anwar' s retrial or release in November 2000, the JvfYC, with the support of the 
Ex-Policemen Association of Malaysia, the members of which were largely Malays, 
launched the "Tell Off 7" campaign for one million signatures in protest against the 
move.43 Earlier, another UMNO-linked youth association, the 4B Youth Movement, 
headed by the then Deputy Transport Minister and UMNO Supreme Council 
Member Datuk Wira M.ohd, Ali Rustam, sacked the Chairman of its Kuala Selangor 
branch Mohd Shafid Omar for being involved in the Reformasi movement.44 Others 
tried to justify Anwar' s trial as just a normal legal process, the justness of which was 
"'Aliran (1999). 
"See the press statement by AB!!\1 President, Ahmad Azarn Abdul Rahman, "Anwar Gets a Hate 
Verdict" dated 9 August 2000, The statement ls accessible at 
http: I /mindarakyat2.tripod.com/2000ogos/i200(h1622.htm (Accessed on 21 May 2007). 
"Bernama, 27January1999, 
"'I1ie Sun, 17 April 1999. 
"Tile Sun, 17 April 1999. 
43 New Straits Times, 11 November 2000. 
44 Bernama, 20 October 1998. 
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always on trial. In this regard, former Supreme Court Judge, the late Tan Sri Hamn 
Hashim, wrote in his column "The Bench Mark" in the New Straits Times: 
"in every trial, justice itself is on trial always - the system, the police, the 
judge, the prosecutors, the defence counsel and the accused person. There is 
no reason to doubt the Anwar trial will be any different." 45 
The tussle between the reformist and the pro-establishment Malays showed 
that the Malay ground was divided over the justness of Anwar' s trial. Be that as it 
may, Anwar had successfully turned the court into a contested political arena, 
challenging the legitimacy of the country's judicial institutions and the attendant 
statist legal meanings the government sought to articulate. It was in this vein that the 
trial has been perceived from critical points of view, citing the abandonment of 
"natural justice", "rule of law", and "judicial independence", contesting the 
government's insistence on Anwar' s "crime" and the supposedly independent 
judiciary.46 The legal coercion and systematic humiliation meted out to a Malay 
"subject" by a Malay "protector" had unleashed a whole set of the more liberal legal 
meanings among the reformist-Malays. It was not surprising therefore that even a 
Malay-based Islamic organization like ABIM was at ease with the western-liberal 
legal jargon such as "natural justice" and "rule of law" in condemning the 
"injustices" done to Anwar.47 The Malays who participated in the street 
demonstrations in support of Anwar too began to value the rights to freedom of 
assembly, of expression and of speech which were understood in terms of the 
western liberal tradition. Sabri Zain' s Reformasi Diary quoted a Malay demonstrator 
as saying, "I think the demonstrations were good. They showed Dr. Mahathir that 
the people are angry with what he had done. But the police were rough with us and 
it frightened a lot of people. 'They had to use violence and fear to silence the people. 
45 See "Justice itself is always on trial'', Neru Straits Times, 12 November 1998. 
46 See Malaysian Bar Council (2001). 
47 See the press starement by ABIM President, Ahmad Azam Abdul Rahman, "Anwar Gets a Hate 
Verdict" dated 9 August 2000. The statement is accessible at 
htt12:/lmindarakyat2.tri[.lod.com/2000ogps/i20Q0-1622.htm (Accessed on 21 May 2007). 
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That is not a sign of good government."4S Such a western conception of the rights to 
freedom of assembly and expression, and the role it plays in making the government 
more accountable to the people was then fused with the conception of dignity in the 
Malay tradition, giving a further boost to the reformist-Malay open revolt against the 
Malay-led government for the un-Malay treatment that Anwar received from it. 
Again, Sabri Zain's diary quoted a Malay lady as saying, ""We Malays don't usually 
treat people like this. 'Marnah' (Dignity) is very important to us. Even the guilty 
deserves dignity ... But our leaders don't seem to understand this. '!his is not the 
Malay way. That is why so many of us are angry."49 It was in this context that the 
reformist-Malays were increasingly more concerned with the justness of the law 
rather than the law's ess<cntially statist objectives. These legal meanings had then 
turned into the reformist-Malays' text of resistance. 
But, there are of course factors other than the essentially" cultural" that may 
help explain the open Malay revolt against the political establishment, especially 
UMNO. It is noteworthy that the Anwar saga occurred in a period during which the 
use of repressive laws on the grounds of maintaining racial harmony and preserving 
national security had increasingly been called into question. The expansion of the 
Malay middle class and the narrowing gap in inter-ethnic income disparity eased 
any apprehensions about possible ethnic or religious conflict. As a recent survey 
administered by the Merdeka Centre for Opinion Research revealed, 97.1 percent of 
Malaysian Muslims, the majority of whom were Malays, said that it was acceptable 
for them to live alongside the people of other religions, indicating a greater level of 
acceptance of racial, cultural and religious diversity among the Malays in Malaysia.SO 
Coupled with the eclipse of the communist threat, the government's rationale that 
the ISA is necessary to preserve racial harmony appeared less convincing. In 
addition, since the 1990s the ISA has also been increasingly used against Malay 
48 5e€ "Waiting for justice (13 November 1998)" in the online version of Sabri Zain's Face Off A 
Malaysian Reformasi Dian] (1999-98) at http://www.sabrizain.org/relormasi/waiting2.htrn (Accessed 
on 21 May 2007). 
"'See the on\ine version of Sabri Zain' s Reformasi Dian], above. 
so The survey entitled "Muslim Identities Public Opinion Survey: Peninsula Malaysia", coordinated 
by Associate Professor Dr. Patricia Martinez of the Asia-Europe Institute at the University of Malaya, 
was conducted in December 2005. It involved about 1000 respondents across peninsular Malaysia. See 
also New Straits Times, 20 August 2006; Tiie Sun, 5 September 2006. 
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political dissidents, something of a reversal from the trend in the 1960s through 
1980s when the law was mainly used against the "communists" and the so-called 
"chauvinist" elements often associated with the Chinese. At the same time, there had 
been growing disaffection among the Malays with UMNO' s patronage dispensing 
function, which seemed to benefit only a few politically-well-connected individuals 
rather than the Malay masses. This was particularly evident at the peak of the 1997 
economic crisis, roughly coinciding with the UMNO leadership criBis, when the 
bailouts of companies belonging to politically-well-connected individuals, including 
that of Dr. Mahathir' s son and the Daim-linked Renong, exacerbated not only 
factional conflict within UMNO, but also Malay anger toward the party. \Vorse still, 
public funds such as the cash-rich Employees Provident Funds (EPF) and Lembaga 
Urusan Tabung Haji (Pilgrimage Fund Management Board), which are often loosely 
referred to as the "people's money", were involved in bail-out exercises. Hence, the 
notion of "protection" for the Malays that UMNO claimed to offer gradually 
diminished in the minds of disgruntled sections of the Malay community. The power 
spawned by the ruling elites seemed always open for abuse, serving the interests of 
the few.SI 
As such, the law's instrumentalist-purposive function has been to be a tool by 
which the ruling elites limited the scope of political opposition. Coupled with the 
wide attention and voluminous comments the Anwar saga received in the 
international media as well as local alternative print and internet media, however, 
the contestations between liberal legal meanings and the illiberal legal meanings 
reached a higher level of intensity with the former being mainly informed by the 
minimalist conception of rule of law while the latter by the statist instrumentalist-
purposive notion of rule by law. Both were attempting to counteract each other in 
defining the public's consciousness of what is right and what wrong. It is important 
to note that the Anwar saga and the attendant legal coercion had merely intensified 
the proliferation of the liberal legal meanings that had been unfolding in a society 
now experiencing upward social mobility and" open-sky" exposure as a result of the 
state-led economic development "project" and the expansion of global capitalism. 
s1 Hari (2000: 533). 
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The liberal legal meanings, in tum, served as the ideological basis for an open revolt 
against the political establishment, especially among the more reformist Malays. 
The State's Response to the Liberal Legal Meanings 
Since the outbreak of Reformasi, a number of civil society coalitions articulated the 
liberal legal meanings and mobilized public support for legal change. Groups such 
as the Abolish ISA Movement (Gabungan Mansuhkan ISA, GMI), Malaysian Bar 
Council, Media Charter 2000, Police Watch and Human Rights Committee (PWHRC) 
and Malaysian Students' Solidarity (Solidariti Mahasiswa Malaysia, SMM) pressed for 
the review or repeal of the Internal Security Act, University and University Colleges 
Act, Printing Presses and Publications Act, Police Act, Official Secret Acts, Sedition 
Act, Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and the like. Though articulation of the 
liberal legal meanings was limited to the more reformist sections within the society -
mostly members of the human rights NGOs, anti-establishment Islamic groups and 
opposition politicians - its coming to the limelight, especially through the BA' s 
election manifesto and those of other civil society groups, caused a dent to the BN' s 
image. The Reformasi and the extent to which the new opposition was able to 
challenge the BN prompted the government to respond to the rise of the liberal legal 
meanings, in both responsive and repressive ways. It was in the politically less 
sensitive areas such as normal crimes that the government showed some 
responsiveness to change, albeit very limited. While in the more politically sensitive 
areas such as race relations and national security- especially with the rise of Islamic 
militancy, whether perceived or real - the government continued to adopt a 
restrictive legal approach. 
An important development in the state's positive response to the rise of 
liberal legal meanings was the setting up of ombudsman-like organizations such as 
the National Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) in 1999 and the Royal 
Commission to Enhance the Operation and Management of the Royal Malaysian 
Police (Police Royal Commission) in 2003, which provided opportunities for various 
interest groups and members of the public to channel their grouses and 
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recommendations for legal change. Though the bulk of the commissions' 
recommendations were left unheeded by the government, the setting up of the 
commissions created an initial climate of responsiveness on the part of the 
government in dealing with human rights issues and allegations of abuse of powers 
in the police force. Within the judiciary, however, there had been no major indication 
that judges were adopting a more liberal judicial attitude. One exception is perhaps 
the Federal Court's decision to overturn Anwar' s sodomy conviction in September 
2004 which resulted in his release from prison. 
This section looks at the role of civil society coalitions for legal change and 
subsequent state's responses to them in three specific cases - the movement against 
the ISA; the police and "normal" criminal justice system; and the Anwar release. 
This is mainly to demonstrate the dynamics of the state's mixed responses to the rise 
of liberal legal meanings and the subsequent calls for legal change. It is argued that 
while the government lacked political will in making significant legal changes along 
more liberal lines, the reformist sections within the society too, which made up the 
bulk of the multiracial civil society coalitions for legal change, failed to mobilize 
substantial mass multiracial support for their initiatives, hence undermining their 
position vis-a-vis the government. Furthermore, the continued articulation of 
competing ethnic interests and the rise of Islamic militancy following the September 
11 attack on the United States, whether perceived or real, provided the government 
with justifications to maintain, and occasionally use, repressive laws as a means to 
maintain national security and preserve racial harmony. 
Case 1: lvfovement against the Internal Security Act 1960 
The Abolish ISA Movement (Gabungan Mansuhkan ISA, GMI) is a coalition of about 
80 NGOs calling for the repeal of ISA and the release of ISA detainees. Launched in 
April 2001, the movement consisted of human rights groups, Islamic movements, 
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women's groups, trade unions, Oi.inese associations and student movements.52 
SUARAM served as its secretariat and the then PAS President, Dato' Hj. Fadzil 
Noor, chaired its main committee. The movement was set up as a response to the 
ISA arrests of ten keADILan politicians and Reformasi activists in April 2001 for their 
alleged involvement in planning a street demonstration in Kuala Lumpur on 14 
April 2001 (Black 14) to commemorate Anwar' s conviction.53 Another coalition 
against the ISA was the Students' Abolish ISA Movement (Gabungan Ma/wsiswa 
Mansuhkan ISA, GMMI) formed in May 2001. Like its parent organization GMT, 
GMMI, which comprised twelve anti-establishment student groups, was also multi-
racial and cross-sectional in its composition.54 The student movement was also active 
in campaigning against the University and University Colleges Act, which restrains 
student activism. The Malaysian Bar Council, a regular opponent of the ISA and 
other preventive detention laws, also joined hands in the campaign against the ISA.55 
Outside Malaysia, a similar anti-ISA movement was also launched by Malaysians 
who lived in the United Kingdom. The movement aimed at" organizing campaigns 
s2 Among its key members were Refimnasi actors like the Voice of the Malaysian People (SUARAM), 
famaah Isiah Mnlaysfo (JIM), Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM), Aliran Kesedaran Negara 
(ALIRAJ\') and National Human Rights Society (HAKAM). 
53 Interview with Chang Llh Kang, GMI Secretary, 18 March 2005, Petaling Jay a.Those arrested were 
keAD!Lan Vice-President Tian Chua, Youth Chief Mohamad Ezam Mohd. Noor, Youth Secretary 
Lokman Nor Adam, MPT Members Saari Sungib, N. Gobalakrishnan and Dr. Badrulamin Baharom, 
Director of Free Anwar Campaign Raja Petra Raja Kamaruddin, former socialist student leader 
Hishamuddin Rais and Refllrmasi activists Abdul Ghani Haroon and Badaruddin Ismail. 
54 Among its key members were the Malay /Muslim-based student organizations like the National 
Union of Muslim Students' Associations of Malaysia (Persatuan Kebungsaan Pelajar Islam Mnlaysia, 
PKPIM), the Malaysian Isiah Students' Peer Club (Kelab Rak.an Siswa Isiah Malaysia, KARISMA) and the 
Peninsular Muslim Students' Coalition (Gabungan Mahasiswa Islam Semenan1ung, GAMIS); the 
predominantly-Chinese Malaysian Youth and Students' Democratic Movement (Gerakan Demokratik 
Belia dan Pe/ajar Malaysia, DEMA); and the socialist leaning Universiti Bangsar Utama (UBU). Other 
members were the National Student's Action Front (Badan Berlindak Mahasiswa Negara, BBMN), 
National Vocal Students' Movement (Gerak1m Maluwi>wa Lantang Negara, GMLN), Wangsa Maju 
Student Coalition (Gabungan Mahasiswa Wangsa Maju, G!vfWM), Youth's Front for Democracy (Front 
Anak Muda Untuk Demokrasi, FRAKSI), Islam the Saviour of Umma/1 Group Uamaah Islam Penyelamat 
Ummah, !PU), Malaysian Ulama' Society's Student Secretariat (Sekretariat Pe/ajar Persatuan Ulama' 
Malaysia, SPPUM) and Students' Committee (fawaiank-uasa Mahasiswa Malmsiswi, JKMI). 
55 The Bar Council was one of the first organizations which called for the repeal of repressive laws 
since the outbreak of R.eformasi. In its Annual General Meeting (ACM) on 10October1998, the 
organization passed a resolution calling for the repeal of the ISA and other preventive detention laws 
such as the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 and the Dangerous 
Drugs Act 1985. See Memorandum from the Malaysian Bar Council on the RepeaJ of Laws Relating to 
Detention Without Trial, 1998. 
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demanding the repeal of all preventive detention laws which run contrary to the 
basic tenets of human rights". 56 
Among the main concerns raised by the opponents of the ISA was the 
government's penchant for using the detention without trial law to silence critics. A 
report by a delegation of legal experts from Fordham Law School in the United 
States, who carried out a year-long study on the use and impact of the ISA in 
Malaysia in 2002, stated that by detaining opposition leaders under the ISA, the 
government had effectively silenced their critical voices and left their organizations 
in disarray.57 This was achieved by breaking down the chain of communication 
between the leaders and party members, as well as using interrogation sessions, 
during which the opposition politicians were detained, to demoralize them and dig 
out valuable information abcut their party's organization and activities.SB Another 
concern was with the Malaysian government's reliance on the global war against 
terror as a justification to step up the use of ISA against suspected Muslim 
"militants" as well as to vindicate its continued existence. Jn the months 
immediately subsequent to the September 11 attack on the United States, more than 
70 individuals were arrested and detained under the ISA for their alleged 
involvement in militant Islamic groups said to be linked to the international terrorist 
organizations like the al-Qaeda and famaah Islamiyyah.59 It was on the heels of this war 
against terror that the government found a new justification for the continued use of 
the ISA, against the wishes of its critics, as a means to curb the threats of Islamic 
militancy. The then Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister, Datuk Seri Abdullah 
Ahmad Badawi announced soon after September 11 that the attacks demonstrated 
the value of the ISA as" an initial preventive measure before threats get beyond 
control". 60 
56 S€€ statement by Jeffrey Tan, AIM-UK coordinator, quoted in Malaysiakini, 9 May 2001. 
"See Fritz & Flaherty (2003: 1350). 
53 See Saari (2001). See also the affidavits of the 10 keAD!Lan leaders and Refarmasi activists who were 
detained under the ISA for their alleged involvement in planning the "Black 14" street demonstration, 
filed at the Federal Court supporting their habeas corpus application 
s9 See Fritz & Flaherty (2003: 1346) 
6-0 Cited in Fritz & Flaherty (2003: 1346). See also Human Rights Watch's report on Malaysia in 
"Opportunism in the Face of Tragedy: Repression in the Name of anti-Terrorism" at 
htip;//lu'W.Of /campaigns/septemberll/opportunismwatch.htm#Malavsia (Accessed on 30 May 
2007). 
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The bulk of complaints against the ISA were about the law's lack of 
safeguards for human rights. The wide powers given to the police to arrest a 
"suspect" for the initial period of 60 days as well as the wide discretionary powers of 
the minister in charge of national security to detain a person without trial for a 
period of two years, which can be renewed indefinitely, had led to allegations of 
various forms of abuses of the detainees' basic rights by the authorities.61 These 
included arbitrary arrests and detentions of suspects; failure to provide adequate 
access to legal counsel; the absence of any effective forms of review of arrests and 
detentions, or of the conditions in which the detainees were kept; and the infliction 
of intolerable conditions of detention and treatment which was "cruel, inhuman and 
degrading" .62 In January 2004, 31 ISA detainees, all of whom were alleged Muslim 
militants, handed a memorandum to the National Human Rights Commission 
(SUHAK.<\M), outlining 59 forms of abuses by the detaining authority.63 These 
included allegations of them being kicked, beaten up and spat on by the 
interrogators, forced to drink spittle, stripped naked during interrogation and 
threatened with arrest of family members should they refuse to 'cooperate' or file 
habeas corpus applications challenging their arrest and detention.64 A memorandum 
by the GMI to SUHAKA.\1 in October 2001 also stated that the detainees had very 
limited access to reading materials; were not allowed to perform the Friday prayer; 
family visits and personal correspondences were closely monitored by the detaining 
authority, and the detainees' discussions with their lawyers were held under the 
watchful eyes of the detaining officers.65 
It was in this context that the basis for the opposition to the ISA had mainly 
been on grounds of its violation of basic human rights and personal liberties, which 
in tum paved the way for the promotion of liberal legal meanings as the ideological 
•1 Fritz & Flaherty (2003). 
"'See Fritz & Flaherty (2003: 1350) . 
.., Mlllaysiakini, 20 January 2004. 
64 See Malaysiakini, 20 January 2004. Deputy Internal Security Minister Dato' Noh Omar however 
refuted the detainee's claim, saying that they were not tortured but "rehabilitated", He added that the 
claim was part of a smear campaign "by those who were unhappy with the way the government 
fought terrorism". See Mlllmjsiakini, 17 May 2004. 
"See GMl's memorandum to SUHAKAM: "The Condition of the Political Detainees (ISA) at 
Kamunting" dated 10 October 2001. The document is accessible at 
http:/ /www.freeanwar.com/facnewsoct2001/press release121001.html. (Accessed on 29 May 2007). 
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basis for the civil society's call for legal reform. Again, this was not altogether new. 
The same liberal legal concepts had served as the ideological basis for the opposition 
to the ISA since its introduction in 1960. But what is salient this time round was the 
vigor with which the more reformist sections within the Malay /Muslim community 
articulated those liberal legal concepts, which were sometimes fused with the Islamic 
worldview of liberty and justice, in opposing the ISA. Since the outbreak of 
Reformasi, it was not uncommon to find the leading members of the Malay-based 
Islamic groups like A BIM and JIM to talk fondly about individual rights and 
liberties, and its compatibility with the Islamic conception of justice. Calling all 
concerned Malaysian citizens to uphold their rights and oppose all forms of 
injustices, Dr. Harlina Haliza Siraj, a Jamaah Islah Malaysia's (JIM) women's central 
committee member, asserted that the ISA "violates the fundamental rights of 
individuals and the principle of justice as outlined in the Holy Qur' an and al-Sunnah 
(prophetic tradition)".66 The editorial in the July 2001 issue of Risa/ah, the ABIM's 
organ, called on the government to release a!l Reformasi activists who were detained 
under the ISA, asserting the Islamic movement's stance that the detention was in 
breach of the "principles of democracy, justice and human rights" .67 The same issue 
of Risalah also carried an article about the Islamic perspective on human rights, 
which includes the rights to life and property, personal dignity, individual liberty, 
freedom of speech and equality before the law.68 Treating these rights as something 
"given" by Allah, the article declares: 
·when we discuss human rights, we are discussing the rights that Allah 
endows to His servants. The rights are not granted by the Sultan or rulers of 
any country. Rights granted by the Sultan or any legal bodies can be 
withdrawn. The same goes for the privileges given by a dictator. He can even 
manipulate the privileges according to his whims. But since human rights are 
"Malaipiakini, 30 April 2001. 
"See Risala11, No. 3, July 2001. 
"See "Hak-Hak Kemanusiaan yang Dijamin Islam" (Human Rights Guaranteed by Islam) in Risa/ah, No. 
3, July 2001. 
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endowed by Allah, nobody can (violate) those rights. Every Muslim who 
claims to profess Islam as his religion must respect these rights.69 
The fusion of Islam and human rights as the ideological basis for the reformist 
Malays' opposition to the ISA was not surprising. By 2001, not only the number of 
organizations protesting against the ISA had doubled from about 40 in 1987 to about 
80,7° but the protests had also taken a multi-racial outlook with the Malay /Muslim 
organizations assuming the more significant roles. At its inception in 2001, the GMI 
wa5 led by Zaid Kamaruddin, a Jamnah Isiah lvlalaysia GlM) leader, while the GMMI 
was led by Syahrir Mahmood, a leader of the JIM-linked Malaysian Isiah Students' 
Peer Club (Ke lab Rakan Siswa Isiah Malaysia, KAR IS MA). Thi5 was quite different 
from the situation in the 1960s through 1980s when the campaigns against the ISA 
had mainly bee.n led by non-Malays, especially Chinese.71 However, since the 1990s 
onwards, "political detentions" under the ISA had been increasingly directed toward 
the Malays, rather than the Chinese "communists" and "chauvinists". These 
included the mid-1990s ISA arrests of the followers ofAl-Arqam and the Shi'ite sect, 
which had both been declared as deviationists by the government.72 By November 
2001, all except one of the 39 political detainees at the Kamunting Detention Camp 
were Malays/ Muslims.70 The Malay anti-ISA campaigners had also been subjected 
to arrests under the ISA and the illegal assembly law. In July 2001, the police 
arrested two Malay student leaders under the ISA for their active involvement in the 
anti-ISA movement.74 Earlier, on 8 June 2001, seven student leaders, all of whom 
were Malays, were remanded by the police after they participated in a 
"See "Hak-Hak Kemanusiaan yang Dijamin Islam" (Human Rights Guaranteed by Islam) above. 
7o Malaysiakini, 20 November 2000; Malaysiakini, 30 April 2001. 
11 See Kua (2005). 
n See Marzuki (2007). The Muslim bureaucrats in the government are mainly Sunnis of the Shafie 
school, which regarded !he Shi'ite teachings as a form of deviation from lslam. 
7.3 They were members of the Al-Ma'unah group (15), members of Kumpulan Militan Malm;sia (9), 
"militant" Reformasi activists (4), members of the Free Acheh Movement (4), members of fihadi Gang 
(3) and followers of the Shi'ite sect (3), The exception was keADILan Vice-President, Tian Chua, who 
was arrested in connection with the foiled "Black 14" streets demonstration in Kuala Lumpur in April 
2001. See SUARAM (2004: 28). 
74 The two were University of Malaya Studenf s Representative Council President, Mohamad Fuad 
Mohd lkhwan, and MARA Skills Institute student, Khairul Anuar Alunad Zainuddin .. See 
Malaysiakini, 7 July 2001. 
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demonstration at the National Mosque to protest against the ISA. All of them were 
subsequently expelled from their respective universities and faced criminal charges 
for participating in the illegal assembly.75 The fact that more Malays were subjected 
to arrests and detentions under the ISA had drawn more Malay /Muslim based 
organizations, mostly key actors of Refermasi, to work hand in hand with the regular 
ISA critics among the anti-establishment sections within the non-Malay communities 
as well as the secular human rights groups to oppose the law. 
On a positive note, the public calls for the repeal of ISA had struck a chord 
with the National Human Rights Commission's (SUHAKAM) position on the issue. 
The government's human rights watchdog in its review of ISA in 2003 
recommended an interim amendment to the ISA, in anticipation of its eventual 
repeal, and the enactment of a new comprehensive security law to redress an 
"imbalanced situation" which it described as,, disproportionately weighted in favor 
of national security" .76 Recommending that the new security law should "take a 
tough stand on threats to national security, and yet conforms to the international 
human rights standard" ,77 SUHAKAM proposed that the period of detention for 
investigation purposes should not exceed 24 hours; detainees be allowed bail; 
extension orders must only be granted by the High Court; detainees must be present 
before the judge to obtain the order; a court order can only extend the detention by 
seven days each time; and the total detention time must not be more than 29 days, 
after which a detainee must be charged or released.78 The proposed interim 
amendment to the ISA would include dear definition of the detention criteria; 
reducing the detention period from two years to three months; charging or releasing 
a detainee after the expiry of the three months period; requiring the detaining 
authorities to submit an annual report on the ISA to the Parliament; and making the 
ISA valid for one year unless renewed by the Parliament annually.79 In a separate 
report on conditions of detention under the ISA, which was made following a 
hunger strike staged by the six Refermasi detainees in April 2002 demanding their 
"Malaysiakini, 22 June 2001. 
76 See SUHAKAM (2003b: 99). 
77 Malaysiakini, 9 April 2003. 
"See SUHAKAM (2003b); Malaysiakini, 9 April 2003. 
"' See SUHAKAM (2003b); Malaysiakini, 9 April 2003. 
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release or being charged in court, SUHAKAM recommended, BO inter alia, that 
disciplinary actions be taken against the detaining officers who inflicted "cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment" on the detainees; family members should be 
informed of the detainees' arrests within 24 hours of the arrest; an officer will only 
need to be "within sight" during family visits to guarantee a higher level of privat')' 
between the detainees and their family members; and the detainees should be 
produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest and be allowed access to legal 
counsel.Bl 
Some positive developments also occurred within the judiciary. In May 2001, 
Shah Alam High Court Judge Dato' Mohd Hishamudin Yahya allowed habeas corpus 
applications of two keADILan politicians, N. Gobalakrishnan and Abdul Ghani 
Haroon, who were earlier arrested under Section 73(1) of the ISA in connection vvith 
the foiled "Black 14" street demonstration. The judge held that their arrest was mala 
fida and ordered their release.82 Noting the heavy presence of police officers at the 
court complex on the day of the judgment, the judge allowed another application for 
an order prohibiting the police from arresting the two opposition politicians within 
24 hours of their release. The judge also took a swipe at the police for not allowing 
family members to visit the two detainees for almost 40 days after their arrest 
despite a formal request having been made to the Inspector-General of Police, saying 
that such an action was "cruel, inhuman and oppressive not only to the (detainees) 
but (also) to their farnilies".83 But the more significant part of the judgment was the 
judge's assertion that by virtue of Article 5(2) of the Federal Constitution,84 "a 
detainee had every right to be present in court at the hearing of his habeas corpus 
application".8-' This was a departure from the previous principle that the habeas 
BO The six detainees were Mohamad Ezam Mohd Noor, Tian Chua, Saari Sungib, Hishamuddin Raid, 
Dr. Badrulamin Baharom and Lokrnan Noor Adam. 
81 See SUHAKAM (2003a). 
"Abdul Ghani Haroon v Ketua Polis Negart1 and Anotlier Application [2001] 2 ML) 689 
83 [2001] 2 MLJ 689, p.p. 690. 
84 Article 5 (2) of the Federal Constitution states that "where complaint is made to a High Court or any 
judge thereof that a person is being unlawfully detained the court shall inquire into the complaint 
and, unless satisfied that the detention is lawful, shall order him to be produced before the court and 
release him". 
85 [2001] 2 ML) 689, p.p. 696. 
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corpus application does not come with the applicant's right to be present in court.86 
As access to ISA detainees was normally difficult during the initial 60 days detention 
period, the right to be present in court provides the lawyers and family members 
with an opportunity to get access to them and to know their condition. 
In September 2002, a landmark Federal Court's decision in Mohamad Ezam 
Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara87 departed from the settled Jaw on the application of 
subjective tests in determining whether the police had exercised their power of arrest 
under section 73(1) of the ISA in accordance with the law. The five appellants, who 
were detained under the ISA in connection with the foiled "Black 14" street 
demonstration, alleged that their detention was mala fide as it was merely for the 
purpose of" intelligence gathering which was unconnected with national security". 88 
The appellants claimed that the police interrogators had quizzed them about their 
political activities and sexual lives, not about the police allegations that they had 
acquired explosives and weapons to cause a violent demonstration in Kuala Lumpur 
in April 2001 involving at least 50,000 people.B9 Delivering the Federal Court's 
judgment, Chief Judge of Sa bah and Sarawak, Tan Sri Steve Shim, departing from 
the principle set out in Theresa Lim,90 held that the subjective judgment of the 
Minister to detain a person under Section 8 of the ISA cannot be extended to the 
police.91 This implied that an objective test was to be applied in respect of the first 60 
days detention by the police and that the court was not barred from perusing 
"information concerning matters of national security" at this stage. 92 This decision 
had wide implications for the initial detention under the ISA since the police, in 
respect of habeas corpus applications by the detainees, are obliged to reveal essential 
information pertaining to the facts and reasons of the arrest. The police too can no 
longer hide behind the subjective test principle to arrest a person under the ISA for 
86 See Minister of Home A/fairs v Lim Guan Eng [1989] 1 MLJ 420. 
"{2002] 4 MLJ 449. 
"' [2002] 4 MLJ 449, p.p. 450. The five appellants were keAD!Lan Vice President Tian Chua, keADllan 
Youth Chief Mohamad Ezam Mohd. Noor, keADllan MPT Member Saari Sungib, Free Anwar 
Campaign Director Raja Petra Raja Kamaruddin and social activist Hishamuddin Rais. Raja Petra was 
however released before the expiry of the 60 days detention period. 
••See statement by Inspector-General of Police Tan Sri Norian Mai quoted in Bernama, 11April2001. 
90 See Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v [nspectorGeneral of Police [1988] 1MLJ293. 
91 See [2002] 4 ML) 449, p.p. 451. 
"See [2002] 4 ML) 449, p.p. 479. 
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the purpose of intelligence gathering and building up a case against a detainee, as 
the five appellants alleged. 
Though the Federal Court's decision in Mohamad Ezam was lauded by the 
reformist civil society activists, a significant change toward liberal legal reform in the 
judiciary was not in sight. The Federal Court continued to acknowledge the long 
held principle that the subjective test was to be applied in respect of the minister's 
satisfaction to detain a person without trial for a period of two years under Section 8 
of the ISA, echoing the long standing judicial attitude toward matters of national 
security that they are best left to the discretion of the Executive.93 In fact, as detention 
orders by the minister had been issued against the appellants, the Federal Court's 
decision in practice became academic. The Federal Court in August 2001 also 
reversed Justice Hishamudin' s decision on the detainees' constitutional right to be 
present in court in respect of the habeas corpus application. The reason was that as the 
ISA is a security law under Article 149 of the Federal Constitution, such right was a 
limited one. 94 Touching on the function of the court as the guardian of justice, and 
the trial judge's concern about the detainees' constitutional rights, Chief Judge of 
Sabah and Sarawak, Tan Sri Steve Shim, who presided over the Federal Court's 
panel of judges in the appeal, quoted Federal Court Judge Raja Azlan Shah's (as he 
then was) judgment in Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia9s to substantiate his 
opinion. The following excerpts from Raja Azlan' s judgment speak volumes for the 
apex court's long held "restraint" approach in dealing with the "justness" of security 
laws: 
The question whether the impugned Act is "harsh and unjust" is a question of 
policy to be debated and decided by Parliament, and therefore not (meant) for 
"See also the subsequent Federal Court's decision in Kerajaan lvlalaysia & Ors v Nnsharuddin Nasir 
[2004j 1 CLJ 81, Chief judge of Sa bah and Sarawak, Tan Sri Steve Shim, delivering the Federal Court's 
judgment said, "In this case the Minister, having seen the police report, was satisfied, on a subje<:tive 
basis, that the respondent's activities had threatened national security. It was therefore not open for 
the court to examine the sufficiency or relevance of the allegations contained in the reporf'. 
••See Ketua Polis Negara v Abdul Glmni Haroon [2001 J 4 ML) 11. The judges who sat on the panel to 
decide this appeal were Chief judge of Sabah and Sarawak Tan Sri Steve Shim and Federal Court 
Judges Dato' Abdul Malek Ahmad and Dato' Haidar Mohd. Noor. 
"[1977] 2 ML) 187 
271 
judicial determination. To sustain it would cut very deeply into the very being 
of Parliament. Our courts ought not to enter this political thicket, even in such 
a worthwhile cause as the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
constitution.% 
The government too was unresponsive to public calls for the repeal of the ISA 
and to the SUHAKAM' s recommendations. 'The general attitude of the government 
toward the ISA remained, as it always has been, that "it protected the people from 
threats to public order" .97 In response to the Federal Court's decision in Mohamad 
Ezam on the application of the objective test to determine the exercise of police 
power to detain a person for the initial 60 days period, the government even mulled 
an amendment to the ISA in order "to eliminate the risk of evidence being revealed 
in court that could compromise national security" .98 The Malaysian Bar Council 
opposed this move saying that there must be "a fair balance between legitimate 
national security concerns and fundamental liberties" ,99 SUHAKAM too called on 
the government not to proceed with the amendment that "would further enhance 
the power of the Executive and limit the civil liberties of ISA detainees'' mo 
1nough it turned out that no such amendment was made, other "tactics" were 
used by the detaining authority to circumvent the law. 'This included causing the 
court hearing of the detainees' habeas corpus application be delayed so that it would 
past the initial 60 days detention period.101 This was done by denying lawyers' 
access to the detainees, thereby causing unnecessary delay on the part of the lawyers 
in getting precise instructions from their clients, and hence causing them to be 
unable to discharge their duties.102 In the case of Nasharuddin bin Nasir, a suspected 
"militant" arrested under the ISA on 17 April 2002, the police denied him access to 
" [1977] 2ML)187, p.p. 188. 
w See statement by Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, Dato' M. Kayveas quoted by 
Bernama, 20 November 2003. 
"See statement by Minister in the Prime Minister's Department Datuk Seri Dr. Rais Yatim (the de 
facto Law Minister) quoted in lv!alaysiakini, 8 October 2002. 
99 Bernama, 23 December 2002. 
100 Bernam11, 23 December 2002. 
101 SUARAM (2006: 41). 
102 SUARAM (2006: 41). See also Nasharuddin bin Nasirv Kerajmm Malaysia & Ors [2002] 6 MLJ 65. 
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lawyers until the initial 60 days detention period ended. The police head of special 
branch Dato' Hj Md Lazim Ahmad in his letter to the detainee' s counsel stated 
security reasons as the basis for the denial.103 A family visit was however allowed by 
the police. 'The detainee' s lawyer then applied for a court order granting the lawyers 
the right to access to see the detainee. Allowing the application, Shah Alam High 
Court Judge Dato' Suriyadi Halim Omar questioned "the arbitrary attitude of the 
police in permitting the family (visit), but not his solicitors"'.104 The learned judge 
was also perturbed by the police tactics of" ca.rting off" the detainee to the hospital 
on some medical "pretext" to avoid the lawyer's visit as ordered by the court.105 
Referring to some "overzealous officers" in the police force, the judge remarked, "it 
l<\-ill be the lowest ebb in the history of the judiciary ... when a perfectly legitimate 
court order may be contemptuously, but legally avoided by certain irresponsible 
persons who are endowed with certain specialized skills".!06 Apart from this, there 
were also cases in which the detainees rejected legal recourse after they were 
"turned over" by the police interrogators.107 
Another tactic used by the government to circumvent the judicial precedent 
set out in Ezam' s case was to straight away detain a person under section 8 of the 
ISA. This was the case when Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, 
who is also Internal Security Minister, issued a two-year detention order under 
section 8 of the ISA against five leaders of Hindu Rights Action Front (HINDRAF) in 
December 2007, without first detaining them under section 73(1 ). This new method 
of detention effectively barred the court from relying on the judicial precedent set 
out by the Federal Court in Ezam' s case as an authority to inquire into the 
reasonableness of the grounds of detention. Earlier, on 25 November 2007 
HL!\JDRAF organized street demonstrations in Kuala Lumpur protesting against 
alleged government's discrimination against ethnic Indians in the country. The 
103 See the letter dated 3 May 2002 reproduced in Naslwruddin bin Nasir" Kerajaan Mal"!Jsia & Ors 
[2002] 6 ML) 65, p.p. 68. 
104 [2002] 6 ML) 65, p.p. 72. 
10s [2002] 6 MLJ 65, p.p. 72. 
'°' [2002] 6 ML) 65, p.p. 73. 
107 SUARAM (2006: 41). "Turning over" is a commonly used term to refer to the psychological warfare 
tactics employed by the police interrogators in getting the detainees either to confess to their 
"mistakes" or to agree to suggestions made by them. 
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group had also filed a suit in the British court claiming compensation amounting to 
US$4 trillion from the British government for bringing Indian indentured labors into 
Malaya during the colonial period and allegedly left them without protection after 
Malaya gained independence in 1957. In a memorandum sent to the Bristish 
government, the group also accused the "Islamic-fundamentalist and Malay-
Chauvinist UMNO-led Malaysian government" for committing "ethnic-cleansing" 
and "mini-genocide" against the minority Indians.10s These accusations were made 
following demolition of several "illegal'' Hindu temples by the government to give 
way for development projects.109 Abdullah initially appeared to be hesitant to use 
the ISA against the HIND RAF leaders, but finally gave in to the pressures from 
within the Malay community, especially UMNQ.110 Prior to the ISA arrests, 
HINDRAF leaders P. Uthayakumar, S. Ganapathi Rao and P. Waytha Moorthy were 
charged under the Sedition Act for allegedly inciting racial sentiments. 31 protesters 
who took part in the November 25 demonstration were initially charged with 
ios The full text of the memorandum can be accessed at http:/ /rockybru.blogspot.com/2007 /11/why-
i-didnt-walk-yesterday.html (Accessed on 28 Nov 2007). The use of the word "ethnic-cleansing" and 
"mini-genocide" was rather exaggerating. Dato' A. Vaithilingam, the President of Malaysia Hindu 
Sanggam, expressed his concern that the bad choice of words in HIND RAF' s memorandum had 
divulged public attention away from its otherwise legitimate concern of highlighting the plight of 
Indian community, especially the poor among tbem. According to Dato' Vaithi, the term "mini-
genocide", which HIND RAF leaders often used to refer to the Indian-Malay clash in Kampung 
Medan in March 2001, was overboard. Giving an example, HIND RAF leaders often claimed that 104 
Indians were "slashed and killed" in the incident, whereas tbe official statistics show that 100 were 
injured and only 4 were killed. Interview with Dato' A. Vaithilingam, President, Malaysia Hindu 
Sanggam, Petaling )aya, 14 December 2007. 
1M The Hindu temples were "illegal" as they were built on government or private lands without 
approval from local authorities or consent from land owners. An officer at a local council confided 
that the authorities usually avoided demolishing the illegal temples, especially !:he old ones, fearing 
that such an action would cause racial sentiment to run high. Confidential informal discussion, Kuala 
Lumpur, 14 December 2007. 
nn It is difficult ID rule out internal power-struggle within UMNO as a factor tbat led to the use of ISA 
against the HIND RAF leaders, Since Abdullah came to power in 2003, it was not uncommon for 
UMNO members ID perceive his leadership as "weak". His avoidance from using the ISA would only 
reinforce this perception, giving ammunitions to his "rival" within l:MNO to further discredit his 
leadership. What is more, the HINDRAF protest coincided with another street protest by a group 
called Coalition for Clean and Fair Election (BERSIH) led by PAS. About 30,000 protesters took part in 
the street protest in Kuala Lumpur on 10 November 2007, calling for a clean and fair election in the 
country. The seemingly "unstable" political condition could have prompted Abdullah to use 
repressive measures in order to send a message to UMNO members that he his in control of the 
government. Interestingly, in a nationwide opinion survey conducted by the Merdeka Centre for 
Opinion Research soon after the ISA arrest, a majority of the respondents believed that Abdullah had 
strengthened his position in the government, although many of them, especially l:he non-Malays, 
disapproved the use of ISA against the HJNDRAF leaders. Informal discussion with Ibrahim Suffian, 
Director, Merdeka Centre for Opinion Research, Bangi, Selangor, 16 December 2007. 
274 
attempted murder, but the charge was later dropped as a result of protests from 
Indian groups and human rights NGOs. All except five of them were later charged 
for participating in an illegal assembly, which carries lesser penalty. 
The government also went a step further in its war on terror by amending the 
Penal Code in November 2003 ''to widen the powers of the authorities to tackle 
violent issues" .111 The amended Iaw imposed, inter alia, sentences ranging from 
seven years imprisonment, natural life imprisonment and death on convicted 
terrorists and their accomplices. SUARAM in its 2003 human rights report described 
the provisions as "arbitrarily and widely drafted to cover every possible act - from 
serious bodily injury to a person to an act that involves prejudice to national security 
or public safety" .112 The offences were also extended to cover services, facilities, 
solicitation or support given to terrorists that includes services provided by lawyers 
and accountants. Anyone who harbors, or interferes with the arrest of, terrorists, 
recruits members into a terrorist group or provides them with explosives or facilities 
such as places of meeting is also liable for a crime punishable with a sentence of up 
to life imprisonment.113 Though this anti-terrorism provision was already inserted in 
the penal code, it was not a substitute to the ISA. The government made it clear that 
it would still continue to use the ISA against suspected terrorists "where 
circumstances do not allow the use of the Penal Code".114 Regarding the condition of 
detention under the ISA, the government seemed to be responsive only to the 
SUHAKAM' s recommendations in the less "sensitive" area such as improving 
recreational facilities at the detention camp but not in the more important areas such 
as the detainees' right to speedy medical treatment, the right to consult a lawyer and 
visitation rights by the family members.ns Up to 2005, the human rights body still 
received complaints about delay in giving medical treatment to the detainees, delay 
in processing lawyer's visits, detention camp officers being rude to the detainees' 
111 See Kayveas' statentent in Bernama, 20 November 2003. 
m SUARAM (2004: 41). 
m SUARAM (2004: 41). 
114 See statement by Defence Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak quoted in New Straits Times, 20 
December 2003. 
115 See SUHAKAM' s comments on the government's response to its 2003 annual report (SUHAKAM: 
2006). 
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family members and re-introduction of wire mesh and fiberglass partitions to 
separate the detainees and their family members during family visits.116 
Apart from the war on terror, which served as the new justification for the 
government's lack of political will to institute a more liberal legal reform pertaining 
to the ISA, the civil society coalitions against the law too had not made much 
progress in mobilizing mass multiracial support for the initiative so as to compel the 
government to be more responsive to their demands. Support had mainly come from 
the more "activist" sections within the society - consisting of BA politicians, 
reformist NGO activists and the anti-establishment student groups - without 
significant multiracial follm.,,ing among the masses which remained polarized along 
ethnic lines. In the case of GMI, despite being multiracial and cross-sectional in its 
composition, the movement's campaign drew more support from Malays rather than 
non-Malays.117 This was especially evident during the numerous protests against the 
ISA where the Malay protesters normally outnumbered the non-Malays. 
Furthermore, since the September 11 attack on the United States, the government's 
use of the ISA against suspected Muslim "militant~" raised a specter of growing 
Islamic militancy in Malaysia, a development that was not welcomed by non-
Muslims.11s What is more, the trial of the JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir by an 
Indonesian court in April 2003 also revealed a supposedly "terrorist" plan to 
establish a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia, including Malaysia.119 The arrest of 
Hambali@Riduan Isamuddin, an Indonesian national with Malaysian PR status, by 
the Thai authorities in August 2003 for his alleged role as an al-Qaeda operative in 
Southeast Asia, raised concern that Malaysia too had been a hot bed of terrorism and 
was on its way to becoming an Islamic state.120 In November 2003, thirteen 
Malay /Muslim Malaysian students who had just returned to Malaysia from their 
116 See SUHAKAM (2006) above. 
117 Interview with Chang Uh Kang, GM! Secretary, 18 March 2005, Pe!aling )aya. 
1lSThis included the ISA arrest of a University of Technology Malaysia (UTM) lecturer, Wan Min 
Wan Mat, in September 2002. Wan Min, who allegedly led the KMM' s Joh ore branch, was linked to 
Dr. Azahari Husin, a fellow UTM lecturer accused of being involved in the 2002 Bali blast and several 
other bombings in Indonesia. Dr. Azahari was kllled during a police raid at his hideout in East Java in 
November 2005. 
m Bernama, 23 April 2003. 
120 New Straits Times, 16 August 2003. 
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studies in Pakistan were arrested under the ISA for allegedly having been trained as 
"future leaders" of the Jl. 121 Many of those suspected "terrorists" / especially the 
members of KMM, were also associated with PAS, which had hardened its stance on 
the Islamic state issue after the 1999 general election. It was in the wake of this chain 
of events and coincidences that the GMI faced difficulties in drawing significant non-
Malay /non-Muslim opposition to the ISA for its seemingly "legitimate" role in 
curbing Muslim militancy and the emergence of an Islamic state.122 The non-
Muslims' fear was perhaps best encapsulated by the OAP Life Advisor Chen Man 
Hin' s remark explaining the party leaders' feeling about the Islamic state issue, 
leading to the party's break up from PAS and the BA in September 2001: 
"The Islamic state issue is something very serious and not just far-off thing. 
They (the non-Muslims) feel the heat of Islamic fanaticism, including the 
visions of Taliban, Iran and Iraq", 123 
Though ethnic relations remained harmonious, with the exception of limited 
Malay-Indian clashes in Kampung Medan, a suburb near Kuala Lumpur in March 
2001, ethnic issues continued to linger in the mainstream of Malaysian politics, 
giving a basis for the government to justify the maintenance of ISA as a means to 
curb ethnic tension. These included a row over Suqiu's appeals which came on the 
heels of UMNO Youth demonstration in front of the Selangor Chinese Assembly 
Hall in August 2000, demanding apology from Chinese organizations which 
endorsed the 1999 election appeals (Suqiu) for questioning the Malay special rights 
m SUARAM (2004: 32). The students were first detained by the Pakistani authorities in September 
2003 for their alleged involvement ir militant activities (Bernama, 21 September 2003). 
m Interview with Chang Lih Kang, GM! Secretary, 18 March 2005, Petaling jay a, 
ms.,., Chen Man Hin's remarks on the DAP break-up with the BA in September 2001, quoted in the 
World Socialist Web Site News, 1October2001, at 
httJd~ww. WS"'.~.articles/ 2001 I oct2001/ mala-001.shtml (Accessed on 28 May 2007). It is to be 
noted however that DAP' s break-up with PAS in the BA was the culmination of other issues 
concerning PAS's stand on the Islamic state which occurred before the September 11 attack on the 
United States. The attack, as well as the non-Muslims' perceived fear of Mus!Jm militancy and its 
version of Islamic state, in one tvay or other~ served as a catalyst for the break-up, 
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and privileges.124 To add insult to injury, Dr. Mahathir in his Merdeka Day speech on 
30 August 2000 condemned the "Chinese extremists" by equating them with the 
Islamic deviationists and the communists who "wanted to totally abolish the special 
status of the Malays in Malaysia" .125 The prime minister's remark enraged the anti-
establishment sections within the Chinese community who came into the open to 
criticize him for his racial slant At the same time, the Chinese community was also 
alarmed by the government's proposal to implement the Vision School project, 
which would house Chinese and Tamil vernacular schools and the Malay-medium 
national schools on the same premises. The project's main objective was to promote 
national unity through friendly interaction among students of different races. The 
01inese education movement Dong Jiao Zong (DJZ) however rejected the proposal, 
fearing that the setting up of coordmating committees comprising representatives of 
the three school streams to assume management of the schools would affect the roles 
and functions of the Board of Directors of the Chinese vernacular schools, and 
eventually hamper mother-tongue education and the promoti.on of Chinese 
culture.126 
In a related development, the DJZ, as well as sorne Malay educationists and 
opposition politicians, were also opposed to the government's policy on the use of 
English language as the medium of instruction in teaching Mathematics and Science 
in schools. The policy, which was introduced in mid 2002, aimed at improving the 
students' mastery of English especially in the fields of science and technology. The 
DJZ' s opposition to the policy was primarily based on its fear that it would hamper 
124 Bernama, 18 August 2000. In the 1999 general election about 1800 Chinese organizations endorsed 
an election appeal (suqiu) which contained, among others, demands for democracy, human rights, 
equitable distribution of wealth, curb on corruption, review of privatization policy, liberal education 
policy, multiculturalism, modernization of Chinese new villages, protection of women's rights, 
restoration of confidence in the police force, media independence, better social services, better public 
housing scheme, protection of environment, indigenous people's right to native customary land and 
respect for the rights of workers. Under the demand for equitable economic policy, the election 
appeal pressed for the abolition of "quota system based on "race" and replace it with a means-tested 
sliding scale", This demand was viewed by the Malay critics as an attempt to question Malay 
privileges. For a full list of the appeal, See Kua (2005: 187-195). 
us Asimveek, 15 September 2000. 
"'See statement by Dong Zong Chief Executive Officer, Bock Tai Hee, quoted in Malaysiakini, 15 
November 2000. Dong jiao Zang, which consisted of the United Chinese School Committees' 
Association of Malaysia (Dong Zong) and the United Chinese School Teachers' Association of 
Malaysia ()iao Zong), was among the initiators of the Suqiu' s appeals. 
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mother-tongue education, while the Malay educationists were concerned that the 
policy would not only erode the role of Malay as a modern language, but also pose 
difficulties for Malay students, especially those with poor mastery of English, to 
comprehend the two difficult subjects,127 Though the organized articulation of ethnic 
interests in relation to these issues remained contained, in an attempt to silence the 
critics of the government, Deputy Home Minister, Dato' Zainal Abidin Zin, warned 
that the government would use the ISA as a last resort to quell the education 
"extremists" from aggravating racial tensions.J28 
In a nutshell, it seemed that the government had found justification in the 
continuing articulation of competing ethnic interests, as well as in the fight against 
terrorism, to maintain the existence of the ISA as a means to curb racial tension and 
the threat of, whether perceived or real, Muslim militancy. Though the articulation 
of liberal legal meanings, especially among the reformist Malays, the anti-
establishment sections within the non-Malay communities and the human rights 
groups, helped civil society actors forge a multiracial and cross-sectional coalition 
against the ISA, their ability to mobilize mass multiracial support to the cause was 
seriously limited by the society's continued polarization along ethnic and religious 
lines, as well as the government's resolve to use repression to curb any move toward 
that goal. 
Case 2: The Police and the "Normal" Criminal Justice System 
At the height of Reformasi, the Malaysian police came into the limelight, but for the 
wrong reason. Its harsh actions against the demonstrators, its unnecessarily violent 
raid on Anwar' s house, the then Inspector-General of Police Tan Sri Rahim Noor' s 
assault on Anwar - while he was in police custody - and the questionable ways by 
which police interrogators "turned over'' ISA detainees raised serious questions 
about the integrity and accountability of the police force when it came to handling 
"political offenders". 
l27 See statement by Malaysian Linguistic Society President Dr. Awang Sariyan quoted in Bernam11, 14 
May 2002. 
126 Malaysiakini, 12 August 2002. 
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The handling of ordinary criminal suspects seemed to be even worse and 
came suddenly to public attention on successive days in October 1998 when police 
killed eleven people suspected of crimes in separate incidents in different parts of 
the country. On 2 October, police shot dead three men and two women suspected of 
kidnapping the 11-year-old son of former Selangor Menteri Besar Tan Sri 
Muhammad Muhammad Taib.129 The next day in a separate incident the police shot 
dead six men in Tumpat, Kelantan, who were believed to be involved in armed 
robberies, firearms smuggling and drug trafficking. Bo But these were not the only 
cases. In May 1999, the then Deputy Home Minister, Datuk Seri Abdul Kadir Sheikh 
Fadzir, revealed in Parliament that over the previous ten years, a total of 655 people 
had been shot dead by the police.131 Between 2000 and 2004, a total of 127 cases of 
deaths caused by police shooting were reported (see Table 6.2). Some, however, had 
been accidental victims. For example, a bank teller had been inadvertently killed by 
police during an armed robbery at the Bank Simpanan Nasional's Kepong branch in 
January 1999 and a young doctor was shot dead in an open area near Bandar Tasik 
Selatan light rail transit station in Kuala Lumpur in September 1999.132 These 
shootings raised concerns about the way the police used their fire-power, which 
resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians and suspected criminals before they were 
proven guilty by the courts. And, in some ca5es, the offence that the suspects 
allegedly conunitted did not warrant death sentences. 
Deaths at the hands of the police occurred in other ways as well. The Deputy 
Home Minister, Dato' Chor Chee Heung, revealed to Parliament on October 14 2002 
that six people had died in police custody in 2000, ten in 2001 and 18 in the first nine 
months of 2002.133 Five years later in April 2007 the government provided revised 
figures - seven deaths in 2000, 16 in 2001, 15 in 2003 and 19 in 2004 but did not 
provide equivalent statistics for more recent years. In the meantime, several high-
profile cases of deaths in police custody came to public notice, raising further doubts 
about the police's handling of ordinary suspected criminals. For example, three 
"'TIU! Sun, 15 October 1998, 
Bo The Sun, 15 October 1998. 
131 Mnlaysiakini, 19 June 2001. 
132 Malaysiakini, 19 June 2001. 
133 Malaysiakini, 15 November 2005. 
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Indian youths died in July and August 2002, while they were in police custody. The 
family members of Tharmarajen, 19 and Ragubathy, 24, claimed that the two youths 
died under "mysterious circumstances", while they were detained at the Putrajaya 
police station in July 2002. Another Indian detainee, Vivashanu, 24, was claimed to 
have been beaten by the police before his body was dumped into the Klang River.J34 
In May 2005, the decomposed body of another Indian youth, Francis Udayappan, 24, 
was recovered from the Klang River, after he allegedly "escaped" from the 
Brickfields police lock-up more than a month earlier. Udayappan's mother, G Sara 
Lily, alleged that her son was beaten to death by the police before his body was 
thrown into the river.135 
Malaysian NGOs and the Bar Council reacted vociferously to episodes of 
police violence by calling for inquests to be held into the incidents of custodial death 
and police shootings, and for a sweeping legal change in order to hold the police 
more accountable for their actions. These were not the first protests, however, as 
similar demands had been made by a group of 61 NGOs in October 1998. The group, 
calling itself Shot-Dead Issue Ad-Hoc Committee, demanded, inter alia, that the 
police stop all actions that were against the law and the constitution; that the 
government draft laws whereby complaints against the police were investigated by 
an independent body, not by members of the police force; and that the government 
ratify international treaties on human rights.Bo The Malaysian Bar Council added its 
voice when its President, Dr. Cyrus Das, urged the Attorney-General to hold a 
public inquiry into the police shootings, saying that" the inquiry will go a long way 
toward abating public concern over the incidents" .137 Three years later at its Annual 
General Meeting in March 2001, the Bar Council reiterated its concern about the 
increasing incidents of police shootings by passing a resolution demanding an 
inquest over the issue.138 In a memorandum prepared by the Kuala Lumpur Bar 
Committee, the legal body also called for a complete overhaul of the criminal justice 
5ystem in Malaysia to overcome the many aspects, which the Bar claimed were 
134 Malaysiakini, 22 August 2002. 
m Malaysiakini, 25 May 2004. 
136 The Sun, 15 October 1998. 
m New Summy Times, 18 October 1998. 
"' T1ie Sun, 18 March 2001. 
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"contrary to the expectations and values of a civilized soc:iety".139 These included 
cleaning-up of custodial violence and abuse in detention; elimination of the culture 
of intimidation and fear; stricter enforcement of procedures to investigate all police 
shootings; conducting remand hearings in public, not in chambers; and facilitating 
the detainees' access to counseLl4o 
Another group calling for a better criminal justice system was the Police 
Watch and Human Rights Committee of the unregistered Malaysian Human 
Reformation Party (Parti Reformasi Insan Malaysia, PRIM), a splinter group of 
keADILan. This group consisted predominantly of Malaysian Indians pressing for 
the review of the Police Act, the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code to 
curb police brutality. The group, formed in 1999, provided legal service, often on pro 
bona basis, to the victims of police brutality and their family members. Their lawyers 
handled cases of death in police custody and unlawful shootings by the police.Hl A 
report compiled by the group in 2003 revealed that there were on average 2.2 people 
being killed or dying in police lock-ups or detention centers every month. It also 
reported 122 cases of assaults, beatings and torture of detainees while in police 
custody, indicating the extent of police heavy-handedness in dealing \-vith "normal" 
suspected criminal5.142 Apart from handling cases of custodial death and police 
shootings, the committee also called for a comprehensive review of the Penal Code 
and the Criminal Procedure Code to promote and safeguard the rights of suspected 
criminals and the public. This included requiring a warrant of arrest to be produced 
in all cases of police arrest, except when an officer directly witnesses the commission 
of an offence or arrives at the scene immediately afterward; reduction in the 
maximum remand period from 15 days to three days for offences punishable with 14 
years imprisonment or less; prohibition of" serial remand" ;143 the police to apply the 
"
9 See excerpts of the memorandum, "The Administration of justice in Malaysia", in Tlie Sun, 7 March 
2001, 
'"' Tire Sun, 7 '.v!arch 2001. 
141 See the group's brief introduction at http://www.policewatchmalavsia.com/index.php?do:about 
(Accessed on 23 May 2007). 
"'See the group's urgent appeal to the Asian Human Rights Commission at 
http:/ /www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2003/ 458/ (Accessed on 23 May 2007). 
t 43 The practice by which a suspect is transferred from one jurisdiction to another to enable the police 
to obtain fresh remand order after the existing one expires. 
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principle of "investigate first and arrest later", rather than "arrest first and 
investigate later"; remand proceedings to be conducted in public; elimination of 
malicious prosecution by the police prosecutors; severe puni.shment for unlawfully 
causing death to a suspected cri.minal; and the Attorney-General to commence a 
mandatory inquest within two weeks of any incidents of unlawful killings by the 
police.144 
The group's struggle landed its leader P. Uthayakumar, also a lawyer, in deep 
trouble in May 2004. Uthayakumar claimed that a group of men, whom he believed 
were acting under the instruction of police top brass, assaulted him on his way home 
from work145 Uthayakumar had been representing the families of several detainees 
who died while in police custody in a number of inquests, and aggressively urging 
the police to acknowledge responsibility for the deaths. Other allegations of police 
abuse like inflicting physical and mental torture on suspected criminals continued to 
gain publicity, especially in the alternative on!ine news-sources like Malaysiakini.146 
The mainstream media too aired the concerns of the public as well as NGOs' about 
such incidents, giving a further boost to the calls for reform in the police force and 
the entire criminal justice system.147 The New Straits Times even published in its 
Saturday Forum an article authored by a prominent senior lmvyer and the then 
President of National Human Rights Society (HAKAM), Raja Aziz Adruce. Referring 
to an incident of police shooting in 1998, the article commented: 
144 See the Police Watch and Human Rights Committee's memorandum on "Proposed Arnendmentto 
the Criminal Procedure Code and the Penal Code" dated 19 August 2004. 
m Malaysiakini, 11 May 2004. In January 2003, Uthayakumar, who was also the Secretary.General of 
the unregistered PRIM, was charged in the Sepang magistrate's court for criminally intimidating a 
police officer. However, in May 2003, High Court judge Dato' Suriyadi Halim Omar granted him a 
discharge without amounting to acquittal. Following the incident in May 2004, Uthayakumar sought 
asylum in the United Kingdom. He however returned to Malaysia in mid· June, after the government 
assured him of his safety. The Court of Appeal in April 2005 upheld the High Court's decision on his 
discharge. See New Straits Times, 16 June 2004; New Straits Times, 19 April 2005. 
1
" See for example Malaysiakini, 19 June 2001, 21 September 2002, 1 November 2002, 15 November 
2002, 19 November 2002, 16 January 2003, 17 January 2003, 8 October 2003, 15 December 2003, 16 
January 2004, 28 February 2004, 5 March 2004, 26 April 2004, 1 May 2004, 13 May 2004, 25 May 2004, 
27May 2004. 
147 See for example The Sun, 15October1998, 21 December 1998, 31December1998, 23 September 
1999, 7 March 2001, 18 March 2001; New Straits Times, 11April1998, 17April1998, 18October1998, 25 
March 1999, 12 August 2002. 
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"Jf the trend continues, would members of the general public, unimaginable 
though it may be, be caught in crossfire one day? More importantly are the 
criminal elements in Malaysia of such a special breed who must be gunned 
down in their cars or houses, a scenario which is becoming the norm rather 
than exception. What about affording them, as suspects, an opportunity to 
surrender? Even more significantly, what about the basic creed of "innocent 
until proven guilty"? These are not trivial questions. They all point to possible 
lapses in the performances, professionalism and overall discipline of the 
police force which impinge on the collective interest and well-being of our 
society.14B 
The government's responses to these public calls were mixed. On a positive 
note, the government in January 1999 set up an independent commission of inquiry 
to probe Anwar' s assault allegation.149 After examining testimonies of several 
witnesses, who included senior police officers at the scene of the assault, the 
commission found Rahim Noor responsible for the attack. The former Inspector-
General of Police was then hauled to the Kuala Lumpur Sessions court in April 1999 
to face charges of attempting to cause grievous hurt.150 He was found guilty by the 
court in March 2000, and sentenced to two months imprisonment and RM 2000 
fine.151 The police had earlier conducted an internal investigation into the October 
1998 incidents of police shootings in Kelantan and Selangor, which had led to public 
outcry over the manner the police used their fire..power. The police however 
stopped short of making public the results of its investigation, and hence raised 
doubts over the credibility and thoroughness of the investigation.1s2 Responding to 
148 New Straits Times, 11April1998. 
1'9 Bernama, 27January1999. The commission members were former Chief judge of Malaya Tan Sri 
Anuar Zainal Abidin (Head), former Attorney-General Tan Sri Abu Talib Othman, Appeal Court 
Judge Datuk Mahadev Shankar, and Pantai Medical Centre's consultant orthopedic surgeon Datuk Dr 
Yeoh Poh Hong. 
1so Bernama, 22 April 1999, 
1s1 Bemama, 15 Mac 2000. 
1s2 The then Acting Inspector-General of Polke, Tan Sri Norian Mai, however, defended his men who 
involved in the incidents, saying that as those who were shot dead were themselves armed with 
firearms, the action taken by the police "was appropriate and within the provision of existing laws". 
See Bernama, 11February1999. 
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the public outcry over several high-profile cases of custodial death in mid-2002, the 
Attomey-GeneraYs Chambers in September ordered inquests to be held into the 
deaths of Tharma Rajen, Ragubathy and Vevashanu.153 An inquest was also held in 
August 2004 to probe the death of Francis Udayappan.154 Despite these positive 
efforts, the number of inquests had been far below the actual number of reported 
incidents. The available data shows that only six inquests were held out of 80 
reported cases of custodial death between 2000 and 2004 (See Table 6.1).155 The police 
continued to attribute incidents of death in custody to various diseases (see Table 
6.2), while the family members of the deceased reported cases of police withholding 
and suppressing evidence, and hospitals refusing to release coroner's or medical 
reports pertaining to such deaths.156 Official statistics on deaths by police shooting 
showed significant decline in 2004 (see Table 6.3), but the police maintained, in 
virtually all cases, that the suspects shot first, and that return fire was necessary.157 
Table 6.1: Official Statistics on Incidents of Death in Police Custody, 2000-2004 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
Number 7 16 15 23 19 80 
of deaths 
Source: Bernama, 23 April 2007 
is> Bemama, 2 September 2002. 
"'New Straits Times, 12August2004. The Coroner's Court on 7 April 2006 however found no foul 
play in Udayappan' s death. In April 2007, Udayappan' s mother G Sara Lily proceeded to sue the 
Attorney-General, the Inspector-General of Police and several others in connection with his death, 
claiming over RM 29 million in damages_ Bernama, 13 April 2007. 
155 The breakdown of cases of custodial death according to year is as follows: 2000 (1cases),2001 (16), 
2002 (15), 2003 (2'J) and 2004 (19). See Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's written 
reply to a parliamentary question in April 2007 reported by Bemama, 23 April 2007. For the number of 
inquests, see New Straits Times, 10 February 2007. 
t56 SUARAM (2006: 45). 
157 SUARAM (2006: 53), The police in 2002 tested the use of electric taser gun, which had the capacity 
to temporarily imn1obilize a person, making it easier for the police to arrest criminal su.<;pects without 
seriously injuring them. The use of taser gun was however limited, and not suitable in a situation 
where the suspects were armed (New Straits Times, 5 July 2002) .. 
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Table 6.2: Official Statistics on Causes of Deaths in Prison and Custody, 
1990 to September 2004 
Cause of Death Death in Prison Death in Lock-up 
HIV/AIDS 
Septicaemia 
Pulmonary Tuberculosis 
Pneumonia 
Meningocuaphacitis 
Heart Disease 
High Blood Pressure 
Hepatitis 
Diabetes 
Breathing Difficulties 
Asthma 
Other Diseases 
Suicide 
Fighting Among Detainees 
Bleeding of Brain 
Fleeing from Custody 
Slipped in the Lock-up 
Total 
Source: SUARAM Human Rights Report, 2005. 
523 
391 
196 
111 
9 
32 
9 
8 
6 
27 
271 
1,583 
Table 6.3: Official Statistics on Deaths by Police Shooting, 2000-2004 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
Number 27 
of 
Deaths 
14 43 
Source: SUARAM Human Rights Report, 2005. 
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29 12 127 
31 
3 
8 
60 
33 
5 
3 
6 
1 
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In the midst of growing public concerns over the high incidence of crime, 
police abuse and perception of corruption in the police force, the government in 
February 2004 set up the Royal Commission to Enhance the Management and 
Operations of the Royal Malaysian Police (Police Royal Commission). Headed by 
former Chief Justice, Tun Mohamed Dzaiddin Abdullah, the commission aimed to 
find ways to modernize the police force, improve its service and efficiency, eliminate 
corruption and police brutality, and restore public confidence in the police.158 After 
receiving more than 1200 responses and suggestions through letters, emails and 
public hearings, the commission released its 600-page report in May 2005. Based on 
the inputs, the commission made 125 proposals to enhance the performance and 
management of the police force.159 Among others, it proposed the setting up of a 
Code of Practice for arrests and detention to ensure compliance with the provisions 
in the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC).160 Citing a custodial death case in 2003, the 
corrunission rapped the police and magistrate for refusing the request by the 
detainee's family to have a second independent post-mortem.161 The commission 
also noted with concern the trend by the police in classifying the deaths in police 
custody as "accidental deaths", and hence no post-mortem or inquest being held.162 
The commission suggested that all cases of death in custody be reported to a 
magistrate within one week of the incident, and an inquest be held within a 
iss SUARAM (2006: 46). Other commissioners were Tun Mohammad Hanif Omar (Deputy 
Chairman/former !GP), Tun Salleh Abbas (former Lord President), Tan Sri Azizan Zainal Abidin 
{Chairman of Petronas), Tan Sri Lee Lam Thye (former Member of Parliament/Vice-Chainnan of 
Malaysian Crime Prevention Foundation), Tan Sri Zaki Tun Azmi (prominent lawyer), Tunku Abdul 
Aziz Ibrahim (President of Transparency International, Malaysian Chapter), Datuk Seri Lim Ah Lek 
(former MCA Deputy President), Dalin Paduka Zaleha Zahari (High Court Judge), Dato' Micheal 
Yeoh (CEO, Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute), Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Jasin (fomier New Straits 
Times Group Editor), Dato' Kamilia Ibrahim {President of Malaysian Muslim Women Consultative 
Council), Khutubul Zaman Bukhari (President of Malaysian Bar Council), Dr. Denison jayasooria 
(Executive Director of Social Strategic Foundation) and Ivy Josiah (Executive Director of Women's 
Aid Organization) 
"'New Straits Times, 17 May 2005. 
""The proposed code included a 24-hour camera surveillance at all police stations; access to detention 
cells be made only through a custody officer; all cells must have adequate ventilation and lighting; 
and a detainee should be informed of his alleged offence and of his right to counsel, right to 
communicate with his family and right to bail (Bemama, 16 May 2005). 
161 See the case of Ho Kooi Sang v Universit:i; ef Malru1a Medical Gmtre [2004] 2 MLJ 516. See also news 
reports in Bernama, 16 May 2005 and New Straits Times, 21August2003. 
'" Bernarna, 16 May 2005. 
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month.163 Following complaints that detainees were beaten up by the police when 
they were in remand to make them confess to the crime that they allegedly 
committed, the commission recommended that all statements taken from the 
suspects to be made inadmissible in court, except the one made before a magistrate 
under section 115 of the Criminal Procedure Code.164 
On the issue of corruption, the commission made a shocking revelation about 
"common knowledge" within the police force that a senior officer made an asset 
declaration amounting to RM 34 million, and yet no action was taken against him.165 
Calling for a holistic approach to tackle corruption, the commission proposed the 
setting up of anti-corruption committees at the federal, contingent and district police 
levels; regular job rotations and limitation of tenure in areas of policing vulnerable to 
corruption; amendments to the Prevention of Corruption Act 1997 and the Public 
Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 to facilitate more effective action 
against alleged corrupt practices; and the setting up of the Independent Police 
Complaints and Misconduct Commission (IPCMq.166 The commission also 
recommended amendment to section 107(1) of the CPC (to allow any police officer 
on duty, whether in or outside the police station, to accept any report made by any 
person), section 108A of the CPC (to ensure certified documents be made available to 
the complainants seven days after they have lodged their reports), section 27 of the 
Police Act 1967 (to expedite approval of permits to hold gatherings), section 73 of the 
ISA (to allow detainee' s access to a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest and decrease 
the initial period of detention from 60 to 30 days), section 3 of the Dangerous Drugs 
(Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985 (to limit the maximum period of detention to 
only 30 days) and section 117 of the CPC (to reduce the period of remand from 14 to 
seven days, and a requirement to see a magistrate for every 48 hours). The Restricted 
Residence Act 1933 and the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) 
Ordinance 1969, which allow preventive detention of suspected criminals in 
specified areas and two years detention without trial respectively, were 
"'New Strait> Times, 3 August 2005. 
'" Bernama, 16 May 2005. This requires the repeal of section 113 of the Penal Code, which currently 
renders such statements admissible in court. 
16
' New Straits Times, 17 May 2005. 
166 Bemama, 16 May 2005. 
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recommended for repeal. However, against the wishes of the ISA critics, the 
commission did not recommend the repeal of the law. 
Meanwhile, efforts were also underway to amend the Penal Code and the 
Criminal Procedure Code to cope with the rising number of violent crimes against 
women. Between 1999 and 2003, there were several high-profile rape-cum-murder 
cases. In May 1999, a schoolgirl, Melissa Audrey, 17, was raped and murdered while 
she was on her way to her school in Jalan Cenderasari, Kuala Lumpur, a stone throw 
away from the Federal Police Headquarters Bukit Aman.167 In October 2000, a 
United Kingdom-graduate computer engineer, Nor Suzaily, 24, was raped and 
murdered hy the driver of the bus she was traveling in. Her body was found 
abandoned on a construction site in Klang.168 In June 2003, an information 
teclmology executive, Canny Ong, was abducted by a man while she was entering 
her car, parked at a shopping complex in Bangsar. She was later raped and her body 
was set ablaze in an attempt to eliminate evidence.169 Enraged by these horrific cases 
of violence against women, the All Women's Action Society of Malaysia (AWAM) in 
August 2003 launched a nation wide "Citizens Against Rape" campaign, urging the 
government and the private sector to beef up efforts to increase security in public 
places as a means to protect women from violence.170 In the meantime, there were 
also concerns among the public about the incidents of violent snatch thefts, which in 
most cases caused serious injury to the victims, and even death. It was amidst this 
growing public concerns that the Parliament in July 2004 set up a parliamentary 
select committee to receive feedback from the NGOs and public on the proposed 
amendments to the Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code. Chaired by the 
Minister in the Prime f\.1inister' s Department, Datuk Radzi Sheikh Ahmad, the 
committee held nationwide meet-the-people sessions to receive suggestions and 
memorandums on the proposed amendments, which were mainly about imposing 
harsher punishments for crimes against women and snatch theft, and ensuring 
167 Tiie Sun, 20 May 1999. 
"' Bernama. 16 October 2000. 
'" llmiama, 18 June 2003. 
170 New Straits Times, 6 August 2003. 
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greater police accountability.m More specifically, the suggestions, which in some 
instances overlapped with those of the Police Royal Commission, included harsher 
punishment for convicted rapists (30 years jail and whipping, compared to the 
existing 20 years plus whipping); wider definition of domestic violence; the police to 
provide status reports on investigations within two weeks of receiving requests from 
the public; mandatory inquests within two weeks of any cases of death in custody; 
repeal of section 113 of the CPC (admissibility of suspect' s cautioned statement in 
court);l72 and legal action not only against mothers, but also fathers of abandoned 
babies. But there were also concerns about possible abuse of human rights with the 
proposed amendment to the CPC, which would give wider powers to the police to 
act against terrorist threats.173 
After two years, and input from 67 organizations and 35 individuals, the 
Penal Code (Amendment) Bill 2006 and the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) 
Bill 2006 were finally tabled in Parliament in July 2006, The amendments 
incorporated some of the views given by the public and the NGOs, as well as those 
of the Police Royal Commission. These included a harsher penalty for snatch theft, 
with a maximum of 14 years imprisonment, compared to seven years for normal 
theft (Section 390e of the Penal Code); a person in authority who uses his position to 
have sexual relations with a woman under his subordination will be considered as 
committing rape (Section 375£ of PC); a five-year jail term for a man who causes hurt 
to his wife, with a view of having sex with the latter (new Section 375A of PC); and a 
minimum of 15 years jail sentence and a maximum of 30 years for committing 
aggravated rape (Section 376 of PC). In an attempt to enhance the administration of 
171 Other members of the committee were Barisan Nasional Member of Parliament for Gelang Patah, 
Tan Ah Heng, Teresa Kok (DAP-Seputeh), Datuk Wan junaidi Tuanku )aafar (BN-Santubong), 
Devasamy a/I 5. Krishnasamy (SN-Cameron Highlands), Donald Peter Mojuntin (BN- Penampang) 
and Che Min Che Ahmad (BN-Pasir Puteh). 
172 In connection with the proposal to repeal section 113 of CPC, committee Chairman Datuk Radzi 
Sheikh Ahmad was reported to have said, "Let the police go and do their own work. When we say 
'No more 113', the police will have no more choice. They will have to go and do the investigation 
properly - they can't just have a shortcut. They have DNA and forensics now. They can do all sorts of 
things. They don't need to depend on confessions or cautioned statements. Nowadays, it is taken for 
granted that when a suspect is arrested, he will be tortured in order to obtain a confession." Earlier, 
the Attorney-General issued a directive to all Deputy Public Prosecutors not to use cautioned 
statements and confessions in criminal trials. See New Straits Times, 7 September 2005. 
m See statement by human rights lawyer Edmund Bon quoted in New 5!7aits Times, 21 August 2004. 
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criminal justice, amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code incorporated a 
number of important recommendations of the Parliamentary Select Committee and 
those of the Police Royal Commission. These included facilitating the public to lodge 
reports at any station, mobile or patrol unit, or to any officer on the street (Section 
107), the police to give status reports to a complainant not later than two weeks after 
a request is made (new Section 107A); and the Public Prosecutor, upon receipt of a 
report by a complainant of the failure on the part of the officer-in-charge to furnish 
the status report within the specified period, shall cause such report to be furnished 
to the complainant (new Section 107 A). The amended CPC also did away with 
cautioned statements (Section 113 of CPC) and made prosecution documents 
available to the defense (Section 51A of CPC) in order to speed up trial and clean up 
the image of the police.174 The police must also inform the detainees of the grounds 
of their arrest as soon as possible, and allow them to place calls to their family, 
friends and lawyer free of charge, within 24 hours of the arrest (new Section 28A). 
Remand periods were also determined according to the severity of crime. For 
"heavy" crimes,175 the period is not longer than seven days on the first application, 
followed by a maximum of seven more days on the second (Section 117 of CPC). For 
other offences, the period carmot be more than four days on the first round and three 
days on the second (Section 117 of CPC). 
The amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code and the Penal Code, even 
though not all recommendations and suggestions from the public, the NGOs and the 
Police Royal Commission were incorporated into the amending Acts, shows that the 
government was more responsive to the calls for legal reform in the non-political 
"normal" criminal justice system, compared to the more political anti-subversion 
and other security-related legislations. The Prime Minister, who is also the Internal 
Security Minister, said in March 2007 that 80 percent of the proposals by the Police 
Royal Commission had been implemented.176 But without available details on the 
F 4 The admissibility of cautioned statements not only led to allegations of police brutality, in getting 
confessions from criminal suspects, but also delayed trials \.Vhen a "trial-within-a-trial" had to be 
conducted to ascertain the admissibility of the confession, especially when the accused person alleged 
that his confession was made under duress, 
175 "Heavy crimes" refers to offences punishable with death or imprisonment of 14 years or more. 
m New Straits Times, 11 June 2004. 
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specific areas of improvements, it was difficult to determine to what extent the 
government and the police had been responsive to the public calls for 
comprehensive reform. Despite the government's assurance that the commission's 
recommendations were being implemented, human rights activists saw no 
significant progress in the country's criminal justice system.177 Jn some instances the 
police too resisted important reforms proposed by the commission, including the 
setting up the Independent Police Commission on Misconduct and Complaints 
(IPCMC). There were also concerns that the issue of custodial death and police 
shooting, which caused public cry since 1998, had not been sufficiently dealt with by 
the amendments. What is more, as of June 2007, not all the amendments to the CPC 
and PC were yet in force. It seems that while the government had been responsive in 
taking efforts to reform the "normal" criminal justice system, its actual 
implementation leaves much more to be desired. 
Case 3: The Judiciary and Anwar's Release 
As the Reformasi campaign grew in strength, some court decisions on matters related 
to national security seemed to be sympathetic to the human rights cause.l78 But as 
judges interpreted the law "as it is", and of course they were bound by the rules of 
interpretation and the principle of stare decisis, they had very little room for 
maneuver beyond the parameters that the law" as it is" demarcates. They could 
hardly go beyond the parameters of the statist-purposive legal framework, which 
seeks to strike a balance between the need to safeguard individual freedoms and to 
maintain national security. 
Anwar's case proved to be different. Since Anwar was prosecuted under a 
"normal" criminal law, and not detained under any of the more politically-guided 
anti-subversion and security-related legislation, the judges in his trials were not so 
177 See statement by Tenaganita Director Irene Fernandez quoted in The Sun, 15 January 2007. 
178 See for example High Court Judge Dato' Hishamuddin Mohd Yunus' judgment in Abdul Ghani 
Haroon v Kotua Polis Negara and Another Application [2001] 2 ML) 689; High Court Judge Dato' Suriyadi 
Halim Omar's judgment in Nasharuddin mn Nasir v Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2002] 6 ML) 65; and the 
landmark Federal Court's judgment in Mohamad Ezarn Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara [2002] 4 ML) 
449. 
292 
confined to the more" political" statist-purposive legal framework in interpreting the 
state law "as it is". They could have been more at liberty to make their findings of 
facts, based on available evidence, adduced and examined according to the rules of 
"normal" criminal proceedings. In the absence of undue influence and unbound by 
the more restrictive statist interpretation of the politically-guided anti-subversion 
and security-related legislation, the judges, in normal circumstances, could have had 
more leeway to come up with an independent, apolitical decision. But the Anwar 
trial was not like other "normal" criminal trials. Anwar' s stature as a former Deputy 
Prime Minister, the political facts surrounding the case, and the political 
ramifications the trial generated, made his trial more political than any other trials. 
There were widespread concerns that the trial was politically motivated, and that the 
trial judges, in both his corruption and sodomy trials, were biased against him. ·what 
is more, some of the critics of Anwar' s trial within the legal fraternity alleged that 
the judges had even breached the "normal" rules of criminal proceedings. 179 In the 
sodomy trial, the judge not only failed to give the benefit of the doubt to Anwar as 
an accused - in connection with the star witness Azizan Abu Bakar' s conflicting 
statements on the dates of the offence, as well as over his admission in court that he 
had never been sodomized by Anwar - but drew conclusions that would be quite 
unusual in "normal" criminal proceedings when he went on to say that Azizan was 
a "wholly reliable, credible and truthful witness." The general view about the cause 
of the seemingly biased trial, and as Anwar himself alleged, was because the 
judiciary, in connection with the trial, having been subjected to the wishes of the 
political elite.rno 
But there were some positive developments after the March 2004 general 
election. Abdullah, who succeeded Mahathir as the Prime Minister in October 2003, 
promised a sweeping political reform, which included fighting graft, improving 
public delivery system, restoring judicial independence and promoting wider 
democratic participation. As a grandson of a prominent Islamic scholar and a 
graduate in Islamic studies himself, Abdullah polished his Islamic credentials by 
179 Interview with Dato' Shaik Daud Mohd. Ismail, former Court of Appeal Judge, 17 November 2006, 
Bukit Damansara, Kuala Lumpur. 
;so See Malaysian Bar Council (2001) .. 
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promoting Islam Hadhari (Civilizational Islam), which emphasized the universal 
values of Islam and its balanced approach to material and spiritual well-being. 
Abdullah' s pledge of political reform, coupled with his Islamic credentials, added to 
the feel-good factor in the run-up to the March 2004 General Election. The BN won 
spectacularly in the election by winning 198 of the 219 parliamentary seats and 453 
of the 505 state seats. The ruling coalition formed governments in all states except 
Kelantan, where it was narrowly defeated by PAS. In a reversal of its lackluster 
performance in 1999, UMNO emerged victorious this time by winning 109 of the 198 
parliamentary seats won by the BN parties, hence confirming its position as the 
dominant Malay partner in the ruling coalition. On the contrary, the opposition 
political parties, except the DAP, suffered major setbacks. PAS' s representatives in 
the Dewan Rakyat dropped from 27 to only seven, with almost all party 
heavyweights, including its President Abdul Hadi Awang, loosing. The party lost 
Terengganu to the BN and only managed to retain Kelantan by a two seats majority 
in the state legislature. keADILan did not fare any better, winning only the 
Permatang Pauh parliamentary seat with a thin 590 votes majority, after a recount. 
The DAP, however, slightly improved its performance by winning 12 parliamentary 
seats, two more than in 1999. The BN's landslide victory, and more specifically the 
UMNO' s regained strength, indicated that the Anwar saga and the attendant "Malay 
revolt", which had posed a "historic" challenge to UMNO in 1999, was no longer a 
factor in the election. 
Meanwhile, Anwar too was suffering from acute back pain. Serving his jail 
sentence for the sodomy conviction, Anwar had tried many times to get permission 
to travel to Germany to undergo medical treatment of his choice there, but was 
turned down by the government. Languishing in prison, his only chance to 
overcome his health woes was to get an acquittal for his sodomy conviction and then 
travel to Germany as a free man,IBl But this too proved to be very unlikely since he 
failed in his appeal to the Court of Appeal in April 2003, and the same court in 
January 2004 rejected his application for a review of the appeal decision. In May 
2004, the Federal Court rejected his bail application pending appeal, and until July 
tBJ Anwar completed serving his jail sentence for corruption in April 2003. 
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2004, the apex court was still withholding its decision on his final appeal.182 But in 
August 2004, things took a tum for the better. Sources close to the former Deputy 
Prime Minister believed that there had been a high-level meeting between Anwar' s 
and Abdullah's right-hand men in August, in which the latter indicated that 
Abdullah would not interfere in the impending Federal Court's ruling on the appeal. 
Party insiders secretly passed news that there had also been a meeting between 
Abdullah and Wan Azizah, purportedly to discuss about Anwar's medical 
treatment, where the former gave assurance that he would let the judges to decide 
on Anwar' s appeal. Jn the meantime, there were also moves from some groups 
within the UMNO circle, one of which was closely associated with Daim Zainuddin, 
to persuade Abdullah to help secure Anwar's release, or at least, grant permission 
for him to undergo medical treatment in Germany.183 But there were also pressures 
from quarters within UlvINO, especially those associated with Dr. Mahathir, to 
oppose Anwar' s acquittal and release.184 \!Vhat is more, rumors of secret meetings 
between .A.nwar' s former Political Secretary Mohamad Ezam Mohd Nor and 
Abdullah's son-in-law and UMNO Youth Deputy Chief Khairy Jamaluddin, 
suggested a possible political deal between Anwar and Abdullah, which enraged the 
remnants of Mahathir' s supporters in UMNO, who were now aligued to the Deputy 
Prime Minister Datuk Seri Mohd. Najib Tun Razak.185 
Amidst rumors of pressures and counter pressures on the judges and the 
government in relation to the impending Federal Court's decision, the apex court on 
2 September 2004, by a 2-1 majority decision, acquitted Anwar and set him free. 
Delivering the majority decision, Federal Court Judge Dato' Abdul Hamid 
Mohamad, who presided over the panel of three judges, with Judge of the Court of 
Appeal Dato' Tengku Baharudin Shah concurring and Federal Court Judge Dato' 
Rahmah Hussain dissenting, said that some parts of Azizan' s evidence - particularly 
relating to his uncertainties over the exact dates of the commission of the offence 
were doubtful, inconsistent and uncorroborated, making it unsafe for the court to 
182 Bernama, 20 July 2004; Bernama, 22 July 2004. 
1s3 Confidential interview, 10 October 2006, Kuala Lumpux. 
11!4 Interview with Anwar Ibrahim, 26 December 2004, Bukit Damansara, Kuala Lumpur. 
185 Confidential interview, 10 October 2006, Kuala Lumpur. Both Anwar and Abdullah however 
denied that there was any" deal" between them. 
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convict Anwar.186 But the judge made a perplexing remark at the end of his 
judgment, saying that based on the appeal record, they were more inclined to believe 
that the sodomy incident did happen, but the prosecution had failed to prove the 
alleged offence beyond reasonable doubt.187 It was not certain as to why the judge 
made such a statement, but considering the highly political nature of Anwar' s trial, it 
was not impossible that it reflected a kind of "political compromise", which Anwar 
believed was a move to please Dr. Mahathir.1BB However, reminding that his 
acquittal would have not been possible had Dr. Mahathir remained as the Prime 
Minister, Anwar praised Abdullah "for allowing the judiciary to decide in 
accordance with the law" .189 Dr. Mahathir on the other hand noted that the Federal 
Court's decision was not unanimous, and was still convinced that Anwar was 
guilty.190 The judgment was of course lauded by Anwar's supporters and the legal 
fraternity. Some credited the judges for their courage in correcting the "wrong 
judgments" made by their colleagues,191 while others hailed Abdullah as a 
"reformist" Prime Minister for allowing the judiciary to regain its independence.192 
It seemed that Abdullah had nothing much to lose from Anwar' s acquittal, 
and nothing much to gain either. Anwar's corruption and sodomy verdicts and his 
subsequent incarceration were more of a political ramification stemming from the 
irreconcilable conflict between Anwar and Dr. Mahathir, a "legacy" that Abdullah 
had no qualms about abandoning. Judging from the public responses, the Federal 
Court's verdict to acquit Anwar augured well for Abdullah' s promise to restore 
186 See Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim v Public Prosemtor and another Appeal [2004] 3 MLJ 405, p.p. 406. 
187 See Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor and another Appeal [2004] 3 MLJ 405, p.p. 448. 
lBS Anwar said that on the evening before the Federal Courf s judgment was delivered, he expected to 
Jose. He heard that the judges were divided 2 to 1 in his favour, but were under great pressure, from 
"certain quarters" within UMNO, not to acquit him. He was quite surprised that the judges 
"remained firm", but the last"compromise" was to insert a paragraph in the majority judgment 
saying that though there was insufficient evidence to convict him, the judges might personally believe 
that the offence did take place. This, according to Anwar, was certain to please Dr. Mahafuir. 
Interview with Anwar Ibrahim, 26 December 2004, Bukit Damansara, Kuala Lumpur. 
189 Associated Press, 2 Sepl€mber 2004. 
190 Dow Jones International News, 2 September 2004. 
m Anwar' s lead counseL Christopher l'ernando also believed that the judges had made their 
courageous decision based on the merit of the case. Anwar' s solicitor, Saiful Jzham Ramli, also 
concurred with Fernando. Informal discussion with Christopher Fernando and Saiful Izham, 24 )tme 
2004, Penang. See also statement by ALIRAN President, P Ramakrishnan, in Inter Press Sm,ice, 2 
September 2004. 
m Inter Press Service, 2 September 2004. 
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judicial independence, and hence boosted his image as a "reformist" Prime 
Minister.193 And as Abdullah himself initially appeared hesitant to pressure the 
judges not to acquit Anwar, it could be possible that the judges had more leeway to 
decide the case according to the rules of "normal" criminal proceedings.194 As 
Anwar himself suggested, his release could have not been made possible if Dr. 
Mahathir was still in power, indicating that in the absence of strong undue political 
pressures from the top, the judges could come up with quite a reasonable decision. 
But this too suggests that the proliferation of new "liberal" legal meanings did not 
cause much change to the judiciary. Judicial independence, especially in relation to 
politically highly sensitive cases, remained an issue around which the judges needed 
to tread very carefully. 
Conclusion 
The Reformasi movement's articulation of a non-communal vision of Malaysian 
politics, and its contribution to shifting the discourse of rights from communal 
towards individual, helped promote a more liberal and human rights-based 
understanding of the law, moving away from its illiberal statist perspective. Anwar' s 
protracted trial, and the questionable ways in which the courts tried the case, 
provided avenues for opposition politicians and civil society actors to inflict moral 
injury on the country's political and legal system, putting its credibility in peril But 
as the articulation of competing conununal interests among different communal 
groups remained significant, there was a serious limit on the articulation of the 
reformist liberal vision of the law more widely within the society, so as to enable the 
reformist sections within the society to mobilize sufficient mass multiracial support 
to press the government for a significant legal reform in a more liberal direction. The 
ever-present existence of possible racial tension resulting from articulation of 
1
" Abdullah's "reformisf' image was soon lost into oblivion when he made only slow progress in 
fighting corruption, widening democratic space and improving public delivery system, which were 
supposed to be the key areas of his reform agenda. 
1q4 But according to Anwar, Abdullah himself was under great pressures from some quarters in 
UMNO not to let the judges acquit him. Interview with Anwar Ibrahim, 26 December 2004, Bukit 
Damansara, Kuala Lumpur. 
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competing communal interests, and since the September 11 attack on the United 
States, the threat of Islamic militancy, provided justification for the government to 
perpetuate the existence and use of repressive laws as a means to maintain racial 
harmony and national security. Except in politically less sensitive legal areas, a shift 
toward liberal legal reform had not been in sight. The judiciary too, though in a 
couple of cases had shown its sympathy to the human rights cause, had not been 
making significant progress in adopting a less restrained approach in interpreting 
politically-guided anti-subversion and security-related legislation, leaving the statist-
purposive legal meanings still dominant in relation to this legislation. 
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C11apter VII 
The Pre-eminence of Constitutional-Contract Politics 
By the early 2000s, a proliferation of competing legal meanings had produced 
both a modern liberal interpretation of universal human rights principles and 
values and the pre-eminence of communally-based constitutional-contract 
politics based more on religion than ethnicity. This chapter is concerned with the 
still unresolved struggle between the two approaches. On the one hand, an 
emerging new liberal human rights struggle in Malaysia revolved mainly around 
resistance to religious laws and practices which sit uneasily with a modem 
liberal interpretation of universal human rights principles and values. On the 
other, the Islamic mainstream formed coalitions to defend the Islamic faith as 
well as its communitarian values and "special" constitutional position from the 
liberal challenge. Though the new human rights struggle may not be altogether 
new, its predominance in the discourse of law and human rights in Malaysia is a 
recent development. As the proliferation of liberal legal meanings subsequent to 
the 1998 Reformasi helped civil society coalitions to oppose repressive laws on the 
basis that they militate against the principles of individual rights and freedoms, 
the new human rights struggle attempts to re-define the country's Islamic 
religious laws on the same basis. One important aspect of this struggle is a 
plethora of civil society initiatives against so-called "religious authoritarianism" 
- a complex constellation of official and un-official Islamic religious laws 
embedded in state laws and edicts of the ulama' (religious scholars) respectively, 
the former vigilantly enforced by state religious bureaucrats. Human rights 
activists criticized enforcement of those laws, claiming that they impinge on 
individual rights and liberties as understood in the libertarian fashion. Contrary 
to the new human rights struggle, the Islamic mainstream sought to reaffirm the 
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special constitutional position of Islam, giving a new lease of life to the 
communally-based constitutional-contract politics. It is in this context that the 
proliferation of liberal legal meanings contributed to the pre-eminence of 
communal politics in Malaysia in which religion rather than ethnicity becomes 
its main marker. The persistence of communally-based constitutional-contract 
politics and the potential destabilizing forces it may unleash seems to restore a 
semblance of legitimacy, however minimal, to the use of repressive laws as a 
means of keeping any possible rupture in ethno-religious relations in check 
Religious Freedom versus Religious Authoritarianism: 
A Conflict of Legal Meanings 
Since the mid 1990s, the more liberal sections of Muslim society, such as the 
Muslim intellectuals in Sisters in Islam (SIS), an organization consisting of 
professional Muslim women committed to promoting the rights of women using 
the more liberal interpretation in Islam, have been critical of the implementation 
of Islamic criminal and family laws, which they viewed as not in conformity with 
the principles of human rights and discriminatory against women.l By the early 
2000s, the liberal Muslims formed overlapping coalitions with human rights 
NGOs, non-Muslim religious groups and concerned individuals in opposing the 
Islamic laws contained in the various State Enactments and Acts of Parliament.2 
In support of promoting personal freedoms, understood in its essentially western 
liberal notion, and guided by common humanitarian rather than ethno-religious 
1 See for example SIS's Memorandum on the Syariah Criminal Code (II) 1993 State of Kelantan 
(25 December 1993), Memorandum on the ProvL~ions in the Syariah Criminal Offences Act and 
Fundamental Liberties (8 August1997), Memorandum on the Reform of the Islamic Family Laws 
on Polygamy (11December1996), Memorandum on the Equal Right to Guardianship for Muslim 
Women (18December1998). The full texts of the memorandums are available at 
ht!p:/ I www.sistersinislam.org.my /advocacy-memo.hl:!g (Accessed on 18 June 2007). 
2 These included the various states' Syariah Criminal Offences Enactments and, in regard to the 
Federal Territories, the Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act. 
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communitarian values, these groups advocated the repeal or review of Islamic 
laws as well as municipal by-laws,3 which infringe the principles of human rights 
and equality understood in its exclusively western liberal tradition. These 
include prohibition of gambling, drinking liquor, close proximity between 
unmarried couples and other "indecent behaviors" ranging from "indecent" 
dressing to participating in beauty contests and patronizing night clubs.4 These 
laws have their roots in ethno-religious communitarian doctrine - and are based 
on Islamic religious texts as interpreted by traditional Islamic religious scholars, 
often according to the Shafi'e school of thought, the religious denomination to 
which the majority of Malays belong. 
The view which rejects the primacy of ethno-religious communitarian 
underpinnings in defining the parameters of what is legally right or wrong, and 
which prioritizes common humanitarian values in guiding state laws and 
individual behavior, is indicative of a major shift in the understanding of state 
law. It not only rejects ordinary illiberal state laws that infringe on fundamental 
human rights, the legitimacy of which has been increasingly questioned by 
Reformasi-leaning activists across social, political and religious divisions; but also 
opposes state religious laws, the legitimacy of which rests upon a "conservative" 
interpretation of the sacred religious texts.5 It is in this context that the politics of 
'An example of alleged infringement of personal freedoms by law applicable to Muslims and 
non-Muslims alike is section 8(1) of Park (Federal Territory) 1981, which provides that' Any 
person found behaving in a disorderly manner in any park commits an offence.' On 2 August 
2003, an enforcement officer of the Kuala Lumpur City Hall served summons on a young non-
Muslim Chinese couple for hugging and kissing in public, and thereby commiting an offence 
under the by-law. 
•The enforcement of these laws, a Malaysian academic and human rights activist, Farish Ahmad 
)Joor, has argued, "is a logical extension of the policing and control of the Malays, which in turn 
is reflection of the divisive, unstable and - ultimately - self-defeating politics of 
comm unitarianism in Malaysia". As "this (religious) authoritarianism rests on denial of the 
common humanity that (Muslims) share with others", Farish argued, such denial "can only be 
transcended through a politics that is predicated on the ethics of Love", which is defined as "the 
recognition of the common humanity people share with the Other," and as such compels them 
"to act for the Other and in defence of the Other". See Farish (2005). 
' The word "conservative" is loosely used to refer to the majority view among the traditional 
Islamic legal scholars especially in matters related to Islamic criminal laws and transactions. One 
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"common humanitarian values" -- which militates against the 
compartmentalisation of the common human race through vigilant enforcement 
of ethno-religious legal edicts applicable only to Muslims -- collided with the 
politics of" defenders of the faith" which seeks the maintenance of those ethno-
religious legal edicts, as embedded in state law, 
There have been fierce contestations within civil society - between the 
"liberal" camp, which comprises the more liberal Muslim groups such as Sisters 
in Islam (SIS) as well as most secular human rights NGOs and non-Muslim 
religious groups on one hand and the "conservative" camp, which consists of 
mainstream Islamic organizations such as ABIM and JIM and a host of other 
Islamic organizations, on the other - with both forces vying for moral and 
political authority to guide people's behavior and influence state policies. At the 
core of these contestations are different sets of legal meanings which seek to 
define the parameters of legitimate state law. As Migdal puts it, there exist in 
society "multiple sets of law including those opposed to the state, others not 
controlled by the state but not necessarily in opposition to it, and still others 
complementary to state law".6 That contestation has been marked by opposing 
coalitions within the civil society - one pushing toward liberal reform and the 
other pulling towards maintenance of the religious status-quo. 
Religion and Constitutional-Contract Politics 
By the mid 2000s, communal politics once again came to prominence with 
religion as its important marker, as defenders of the religious status quo rely 
example is the view that apostasy is a crime in Islam. In a recent nationwide opinion survey 
conducted by the Merdeka Centre for Opinion Research, 98 percent of Malaysian Muslims concur 
with such a 'conservative' view. 57 percent of respondents support the implementation of hudud 
(Islamic criminal law), while 73 percent think that Malaysia is an Islamic state, reflecting their 
essentially conservative stance (The Sun, 5 September 2006). 
'Migdal (1998: 24) 
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heavily on l:he communally-based constitutional contract, which they claim gives 
a special position to Islam to justify their arguments. The promoters of religious 
freedom on the ol:her hand defy the notion of an Islam-favored constitutional 
contract and emphasize the secular nature of the 1957 Federal Constitution to 
press for re-interpretation of the constitutional position on religious freedom 
along modem, liberal lines. The still unresolved struggle between the two 
viewpoints can be seen in a number of campaigns and initiatives for religious 
freedom and the debate that followed. 
Anti-Moral Policing Campaign 
In early 2005 a multiracial and multi-religious coalition of human rights activists 
launched a campaign against moral policing by state Islamic and municipal 
authorities. This initiative was significant in the sense l:hat it offered a different 
interpretation of basic tenets of Islam and attempted to convince the public l:hat 
religious interpretations should not be monopolized by a group of conservative 
ulama', the hitherto authoritative interpreters of religion. Put simply, it attempted 
to challenge l:he mainstream-defined Islamic legal meanings by offering 
alternative interpretations of Islamic legal precepts which are based on the 
Qur' anic texts and prophetic traditions, but are also infused wil:h modern-liberal 
perspectives on universal human rights principles and values. 
Sisters in Islam (SIS), a strong opponent of moral policing and campaigner 
for individual liberties, views the religious authorities' zeal in enforcing Islamic 
moral laws as violating both the Qur' anic spirit of morality and fundamental 
human rights.7 A statement issued by SIS quoted several Qur'anic verses such as 
"Do not pry into others' secrets";B "Do not enter other houses except yours 
without first asking permission and greeting the occupants [saluting the 
7 Sisters in Islam (2005). 
•Verse 12 in Surah A-Hu}rat 
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inmates]";9 and also a liadith of the Prophet (p.b.u.h) which means "Do not harm 
Muslims, and do not revile them, nor pursue their imperfections" .1° These 
Qur'anic verses and Hadiths were quoted to support the organization's claim 
that moral policing, as practiced by religious authorities in various raids on 
unmarried couples, night club patrons and gamblers, has no basis in Islam. The 
statement concluded in liberal style by stating that "the balance between law and 
morality must be decided by society in a democratic manner and not through 
legislation driven from above with no public support nor public discussion."11 In 
another joint statement, the anti-moral policing campaigners maintained that the 
question of "how people dress and where, how and with whom they socialize" 
should be best left to their personal choices, indicating the group's sanctification 
of the individual's private space in regard to matters of personal freedoms. The 
use of punitive religious and municipal laws to regulate morality, the opponents 
of moral policing argued, "results not in a more moral society but a mass of 
terrified, submissive and hypocritical subjects".12 
The Anti-Moral Policing Campaign launched in March 2005 was in protest 
against the arrests of about 100 Muslim patrons of the Singapore-owned Zouk 
night club in Kuala Lumpur by the Federal Territories Religious Department 
OA 1vv1) enforcement officers during a raid in January 2005. The religious officers 
claimed that those arrested were dressed indecently or had consumed alcohol. 
The anti-moral policing campaigners, who called themselves Malaysians Against 
Moral Policing, also questioned the state's role in defining the morality of its 
citizens and the use of punitive religious and municipal laws to curb immorality 
and indecency. The campaign called for the repeal of provisions in religious and 
municipal laws that deny citizens their fundamental right to privacy, freedom of 
'Verse 27 in Surah An-Nur 
10 Sisters in Islam (2005). 
n Sisters in Islam (2005). 
12 See Joint Statement entitled "The State Has No Role in Policing Morality" at 
http://www.petitionspotcom/petitions/mamp (Accessed on 7 December 2006). 
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speech and expression, and those that overlap with the federal penal code;13 the 
appointment of a committee to monitor the process of repealing these laws, 
including representation from women's groups, human rights groups, civil 
society organizations, progressive religious scholars and constitutional expert5; 
and the strengthening of pluralism through community dialogue on the issue of 
morals in the society.14 The campaign was endorsed by about 50 NGOs and more 
than 200 individuals including prominent government and opposition 
politicians.15 The NGOs include Sisters in Islam (SIS), Suara Rakyat Malaysia 
(SUARAM, Voice of Malaysian People), National Human Rights Society 
(HAKAM), Aliran Kesedaran Negara (ALIRAN, Movement for National 
Consciousness), All vVomen's Action Society (AWAM), International l'vfovement 
for a Just World GUST), Malaysian Youth and Student Democratic Movement 
(DEMA), Malaysian Trade Union Congress (MTUq, Pusat Komunikasi 
Masyarakat (KOMAS, Centre for Community Communication) and Universiti 
Bangsar Utamn (UBU). Most of these NGOs had been in the forefront of the 1998 
Refarmasi movement. Three opposition political parties - the DAP, PKR and the 
unregistered Parti Sosialis Malaysia (PSM, Malaysian Socialist Party) - also 
13 These included Section 29 of the Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997 and 
Section 31 of the Syariah Criminal Offences (Selangor) Enactment 1995 which makes it an offence 
for a Muslim who, contrary to Islamic law, acts or behaves in an indecent manner in any public 
place; Section 9 of the Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act/Section 12c of the 
Syariah Criminal Offences (Selangor) Enactment which make it an offence for a Muslim to defy 
the fatwas (religious edicts) of a Mufti, See for example Sisters in Islam's memorandum on "The 
Provisions in the Syari'ah Criminal Offences Act and Fundamental Liberties" dated 8 August 
1997. The full text of the memorandum is available at 
http://wv.w.sistersinislamorg.my/ merno/080897.htm. 
14 Joint Statement, "State Has No Role in Policing Morality", The full text of the joint statementis 
available at http://www.sistersinislam.org.mv /mamp/endorsees.htm (Accessed on 17 June 
2007). 
1s Prominent Malay BN politicians who endorsed the campaign include Minister in the Prime 
Minister's Department Datuk Seri Mohamad Nazri Aziz, Minister of Youth and Sports Dato' 
Azalina Othman Said, Minister of Culture, Arts and Heritage Datuk Seri Dr. Rais Yatirn, Member 
of Parliament for Kata Bharu Dato' Zaid Ibrahim and Member of Parliament for Gombak Datuk 
Dr. Rahman Ismail. Others include OAP Members of Parliament Lim Kit Siang, Chong Eng, Fong 
Po Kuan, Tan Seng Giaw, M Kulasegaran and Teresa Kok PKR Vice President Sivarasa Rasiah 
also endorsed the campaign. See the full list of endorsees at 
http://www.petitionspot.com/petitions/marnp (Accessed on 7 December 2006). 
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endorsed the campaign.16 Earlier, a women's group called Joint Action Group 
Against Violence Against \Vomen GAG), which consists of Women's Aid 
Organization (WAO), Women's Development Collective (WDC), Sisters in Islam 
(SIS), All Women's Action Society (AWAM) and \Vomen's Centre for Change 
(WCC), also opposed the Zouk raid, citing unprofessional conduct of religious 
officers against women detainees.17 As a result of the various protests, none of 
those arrested were charged in the Syariah court. The Minister in the Prime 
Minister's Department (the de-facto Islamic Affairs Minister), Dato' Dr. Abdullah 
Mat Zin, explained in Parliament in April that the decision not to charge them 
was made due to "lack of evidence which warrants prosecution" .rn The cabinet 
too discussed the arrest and ordered a review of religious enforcement powers, 
including requiring future raids to be carried out only with police approval and 
in the presence of senior police officers.19 The Cabinet also ordered the newly 
formed 4B Youth's "Mat Skodeng Squad" (Snoop Squad), which was set up to spy 
on Muslim couples, to stop their activities.20 
In response to the Anti-Moral Policing Campaign, a coalition of 
mainstream Islamic organizations launched a counter-campaign to defend the 
enforcement of Islamic moral laws. About 50 Islamic organizations, which 
included ABIM, JIM, PKPH'v1, Malaysian Ulama' Association (PUM), Malaysian 
Chinese Muslim Association (l\1ACMA) and Indian Muslim Youth Movement of 
Malaysia (GEPIMA) issued a joint statement claiming that the campaign "has 
16 See http://www.petitionspot.com/petitions/mamp for a full list of endorsees. 
17 The Malay Mail, 27 January 2005. 
1s Malaysiakini, 14 April 2005. 
19 The Star, 25 March 2005. 
20 Tiie Star, 25 March 2005. Formed in 1965, the 4B Youth is one of Malaysia's oldest youth 
organizations. Although its membership is open to all Malaysian citizens above the age of 18, the 
organization is predominantly Malay-based and closely associated with UMNO. Its current 
President is UMNO Vice-President and Malacca Chief Minister Datuk Seri Mohd Ali Rustam. Its 
previous presidents, Dato' Seri Tajol Rosli Ghazali (1991-1994), Dato' Hj. Suhaimi Kamaruddin 
(1968-1991) and Mohd Kassim Shah (1965-1968) were all UMNO leaders. The word 4B refers to 
the organization's motto of Bersatu (to unite), Belajar (to learn), Bekerja (to work) and Berkhidmat 
(to serve). See the organization's history at http://www.4bmalaysia.com/sejarah4b%20page.htm 
(Accessed on 19 June 2007). 
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caused confusion and ambiguities about the concepts of prevention of sin and 
the limits of individual freedom in Islam".21 Prevention of sin, especially by the 
government, the organizations maintained, is a manifestation of the principle of 
hisbafz22 and al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al-rnunkar (enjoining good and 
forbidding evil) which are central to the teachings of Islam.23 The group also 
maintained that although the weaknesses in the implementation of those laws 
should be properly addressed by the authorities, by no means should they be 
made an excuse to justify the repeal of those laws.24 Sharing the same sentiment 
was the National Fatwa Council, which consists of state muftis and religious 
scholars who urged the government in its April meeting to uphold the Islamic 
concept of" enjoining good and forbidding evil" by enforcing those laws more 
responsibly.25 
As the Anti-Moral Policing Campaign was portrayed as a non-partisan 
initiative aimed at promoting the rights of individuals in choosing their moral 
life, and thus essentially not a threat to the existing political regime, some Barisan 
Nasional (BN) politicians also expressed their support for the campaign.26 UMNO 
Supreme Council member and Minister in the Prime Minister's Department 
Datuk Seri Mohamad Nazri Aziz even described the arrest of over 100 Muslims 
at the Zouk night club as an action akin to those under Afghanistan's infamous 
21 See Joint statement entitled "Pencegahan Maksiat dan Salah Laku Moral Hanis Dipertahankan" 
(Prevention of Sins and Immoral Conduct Should Be Defended) dated 31 March 2005. The text of 
the statement can be accessed at 
ht!;p:/ /www.abim.org.mv /web/modules/news/article.php?storyid=515 (Accessed on 30 
November 2006). 
22 The Hisbah literally refers to a religious institution under the authority of the state that appoints 
people to carry out the responsibility of enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong. Its 
purpose is to safeguard the society from deviance, protect the faith, and ensure the welfare of the 
people in both religious and worldly matters according to the Islamic law. 
"'See the Joint Statement on Prevention of Sins. 
2< See the Joint Statement on Prevention of Sins. 
2s The chairman of the National Fatwa Council, Datuk Dr Ismail Ibrahim, was quoted as saying, 
'When we elect a government, we give it powers to uphold the moral values of society because 
the destruction of morals will bring disaster to the country". He also viewed that the government 
is the responsible body to issue Islamic decrees (Tlte Straits Times, 16 April 2005). 
"' See note 12. [Better to place footnote 12 here] 
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Taliban rule.27 Giving his support to the memorandum seeking the repeal of the 
ostensibly rights-infringing Syariah and municipal moral laws, he stated that "no 
one religion should dominate the private lives of Malaysians in general."28 In a 
rare display of solidarity between government and opposition Members of 
Parliament, the bi-partisan Parliamentary Caucus on Human Rights, with the 
exception of PAS' s representative, endorsed the anti-moral policing 
memorandum.29 
But the endorsement of the campaign by UMNO ministers like Mohamad 
Nazri, Datuk Seri Dr. Rais Yatim (Minister of Arts, Culture and Heritage) and 
Dato' Azalina Othman Said (Minister of Youth and Sports), did not represent a 
consensus within the party. Other U1v1NO politicians protested against the 
campaign. UMNO Secretary-General and Minister in the Prime Minister's 
Department (the de facto Law Minister) Dato' Radzi Sheikh Ahmad shot down 
the campaign and described the demands made by its advocates as 
"unreasonable".30 Echoing the same sentiment was another Minister in the Prime 
Minister's Department (the de facto Islamic Affairs Minister) Dato' Dr. Abdullah 
Mat Zin. He claimed that the demands made by the anti-moral policing 
advocates "would only worsen the situation as it could spiral out of control".31 
An outspoken UMNO politician and l\1ember of Parliament, Dato' Badruddin 
Amiruddin, even accused the anti-moral policing campaigners as traitors for 
attempting to split the Muslim community.32 Other party leaders openly 
27 The Star, 25 March 2005. 
'" The Star, 25 March 2005. 
29 PAS Youth Chief and Member of Parliament Salahuddin Ayub withdrew from the Human 
Rights Caucus after disagreeing with its decision to support the anti-moral policing campaign 
(Malaysiakini, 8/4/2005) 
3tl The Star, 25 March 2005. 
31Malaysiakini,14 April 2005. 
32 Malaysiakini, 30 March 2005. 
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supported the actions by the Federal Territories Religious Department 0AWI) 
officers in conducting the raid on Muslim party goers.33 
Beneath the surface of these advocacies and counter-advocacies lies 
longstanding ideological contest between the Islamists and the secularists who 
since the 1998/99 Reformasi had participated in a common struggle for political 
and legal reform. The mainstream Islamic organizations, while reiterating their 
commitment to democracy, human rights and pluralism, rejected what they 
viewed as a process of secularization pursued by the anti-moral policing 
campaigners.34 This secularization, they argued, was indicated by the 
campaigners' insistence on relegating religion into private space, subjecting 
observances of religious duties to the whims and fancies of individuals, while 
rejecting the religious authorities' role in enforcing religious Iaws.35 Obviously, 
the campaign was viewed by the mainstream Islamic groups as an attempt to 
push religion out of the public space in the name of human rights and individual 
liberties, a process closely associated with secularism, which is anathema to 
many in the Islamic mainstream in Malaysia. The government, responding to the 
protests from the Muslim majority, shot down the initiative and promised to 
retain all laws on morality including the Syariah laws in order to safeguard the 
morals of Malaysians.36 
33 Umno Youth religious bureau chairman Shamsul Najmi Shamsuddin for example backed the 
JAW! raid, saying that it was wrong for Muslims to be in a place that serves liquor or which is 
involved in gambling (Malaysiakini, 23 February 2005). 
34 See the Joint Statement on Prevention of Sins. 
http: I I www.abim.org.my (web I modules/news I article.J2!:lJ;~ ?storyid=515 (Accessed on 30 
November 2006). 
35 See the Joint Statement on Prevention of Sins at 
http:( /www.abim.org.my/web /modules/ news/art:icle.php?storyid=515 (Accessed on 30 
November 2006). 
"See Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's statement in Utusan Malaysia, 16 April 2005. 
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The Interfaith Commission of Malaysia 
About the same time as the outcry over moral policing by religious authorities, a 
group of human rights organizations, a professional organization, a number of 
liberal Muslim organizations and non-Muslim religious groups, proposed the 
formation of an Interfaith Commission of Malaysia (IFCM), a statutory body that 
would have functions and powers similar to that of the Malaysian Human Rights 
Commission (SUHAKAM).37 The initiative to form such an interfaith body was 
first conceived in a conference on freedom of religion organized by the Human 
Rights Committee of the Bar Council and HAKAM on 10 December 2000.38 A 
multi-faith committee which included mainstream Islamic organizations as 
members was then set up to discuss the formation of a multi-faith Inter-Religious 
Council (IRC).39 In August 2001, the Malaysian Consultative Council of 
Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism (MCCBCHS) submitted a 
memorandum to the Human Rights Committee of the Bar Council" outlining the 
main problems in relation to the freedom to profess and practice one's religion 
37 The group consists of the following organizations: Malaysian Bar Council, Malaysian 
Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism (MCCBCHS), Pure Life 
Society, Inter-Religious Spiritual and Fellowship (INSAF), Malaysian Interfaith Network, Sisters 
in Islam, FORUM IQRA, Spiritual Assembly of Baha'is of Malaysia, Persekutuan Pertubuhan 
Agama Tao Malaysia, Federation of I-Kuan Tao Associations Malaysia, Saka Gakkai Malaysia, Sri 
Sathya Sai Central Council, Circles of Life, Theosophical Society, National Human Rights Society 
(HAKAM), Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM), Aliran Kesedaran Negara (ALIRAN), National 
Council of Women's Organizations Malaysia (NCWO), Research for Social Advancement 
(REFSA). The conference to discuss the formation of IFCM held in February 2005 was funded by 
German-based Konrad Adenaur Foundation (KAF). 
''The idea to form an inter-religious council was mooted by Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, President of 
the International Movement for a Just World (JUST), in a paper presented at the conference 
(Malaysian Bar Council 2000). 
39 Such a council has a precedent in the form an inter-religious committee set up under the 
purview of the Prime Minister's Department when Tun Hussein Onn was the Prime Minister. 
The committee, which comprised representatives of Malaysia's main religions, functioned as an 
advisory body to the government and deliberated on inter-religious issues such as building 
places of worship and dissemination of religious literature. The committee was disbanded after 
Tun Hussein resigned as the Prime Minister in 1991 (Malaysian Bar Council 2000: 119). 
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faced by members of the non Muslim communities" .40 The problems stated in the 
memorandum included the absence of the legal right to revert to his or her 
former religion after converting to Islam, the stating of Muslim religious identity 
on identity cards which causes problems for converts out of Islam, the illegality 
of inter-religious marriage, the difficulties faced by non-Muslim family members 
to claim the body of Muslim converts upon their death, difficulties in obtaining 
approval for building of non-Muslim places of worship and the ban on the 
Malay-language Bible.41 
The MCCBCHS' memorandum became an issue of much contention when 
mainstream Islamic organizations in the committee rejected reference to the 
memorandum as the basis for the formation of the inter-religious council. This 
resulted in their withdrawal from the committee in mid 2003.42 Despite strong 
objections from Islamic groups such as ACCIN43 and ABIM, as well as the 
International Movement for Just World GUST), the committee proceeded to 
organize a workshop "Toward the Formation of an Inter-Religious Council" on 
17 May 2003.44 The workshop resolved to propose the setting up of a" statutory 
<n See MCCBCHS covering letter dated 22 August 2001 addressed to Mr. Cecil Rajendra, 
Chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the Bar Council. 
41 See MCCBCHS memorandum to the Human Rights Committee of the Bar Council dated 22 
August 2001. 
42 Obviously, the Islamic groups could not accept the tendency to advocate for the right of 
Muslims to renounce Islam, which is considered as an intra-religious issue. Interview with Azril 
Mohamad Amin, ABIM Vice President, 19 August 2005, Kuala Lumpur. 
"'ACCIN consists of the following 14 lslamic groups: Malaysian Chinese Muslim Association 
(MACMA), Indian Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (GEPIMA), ABIM Islamic Outreach, 
Jamaah Isiah Malaysia OIM), Malaysian Ulama' Association (PUM), World Assembly of Muslim 
Youth (WAMY), National Union of Malaysian Muslim Students' Associations (PKP!M), SABA 
Islamic Media, Al-Hidayah, Islamic Information and Services, Al-Hunafa Society, Malaysian 
Darul Fitrah Society, Research and Information Centre on Islam (RICO!) and Islamic Welfare 
Society of Malaysia (PERKIM) Youth. 
"Dr. Kamar Oniah, JUST representative in the committee, explained that the Human Rights sub-
Committee of the Bar Council, chaired by Cecil Rajendra, dominated the meetings and ignored 
opinions of others, giving rise to a perception that there had been a prior decision on the matters 
discussed. She was also strongly dissatisfied with attitudes of the members of the Human Rights 
sub-committee who were keen to blame Islam for restricting religious freedom, citing apostasy 
cases in which they, as lawyers, lost. She concluded that this group of lawyers, Muslims and non-
Muslims, were not interested in negotiating the formation of an interfaith consultative body, but 
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body whose primary objective shall be to advance, promote and protect every 
individual's freedom of thought, conscience and religion with a view to promote 
harmonious co-existence (of different religious communities) in Malaysia".45 SIS 
too boycotted the workshop due to the committee's failure to build common 
understanding among the faith groups, but later rejoined the initiative.46 
The committee then proceeded to draft an Interfaith Commission of 
Malaysia Bill, which was presented for discussion at the National Conference 
Toward the Formation of the Interfaith Commission of Malaysia in February 
2005. The Bill, in concurrence with the points of agreement achieved in the May 
2003 workshop, enumerates the main functions of the proposed commission, 
which, among other things, include to "advance, promote and protect every 
individual's freedom of thought, conscience and religion";47 "identify values and 
ethical standards universal to all religions, faiths, beliefs and ways of life with a 
view to promoting the same" ;48 "identify and recommend ways in which 
harmonious interfaith co-existence in larger society can be promoted and 
achieved with a view to (promoting) national harmony and unity";49 "receive, 
address and make recommendations in respect of complaints or grievances 
brought by persons, bodies or organizations in connection with the individual 
right to profess and practice his religion or faith of choice";so and "recommend to 
to press for the right to renounce Islam instead, which she believes is a specifically intra-faith 
issue. See myislamnetwork.net interview with Dr. Kamar Oniah, 21 July 2006, at 
http: I ( myislamnetworknet/portal/ modules/ news/print.php?storyid~18 (Accessed on 2 
December 2006). 
45 See Points of Agreement "Towards the Formation of an Inter-Religious Council Workshop" 
dated 17 May 2003. 
46 Sharifah Zuriah, SIS representative in the committee, said that she boycotted the workshop as 
its organizers had failed to focus on the importance of creating a basis for common 
understanding among the faith groups before addressing grievances of some non-Muslim 
groups. She described the organizer's insistence on making the MCCBCHS' memorandum to the 
Bar Council a benchmark for the formation of !RC, despite objections by some Muslim groups. as 
a wrong move (Yap 2003). 
47 Clause 4(1)(a) of the proposed Interfaith Commission of Malaysia Bill. 
48 Gause 4(1)(b). 
49 Clause 4(1)(c). 
5-0 Clause 4(1)( d). 
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the Government with regard to the subscription or accession of treaties and other 
international instruments in the field of religious harmony" ;51 
The draft Bill itself reflected an attempt to substitute the ethno-religious 
statist conception of legal meanings in relation to laws which regulate matters of 
religion with those based on universal principles of human rights and individual 
liberties. For instance, the draft Bill defines "infringement of religious harmony" 
as including "any act or omission which has as its effect the nullification or 
impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by any person or 
community of persons of his or their freedom of thought, conscience, religion or 
belief as prescribed by international norms" (emphasis is rnine).52 The draft Bill's 
reference to universal human rights principles as prescribed by international 
norms as a basis for religious harmony was a clear departure from the ethno-
religious statist legal meanings in two ways. First, it contradicted the limited 
mainstream Islamic-defined legal position on freedom of religion. Though most 
of the Islamists do not deny a person's right to profess and practice religion of his 
or her choice, they adopt a much stricter view in regard to the right of a Muslim 
to convert into other religion, or to apostatize, which is considered as a serious 
crime in Islam.53 Some of the states in Malaysia like Pahang, Perak, Kelantan, 
Sabah and Malacca criminalize apostasy.54 Only Negeri Sembilan has a clear 
51 Clause 4(1 )(i). 
52 Clause 2. 
53 According to an opinion survey on Malaysian Muslims' identity conducted by the Kuala 
Lumpur-based Merdeka Centre for Opinion Research (commissioned by Asia Europe Institute, 
University of Malaya) 97 percent of respondents say 'yes' when asked about their willingness to 
live alongside people of other religions, but 98 percent say 'no' to the right of Muslims to 
renounce Islam. The telephone survey which was conducted between lS - 18 December ZOOS 
involved 1,029 Muslim respondents throughout Peninsular Malaysia. 
54 In Pahang, an apostate upon conviction is liable to a fine not exceeding RMS, 000 and/ or 
imprisonment of not more than three years, and possibly six strokes of the cane. In Perak, an 
apostate shall be liable to a fine not exceeding RM3, 000 or to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding two years or to both (Section 13 of the Perak Syariah Criminal Offences Enactment No 
3 of 1992). In Malacca, a person who attempts to apostatize shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 
RMS, 000 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years or to both (Sections 67 of the 
Malacca Syariah Criminal Offences Enactment No 6of1991). In Sabah, a Muslim who claims that 
he is not a Muslim shall be liable to a fine not exceeding RM2, 000 or to imprisonment for a term 
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procedure on application for renouncing Islam. The state's Administration of 
Islamic Law Enactment 1991 (Amended 1995) provides for Muslims to dec.lare 
renunciation of Islam at the state Syariah High Court. 55 All states in Malaysia, 
except Penang, Sabah, Sarawak and the Federal Territories, restrict propagation 
of religious doctrines and beliefs other than those of Islam among Muslims. Such 
restriction is authorized by Article 11(4) of the Federal Constitution. Second, its 
propagation of religious freedom and equality among religions as a basis for 
religious harmony is a clear departure from the statist illiberal conception of the 
constitution. The Malaysian state, apart from giving a special position to Islam as 
the state religion, has instituted various restrictive laws, such as the Sedition Act, 
the Internal Security Act and the various state laws which restrict the 
propagation of non-Muslim religions among the .\1uslims, the objective of which, 
the government claims, is to regulate inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations in 
order to maintain racial and religious harmony. By making such references in a 
Bill intended to be presented to the government for consideration, the advocates 
of IFCM challenged not only the mainstream limited Islamic-defined legal 
meanings of religious freedom, but also the illiberal statist vision of fundamental 
liberties. The Bill in essence reflected the proliferation of new legal meanings 
not exceeding one year or to both (Sections 55(2) of the Sa bah Syariah Criminal Offences 
Enactment 1995). Detention at the Islamic Rehabilitation Centre for the purpose of religious 
counseling was also provided in Kelantan, Sabah and Malacca. It was for a period not exceeding 
three years in Kelantan and Sa bah and not exceeding six months in Malacca. (Section 102 of the 
Kelantan Islamic Religious Council and Malay Customs Enactment No. 4 1994, Section 66 of the 
Malacca Syariah Criminal Offences Enactment No 6 of 1991, and Section 63 of the Sa bah Syariah 
Criminal Offences Enactment 1995). 
ss Section 119. Between 1994-2003, 16 such applications were approved by the state. See 
!v!alaysiakini interview with MARA University of Technology (UITM) Professor of Law, Dr. 
Mohd Azam Mohd Adil (Malaysiakini, 11 November 2006). The Negeri Sembilan Mufti, Dato' 
Mohd. Murtadza Ahmad, speaking at the "Convention on Freedom of Religion and the Issue of 
Apostasy: Towards a Practical Resolution" held at the International Islamic University Malaysia 
(lIUM} on 29 November 2006, however said that a preventive and punitive law on apostasy 
needs to be formulated (Malaysiakini, 29 November 2006). 
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along the line of universal principles of human rights and individual liberties 
within the broader political space following the 1998/99 Reformasi.56 
Hardly unexpected, strong protests emerged from the ACCIN and its 
affiliated organizations, as well as the Syariah Committee of the Bar Council. In a 
joint memorandum against the proposed Interfaith Commission of Malaysia, 
ACCIN described the proposal as essentially anti-Islam and therefore urged the 
government to reject it.57 The organization quoted several items in the 
MCCBCHS' memorandum to the Bar Council to substantiate its claim. These 
items related to matters of law and administration such as suggestions that a 
Muslim's identity card should not disclose his or her religion, the civil courts 
rather than the Syariah courts should have jurisdiction to determine the right of a 
Muslim to renounce Islam and Article 11 of the Federal Constitution (freedom of 
religion) should be interpreted in tandem with international human rights 
instruments. ACCIN also referred to juristic matters that it claimed were 
specifically internal to Islam. These include suggestions that tvfuslims should 
have the right to renounce Islam and nobody should be regarded as a Muslim by 
reason of both parents being a Muslim.58 ACCIN believed that the motive for the 
formation of IFCM was based on the MCCBCHS' memorandum, which it 
described as non-Muslim interference with Islam. The organization believes that 
such an attempt would "imperil rather than ensure communal harmony" .59 
The committee submitted the proposed Bill to the government in March 
2005. Copies of the Bill were sent to the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, 
56 Dr. Shad Faruqi, a Malaysian constitutional expert, commenting on the proposed Bill, said that 
"the Bill tried hard to evade constitutional provisions and was more of a call for reform of the 
constitution and rewriting of the social contract than the drafting of legislation under the existing 
constitution" (Malaysiakini, 1 April 2005). Dr. Shad gave the same opinion in my interview with 
him on 25 February 2005, Bangi. 
57 See ACCIN's "Memorandum on the Proposed Inter-Religious Commission to the Government 
of Malaysia" dated 25 January 2005. 
58 See ACCIN's "Memorandum on the Proposed Inter-Religious Commission to the Government 
of Malaysia" dated 25 January 2005. 
"See ACCIN's statement" ACCIN Insists on Protesting against the Formation of !FC" dated 7 
March2005. 
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two Cabinet Ministers and the Attorney-General for consideration.60 The 
government however called for the proposal to be deferred due to "different 
levels of sensitivity among the people".61 Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad 
Badawi told the Parliament in March 2005 that the setting up of the commission 
"may result in complications arising, rather than achieving inter-religious 
understanding". Instead of forming the commission, the Prime Minister 
suggested that more interfaith dialogues be held.62 Minister of Arts Culture and 
Heritage Datuk Seri Dr. Rais Yatim who had earlier described the initiative as "a 
milestone event" when opening the conference toward the formation of IFCM in 
February concurred with the Prime Minister's decision and urged all parties 
involved to engage in more informal interfaith dialogues instead. But as the 
protests against IFCM persisted, the government finally nailed the coffin on the 
initiative by saying that it would not entertain any more efforts to set up the 
commission. 
The Article 11 Group 
Article 11 is a coalition of thirteen NGOs formed in May 2004, the primary aim of 
which is to uphold the supremacy of the Federal Constitution and to promote 
religious freedom in Malaysia. The thirteen NGOs are the All Women's Action 
Society (AWAM), Malaysian Bar Council, Catholic Lawyers Society (CLS), 
Interfaith Spiritual Fellowship (ISF), Malaysian Civil Liberties Society (MCLS), 
Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism & Sikhism 
(MCCBCHS), National Human Rights Society (HAKAM), Pure Life Society, 
Sisters in Islam (SIS), Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM, Voice of Malaysian 
People), Vivekanda Youth Movement, Seremban, Women's Aid Organization 
60 Malaysiakini, 17 Mac 2005. 
61 Malaysiakini, 24 Mac 2005. 
62 Malaysiakini, 24 Mac 2005. 
316 
(WAO) and Women's Development Collective (WDq. Most of these 
organizations were either involved in advocating the formation of IFCM or 
supporting the application by Azlina Jailani, a Malay-Muslim woman who 
converted to Christianity, to drop the word Islam and her Muslim name from her 
identity card.63 The joint secretariat of Article 11 was formed by WAO and SIS. 
The reason for the setting up of Article 11, as its proponents claim, was to fight 
against the purported injustices meted out to persons like Shamala, a Hindu 
woman whose husband had converted to Islam. In April 2004, the High Court in 
Kuala Lumpur granted Shamala custody of her two young children, but with a 
condition that she must not expose them to the Hindu faith. Her estranged 
husband had earlier converted their children to Islam without her knowledge. 
The civil court rejected her application for a declaration that the conversion was 
invalid, citing that the correctness or otherwise of their conversion was a matter 
for the Syariah court to decide. The court's decision, Article 11 claims, violated 
Shamala's parental right to co-determine the religious upbringing of the children, 
and as such a serious infringement of her right to religious freedom. 64 Article 11 
itself was named after Article 11 of the Federal Constitution which provides for 
freedom of religion. Shamala's case has been a rallying point for the thirteen 
NGOs to promote greater freedom of religion among all Malaysians regardless of 
race or religion. 
The coalition insisted that no citizen should be discriminated against on 
the basis of religion, race, descent, place of birth or gender. It also called for the 
individual rights to freedom of thought, conscience and belief to be fully 
respected, guaranteed and protected, while every citizen should have a 
responsibility to condemn discrimination and intolerance based on religion or 
belief. Religion or belief, the organization emphasized, should support human 
63 See further discussion on the Azlina Jailani (Lina Joy) case below. 
64 See Article ll's background information at http://www.articlell.org/01AboutUs.htrn 
(Accessed on 3 December 2006). 
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dignity and peace. On the issue of guardianship of children, it promoted both 
parents' equal right to guardianship and that children should be protected from 
any form of discrimination on the grounds of religion, and in all cases, the 
interests of children should be paramount.65 
In its open letter to the government, the coalition outlined its position on 
the supremacy of the constitution, the nature of the Malaysian state and the right 
to freedom of religion.66 Apparently, the bone of the coalition's contention was 
that although Article 3 of the Federal Constitution provides that Islam is the 
religion of the Federation, the Federal Constitution is the supreme law of the 
land and Malaysia remains a secular state. It drew the government's attention to 
the Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission, 1956-57, 
which states that Article 3 "shall not imply the state is not a secular state".67 It 
also referred to the Supreme Court decision in Che Omar Oie Soh v Public 
Prosecutor in 1988/•ll which reaffirmed that" the !aw in this country is still what it 
is today, secular law". Based on this perspective, the coalition criticized the civil 
courts which generally declined to adjudicate on "pressing issues simply because 
they involved some elements of Islamic law, leaving litigants without any 
remedy".69 Obviously, the coalition referred to judicial attitudes toward Article 
121(1A), which provides exclusive jurisdiction to the Syariah courts to hear cases 
on matters related to Islamic law. The coalition thus called upon the government 
and the judiciary to uphold the supremacy of the Federal Constitution; to ensure 
governance in accordance with the Federal Constitution and premised on the 
•s See Article 1l's background information at http://www.artide11.org/01AboutUs.htm 
(Accessed on 3 December 2006). 
66 See Article ll's "Open Letter: Reaffirming the Supremacy of the Federal Constitution" 
(undated) at http:/lwww.article11.org/020penLetter.htm (Accessed on 3 December 2006). The 
coalition claims that the open letter garnered 18,000 signatures on hard copy. As of 3 December 
2006, the open letter obtains2, 609 online signatures. 
67 This contention had its origin in the Alliance's memorandum to the Reid Commission as 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
""[1988] 2 MLJ 55. 
69 See Article 11 's Open Letter. 
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universal values of all Malaysian peoples; to reaffirm that Malaysia shall not 
become a theocratic state; and to recognize the proper position of the judiciary 
within the constitutional framework, as an independent and equal arm of 
Government.70 Article 11 member organizations had been calling upon the 
government to repeal or amend Article 121(1A) to enable the civil High Courts to 
hear cases, which by virtue of the said Article, are strictly within the jurisdiction 
of the Syariah courts.71 
Article 11 sought to advocate its ideas and raise people's awareness about 
the supremacy of the Federal Constitution and the individual right to freedom of 
religion through public discussions in a series of nationwide "road shows". Its 
first two public forums held in Petaling Jaya and Malacca on 12 March and 21 
April 2006 respectively ran smoothly. About 200-300 participants, mostly non-
Muslims, attended the forums. However, its third public forum in Penang on 14 
May 2006 met fierce protests from Muslims led by a group called Badan Bertindak 
Anti-IFC (BAD AI, Anti-IFC Action Front). About 1000 protesters gathered in 
front of the Cititel Hotel along Penang Road, where the public forum "Federal 
Constitution: Protection for All" was held. The protesters waved banners and 
placards with words like" IFC Rampas Kuasa Raja" (IFC Seizes (Malay) Rulers' 
Powers), "IFC Angkara Zion is" (IFC is Zionist Savagery) and" Batalkan IFC" (Stop 
IFC), indicating their attempt to link the Article 11 initiative with the proposed 
IFCM.72 Some of the protesters even joined the forum and engaged in heated 
70 See Article ll's Open Letter. 
71 These include cases on guardianship of a minor and the status of his or her religion when one 
parent converted to Islam, religious status of a Muslim who converted out of Islam, the religious 
status of a Muslim convert who reverted to his or her previous religion, etc. See for example the 
Malaysian Bar Council's press release" Amend Constitution with Care" dated 17 January 2006. 
The full text of the press release is available at 
http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/content/view /2232/2/ (Accessed on 19 June 2007). 
72 This is most probably due to the similarities in the main objective of both initiatives, i.e. to 
promote freedom of religion. Furthermore, the majority of the member organizations of Article 11 
were either advocates or supporters of the !FCM. Article 11 however denied that it had any 
connection with IFCM, or seeks to revive the initiative to form the interfaith body. 
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arguments with the panelists. As a result of the protest, the forum had to be cut 
short when only three of the five speakers were able to speak.73 
Another public forum held in Johor Bharu on 22 July 2006 also met with 
protests from Muslims led by a group called Front Bertindak Anti Murtad 
(FORKAD, Anti-Apostasy Action Front). About 300 protesters gathered outside 
the hotel venue where the forum was held?4 Similar to the Penang protest, the 
Joh ore protesters also held placards and banners with printed slogans such as 
"Pertahankan Hak Umat Islam" (Defend Muslims' Rights), "Jangan Cabar Kami" 
(Don't Dare Us), "Jangan Ganggu Agama Kami" (Don't Meddle with Our Religion), 
"Jangan Sentuh Sensitiviti Islam" (Don't Touch on Islamic Sensitivities) and 
"Hancurkan Gerakan Anti-Islam" (Crush Anti-Islam Movement).75 Tensions ran 
high and commotion broke out when the organizer refused to call off the forum 
as demanded by the protesters. The forum proceeded as planned, but with a 
heavy presence of about 200 police personnel including the riot police.76 This 
incident again indicates strong contestation between the two contending forces 
and the possibility of tensions running out of control. 
In response to the escalating religious tensions resulting from Article 11' s 
road shows, which also occurred about the same time that the Azlina Jailani 
(Lina Joy)'s case was heard at the Federal Court, the government in July 2006 
curbed freedom of speech by banning public debate on sensitive religious 
issues.77 Describing the tensions as reaching a "worrying level", Prime Minister 
73 '[be three speakers were AWAM Executive Director Honey Tan, constitutional expert Professor 
Dr. Shad Saleem Faruqi and HAKAM Deputy President, Malik lmtiaz Sarwar. Two other 
speakers, ALIRAN President P Ramakrishnan and Member of Parliament for Kota Bharu Dato' 
Zaid Ibrahim, could not speak. See ALIRAN report on the incident at 
http://www.aliran.com/content/view/62/11/ (Accessed on 3 December 2006) 
7• Miilaysiakini, 22 July 2006. 
75 Justifying the protest, Johor PAS Commissioner, Dr. Mahfodz Mohamed who led the mob was 
reported to have said, "We can't just keep quiet. We don't want to see apostasy continuing before 
our very eyes in a country that proclaims Islam as the official religion" (Malaysiakini, 22 July 
2006). 
76 Malaysiakini, 22 july 2006. 
,., New Straits Times, 26 july 2006. 
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Abdullah Ahmad Badawi warned that such issues "evoke emotions, and when 
discussed openly, without control, they create anger, and this leads to unwanted 
situations" .78 The ban was lauded by Islamic organizations, which had earlier 
opposed the Article ll's road shows. The Muslim Professional Forum (MPF) 
President Dr. Mazeni Alwi welcomed the ban and concurred with the Prime 
Minister that "issues of religious sensitivity should not be openly debated in the 
public arena" .79 He condemned the Article 11 advocates for turning the climate 
of relative openness under Abdullah's government "into a free-for-all Islam-
bashing in the name of championing religious freedom" .so In a similar vein, 
ABIM President Yusri Mohamad urged the Article 11 group not to use a 
"confrontational" approach in discussing sensitive religious issues like freedom 
of religion, especially by organizing open public debate on the matter.Bl As a 
result of the Muslim protests, the government also dismissed the possibility of 
amending Article 121(1A) and assured the Muslims that the Syariah courts 
would retain jurisdiction on matters concerning Islam.s2 
Ayah Pin's Sky Kingdom 
In July 2001, the Terengganu Islamic Affairs Department acted against the 
followers of Ayah Pin's Kerajaan Langit (Sky Kingdom), a religious cult that had 
been declared deviant by the Terengganu Fatwa (Islamic religious edict) 
78 New Straits Times, 26 July 2006. 
79 See MPF's press release, "Issues of Religious Sensitivity Should not be Openly Debated in the 
Public Arena: MPF" dated 4 August 2006 at 
http://rnyislamnetwork.net/portal/rnodules/news/ print.php?storyid=SS (Accessed on 19 June 
2007) 
80 See MPF' s press release dated 4 August 2006 at 
http://myislamnetwork.net/portal/rnodules/news/print.php?storyid=SS (Accessed on 19 June 
2007) 
s1 Harakahdaily, 4 August 2006. 
82 See Minister in the Prime Minister's Department Datuk Seri Mohamad Nazri Aziz's statement 
quoted in PEMBELA's website, myislamnetwork, on 22 August 2006. The statement is available 
at http://myislamnetwork.net/portal/rnodules/news/print.php?storyid=75. (Accessed on 19 
June 2007). 
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Committee in 1997. Ayah Pin, or Ariffin Muhamad, is a self-style 'spiritual 
leader' of Malay descent who claimed he is the reincarnation of God on earth. He 
preached that all religions are the same and everybody has the right to submit to 
God in whatever ways they wish. An anonymous person who claimed to be an 
ex-member of Ayah Pin's sky kingdom wrote in Malaysiakini, a local internet 
news source, alleging that the cult leader prohibited Muslims from performing 
mandatory daily prayers for they had yet to know God.83 Four of the cult 
followers had been sentenced to two years imprisonment in 1998 for attempting 
to renounce Islam.84 Ariffin himself was sentenced to 11 months imprisonment 
by the Syariah court in 2001 for insulting Islam.BS His followers, who include 
Malays, Indians, Chinese and a number of foreigners, attended his sermons in a 
small commune in Hulu Besut, a district in the interior of Terengganu. The 
commune itself is home to about 200 cult followers. 
Ariffin's teaching could be traced back to the 1980s but his commune came 
into prominence when a giant teapot, an umbrella tower and other weird 
structures built on the land housing the commune - which cult members claimed 
cost millions of ringgit - caught media attention in 2005. Acting on public 
complaints, Islamic Religious Department enforcement officers and the police 
broke into the commune on 2 July 2005 and arrested 21 cult members for 
allegedly possessing documents about teachings which were contrary Islam.86 
Ariffin and the first of his four wives, however, escaped arrest.87 On 20 July, a 
second arrest took place in which 59 cult members, including a New Zealand 
citizen Judith Lilian, were arrested for breaching the fatwa (edict) issued by the 
Fatwa Committee in 1997 banning the cult. Judith however escaped charges for 
83 See 'Pengikut Ayah Pin Perlu Bertaubat' (Ayah Pin's Followers Need to Repent), Malaysiakini, 
26 May 2005, http:/ /www.malaysiakini.com/letters/36450 (Accessed on 5 December 2006). 
84 Malaysiakini, 25 May 2005. 
"Malaysiakini, 28 January 2005. 
86 Malaysiakini, 4 July 2005. 
87 Malaysiakini, 4 July 2005. 
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she was a non-Muslim. As for the Muslims, they were charged for the offence 
and upon conviction would be liable to a maximum of two years imprisonment 
or RM 3,000 fine.BB On 31 July 2005, the Besut district authorities moved into the 
commune and destroyed the giant structures on the land for violating the 
National Land Code.B9 Earlier, a group of angry villagers, mostly Malay 
Muslims, had attacked the commune and torched the structures.90 By August 
2005, most of the residents deserted the commune, leaving only about 10 families 
who "had no other place to go" .91 
Against the backdrop of Ayah Pin's Sky Kingdom controversy was 
contestation between the promoters of absolute religious freedom and the 
defenders of Islamic faith. It is in this context that there had been calls for the use 
of restrictive laws against the cult followers as a means to preserve the sanctity of 
Islamic faith. A threat to the Islamic faith was viewed as a threat to national 
security. The Religious Adviser to the Prime Minister, Tan Sri Abdul Hamid 
Othman, for example, said that Ariffin was a threat to national security and thus 
should be detained.92 Perak Mufti and member of National Fatwa Council, Datuk 
Seri Harussani Zakaria, shared this view and urged the government to use the 
Internal Security Act against Ariffin and his followers as a means to contain their 
activities and influence.93 Ayah Pin's Sky Kingdom, Harussani claimed, was a 
"government-within-the-government", which was a serious threat to national 
security.94 The Terengganu NGOs Action Front, which consisted of 12 Malay-
88 Among those arrested was Kamariah Ali, a Muslim woman who claimed that she had 
renounced Islam in 1998. Kamariah had earlier applied to the Federal Court for a declaration of 
her right to renounce Islam under Article 11 of the Federal Constitution. Her application was 
however dismissed by the Federal Court in July 2004. See Kamariah bte Ali & Ors v Government of 
Kelantan & Anor [2005] 1 MLJ 197. 
89 Malaysiakini, 31 July 2006. The structures were erected on agricultural land, violating the land 
law. 
90 Malaysiakini, 18 July 2005. 
91 Malaysiakini, 12 August 2005. 
"Malaysiakini, 18 July 2005. 
93 Malaysiakini, 20 July 2005. 
"Malaysiakini, 20 July 2005. 
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based national and local NGOs in Terengganu, called upon the government to 
detain Ariffin under the ISA. The NGOs were the 4B Youth Movement, 
Malaysian Association of Youth Clubs (MAYC), Gabungan Pelajar Melayu 
Semenanjung (GPMS, Peninsular Malay Students' Association), Terengganu 
Young Professional Movement, Malaysian Muslim Youth Club, Muslim Youth 
Movement of Malaysia (ABIM), Terengganu Literature Society, Terengganu 
Young Entrepreneurs Assembly, Terengganu Bestari Association, Silat Gerak 
Sejati Association of Terengganu, Sultan Mahmud College ex-Boys Association 
and MARA Junior College ex-Boys Association (Ansara). In a memorandum 
submitted to the Prime Minister on 21 July 2005, the movement claimed that the 
activities of Ayah Pin's cult since 30 years ago "endangered the Muslim 
ummah".95 The memorandum also mentioned foreigners' involvement in the cult 
and the moral and financial support it allegedly received from international 
organizations as a threat to national security and public order.96 
On the other side of the fence stood human rights NGOs which were 
perturbed by the government's apparent persecution of members of a "minority 
religious sect" and the infringement of their right to freedom of religion.97 
SUARAM filed a formal complaint with the United Nations Special Rapporteur 
for Freedom of Religion, alleging state-led persecution against Ariffin and his 
followers.98 In a letter to the UN Special Rappoteur dated 15 August 2005, 
SUARAM said the organization had learnt that the "followers of the minority 
religious sect have pursued their faith in a peaceful and law-abiding way". The 
organization further said "none of their activities have in any way infringed 
other people's rights or threatened social order". Thus SUARAM viewed their 
arrest and detention as "unlawful and arbitrary and the authorities' action 
95 Malaysiakini, 21 July 2005. 
96 Malaysiakini, 21 July 2005. 
97 See SUARAM statement in Malaysiakini, 17 August 2005. 
"Malaysiakini, 17 August 2005. 
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against them as totally uncalled for".99 SUARAM also viewed the action against 
Ariffin and his followers as a deprivation of their fundamental human rights 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Not only that, the 
human rights organization named Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and 
several others involved in the "persecution" of the cult members as "perpetrators 
(sic) of human rights".100 SUARAM's position on Ayah Pin Sky Kingdom 
signified a challenge to the limited statist ethno-religious legal meaning of 
freedom of religion, preferring instead a wider interpretation based on the 
principles enshrined in international instruments. By saying that the cult 
members did not do anything wrong in law, the organization in essence was 
trying to put in question the legitimacy of state Islamic laws which authorized 
state actions against them. 
The Judicial Attitude toward Religious Freedom: Re-Affirming Islam 
In the early 2000s, there was a host of controversial litigations in which the 
limited ethno-religious statist legal meanings of freedom of religion were 
challenged. These included challenging the established view among the civil 
court judges on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Syariah courts, as provided 
under Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution, to decide on matters relating 
to conversion to and from Islam.101 Paragraph 1 of List II (State List) of the Ninth 
Schedule in the Federal Constitution empowers the State Legislative Assemblies 
to make laws creating the Syariah courts in their respective states. The Syariah 
courts have jurisdiction only over persons professing the religion of Islam and in 
99 Malaysiakini, 17 August 2005. 
100 MalaysiaJ..ini, 17 August 2005. The word "perpetrators" must have meant "violators" or 
"perpetrators of violations of human right'". 
101 See for example Shamala Sathiyaseelan v Dr feyaganesh C Mogarajah fr Anar {2004] 2 MLJ 648. 
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respect of matters enumerated in the paragraph 1 of the State List.102 They also 
have jurisdiction in respect of the control of propagation of doctrines and beliefs 
among persons professing the religion of Islam and in determining matters of 
Islamic law and Malay custom.103 
Previously, there had been cases in which decisions of the Syari' ah courts 
were reversed by the civil courts which ruled that they also had jurisdiction over 
matters which were presumably said to be pertaining to Islamic lawsrn4 This led 
to a conflict of jurisdiction between the Syariah and the civil courtsrns To avoid 
such conflict, the Parliament in 1988 amended the Federal Constitution to 
introduce new Article 121(1A) which provides for exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Syariah courts to hear matters relating to the administration of Islamic laws. 
Since then, the general attitude among the civil court judges has been not to 
entertain cases which involved matters pertaining to Islamic law and passed it on 
to the Syariah courts.106 These include cases relating to renunciation of Islamic 
faith.107 Such restrictive interpretation had been criticized by the promoters of 
absolute religious freedom because it curtails the right of a Muslim to renounce 
Islam, given that the Syariah courts had usually been loath to allow renunciation 
102 Among the matters included in the list were Islamic laws relating to succession, testate and 
intestate, betrothal, marriage, divorce, dower, maintenance, adoption, legitimacy, guardianship, 
gifts, partitions and non-charitable trusts; Wakafs and the definition and regulation of charitable 
and religious trusts, the appointment of trustees and the incorporation of persons in respect of 
Islamic religious and charitable endowments, institutions, trusts, charities and charitable 
institutions operating wholly within the State; Zakat, Fitrah and Baitulmal or similar Islamic 
religious revenue; mosques or any Islamic public places of worship, creation and punishment of 
offences by persons professing the religion of Islam against Islamic precepts, except in regard to 
matters included in the Federal List; and the control of propagating doctrines and beliefs among 
persons professing the religion of Islam. 
103 See Paragraph 1 of List II of the Ninth Schedule in the Federal Constitution. 
104 See for example Commissioner of Religious Affairs v Tengku Mariam [1970] 1 MLJ 220 and Myriam 
v Mohamed Ariff[l971] l MLJ 265. 
10s For more detail analysis see Abdul Hamid (2002). 
106 See for example Mohamed Habibullah bin Mahmood v Faridah bte Dato' Talib [1992] 2 MLJ 793; 
Nor Kursiah bte Baharuddin v Shahril bin Lamin & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 537; Kaliammal a(p Sinnasamy v 
Director, Federal Territory Islamic Affairs Department (JAWI) & Anor [2006] 1 MLJ 685 
107 See for example Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (Perkim) Kedah 
& Anor [1994] 2 CLJ 107; Kamariah bte Ali v Government of Kelantan & Anor [2002] 3 MLJ 657. 
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of Muslim faithrnB To make matters more problematic, some states like Pahang, 
do not have legal provision to allow a Muslim to renounce his religion, nor for a 
Muslim convert to revert to his previous religionrn9 This has left the litigant in a 
legal limbo without possible remedy. Furthermore, in most of the states, there 
have been severe punishments for those who were found guilty of deliberately 
renouncing Islam. 
The Shamala and Mohamad Abdullah @ Moorthy Case 
The Malaysian dual legal system - syariah and civil legal systems - proves to be 
cumbersome when it comes to the conversion of a non-Muslim spouse to Islam. 
This is when the question of dissolution of marriage, child custody and 
maintenance criss-crosses the two legal systems. The converting spouse normally 
approaches the Syariah court for legal remedies, while the non-converting 
spouse goes to the civil courts. When minor children are involved, the question 
of who has the right to determine their religion also becomes an issue. 
The Shamala litigation vividly illustrates such a legal limbon° In 
November 1998, Shamala Sathiyaseelan and Dr. Jeyaganesh, both Hindus, were 
married in a Hindu ceremony. Four years later the husband converted to Islam 
and subsequently converted their two minor children to Islam without the wife's 
knowledge. The marriage eventually broke down. In December 2002, Shamala 
initiated legal proceedings at the civil High Court, seeking custody of her two 
children. The matter was fixed for hearing in January 2003, but on the defendant 
ioa This view is however not always correct when Syariah courts in some instances did pronounce 
Muslims as apostates. The Negeri Sembilan Syariah High Court for example allowed 16 apostasy 
applications between 1994 and 2003 (see note 49). The case of Nyonya Tahir is another example. 
Nyonya Tahir (deceased) was born as a Muslim but lived as a Buddhist after she was married to 
a Buddhist. Based on evidences given by the deceased' s family, the Syariah Court declared her as 
a non-Muslim and allowed her body to be buried according to Buddhist rite. 
109 Thia (2006) 
110 See Shamala Sathiyaseelan v Dr Jeyaganesh C Mogarajah & Anor [2004] 2 MLJ 648. 
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husband's (whose Muslim name was Muhammad Ridzuan) request, was 
postponed several times until March 2003. In the meantime, Muhammad 
Ridzuan, through his solicitors on 7 January 2003 filed an application in the 
Selangor Syariah High Court for an ex-parte hadanah (custody) order. On 8 May 
2003, the Selangor Syariah High Court granted him the order. But as the civil 
High Court on 17 April 2003 had granted an interim custody order to Shamala, 
the Syariah High Court's hadanah order did not change her right to custody.111 
Meanwhile, Shamala applied for a civil High Court's order that her children's 
conversion to Islam was null and void, claiming that as the children's natural 
mother, she had the right under Article 12(4) of the Federal Constitution to 
determine their religion. However, the Kuala Lumpur High Court on 13 April 
2004 dismissed her application on the ground that under of Article 121 (lA) of 
the Federal Constitution, the Syariah Court is the only qualified forum to 
determine the religious status of her two children, whom the court considered as 
Muslims at the time the application was made.112 High Court Judge Dato' Faiza 
Tamby Chik referred to a letter from the Federal Territory Mufti saying that the 
children were automatically converted to Islam, when one of the parents 
embraced Islam and the conversion was effective even though one parent 
opposed it.113 
The High Court's decision was criticized by human rights NGOs and non-
Muslim organizations. Pushpa Ratnam, a legal officer at the All Women's Action 
Society (AWAM) described the decision as akin to "slamming the door shut on 
Shamala' s rights as a mother" .114 The National Evangelical Christian Fellowship 
of Malaysia (NECF) carried an article in its newsletter which says that 
111 See Shamala Sathiyaseelan v Dr Jeyaganesh C Mogarajah [2004] 2MLJ 241. The interim order gave 
Shamala custody of the children while Muhammad Ridzuan was allowed to see them over the 
weekends, but not to take them out of Alor Setar where they lived. 
112 Bernama, 13 April 2004. 
m Bernama, 13 April 2004. 
114 Pushpa (2004) 
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"Shamala's case not only illustrates the dilemma of a dual-legal system and 
infringement of the rights of non-Muslims when their spouses embrace Islam, it 
also raises the imminent issues on the question of public confidence in the law of 
the land and the judiciary".11s Bar Council President Kuthubul Zaman Bukhari 
commented on the case saying that the right to decide a minor's religion is "an 
issue of parental right, rather than an issue of religion".116 MCCBCHS President 
Harcharan Singh described the decision as "the last straw in a series of decisions 
that have systematically emasculated the civil courts vis-a-vis the Syariah 
Courts" .117 Harcharan further said that the situation in which "a non Muslim 
parent can have her children converted against her will by her estranged 
husband" is utterly unjust. He thus called for a protection "to those from 
minority religions in Malaysia on an urgent and immediate basis" .118 
The issue of conversion to Islam is even more complicated than meets the 
eye when the Muslim convert dies without his family knowing that he had 
converted to Islam. The legal battle over who has the right to bury the dead 
according to which religious rites had caused considerable tensions in a multi-
religious and multiracial society such as Malaysia. The Mohamad Abdullah@ 
Moorthy litigation illustrates this point. M. Moorthy, an army commando who 
made his name as the first Malaysian to climb Mount Everest in 1997, converted 
to Islam in October 2004 without the knowledge of his wife and family 
members.119 He continued to live with his family until he died on 20 December 
2005. The legal battle ensued when the Syariah High Court on 23 December 2005 
ordered the Kuala Lumpur Hospital to release his body to the Federal Territory 
m Lim (2004). 
ll• Aliran Monthly, 2004, Issue 4, Volume 24. 
117 See Harcharan's statement "Last Straw in a Series of Decisions - MCCBCHS Aghast at the 
Situationn (undated) at hliEd/www.ccmalaysia.QJ:g/press/release%2jl],0040416mccbchs.htm 
(Accessed on 6 December 2006). 
118 See Harcharan' s statement "Last Straw in a Series of Decisions - MCCBCHS Aghast at the 
Situation" (undated). 
119 Mohamad's brother, Husin Abdullah, who converted to Islam in 1981, also did not know that 
Moorthy converted to Islam (Bernama, 29 December 2005). 
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Islamic Religious Council (MAIWP) for burial according to Muslim rite. Syariah 
High Court Judge Mahayuddin Ibrahim said that Mohamad had converted to 
Islam and there was no evidence that he had been made an apostate by any 
Syariah court in the country.120 A day before the decision was made Mohamad's 
Hindu wife Kaliammal filed an originating summons at the High Court seeking 
an injunction to restrain the Islamic religious council from claiming Mohamad's 
body from the hospital. On the day the Syariah High Court made the decision, 
she once again filed an application for an interim injunction at the Kuala Lumpur 
High Court. She also asked the court to declare null and void all documents 
pertaining to Mohamad' s conversion to Islam and that he never embraced 
Islam.121 Meanwhile, the Kuala Lumpur Hospital, after negotiating with the 
parties involved, retained Mohamad's body pending High Court decision on 
Kalliamal' s application. The application was heard on 27 December 2005 and two 
days later High Court Judge Datuk Mohamed Raus Sharif ruled that the High 
Court had no jurisdiction to decide on the question of whether Mohamad had 
converted to Islam because the issue falls within the jurisdiction of the Syariah 
court. He said his decision "is in line with Article 121(1A) of the Federal 
Constitution which states that the Civil Courts have no jurisdiction regarding 
matters over which the Syariah Court has been vested jurisdiction by the written 
law".122 l\1ohamad's body was then surrendered to the Federal Territory Islamic 
Religious Council (MAIWP) for burial according to Muslim rite, despite protests 
from the deceased's Hindu family. 
The Mohamad Abdullah@Moorthy litigation again raised the issue of 
freedom of religion and the right of religious minorities. Malaysia Hindu 
Sangam President Datuk A Vaithilingam regretted the lack of legal protection 
given to non-Muslims, while the Muslim community is fully protected by the 
12tl Bemama, 23 December 2005. 
121 Bemama, 23 December 2005. 
m Bemama, 28 December 2005. 
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law.123 A coalition of 35 Hindu-based NGOs submitted a memorandum to the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong on 9 January 2006 requesting the King to "take into 
account the feeling of the minority and advise (government) officers to take 
necessary action" ,124 The legal and constitutional side of the issue moved to 
higher ground when non-Muslim religious groups and NGOs called for the 
amendment of Article 121 (IA) of the Federal Constitution which gives exclusive 
jurisdiction to the Syariah courts to decide on matters relating to the 
administration of Islamic law. MCCBCHS called upon the government to give 
powers to the High Court, not the Syariah Court, to determine the validity of 
conversion into and out of Islam so that "all Malaysians can be parties and have 
equal rights as witnesses" .125 Catholic Archbishop Datuk Murphy Pakiam urged 
the government to consider repealing Article 121(1A) and "restore sovereign 
power to the civil courts to rule in cases involving non-Muslims in Islamic 
affairs".126 A DAP-organized roundtable discussion held on 5 January 2006 
passed a resolution that the decisions by the Syariah courts should be open for 
review by the civil high courts.127 HAKAM President and human rights lawyer 
Malik Imtiaz Sarwar, speaking at the roundtable discussion, advocated the 
repeal of Article 121(1A) in order to avoid jurisdictional conflict between the 
Syariah and the civil courts.12s 
But these calls met protests from Islamic groups. A coalition of Muslim 
organizations called the Syariah Law Action Committee condemned the 
resolution reached at the parliamentary roundtable discussion. The coalition's 
m See Vaithilingam's letter to Malaysiakini "Little Protection for non-Muslims" appeared on 28 
December 2005. The letter can be accessed at http:l/www.malaysiakini.com/letters/ 45073 
(Accessed on 6 December 2006) 
124 The Star, 10 January 2006. 
125 New Straits Times, 29 December 2005. 
126 New Straits Times, 12 January 2006. 
127 The discussion were attended by Indian Malaysian community leaders, interfaith groups 
activists, lawyers, social and human rights activists and concerned individuals (Malaysiakini, 5 
January 2006) 
128 New Straits Times, 6 January 2006. 
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member organizations included the Malaysian Institute of Syariah Research and 
Development (ISRA), Ulama' Association of Malaysia (PUM), Ulama' 
Association of Kedah (PUK), Secretariat for the Assembly of Ulama' for Asian 
Region (SHURA), Malaysian Syari' e Lawyers Association (PGSM), Muslim 
Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) Jamaah Isiah Malaysia GIM) and Movement 
for Malay Empowerment (TERAS). A statement issued by the coalition's 
secretary Azmi Abdul Hamid said "the resolution, if accepted by the 
government, would degrade the status of Syariah judicial system and 
subordinate it to civil judicial system like the situation was during the colonial 
era".129 In a separate statement, ABIM called upon the government to retain 
Article 121 (lA) as it is.130 
The call for review of Article 121 (lA) and protection for non-Muslim 
rights reached new heights when nine non-Muslim cabinet ministers, led by 
MCA President Datuk Seri Ong Ka Ting, submitted a memorandum on non-
Muslim rights to the Prime Minister on 19 January 2006. The memorandum, 
which was drafted in consultation with NGOs, especially the MCCBCHS, called 
upon the government to review Article 121(1A), amend laws that allow only one 
parent to convert children below 18 years of age and rectify conflicts between 
Syariah and civil lawsB1 On 20 January, about 200 Muslim students gathered at 
the National Mosque in Kuala Lumpur to protest against the proposal to amend 
Article 121 (lA). The participants in the protest included members of PAS-linked 
129 See Mohd Azmi's statement "Bantah Cadangan Memansuhkan Perkara 121 (lA) 
Perlembagaan Persekutuan" (Protest against the Proposal to Repeal Article 121 (lA) of the 
Federal Constitution), undated. The text of the statement can be accessed at http://www. umno-
reform.com/URnews/bantahan121A.htm (Accessed on 6 December 2006). 
130 See ABIM's media statement" A13IM Pertahan Kedaulatan Mahkamah Syariah yang 
Diperuntukkan Dalam Perlembagaan" (ABIM Defends the Sanctity of Syariah Courts Provided in 
the Constitution) dated 18 January 2006. 
131 New Straits Times, 20 January 2006. The Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, Datuk 
Dr. Maximus Ongkili, one of the ministers who signed the memorandum, explained that the 
memorandum included specific proposals submitted by the MCCBCHS. He also said that 
MCCBCHS met most of the ministers and handed them a copy of the memorandum they had 
submitted to the Prime Minister (Bernama, 21 January 2006). 
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Coalition of Peninsular Muslim Students (GAMIS), ABIM-linked National Union 
of Muslim Students' Association of Malaysia (PKPIM) and JIM-linked Malaysian 
Isiah Students Peer Group Club (KARISMA). A joint statement issued by the 
three Muslim student organizations urged the government to retain the powers 
of the Syariah courts as contained in Article 121 (1A)l32 Responding to the 
protests, the Prime Minister announced that there would be no changes to Article 
121 (lA).133 UMNO Supreme Council member and Perlis Menteri Besar Datuk 
Seri Shahidan Kassim backed the Prime Minister's decision and described the 
move by the nine non-Muslim ministers as an open criticism of the 
government.134 All the non-Muslim ministers, except the Minister in the Prime 
Minister's Department Tan Sri Bernard Dompok, later withdrew the 
memorandumBs 
The Kamariah Ali Case 
In Kamariah bte Ali & Ors v Government of Ke/an tan & Anor,136 the counsel for 
appellants who claimed that they had renounced Islam requested the Federal 
Court to interpret the meaning of religious freedom under Article 11 of the 
Federal Constitution. Should a wider interpretation of religious freedom be 
accepted, the laws which restrict a person's right to profess and practice the 
religion of his choice, including to renounce Islam, would be void for 
contravening a provision of the Federal Constitution, the supreme law of the 
land. Interpretation of the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Court, not the Syariah Court. 
m Bemama, 2() January 2006. 
133 New Straits Times, 21 January 2006. 
134 Bernama, 21January2006. 
135 New Sunday Times, 22 January 2006. 
t36 [2005] 1 MLJ197. 
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In brief, the facts of the case are as follows. In 1992 four Muslims were 
sentenced to two years imprisonment by the Syariah court in Kelantan for their 
involvement in a religious cult, the teachings and practices of which contravened 
hukum syarak (Islamic law). The four were Daud Mamat, Kamariah Ali, her 
husband Mohamad Ya (deceased) and Mad Yacob Ismail. All of them were 
Kelantanese of Malay descent born into the Islamic faith and brought up as 
Muslims. In 1996, the Kelantan Syariah Court of Appeal changed the sentence to 
a bond of good behavior for three to five years, during which they were required 
to attend monthly counseling sessions at the District Qadhi Office to pronounce 
repentance. They failed to attend the sessions. As a result, the four faced new 
charges of contempt of court in 2000. During the trial for contempt, they claimed 
that they had renounced Islam in 1998, producing a statutory declaration to that 
effect, and as such, they argued, the Syariah court had no jurisdiction to try them. 
The Syariah court, however, found them guilty and sentenced them to three 
years imprisonment. The four did not file an appeal against the decision of the 
Syariah court but instead applied to the civil High Court in Kota Bharu for a 
declaration of their right to profess and practice the religion of their choice under 
Article 11 of the Federal Constitution and asked the court to grant a writ of 
habeas corpus. In brief, the declarations sought were: 
1 the plaintiffs had the constitutional right to profess and practice the 
religion of their choice under Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution; 
2 Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution holds sway over any other 
laws, be they Federal or State as regards the choice and practice of the 
religion; 
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3 the absolute right and freedom of the plaintiffs under the said article 
to profess and practice their religion of choice, could only be decided by 
themselves alone and not subject to the declaration or confirmation of 
anybody else, be they individual or otherwise; 
4 any provision in the law, be they Federal or State, that does provide 
for the definition of a Muslim but does not recognize Article 11(1) of the 
Federal Constitution is void; 
5 any law, be they Federal or State, pertaining to the religion of Islam 
will be inapplicable to the plaintiffs, as they had declared their apostasy 
and hence are protected by Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution; 
6 any law that empowers the Syariah court to decide whether they had 
left the religion of Islam or not, or requires a declaration from such 
court as a precondition before they are considered as having left the 
religion of Islam, contravenes Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution; 
7 any provision in the law, be they Federal or State, that restricts or 
prevents the right of the plaintiffs to declare themselves not wanting to 
profess, and practice the religion of Islam contravenes the said article, 
and hence is void; and 
8 pursuant to the above anticipated declaratory orders, the defendants or 
their agents are not entitled to demand or impose any conditions before 
they are considered as having left the religion of Islam.137 
137 See Daud bin Mamat & Ors v Majlis Agama Islam & Anor [2001] 2 MLJ 390, p.p. 396. 
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Obviously, declarations sought by the plaintiffs pertain to their right to 
renounce Islam and to be free from any obligation under the religion. The 
plaintiffs relied heavily on Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution, which grants 
the right to every person "to profess and practice his religion", to support their 
application. Rejecting the application, High Court Judge Datuk Suriyadi Halim 
Omar, in his judgment in February 2001, said "The act of exiting from a religion 
is certainly not a religion, or could be equated with the right 'to profess and 
practice' their religion. To seriously accept that exiting from a religion may be 
equated to the latter two interpretations, would stretch the scope of art 11(1) of 
the Federal Constitution to ridiculous heights, and rebel against the canon of 
construction".138 Suriyadi also held that the plaintiffs were still Muslims as they 
had never been declared apostates by the Syariah court as provided under 
section 102 of the Kelantan Islamic Religious Council and Malay Custom 
Enactment 1994. In affirming the competency of the Syariah court to ascertain 
whether a person has indeed apostatized, the judge said, "the jurists in the 
Syariah Court, apart from being conversant with religious matters, will also be in 
a more elevated position to make sound judgment of the status of any would-be-
apostate, bearing in mind their constant interaction with the Muslim 
populace". l39 More important is the issue of jurisdiction. Suri ya di re-affirmed the 
general judicial attitude toward exclusive separation of jurisdiction between civil 
and syariah courts as provided under Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution. 
As the plaintiffs were legally Muslims, Suriyadi held, they remained within the 
jurisdiction of the syariah court, and the Islamic court was the competent court 
when it sentenced them to three years imprisonment for contempt. Their 
application for a writ of habeas corpus was rejected by the court accordingly. 
The plaintiffs then appealed to the Court of Appeal to have the liigh 
Court's decision quashed. The counsel for the plaintiffs, Haris Mohd Ibrahim, 
13H [2001] 2 MLJ 390, p.p. 402. 
139 [2001] 2 MLJ390, p.p.401. 
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submitted inter alia that section 102 of the Kelantan Islamic Religious Council and 
Malay Custom Enactment 1994, which requires a Muslim who wishes to 
apostatize to obtain prior leave of the Syariah Court, is contrary to Article 11 of 
the Federal Constitution, which guarantees the right to freedom of religion, and 
as such is void. He argued that Article 11 not only grants the right to every 
person to profess and practice religion of his choice, but also to renounce it. It is 
also up to the person whether to profess a religion or not to profess any religion 
at any time he wishes. Preferring a wider interpretation of Article 11, he further 
argued, no law shall restrict a person from making his religious choice or require 
him to follow certain religious requirements HD In dismissing the appeal, the 
three panel judges of the Court of Appeal unanimously held that Article 11 of the 
Federal Constitution cannot be interpreted so widely as to revoke all legislation 
requiring Muslims to perform certain requirements under Islam or prohibit them 
from committing certain forbidden acts because "the Federal Constitution itself 
empowers State Legislative Bodies to codify Islamic law in matters mentioned in 
the State List".141 Furthermore, the judges said, should wide interpretation be 
given to the right to freedom of religion under Article 11, then all Islamic laws 
prohibiting adultery, close proximity, avoiding payment of zakah (alms), etc. will 
be void.142 The court also held that Section 102 of the Kelantan Enactment does 
not prohibit a person from renouncing Islam. It only requires a person who 
wishes to renounce Islam to obtain prior confirmation from the syariah court. 
This is to avoid confusion in law as to whether a person is a Muslim or not.143 
The court however agreed with the appellants' counsel that section 102 (1) and 
(2) is only applicable to the muallaf (converts to Islam). As the appellants were 
not muallaf, the two sub.sections are not applicable to them. However, by virtue 
HO Kamariah bte Ali & Ors v Government of Kelantarr & Anor [2002J 3 MLJ 657, p.p. 665. 
141 [2002] 3 MLJ 657. The three-member panel judges comprised Court of Appeal fudges Datuk 
Abdul Hamid Mohamad, Datuk Abdul Kadir Sulaiman and Datuk Alauddin Mohd. Sheriff. 
m [2002] 3 MLJ 657, p.p. 665. 
143 [2002] 3 MLJ 657, p. p. 666. 
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of Article 121(1A), the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court's decision that it 
had no jurisdiction to decide on the correctness of their renouncement. 
On 5 November 2002, the Federal Court granted leave to the appellants to 
appeal on perennial questions of freedom of religion under Article 11 of the 
Federal Constitution. The questions in brief were whether a person's right to 
profess and practice his religion under Article 11(1) includes the right of a 
Muslim who has attained the age of majority to renounce Islam; whether the 
laws which restrict the right of a person (other than those who have yet to attain 
the age of majority) to renounce his religion is inconsistent with Article 11(1) and 
as such is void; and whether the restrictions under sections 102(1)144, (2)145 and 
(3)146 of the Kelantan Islamic Religious Council and Malay Custom Enactment 
1994, read together with the definition of "Muslim" under section 2 of the 
Enactment is inconsistent with Article 8147, 11(1)148 and (5)149, and Article 7415o of 
the Federal Constitution, and thus void. Malik Imtiaz Sarwar, the counsel for the 
appellants, argued that it is implicit in Article 11(1) that a person is free to choose 
any religion he wants to profess and practice, and the concept of choice includes 
the right to change or renounce his religion. This right, he argued, is only 
restricted by Article 11(5) of the Federal Constitution which outlaws" any act 
contrary to any general law relating to public order, public health or morality", 
The act of the appellants renouncing Islam, Malik contended, is not contrary to 
any laws on public order, public health or morality, and thus not contrary to 
144 This sub-section prohibits a person who had been admitted as Muslim to claim otherwise 
without confirmation from the Syariah Court. 
"'This sub-section provides that a person is still deemed a Muslim until confirmed by the 
Syariah Court as having apostatized. 
146 This sub-section provides maximum three years detention at the Islamic Education Centre for 
any Muslim who is found guilty of purposely renouncing Islam 
14
' Article 8 grants all persons equality before the law and equal protection of the law. 
148Article11(1) grants every person the right to profess and practise his religion and, subject to 
Clause (4), to propagate it. 
149 Article 11(5) does not authorise any ad contrary to any general law relating to public order, 
public health or morality. 
1so Article 74 empowers the Parliament and the State Legislative Assemblies to make laws on 
matters within their jurisdiction. 
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Article 11(5). Malik also drew the court's attention to international instruments 
on human rights which had been ratified by the Malaysian government. These 
include the United Nations Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Bangkok Declaration and Vienna Convention. He urged the court to apply the 
doctrine of legitimate expectation in relation to Malaysia's stance on those 
international instruments and interpret the constitution in such a way that the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution would not be 
illusory.1st Section 102 of the Kelantan Enactment, which prohibits a Muslim 
from claiming that he is a non-Muslim without prior confirmation by the Syariah 
Court, Malik argued, is a restriction to the right to freedom of religion thus 
inconsistent with Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution.152 
The Federal Court, in its judgment on 21July2004, dismissed the appeal. 
The five-member panel judges unanimously agreed that the appellants' act by 
making statutory declarations to declare that they were no longer Muslims does 
not automatically render them non-Muslims, and as such they were not 
exempted from the charges proffered against them in the Syariah Court.153 Using 
a purposive approach, the Federal Court held that the material time to determine 
whether the appellants were Muslims or not is the time when they committed 
the crime under the Kelantan Enactment, which was, according to the fact of the 
case, prior to the making of the statutory declaration in 1998. To decide 
otherwise, the judges reasoned, would open a floodgate for those who want to 
evade punishment under the Islamic laws to renounce Islam when they face 
charges in Syariah courts.154 The Federal Court however reserved its judgment 
on the issue of whether the appellants had the right to renounce Islam under 
Article 11 of the Federal Constitution, saying that the issue was not relevant to 
rn Kamariah bte Ali & Ors v Government oJKelanlan & Anor [2005] 1MLJ197, p.p. 202. 
is2 [2005] 1MLJ197, p.p. 203. 
153 The five panel judges were Chief Justice Ahmad Fairuz, Federal Court Judges Mohd Noor 
Ahmad, PS Gill, Rahmah Hussain and Court of Appeal Judge Richard Malanjurn. 
154 [2005] 1MLJ197, p.p. 208. 
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the present case. It cited Lord Bridge's decision in Ainsbury v Millington155 which 
says, "It has always been a fundamental feature of our judicial system that the 
Courts decide disputes between the parties before them; they do not pronounce 
on abstract questions of law when there is no dispute to be resolved". Obviously, 
in reaching this conclusion, the Federal Court concurred with the Attorney-
General Tan Sri Abdul Ghani Patail's argument that the question is general and 
hypothetical since the appellants did not identify the relevant laws that restrict 
their right to freedom of religion. Though they cited section 102 of the Kelantan 
Enactment, Abdul Ghani argued, this section applies only to muallaf (converts to 
Islam), and the fact was that the appellants were not.156 
Though the Federal Court might be correct in refusing to answer those 
questions, the opportunity was missed for the apex court to clarify once and for 
all the perennial issue of whether or not a Muslim has the right to renounce Islam 
under Article 11 of the Federal Constitution. This has given rise to continued use 
of the courts by the proponents of absolute religious freedom to seek a favorable 
legal position on the issue. Kamariah Ali for example once again declared her 
renunciation of Islam in front of a Syariah court judge in Terengganu in July 2005 
to avoid being convicted as a follower of the deviationist Ayah Pin Sky Kingdom. 
Subsequent to that, Kamariah and another follower of the cult, Daud Mamat, 
filed a suit against the Terengganu Islamic Religious Council and l'vlalay Custom 
seeking, inter alia, a court declaration that they had the right to religious freedom 
under Article 11 of the Federal Constitution. They applied to the High Court to 
refer to the Federal Court questions of law on whether the right to profess and 
practice a religion under Article 11(1) includes the right of a Muslim who has 
attained the age of majority to renounce his religion. High Court Judge Dato' 
Mohamed Raus Sharif dismissed the application on the ground that the issue 
had been dealt with by the Federal Court in their earlier litigation against the 
155 [1987] 1 All ER 929. 
156 {2005] 1MLJ197, p.p. 205, 
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Government of Kelantan. The court also noted that the proceedings were akin to 
an abuse of court procedure. 1s7 
The Lina Joy (Azlina Jailani) Case 
The debate over the right of Muslims to renounce Islam reached a new height 
when the Federal Court in June 2006 heard an application by Azlina Jailani, a 
Malay-Muslim woman, to remove the word Islam from her identity card. Azlina 
claimed that she had converted to Christianity in 1990. In 1997, she applied to the 
National Registration Department to change her name to Lina Lelani, stating her 
conversion to Christianity as the reason. The application was rejected and she 
made a second application in March 1999 to change her name to Lina Joy but 
stated the same reason. She received no reply to her second application. In July 
1999, she was told by an NRD officer that she should not mention conversion to 
Christianity as the reason for name change for it would complicate her 
application. She then resubmitted her application with a new Statutory 
Declaration sworn on 2August1999. In October 1999, the NRD approved her 
application and asked her to apply for replacement identity card. Meanwhile, the 
National Registration Regulation 1990 had been amended, which came into force 
retrospectively on 1October1999, to require that the identity card should state 
the particulars of religion for Muslims. When Azlina applied for the replacement 
identity card on 25 October 1999, she stated Christianity as her religion in the 
application form. As a result, her application was rejected. She then made a third 
application in January 2000 and asked that the word "Islam" and her original 
name be removed from her replacement identity card. The NRD refused to 
l57 See Kamariah bte Ali & Anor v Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Melayu Terengganu & An& [2006] 5 
MLJ 470. Counsel Malik Irntiaz Sarwar represented Kamariah and Daud in this case 
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accept her application stating that the application was incomplete without an 
order of the Syariah court to the effect that she had renounced Islam.158 
Azlina challenged the National Registration Department's decision to 
require her to obtain the Syariah court order as a proof of her conversion. Her 
application was rejected by the High Court and the Court of Appeal. \/\'hen the 
matter was heard before the High Court, Justice Dato' Faiza Tamby Chik held 
that, since the plaintiff was still a Muslim, by virtue of Article 121 (1A) of the 
Federal Constitution, the finality of her conversion out of Islam was within the 
competency of the Syariah Court, not the Civil Court.159 The majority decision of 
the Court of Appeal, with Justice Dato' Gopal Sri Ram dissenting, upheld the 
High Court's decision on the same ground.16D The question before the Federal 
Court was whether the National Registration Department had correctly 
construed its powers under the National Registration Regulations 1990 to require 
Azlina to produce a certificate from the Syariah Court as a proof of her 
conversion to Christianity. The bone of the appellant's contention, as lead 
counsel Dr. Cyrus Das argued, Azlina could profess and practice the religion of 
her choice without prior declaration by the third party (i.e. the Syariah court) on 
her religious status, because the right to profess and practice the religion of one's 
choice is a right under Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution.161 This argument 
is yet another attempt at offering an alternative liberal legal meaning to that 
given by the Islamic mainstream in regard to the legal position on freedom of 
religion involving Muslims as embedded in state law. 
158 Lina Joy v Majlis Agama Islam Wila>jah Persekutuan & Ors [2007] 4 MLJ 585. 
159 Article 121 (1A) provides exclusive jurisdiction to the Shari' ah court to hear cases on matters 
pertaining to Islam. See judgment by High Court Judge Dato' Faiza Tamby Chik in Lina Joy v 
Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan [1' Anor [2004] 2MLJ119. 
160 See judgement by Court of Appeal Judges Abdul Aziz Mohamad, Ariffin Zakaria and Gopal 
Sri Ram in Lina foy v Maj/is Agama Islam Wiiayah Persekutuan & Ors {2005] 6MLJ193. Gopal Sri 
Ram in his dissenting judgement said that the baptismal certificate dated 11 May 1998 produced 
by the appellant in evidence amply supported the accuracy of the particular that the appellant 
was a Christian. 
1&1 See The New Straits Times, 5 July 2006. 
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As Lina Joy's case generated intense public concern, the Federal Court, in 
a rare occasion, had allowed a number of interested organizations which hold 
watching briefs to submit their opinion before the court Taking a more liberal 
line, the Bar Council, the National Human Rights Society and the l\1alaysian 
Consultative Council for Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism 
submitted that Azlina's declaration that she is a Christian was a good proof of 
her religious identity. As such, requiring her to subject herself to the jurisdiction 
of the Syariah Court, which only had jurisdiction on Muslims, was a violation of 
her right to freedom of religion under Article 11 of the Federal Constitution.162 
Representing the Islamic mainstream, ABIM, Muslim Lawyers Association and 
Syarie Lawyers Association on the other hand submitted that Article 11 uses the 
words "profess" and "practice", which means if a person wishes to convert out 
of Islam, he or she must do so in accordance with the laws and regulations of the 
religion. As determination by the Syariah Court on the status of Azlina' s 
conversion is in accordance with Islamic law, requiring such determination does 
not contravene Article 11.163 
The Federal Court in May 2007 dismissed Azlina' s appeal, with two 
Muslim judges, Chief Justice Tun Ahmad Fairuz Sheikh Abdul Halim and Justice 
Datuk Alauddin Mohd Shariff in the majority and a non-Muslim judge, Justice 
Dato' Richard Malanjum dissenting. Delivering the majority decision, Chief 
Justice Ahmad Fairuz, in full agreement with the Islamic mainstream view said: 
There was no final decision that the appellant had no longer professed 
Islam. Thus, the statement that the appellant could no longer be under the 
jurisdiction of the Syai:iah Court because the Syariah Court had only 
jurisdiction on persons professing Islam should not be emphasized 
accordingly. The way a person renounced from a religion should be in 
1•2 [2007] 4 MLJ 585, p.p. 610. 
"'[2007] 4 MLJ 585, p.p. 611. 
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accordance of the regulation or law or practice determined or stipulated 
by the religion itself ... The freedom of religion under art 11 of the Federal 
Constitution required that the appellant complied with the rituals or law 
of the Islamic religion specifically regarding renunciation of the religion. 
Once the decision of the religion of Islam had been complied and the 
religious Islamic authority admit (sic) her apostasy then only could the 
appellant profess Christianity. 164 
Stressing that a Muslim who intends to renounce Islam must exercise his 
right in the context of Islamic law, the Chief Justice added: 
Islam is not only a collection of dogma and rituals but it is also a complete 
way of life comprising of all kinds of human, individual or public, legal, 
political, economic, social, cultural or judicial activities. And when reading 
arts 11(1), 74(2) and item 1 in second list of the Ninth Schedule of the 
Federal Constitution it was obvious that Islam among others included of 
(sic) Islamic law. Hence, if a Muslim intends to renounce from Islam, he is 
actually exercising his rights in the syariah law context which has it own 
jurisprudence relating to apostasy.165 
Wbile the majority decision concurred with the argument put forth by the 
Islamic mainstream, the dissenting judgment did not. Preferring the more liberal 
view on religious freedom and equality, Justice Richard Malanjum said 
Regulation 4 of the National Registration Regulations 1990 which requires 
Muslims to state their religion on their Identity Card, which is not applicable to 
non-Muslims, is tantamount to unequal treatment under the law. On another 
point, criticizing the NRD policy of requiring Azlina to produce an order of the 
164 [2007] 4 MLJ 585, p.p. 595. 
165 [2007] 4 MLJ 585, p.p. 596. 
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Syariah Court as a proof of her conversion and the majority judgment that the 
policy was reasonable, Justice Richard asserted: 
There was an abuse of power on the part of NRD when it failed to take 
into consideration a legally relevant factor, namely the statutory 
declaration and the documents submitted by the appellant, preferring its 
policy of requiring a certificate of apostasy from the Federal Territory 
Syariah Court which in the first place was not stipulated in the regs 4 and 
14 thereby taking legally irrelevant factor into consideration in making a 
decision. Further, the conclusion in the majority judgment that the 
impugned policy adopted by NRD was reasonable within the test of 
Wednesbun; Corporation v Ministry of Housing [1966] 2 QB 275 has 
unfortunately missed one cardinal principle. The implementation of the 
policy had a bearing on the appellant's fundamental constitutional right to 
freedom of religion under art 11 of the Constitution. Being a constitutional 
issue it must be given priority and independent of any determination of 
the Wednesbury reasonableness. Hence, before it can be said that a policy is 
reasonable within the test of !Nednesbury its constitutionality must be first 
considered. The majority judgment failed to carry out such an exercise 
before coming to its conclusion on the NRD policy.166 
Societal Response to the Lina Joy Case 
It is noteworthy that the Bar Council and a host of NGOs which had earlier 
advocated the formation of IFCM supported Azlina1s application. These NGOs 
include Sisters in Islam, Interfaith Spiritual Fellowship, MCCBCHS, SUARAM, 
HAKAM and Pure Life Society. Islamic organizations on the other hand formed 
166 [2007] 4 MLJ 585, p.p. 597. 
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two main coalitions in an attempt to defend the Islamic faith against yet another 
'onslaught' on its sanctity. The first was Peguam Pembela Islam (PPI, Lawyers in 
Defence of Islam), formed on 12 July 2006, comprising Muslim lawyers led by 
former President of the Bar Council Zainur Zakaria. At the top of PPI' s agenda 
was to tackle the 'partisan stand' taken by the Bar Council on cases of apostasy, 
as well as to counter move by certain quarters within the Bar to 'liberalize' the 
Federal Constitution.167 The second coalition, which consists of a broader range 
of Islamic organizations, including the newly formed PP!, was Pertubuhan-
Pertubuhan Pembela Islam (PEMBELA, Organizations of Defenders of Islam), led 
by ABIM.168 PEMBELA's main objective is to raise awareness among Malaysian 
Muslims about the attempts by secular-oriented NGOs and some liberal Muslims 
to liberalize the constitution by advocating the right to renounce Islam, which the 
organization believes constitutes a serious challenge to Muslim faith and a bold 
attempt to undermine the special constitutional position of Islam in Malaysia.169 
It has done so by organizing public forums, ceramahs and seminars as well as 
sending memoranda to the government.170 In its memorandum to the Malay 
J67 Zainur Zakaria, after the launching of PP! said, "Cognisant of the recent attacks against the 
religion of Islam, a group of Muslim lawyers had taken action to defend the position of Islam in 
this country ... Some quarters have questioned and challenged the position and status of Islam in 
this country by using the argument that the human rights of individuals is higher t:han Islam". A 
member of PP!, Zulkifli Nordin, said "If certain groups want the constitution to be liberalized, we 
want !:he constitution to be strengthened to reflect the supremacy of Islam". See Maltr'piakini, 13 
July 2006. 
168 Formed on 16 July 2006, PEMBELA consists of about 80 member organizations, which include 
ACCIN, JIM, Muslim Professionals Forum (MPF), Malaysian Muslim Lawyers Association 
(MJvfLA), Malaysian Syari'e Lawyers Association (MSLA), Malaysian Chinese Muslim 
Association (MACMA), Pertubuhan Kebajikan dan Dakwah Islarniah Malaysia (PERKIDA, Islamic 
Welfare and Da'wah Association of Malaysia), Teras Pengupayaan Melayu (TERAS, Movement for 
Malay Empowerment), Research and Information Centre on Islam (RICO!) and a host of Muslim 
students' organizations like the National Union of Malaysian Muslim Students' Association 
(PKPIM), University of Malaya Muslim Students' Association (PMIUM) and Gabungan Mahasiswa 
Islam Sernenanjung (GAMIS, Peninsular Muslim Students' Coalition). 
169 See Pembela's pamphlet "Frequently Asked Questions on the Azlina Jailani (Lina Joy) Case". 
170 Among the first of its gatherings was a forum held at the Federal Territory Mosque in Kuala 
Lumpur on 23 July 2006 which was attended by about 10,000 Muslims (Ma!aysiakini, 24 July 
2006). There were numerous other ceramahs (public talks) held at the state and district levels to 
address the issue of Lina Joy case and apostasy generally. Some of these ceramahs were foiled by 
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Rulers and the Prime Minister, which it submitted together with 701, 822 
supporting signatures, PEMBELA urged the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the 
Malay Rulers, as the Heads of the Religion of Islam, to "defend the special 
constitutional position of Islam in Malaysia" _171 It also urged the government to 
take necessary actions against "those who attempt to question the special 
position of Islam in the country and promote skewed understanding of the 
Muslim faith".172 Other demands included the maintenance of exclusive 
jurisdiction of the syariah courts as stated in Article 121(1A) of the Federal 
Constitution; amendment to Article 11 of the Federal Constitution by inserting 
clear provision subjecting the right to freedom of religion to Hukum Syarak 
(Islamic law); and for the states which have yet to pass laws restricting 
propagation of non-I\1uslim religions among the I\1uslims, as provided under 
Article 11(4) of the Federal Constitution, to immediately pass the laws.173 
But also high on PEMBELA' s agenda was to funnel Muslims' resentment 
in a more contained way so as not to jeopardize racial harmony and law and 
order.174 In the memorandum submitted to the Malay Rulers and the Prime 
Minster, the organization reminds that" any efforts or actions taken to solve 
problems related to sensitive issues of religion must be based on the principles of 
the police as the government issued stern warnings to parties involved not to raise issues deemed 
to be sensitive to racial harmony Informal discussion with Azril Mohd, Amin, ABfM Vice-
President, 25 August 2006, Kuala Lumpur. 
171 See Pembela' s "Memorandum to the Malay Rulers and the Prime Minister of Malaysia" dated 
29 September 2006. The text of the memorandum can be accessed at 
http:/ /myislamnetwork.net/p9rtal/rnodules/news/print.php?storyid=105 (Accessed on 2 
December 2006). 
172 See Pembela' s "Memorandum to the Malay Rulers and the Pthne Minister of Malaysia" dated 
29 September 2006. 
173 See Pembela' s "Memorandum to the Malay Rulers and the Prime Minister of Malaysia" dated 
29 September 2006. 
174 lnterview with Yusri Mohamad, AB!M President cum PEMBELA Chairman, 16 July 2006, 
Kuala Lumpur. Yusri explained that the lslamist forces are not homogeneous. There are the more 
extreme elements among them, and if the moderate elements '\Nithin the lslamist forces, like the 
majority in PEMBELA, do not take the lead in countering the liberals' "onslaught" on Islam, it 
would create a vacuum in which the extreme elements will come to prominence and jeopardize 
racial and religious harmony. 
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rule of law and the supremacy of the constitution, and must not in any way 
jeopardize inter-religious and inter-ethnic relation in the country" .175 Despite this 
reminder, several incidents raised the specter of mob rule. In August 2006, 
anonymous Short Messaging System (SMS) texts were widely circulated 
threatening Malik Imtiaz Sarwar with death. Malik is a Muslim human rights 
lawyer and President of National Human Rights Society (HAKAM) who strongly 
advocates the formation of IFCM and who had appeared in courts either 
representing or supporting applications by Muslims to renounce Islam. In the 
Azlina Jailani litigation, Malik held a watching brief for the Bar Council 
supporting Azlina' s application. There were also malicious SMS texts which 
claimed that the Federal Court had decided in favor of Azlina's application, 
giving rise to increased anxieties among the Muslim population.176 In both cases, 
PEMBELA denied involvement and condemned those responsible for making 
such malicious claims.177 But such condemnation does not stop beleaguered 
J\.1uslims from believing in "rumors" easily spread through modern channels of 
communication, and being jolted into protests and demonstrations in the name 
of defending the Islamic faith against a clear and imminent danger of aggressive 
proselytization. On 5 November 2006, about 300 Muslims gathered in front of the 
Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Ipoh to protest against the conversion of 
Muslims to Christianity, in which the "National Sailor" Dato' Azhar Mansor was 
said to be involved, after receiving a false SMS text on the event.178 The event 
turned out to be the first Holy Communion service for about 100 Catholic Indian 
175 See Pembela's "Memorandum to the Malay Rulers and the Prime Minister of Malaysia" dated 
29 September 2006. 
176 As of November 2006, the Federal Court has yet to hand down its decision on the case. 
177 See media statement "PEMBELA and ABIM Condemn Intimidation and Death Threats 
Directed to Those Involved in Lina Joy's case" dated 19 August 2006 at 
http:/ I mvislamnetwork.net/portal/ modules/news I article.php?storvid=86 (Accessed on 3 
December 2.006). 
1711 Azhar was the first Malaysian to break the world record in non-stop round-the-world solo 
sailing in a yacht in 1999. 
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children.179 Riot police from the Federal Reserve Unit (FRU) had to be called to 
disperse the angry crowd.180 A Muslim couple was arrested in relation to the fake 
SMS case, in which Perak Mufti Datuk Seri lfurussani Zakaria, a strong 
antagonist of liberal Islam, was also implicated.181 
As the Ipoh incident indicates, apostasy has always been a taboo to 
Muslims. More often than not, the Islamic mainstream is willing to "defend" 
their faith in whatever ways possible. Though public gatherings without a police 
permit are illegal in Malaysia, the Muslim protest in Ipoh suggests that state law 
is less important when it comes to defending Islam against the threat, whether 
perceived or real, it is facing. More pronounced were calls by certain parties 
within the Islamic mainstream urging the government to use detention without 
trial law under the ISA against the apostates in lieu of death penalty which is 
even harsher. In this instance, there is a tendency to liken apostasy to a threat to 
national security which, according to some traditional juristq, warrants the death 
penalty. Echoing this view was a law lecturer at the International Islamic 
University Malaysia, Dr. Zulkilly Muda. He said, during a conference on 
apostasy held at the university on 29 November 2006, "in the absence of hudud 
laws, ISA can be used against the apostate in order to protect the religion" .1s2 
Though his view was not shared by many of his colleagues at the conference, 
citing the lack of judicial review under the ISA as one of the reasons, ABIM 
President Yusri Mohamad agreed that ISA can be used "in the extreme or worst-
case scenario where certain apostates are threatening peace and order and their 
activities suggest grave security consequences and the authorities have trouble 
17• A group of Hindus later protested against the baptism ceremony. The issue was resolved after 
they found out that the Indian children were of Catholic parents, not Hindus. Informal discussion 
with K. Shanmuga, MCCBCHS Legal Advisor, Perth, Australia, 6 December 2007. 
""See Malaysiakini, 6 November 2006. 
181 The Perak Mufti said the couple had earlier told him that a baptismal ceremony of a group of 
Malay Muslims would be held at the church in which the "National Sailor" would also be 
present. He then related this information to a number of persons during a meeting in lpoh. He 
claimed that someone might have spread the "news" through SMS. 
1s2 Malaysiakini, 29 November 2006. 
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compiling the evidence to prosecute" .183 Yusri's view caused a stir within the 
Gerakan Mansuhkan ISA (GM!, Abolish ISA Movement), of which ABIM is a 
member organization. GM! Chairman Syed Ibrahim Syed Noh called upon Yusri 
to clarify his statement while maintaining that ISA is a draconian law which 
should be abolished.184 Mixed views within the Muslim community on the use of 
restrictive laws as a means to protect the sanctity of the Islamic faith and 
maintain national security suggested that perceived or real threats against Islam 
are likely to restore the semblance of legitimacy to the use of restrictive laws such 
as the ISA in Malaysia's multiracial and multi-religious society. To what extent 
the Islamic organizations, which since 1998 had been at the forefront of the 
Reformasi movement fighting alongside the secular NGOs against the excesses of 
state powers, will pursue this hard-line approach to law and religion remains to 
be seen. 
The Opposition and the Politics of New Legal Meanings 
There have been mixed responses from the opposition parties to the 
contestations between the new liberal legal meanings and the limited statist 
ethno-religious legal meanings on the issue of personal liberties and religious 
freedom. Subsequent to the campaigns by secular human rights groups for 
greater space for religious freedom and personal liberty, skirmishes surfaced 
within the multi-racial Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR). The party had been hard 
pressed to live up to its expectation as a bastion of the new politics of 
multiculturalism and human rights based on the promotion of racial equality 
and individual liberties rather than communal appeal. However, communal 
appeal was still prominent when it comes to grappling with sensitive religious 
issues. In relation to the Anti-Moral Policing Campaign, which called upon the 
183 Malaysiakini, 29 November 2006. 
'"' The Sun, 5 December 2006. 
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government to stop using Syariah laws against offenders of "moral crimes", 
some sections within the party criticized the party's Vice-President Sivarasa 
Rasiah for endorsing the campaign. Malay/ Muslim grassroots leaders from the 
Permatang Pauh Division, one of the few party strongholds, expressed their 
rejection of the campaign and demanded apology or explanation from Sivarasa, 
describing his endorsement as an act which was "insensitive to the wishes of the 
majority of the grassroots".185 PKR's Angkatan Muda (Youth Wing) Vice-Head, 
Shamsul Iskandar Mohd Akin, issued a strong-worded statement against the 
anti-moral policing campaigners accusing their effort as a "misguided move and 
sheer hypocrisy" .186 Shamsul who is closely associated with ABIM singled out 
Sisters in Islam, a strong proponent of the campaign, as an organization 
promoting a "skewed understanding of religion and politics" and ridiculed them 
for colluding with UMNO leaders in giving a "semblance of democratic 
legitimacy to an increasingly corrupt and authoritarian political regime" )87 
Shamsul made this claim following several UMNO ministers' endorsement of the 
campaign led by Sisters in Islam. A senior PKR leader described Shamsul's 
statement as interfering with Anwar's efforts at promoting multicultural politics 
and ordered it to be withdrawn from the party website. Another party stalwart 
said the statement was too extreme and "Taliban-styled". A strongly worded 
letter purportedly written by a prominent opposition politician closely associated 
with SIS was also directed against Shamsul.188 
PAS, which after the outbreak of Reformasi in 1998 had been delicately 
balancing its identity as supporter of democracy and human rights on the one 
hand, and defender of Islam on the other, could hardly hide its conservative 
stance. Its Youth Wing organized rallies at several mosques in the Klang Valley 
lll5 Malm1sia Today, 24 April 2005. 
186 Umno Reform.com, 5 April 2005. 
187 Umno Refonn.com, 5 April 2005. 
11IB Interview with Shamsul lskandar Mohd Akin, Vice Head of Angkatan Muda PKR, 25 April 
2005, Kuala Lumpur. 
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in April 2005 to oppose the anti-moral policing campaign and demanded, among 
other things, intervention by the Conference of Rulers to put the issue to rest; 
serious legal actions against Sisters in Islam, including deregistration of the 
organization; SIS and the Parliamentary Caucus on Human Rights to withdraw 
their demands for review of the Islamic morality laws and issue a public apology 
to Muslims; and the Malaysian Islamic Development Department (JAKIM) to 
probe SIS for making allegations that caused confusion about matters of / aqidah 
(Islamic belief).189 The actions and demands by the PAS Youth Wing generated 
criticisms from the anti-moral policing campaigners, accusing the party of merely 
"playing to the gallery" and backtracking from its ostensibly softer approach 
toward Islam and democracy since 1999.190 It raised concerns that the party had 
failed to soften its stance on the Islamic state policy crucial to winning non-
Muslim votes. Rather unconvincingly, PAS Youth Chief, Salahuddin Ayub, 
insisted that the party's softer stance on the Islamic state policy and the reactions 
towards anti-moral policing campaign were two different issues.191 Be that as it 
may, the reaction proves that once fundamental aspects of Islam are challenged, 
the Islamic party will be loath to abandon its essentially conservative stance. PAS 
also objected the proposal to form Interfaith Commission of Malaysia and the call 
for legalization of apostasy and review of Article 121(1A) of the Federal 
Constitution. 
The DAP on the other hand took a totally opposite stance. The non-
Muslim-based opposition party was more comfortable championing the right to 
personal liberties and freedom of religion compared to the multiracial but Malay-
based PKR, or even the non-Malay based political parties within the BN. The 
party supported the Anti Moral Policing Campaign, the formation of the 
Interfaith Commission of Malaysia and the call for review or repeal of Article 
189 Malaysiakini, 15 April 2005. 
190 Malaysiakini, 16 April 2005. 
191 Malaysiakini, 20 April 2005. 
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121(1A) of the Federal Constitution. In addition to the party's endorsement of the 
Anti Moral Policing Campaign, OAP members of Parliament including its 
Chairman Lim Kit Siang endorsed the campaign individually. In relation to the 
proposed Interfaith Commission of Malaysia, Lim Kit Siang described the effort 
as "the most important and commendable initiative to promote national unity in 
multi-religious Malaysia". He took a swipe at the opponents of the IFCM by 
saying that the fiak and negative reactions toward the proposal were 
"completely unthinkable in the first quarter-century of national independence", 
indicating that Malaysian Muslims have grown more conservative over the 
years.192 DAP has also been supportive of the call for review or repeal of Article 
121 (1A). In response to the interfaith disputes over the right of burial as 
transpired in the Mohamad Abdullah@Moorthy litigation, and later the 
Rayappan litigation,193 the DAP advocated restoration of judicial powers to the 
civil courts to hear cases which involves non-Muslims as parties. DAP Secretary-
General Lim Guan Eng said in a statement that the 1988 constitutional 
amendment which introduced Article 121(1A) "goes against the social contract 
and the original 1957 Merdeka Constitution".194 He thus calls for "full restoration 
of the 1957 social contract and the Merdeka Constitution that gave birth to a 
192 See Lim Kit Siang' s statement "Interfaith Commission Bill - Call for all-party Parliamentary 
Select Committee" dated 26 February 2005. The text of the statement can be accessed at 
http://dapmalavsia.org/a!l-archive/E!1glish/2005/f.eb05/barc0205.htm (Accessed on 7 
December 2006) 
"'Rayappan was a Christian who converted to Islam in 1990 to marry a Muslim wife. In 1999 he 
reverted to Christianity and returned to his Christian family. He made a statutory declaration to 
confirm his reversion to Christianity. His identity card also stated Christianity as his religion. 
Dispute over his religious identity and the right of burial between Selangor Islamic Religious 
Council (MAIS) and Rayappan's family cropped up upon his death on 29 November 2006. 
19' See Lim Guan Eng's statement "MCA, MIC, Gerakan and SUPP Ministers Should Press 
Cabinet to Restore the 1957 Social Contract and the Merdeka Constitution" dated 6 December 
2006. The text of the statement can be accessed at 
http:/ /www.,dapmalaysia.org/ eng!Lsh/2006/ dec06/lgeilge522.htm (Accessed on 7 December 
2006) 
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nation based on a shared sense of values of a secular democracy and justice for 
all Malaysians".195 
Conclusion 
It seems that the proliferation of liberal legal meanings, especially the attempt to 
catapult to prominence the more liberal interpretation of state laws on religious 
freedom, had reinforced communalism as the main basis of interest articulation 
and political mobilization in Malaysia. Since the 1998 Reformasi, overlapping 
coalitions of non-governmental organizations, non-Muslim religious groups and 
some politicians had been openly advocating wider interpretation of personal 
liberties and religious freedom based on secular human rights principles and 
libertarian values, and promoted equal rights and privileges for followers of non-
Muslim religions. This has put them in direct confrontation with the Islamic 
mainstream which views such advocacy not only as a threat to the special 
constitutional position of Islam, but also a challenge to the fundamental 
principles of the Islamic faith. In the face of such a "threat", whether perceived or 
real, the "defenders of the Muslim faith" across ethnic divisions mobilized 
communal support and, to a certain extent, aligned themselves with the 
government to defend the sanctity of Islam. The non-Muslim faith-based 
organizations too mobilized support from their religious communities and 
worked hand in hand with human rights NGOs to press for greater space for 
religious freedom. Religion rather than ethnicity has become an important 
marker of this new phase of communal politics. The politics of constitutional 
contract had been reinforced with both sides trying to portray the Constitution as 
either Islamic or secular. This raised the specter of the communally-based 
195 See Lim Guan Eng's statement dated 6 December 2006. It is noteworthy that while the OAP 
looks at the 1957 social contract as essentially secular, the Islamic mainstream on the other hand 
view it as mainly Islam-favoured. 
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constitutional contract politics, which rests primarily on the mobilization of 
distinct ethno-religious consciousness to pursue communal interests. It also 
caused dissension among the ideologically incompatible opposition political 
parties, halting any effort at their consolidation. More important, the potential 
destabilizing forces that this new phase of communal politics may unleash, to 
certain extent, restore a semblance of legitimacy to the restrictive state legal 
powers, the legitimate existence of which has been increasingly put to serious 
question since the 1998 Reformasi. 
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Chapter VIII 
Condusion: The Limits of Political Change 
As individuals tend to uphold their sense of ends and purposes together with 
others sharing a common social identity, their vision of group interests in a 
communally-divided society is often determined by their association with their 
own communal group. In Malaysia, competing communal interests - based on 
ethnic and religious identity - formed the basis of a "communal compact" 
between communal leaders prior to independence in 1957. The nature of the 
state-individual relationship understood in the context of communally-based 
constitutional-contract politics mainly revolved around the debate on the special 
privileges of indigenous Malays and the legitimate interests of other ethnic 
communities. It is therefore quite distinct from that envisaged by liberal social 
contract theory. In independent Malaya/Malaysia the balance has been tilted 
toward prioritizing state power over individual liberties due to a deep concern 
that in a communally-divided society racial tensions can flare up and turn into 
violence at any time. Priority has been given to enhancing the state's capacity to 
maintain order. 
The prioritization of state power originated in the process of constitution-
making itself, which involved hard bargaining between communal groups 
seeking to maximize communal interests. Faced with potentially explosive 
communal politics, as well as a communist threat, the Constitution was finely 
crafted not only to serve competing communal interests, but also to ensure that 
the state was equipped with sufficient powers to keep destabilizing forces in 
check. The Malaysian head of state was given the power to proclaim a state of 
emergency and suspend parliamentary democracy in times of troubles. As 
communal groups continued to promote communal interests beyond the 
constitution-making stage, partly as a result of the constitutional compromise 
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itself which tended to aggravate rather than resolve communal tensions, state 
power was expanded rather than limited over time. During the first two decades 
of independence, various amendments were made to the Constitution and laws 
adopted that enhanced the state's capacity to activate emergency and anti-
subversion powers as a means of political control. These laws, which were 
supposed to be used only at exceptionally troubled moments, became 
normalized as part of the established structure of the state. 
The courts too, recognizing state-defined policy objectives in the 
politically highly sensitive areas of ethnic relations, national security and 
economic development, promoted illiberal statist legal meanings in these areas, 
which in turn legitimated the exercise of state power over individual freedom. 
Toward the end of the 1980s, the judiciary, as a result of continued measures 
adopted by the legislature and the executive to limit the court's interpretive 
scope as well as the packing of the bench with friendly judges, became more 
inclined to be supportive of executive actions. The 1988 judiciary crisis which 
culminated in the sacking of the then Lord President Tun Salleh Abbas and two 
other Supreme Court judges marked the beginning of the more compliant role of 
the judiciary. To a certain extent, the courts too had become one-sided political 
arenas in which the state punished political opponents and delegitimated 
oppositional political activities. 
By the 1990s that government's continual harping on the potential threat 
of communal conflict as a reason for the maintenance of repressive laws was 
becoming more difficult to justify. For a long time no major racial conflict had 
broken out and the communist threat had ended when the Communist Party of 
Malaya surrendered in 1989. During the 1990s, resort to security laws such as the 
Internal Security Act (ISA) had declined. vVhen used, it was primarily against 
"normal criminals" rather than racial extremists or communists. Facing increased 
questioning from opposition politicians and other critics of the use of the security 
laws during "normal times", the government turned to the courts for legitimacy. 
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Instead of detention under the ISA, political dissidents now found themselves 
hauled to the courtroom to face criminal charges or civil suits, ranging from 
sedition to libel. Political trials had been a means by which the government 
portrayed its opponents as acting illegally, while reinforcing the notion that the 
government actually acted 'l'.>ithin the confines of the law. 
But excessive use of courts as one-sided political arenas to disgrace 
political opponents, a5 the Anwar trials demonstrated, had deadened the 
legitimacy that the government sought to pursue. In the wake of the Anwar 
trials, civil society organizations, opposition political parties and concerned 
individuals who formed the backbone of the Reformasi movement launched 
subsequent to Anwar' s sacking from the government and UMNO in September 
1998, condemned the conduct of such trials and questioned the integrity and 
independence of the judiciary. Anwar himself turned the courts into contested 
political arenas by "revealing" the inner political machinations of senior 
ministers, the judiciary, the police and the Attorney-General's office, whom he 
alleged were involved in a high-level conspiracy to end his political career. 
While the government accused Anwar of moral impropriety for his alleged 
sexual misconduct and corrupt practice, Anwar portrayed himself to the masses 
as a victim punished because he was opposed to corruption and abuse of powers 
in the government. The courts had become arenas where politicians could wash 
their dirty linen in public. 
No less important, the 1998 Reforrnasi movement saw the emergence of 
overlapping multiracial and cross-sectional coalitions involving opposition 
political parties, human rights NGOs, mainstream Islamic movements, women's 
groups and concerned individuals pushing for polltical reform in a democratic 
and non-communal direction. In the realm of formal politics, the Barisan 
Alternatif (BA) drew together major opposition political parties, including the 
conununally and ideologically incompatible Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) and 
Democratic Action Party (DAP), in one electoral coalition to challenge Barisan 
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Nasional. In the 1999 general election, this coalition presented a blueprint for a 
more democratic and non-communal Malaysia as an alternative to BN's semi-
democratic and race-based politics. Although the BA failed in its bid to deny the 
BN its two-thirds majority in the Parliament, it made significant inroads in the 
Malay-majority constituencies in the election, thus striking at the heart of the 
BN's political anchorage, the UMNO constituency. In the realm of non-formal 
politics, overlapping multi-communal coalitions of human rights NGOs, 
professional organizations, trade unions and Islamic groups focused on such 
issues as repressive laws, media freedom, judicial independence, transparency, 
good governance and police accountability. In the area of law and human rights, 
liberal legal meanings based on the liberal notion of rule of law contested illiberal 
statist legal meanings based on the illiberal notion of rule by law. This was 
accompanied by a sense of euphoria that not only Malaysia's communally-
divisive politics had reached its limits, but its semi-democratic politics had also 
exhausted its utility. 
This euphoria, however, was soon confronted by old political realities. 
Not long after Reformasi, the BA had to face the brunt of communal politics when 
the DAP in 2001 pulled out from the coalition after disagreement with PAS over 
the Islamic State issue. Dissension also arose within the realm of non-formal 
politics, especially between the secular human rights NGOs and Islamic groups. 
The proliferation of liberal legal meanings and the organization of social 
movements for political and legal reform during the Reformasi had given an 
ideological boost as well as organizational platform for greater promotion of 
liberal legal meanings in the area of religion and politics, the movement for 
which had previously been mainly confined to a small group of NGOs. There 
had been overlapping coalitions for religious freedom that consisted mainly of 
secular-liberal human rights NGOs, non-Muslim religious groups, human rights 
lawyers, non-Muslim-based political parties and some "liberal" Muslims. They 
formed overlapping coalitions for religious freedom and campaigned for reform 
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of the country's dual legal system - civil and syariah- which was seen by non-
Muslims who were concerned about discrimination as discriminatory against 
them, especially at the intersection between civil and Islamic law. 
The Muslim groups reacted by forming coalitions to protect the" sanctity" 
of the Islamic faith from the liberal" onslaught" and the constitutional position of 
Islam in Malaysia. They argued that Islam, together with Malay privileges, had 
been part of the constitutional contract agreed in 1957, and therefore should be 
respected by all. The more liberal group on the other hand stressed the secular 
nature of the Malaysian state based on pronouncements of communal leaders 
before and after independence, as well as several court decisions, and hence 
interpreted freedom of religion under the constitution in more secular terms. The 
politics of the constitutional contract - this time round revolving around the 
contest between "Islamicity" and "secularity" that had not been adequately 
resolved by the 1957 communal compact - reinforced communalism as a focus of 
interest articulation and political mobilization. The Muslim groups, which 
wanted to defend the special constitutional position of Islam, mobilized the 
Islamic mainstream in support of their position, while the secular human rights 
and non-l'v1uslim groups, which felt that their rights to religious freedom has 
been curtailed, mobilized non-Muslims, as well as some liberal Muslims, against 
it. 
Although the contest between the two groups did not lead to physical 
violence, it caused considerable tension within the society, prompting the 
government to turn again to laws that limited freedom of speech and assembly. 
Voices within the Islamic mainstream called for the retention of key features of 
the security laws, like detention without trial, in order to maintain peace and 
order in a communally-divided society. Even without these voices, the 
government found justification in maintaining the laws in view of the potential 
destabilizing forces that a renewed communal contest would unleash. Despite 
demands by human rights groups that the government repeal laws that curtailed 
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individual freedoms such as the Internal Security Act, the Sedition Act, the Police 
Act, the Printing Presses and Publications Act, no significant progress was made 
toward that end. Democratic space, especially when it borders on the politically 
highly sensitive areas of ethnic relations, continued to be circumscribed. 
Fifty years after independence, communally-based constitutional-contract 
politics remains significant in Malaysia. It has been made justification by the 
government of its measures to limit democratic space and halt political change in 
a more liberal direction. While the democratic forces had pushed hard for 
political and legal reform along more liberal lines, the underlying forces are still 
largely communal. ¥\'hat is more, the proliferation of liberal legal meanings, 
especially in religion and politics, reinforced rather than weakened 
communalism. In the 2000s, the contestation of legal meanings - along ethnic and 
religious lines - had a contradictory effect on political change. While it helped 
galvanize societal forces in support of liberalizing political and legal change, it 
also generated an illiberal reaction. The ensuing threat of destabilization in the 
multi-communal society provided justification for the maintenance of an illiberal 
political and legal system. It seems that, for some time to come, efforts at political 
change will still have to deal with the perennial issue of race, religion and 
repression. 
The study of constitutional-contract politics thus offers a fresh look at the 
intersection between communalism, law and state power in explaining the 
nature of authoritarian politics and the limits, as well as possibilities, of political 
change in Malaysia. While existing literatures on Malaysian politics mainly look 
at, among others, the nature of elite relations and the ability of state functionaries 
to dispense patronage in explaining regime continuity or change, this thesis 
views the articulation of non-communal ideas to challenge the notion of 
communally-based constitutional-contract politics as central to the discussion 
about political change or continuity in Malaysia. As this thesis demonstrates, the 
intensity of communal politics to a large extent provides justification for the 
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government to use state power to fend off any possible threats to racial harmony, 
which in turn prevents the political system from moving in a more democratic 
direction. Having said this, one could argue that the possibility of political 
change in Malaysia depends very much on the ability of its political actors to 
successfully challenge the hegemony of communally-based constitutional-
contract politics. Understanding this salient relationship between communalism, 
law and state power is thus a key to understanding the dynamics of political 
change or continuity in Malaysia. 
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